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This study investigates the landslide legislative changes affecting lesbians and 
gay men between 1986 and 2005. It offers six fully-contextualised Critical 
Discourse Analyses of key Westminster parliamentary debates on attempted and 
actual changes in the law in two periods: 1986-1996 and 2001-2004. In addition, 
it offers a corpus analysis of all key debates in each period. This enables 
comparisons of the language used and arguments deployed by speakers who 
supported lesbians and gay men and those who did not, as well as a comparison 
of the two periods. On the basis that Members of Parliament, particularly in the 
House of Commons, draw on the beliefs and values of the sections of society they 
represent and indirectly address via the media, the overall interest of the study is 
in the nature and extent of social change this legislative landslide suggests. The 
study’s particular focus is on shifts and continuities in the cluster of 
institutionalised beliefs that constitute homophobia and the institutional 
arrangements that support them. The content and contexts of these beliefs are 
initially traced via past laws pertaining to same-sex sexual acts, in most cases sex 
between men. This shows firstly, how each law was enacted to serve different 
socio-political purposes in different historical periods and secondly, how their 
intermittent periods of enforcement coincided with the needs of prevailing rulers to 
maintain power and social control. Thus homophobic beliefs ebbed and flowed 
according to the needs of ruling powers. This phenomenon applies past and 
present and constitutes the ethos of the study. It demonstrates both the residual 
nature of a prejudice with a very long history and the salient beliefs and values 
behind arguments used for and against it in contemporary contexts. 
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Preface
[U]rban subcultures were part of a process of self-definition. 
Lesbians and gay men created communities or ‘ghettos’ both for safety
 and for a sense of identity. Urban life provided the space in which
 subcultures could flourish and create their own identities, yet the more
 visible and confident they became, the more vulnerable that made
 them to surveillance and containment. Ghettos have usually felt
 comparatively safe within, yet have been easy to attack from without.
Elizabeth Wilson (1991) ‘The Sphinx in the City’, London: Virago:120
Today, after a generation of scholarship and dramatic social change 
we can go much further in grasping that we make our own sexual 
histories, even if not always in circumstances of our own choosing. 
No one can say with any confidence what the legacy of this fundamental 
change in the theory and practice of sexuality will be. But we can be 
pretty certain that once the spirit of democratization is let loose from the 
bottle, it will be almost impossible to lock it in again. And that, more 
than anything else, is likely to determine the future of sexuality.
Jeffrey Weeks (2008) ‘Traps We Set Ourselves’, Sexualities, 11 (1/2): 32-3

Introduction
 This study explores manifestations of a cluster of institutionalised beliefs 
now widely termed homophobia. It analyses the language and arguments used in 
UK parliamentary debates on legislative proposals affecting lesbians and gay 
men. The years 1986-2010 saw no fewer than 23 actual legal changes and 27 
attempted changes, some of which became law at the second or third attempt. In 
1986 the first amendments to decriminalise lesbians and gay men in the armed 
forces were defeated in the Armed Forces Bill. In 1988 Clause 28, which sought 
to prohibit the claimed ‘promotion of homosexuality’ by local councils, became 
Section 28 of the Local Government Act. Yet in 2004 the Civil Partnership Act 
recognised lesbian and gay partnerships. In 2008 the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act recognised lesbian and gay parents on a child’s birth certificate 
where the child of two women was conceived by insemination or the child of two 
men by a surrogacy arrangement. In 2010 the Equality Act 2006 was revised and 
anti-discrimination law harmonised. In terms of legislation at least this marks 
significant social change. It is the nature and extent of this change in terms of 
homophobic beliefs and their institutional props that is the concern of this 
study, considering that “laws or institutional arrangements which are formally 
‘equal’ in their application to different groups may conceal persistent social 
inequalities.” (Waites 2005a:168)
 What is now known as homophobia has a very long history, most harshly 
documented in edicts, canons and statutes scattered across 1700 years. In most 
cases it was sex between men that was outlawed, often with severe punishments. 
The making of these laws, plus their intermittent periods of enforcement, arose 
when prevailing rulers felt insecure or threatened, or sought to consolidate their 
power. Thus the political context of the law-making is an essential consideration. 
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Historically, enactment of the laws and their periods of enforcement can be seen 
as examples of political scapegoating that bolstered the socio-political control of 
ruling powers. Accordingly, each episode revitalised and perpetuated the cluster 
of beliefs that constitute homophobia. 
 The term homophobia was coined by a clinical psychologist, George 
Weinberg, in the late 1960s and popularised through his 1972 book. He observed 
that some people had a “deep emotional misgiving” about homosexuals which 
seemed to him to be their problem, “not the homosexual’s” (Weinberg 3.2.1997). 
The term neatly depathologised ‘the homosexual’ while questioning the mental 
health of homophobic people by reference to motives and fears located in the 
person. It thus individualised the problem and obscured the history of its socio-
political roots (Adam 1998: 338; Herek 2004: 6-13; Weeks 2011: 82-3). A more 
socially orientated term, heterosexism, was adopted in the 1980s by lesbian 
feminists in reference to institutionalised prejudice and discrimination and was 
positioned alongside sexism and racism (GLC 1986: 5-7; Kitzinger 1987a). It was 
intended as a political concept, but is now little used. It is still referred to in 
LGBT social science, especially in discursive psychology (for example Kitzinger 
1996: 8-12; Peel 2001; 2004), but its dwindling familiarity has led to it being 
understood in contrary ways (Rothblum & Bond 1996: ix). Then in the early 
1990s, the derogatory term ‘queer’ was reclaimed in a flurry of confrontational 
activism (Sinfield 1998: 8-15). ‘Heteronormivity’ was coined in queer commentary 
in reference to the coercive normality of heterosexual privilege (Warner 1993: xxi-
xxv; Berlant & Warner 1998: 548) and has since been negatively applied to ‘gay 
assimilation’, notably in relation to marriage and military service (Warner 1999). 
Criticisms of the perspectives generally termed ‘queer theory’ focus on its basis  
in theories removed from actual socio-political conditions (Adam 1998: 394-5; 
Weeks 2011: 145-6). Criticisms of queer politics focus on its idealisation of 
‘transgression’ with no clear agenda for social change and the artificiality of its 
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adopted polarisation to identity-based rights claims (Seidman 1997: 130-6; Bell 
& Binnie 2000: 141-6). While prejudice and discrimination are not simply a 
question of norms, to the extent that heteronormivity points critical attention 
towards the social impositions of heterosexuality, it is a useful term. However, 
discussions of the reference and/or appropriacy of homophobia, heterosexism 
and/or heteronormivity (and related terms), are based on theorised or asserted 
definitions rather than empirical examinations of how the terms have been used 
and understood by different groups in real-life contexts. The same can be said for 
‘queer’, and in fact all categorising terms.
 Today, ‘homophobia’ has come into general usage (Hodges 2004: 80) and a 
more “catch-all idea” of its reference characterises its use (Weeks 2011: 83). It is 
the most widely used term for social and legal inequalities, oppressive conditions 
and/or negative behaviours in contemporary life. While a view of homophobia as 
personalised misgiving is supported by this study, an asocial, apolitical and 
ahistorical account of it is not. In this study, homophobia is viewed as a socially 
pervasive and potentially shifting cluster of institutionalised beliefs fomenting 
misgivings about and hostility towards same-sex sexual relationships and the 
people who have, or are perceived to have them. Over time, such beliefs have 
generated enduring taboos, intractable prejudices and oppressive practices, of 
which persecutory laws are an officially documented form. That these beliefs and 
the laws pertaining to them were constructed in and have been reproduced via 
language use, makes language analysis an appropriate means to investigate their 
more recent manifestations and existing institutional props. 
 The study is designed to compare the arguments and language used by 
opposing sides of key debates during two distinct periods (1986-1996 and 2001-
2005). Period one includes the third term of the Thatcher Government and the 
Major Government. The legislative proposals examined in this period are: Clause 
28 of the Local Government Bill 1987-8, the first attempt to equalise the age of 
3
consent for gay men in the Criminal Justice and Public Order Bill 1994, and an 
attempt to repeal the ban on lesbians and gay men in the military in the Armed 
Forces Bill 1995-6. Period two falls in the second term of the Blair Government. 
The proposals examined in this period are: an amendment to allow unmarried 
couples to apply jointly to adopt in the Adoption and Children Bill 2001-2, the 
Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2003 which sought to 
outlaw workplace discrimination, and the Civil Partnership Bill 2004 which 
proposed legal recognition of lesbian and gay partnerships. 
 These six legislative episodes are the basis of Chapters 5-10, each of 
which includes the qualitative analysis of a key debate. Political context is key to 
the legislative proposals examined in these six chapters. Each was situated at a 
particular juncture of circumstances and viewpoints which served to constrain or 
support it and influenced whether or not it became law. The oppositional nature 
of parliamentary debates, plus politician’s attentiveness to media, constituency 
and public opinion, means they deploy the arguments and terminology deemed 
most likely to gain support for their cause. However, while they draw on existing 
public beliefs and values in the sections of society they represent and indirectly 
address, they also reconstruct and reinforce those same beliefs and values. In 
offering six fully-contextualised analyses of key debates, the detailed language 
analyses do not lose sight of the conditions that compelled the proposals or the 
origins of resistance to them. Importantly, the proposals were rarely a matter of 
Government initiative; each was prompted by socio-political pressures operative 
at the time they were made.
 The progression of these six chapters shows how lesbian and gay struggles 
against institutionalised homophobia were at first resisted then incrementally 
adopted by the state. Through identifying the factors compelling each legislative 
proposal, plus dominant arguments and language items in each selected debate, 
the chapters cover the gradual institutional take-up of grass-roots resistance as 
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well as the factors that facilitated it. Although there is no necessary connection 
between sexual identity and sexual practice (Weeks 1987: 43), this study views 
the claiming of positive lesbian and gay identities through the 1970s (Weeks 
1995: 98-101) and of minority-group status through the 1980s (Weeks 1995: 
110-111) as essential for resisting oppression. This is not to suggest that these 
umbrella identities were, or are, uniform, fixed, or inclusive, rather that a stable 
group identity was needed for engagement in political struggle (Vance 1989: 27-
8). Predictably, awareness of sexual diversity is virtually absent from the debates.
 The final analysis in Chapter 11 is more quantitative and is based on a 
corpus analysis of all key debates in each period. The purpose of this is to gain 
an overview of collective similarities and differences: first, between speakers who 
supported lesbians and gay men and those who did not; second, between each 
legislative period. Differences emerging from opposing sides of the debates, and 
between each period, thus enable conclusions to be drawn about the nature and 
extent of shifts and continuities in homophobic beliefs and their institutional 
props. These are then related to their respective historical contexts and to other 
sexuality research findings. Ultimately, the study is concerned with the residual 
nature of a prejudice with a very long history and how, once embedded in the 
social consciousness, it can be fought for or against, lie dormant or be revived, or 
mutate in multiple directions according to socio-political forces in play at a given 
time. As a fully contextualised study of language used and arguments deployed 
for and against discrimination in law on the basis of sexuality, it exemplifies the 
socio-political nature of such ebbs and flows.
 The study’s approach to language is based on the social constructionist 
ideas of Valentin Voloshinov (2012 [1926]; 2012 [1927]; 1986 [1929]), refined by 
Mikhail Bakhtin (1981 [1935]; 1986 [1952-3]), in which language appropriation 
and use is seen as inherently ideological in that it necessarily involves views and 
values constructed by participants in situated social contexts. Their ideas are 
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put on a more empirical footing by reference to Michael Hoey’s (2005) concept of 
lexical priming, and are linked to techniques in Corpus Linguistics and analytical 
categories in Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). The debates are analysed using a 
mix of corpus techniques suggested by Paul Baker (2004a, 2004b; 2005; 2006; 
2008; 2012), plus CDA categories selected from the socio-cognitive approach of 
Teun van Dijk (2001; 2003; 2004; 2006a; 2006b; 2006c; 2008) and the discourse 
historical approach of Ruth Wodak (1999; 2003; 2006a; 2006b; 2007; 2008a; 
2008b). All supporting data are supplied on the appendices CD.
 ‘Discourse’ has a wide range of uses in a wide range of disciplines 
(Cameron 2001: 7-17; Wetherell, Taylor & Yates 2001a: 1-7; Fairclough 2003: 
1-4; Jaworski & Coupland 2006: 1-11). Thus discourse analysis can take many 
forms. In this study, discourse applies to situated examples of language used in 
real-life contexts. It does not extend to definitions found in theoretical disciplines 
which include other social practices, rules and regulations, or institutional forms 
(such as in Foucault 1972: 47-9 or Laclau & Mouffe 2001: 105-7) and where 
analysis is not focused on the features and associations of language in situated 
examples of its use. This case study of the legislative changes is a piece of 
empirical social research using language-based social theories and methods in 
which the relevant parliamentary debates provide the data for a CDA analysis of 
the language used. Inevitably, the social, political and historical contexts of the 
data, as well as issues emerging from the analyses, link to work in other socially 
orientated disciplines, but the analyses are data led.
 Chapter 1 reviews laws relating to same-sex sex in terms of struggles for 
political control and social change. It approaches the laws as discrete within 
their contexts of enactment, while acknowledging that aspects of their rationale 
recurred within the shifts of socio-political forces across centuries. The sporadic 
peaks of their enforcement, constitute snapshots of belief and political unrest at 
disparate points in time. 
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 Chapter 2 outlines the contemporary legislative process and the range of 
influences on MPs and Lords, especially that of the press. A review of protocols 
applying to parliamentary debates illustrates their ritualised nature and how the 
rules are subverted to score points, while consideration of Hansard conventions 
evaluates its appropriacy as a data source. The final section explains how the 
study’s data was selected. 
 Chapter 3 outlines three key aspects of Voloshinov’s and Bakhtin’s ideas 
illustrated by contemporary examples related to the study’s concerns. The first 
relates the evaluative aspects of language use to struggle between groups in 
society and social change. The second links people’s appropriation (and non-
appropriation) of language items to the values they are perceived to carry. The 
third situates the construction of meaning within interactive language use. 
 Chapter 4 outlines the analytical tools selected from Baker, van Dijk and 
Wodak with links to the ideas of Voloshinov and Bakhtin and examples related to 
the study’s concerns. The tools enable identification of the lexical items typically 
used by each side of a debate along with their associations, plus strategies to 
unravel ideological stances, presupposed knowledge and historical links. The 
final section sets out the study’s analytical procedures. 
 Chapter 5 investigates the context of Clause 28 and how homophobia was 
mobilised to serve other political agendas in the Local Government Bill 1987-8. It 
shows that where a residual prejudice exists in the consciousness of a society it 
can be deployed, in this case by sections of the press and some politicians, to 
weaken political opposition. The selected debate thus highlights the aspects of 
homophobic belief that were most productive in achieving these ends.
 Chapter 6 shows how the first attempt to equalise the age of consent for 
gay men in the Criminal Justice and Public Order Bill 1994 was prompted by the 
prospect of a case being referred to the European Court of Human Rights. The 
selected debate recounts the emergence of arguments deemed persuasive for 
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supporting equalisation against speakers who maintained that heterosexuality 
and homosexuality were not and could not be equal in law or life.
 Chapter 7 illustrates some complex motivations behind MPs positions on a 
proposal to repeal the ban on lesbians and gay men in the military in the Armed 
Forces Bill 1995-6. It exposes distinctions between personal principles and party 
policy among Conservative MPs and between pragmatic considerations and party 
policy among Labour MPs. The selected debate shows how various speakers 
signalled personal disagreement with their adopted position.
 Chapter 8 documents the carefully negotiated passage of the Adoption and 
Children Bill 2001-2 amid the requirements of the Human Rights Act and fierce 
Conservative resistance in the Lords to joint adoption by unmarried couples. The 
selected debate reveals serial concessions to heterosexual parenting and emotive 
arguments on children’s needs in order to pre-empt the underlying opposition to 
adoption by lesbian and gay couples. 
 Chapter 9 illustrates an unusual three-way division of argument. The 
Government’s concessions to organised religion in the Employment Equality 
(Sexual Orientation) Regulations were challenged in the Lords as discriminatory. 
The ensuing debate pitched cross-party peers, who wanted the Regulations 
withdrawn and amended, against Labour Ministers and Conservative Christians 
who wanted the Regulations approved, but for completely different reasons.
 Chapter 10 documents the stormy passage of the Civil Partnership Bill. It 
was started on the Government’s behalf in the Lords, where it became subject to 
a succession of wrecking amendments. It was also contested in the Commons 
but, because of the Conservatives’ free vote, by a minority of MPs. The selected 
debate highlights the way marriage became a metaphor for the protection of 
heterosexuality and a euphemistic front for homophobic belief. 
 Chapter 11 analyses four basic corpora built from all key debates in each 
period (PLG1, ALG1, PLG2, ALG2). This enables four dimensions of comparison 
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(between PLG1 and ALG1; PLG2 and ALG2; PLG1+2 and ALG1+2; LG1 and LG2) 
which offer an overview of each legislative period and of speakers who were or 
were not supportive of lesbians and gay men. The analyses find clear divisions 
between each side and each period as well as features that remained completely 
taken for granted by both sides in both periods. 
 The final Conclusion contemplates more widely the ebbs and flows of 
homophobic beliefs in relation to legislative change. While historically (and more 
recently in nine countries) homophobic beliefs have been enacted in laws by 
ruling powers when politically expedient, this study shows that such beliefs can 
also become a liability for governments where resistance is strong and socio-
political contexts compelling. This does not mean homophobic beliefs disappear, 
only that they become minoritised or dormant. They can be revived at such times 
they are perceived to be useful and resistance weak. As Angela Eagle MP said of 




 In his wide-ranging study of the nature of prejudice, Allport (1979) [1954] 
lists forms of officially practised discrimination according to the United Nations. 
At the top is “unequal recognition before the law” (ibid: 52). He argues prejudice 
is increased by discriminatory laws and decreased by equal-status laws. Thus 
the repeal of discriminatory laws is seen as a starting point, rather than a result, 
of social change (ibid: 469-73). Yet, such repeals depend not only on equal status 
being upheld as a social value, but also its application to the people affected by 
the laws in question. Arguments for equality before the law acquired increasing 
importance in the debates examined in this study, but they are a very recent 
phenomenon in this legislative history. Laws may be enacted and repealed for 
many reasons, depending on the lawmakers’ objectives and what they believe to 
be true. In the case of laws against same-sex sex, mostly against sex between 
men, the socio-political objectives behind their enactment and intermittent 
periods of enforcement vary considerably. The key question is why it was deemed 
necessary to outlaw consensual sexual activities at all. Different historical 
contexts offer different answers. What they have in common is a backdrop of 
struggles for political control. 
 This chapter reviews the rationale of laws against same-sex sex pertaining 
to what is now the UK. It approaches the laws as discrete within their contexts of 
enactment and use while acknowledging that aspects of their rationale reoccur 
within the shifts of socio-political forces across the centuries. The sporadic peaks 
of their enforcement constitute snapshots of belief amidst political unrest at 
disparate points in time. This is followed by an outline of the nineteenth century 
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patholgisation of same-sex sexual attraction and the struggles for social control 
and legal reform prior to the period of this study. As Weeks observes (1989b: 
203-4) “this historical present is the product of many histories, some of which 
are very ancient, some very recent”. 
 Early Laws
 Laws that clearly refer to sex between men first occur in the fourth 
century under the Christianised Roman Empire. They are relevant because 
Roman Law was a major influence on “western European systems of civil and 
criminal jurisprudence [as well as] canon law” (Bailey 1955: 64). The first edict 
was decreed in 342 by co-Emperors Constantius II and Constans:
When a man ‘marries’ in the manner of a ‘woman’ [...] what does he wish, when sex has 
lost its significance; when the crime is one which it is not profitable to know; when Venus 
is changed into another form; when love is sought and not found? We order the statutes to 
arise, the laws to be armed with an avenging sword, that those infamous persons who are 
now, or who hereafter may be, guilty may be subjected to exquisite punishment. 
(Constantius II and Constans 16 December 342, translation Pharr 1952: 231-2, quoted 
more fully in Bailey 1955: 70)
Then in 390 the co-Emperors Valentinian II, Theodosius I and Arcadius decreed: 
All persons who have the shameful custom of condemning a man’s body, acting the part of 
a woman’s to the sufferance of an alien sex (for they appear not to be different from 
women), shall expiate a crime of this kind in avenging flames in the sight of the people.
(Valentinian II, Theodosias I and Arcadius 6 August 390, translation Pharr 1952: 232, 
quoted in Bailey 1955: 71-2)
Both edicts concern male-gender boundaries. The former was decreed after a 
power struggle between Constantius II and Constans; the latter after an uprising 
in Thessalonica (Fone 2000: 112-3). While the former threatens “exquisite 
punishment”, the latter threatens “avenging flames in the sight of the people” as 
in the story of Sodom. According to Bailey (ibid: 73), there is no evidence that 
either edict was “rigidly enforced”. 
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 The story of Sodom is also invoked in two Novellae decreed by the 
Emperor Justinian. Novella 77 in 538 again applies to men: 
... since certain men, seized by diabolical incitement, practise among themselves the most 
disgraceful lusts, and act contrary to nature: we enjoin them to take to heart the fear of 
God and the judgement to come, and to abstain from suchlike diabolical and unlawful 
lusts, so that they may not be visited by the just wrath of God on account of these impious 
acts, with the results that cities perish with all their inhabitants. For we are taught by the 
Holy Scriptures that because of like impious conduct cities have indeed perished, together 
with the men in them. [...]
For because of such crimes there are famines, earthquakes, and pestilences; wherefore we 
admonish men to abstain from the aforesaid unlawful acts, that they may not lose their 
souls. But if, after this our admonition, any are found persisting in such offences, first, 
they render themselves unworthy of the mercy of God, and then they are subjected to the 
punishment enjoined by the law. [...]
(Justinian, extract from Novella 77 (538), quoted more fully in Bailey 1955: 73-4, author’s 
translation)
It goes on to warn of “extreme punishments, so that city and state may not come 
to harm by reason of such wicked deeds”. Harm did follow: the Eastern Empire 
was invaded by Persia in 540, an epidemic of Bubonic plague began in 541, and 
major cities were destroyed by earthquakes in 543 (Fone 2000: 116). Novella 141 
in 544 takes a conciliatory tone towards what was believed to be God’s anger:
Though we stand always in need of the kindness and goodness of God, yet is this specially 
the case at this time, when in various ways we have provoked him to anger on account of 
the multitude of our sins. [...] We speak of the defilement of males which some men 
sacrilegiously and impiously dare to attempt, perpetrating vile acts with other men.
For, instructed by the Holy Scriptures we know that God brought a just judgement upon 
those who lived in Sodom, on account of this very madness of intercourse, so that to this 
very day that land burns with inextinguishable fire. By this God teaches us, in order that 
by means of legislation we may avert such an untoward fate. [...] Wherefore it behoves all 
who desire to fear God to abstain from conduct so base and criminal that we do not find it 
committed even by brute beasts. Let those who have not taken part in such doings 
continue to refrain in the future. But as for those who have been consumed by this kind of 
disease, let them not only cease to sin in the future, but let them also duly do penance, 
and fall down before God and renounce their plague [in confession] to the blessed Patriarch 
[...] So may God the merciful, in the abundance of his pity, deem us worthy of his blessing,  
that we may all give thanks to him for the salvation of the penitents, whom we have now 
bidden [...] to [reconcile] themselves [with] God who is justly angry with us. [...] 
(Justinian, extract from Novella 141, issued during lent 544, quoted more fully in Bailey 
1955: 74-5, author’s translation)
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As with the earlier edicts, there is no reliable evidence of the extent to which the 
Novellae were enforced (Bailey ibid: 78). The concern with protecting the Empire 
from ruin is framed by the Sodom story as then understood. However, Bailey 
argues (ibid: 9-38), that this understanding rests on Greek, Latin and English 
translations of the Hebrew verb ‘to know’, ‘yadha’, which does not support an 
interpretation of what became known as sodomy. Nevertheless, the edicts’ 
themes (male gender boundaries, the story of Sodom, acting against nature, the 
punishment of burning, fear of God’s wrath, destructive forces, madness, brute 
beasts, disease and plague) all reoccur at later points in time. 
 Between the seventh and eleventh centuries, laws were established locally 
by habit and custom in countries where the Roman Church held sway. A range 
of proscribed sexual acts were listed in penitentials. These handbooks of sins 
and recommended penances were compiled mostly by bishops for priests hearing 
confession. Surviving penitentials vary in both the sins and penances listed 
(Bailey ibid: 100). Penances involved fasting, prayer, abstinence, or exclusion 
from the rites of the Church for a given number of years; they varied according to 
sexual act, age, rank, culpability, and whether the individual was lay or clergy 
(Fone 2000: 125). Some penitentials were explicit and listed specific sexual acts. 
According to Bailey (ibid: 154), they display an awareness of “the complexity of 
sexual behaviour” which was absent from later civil laws. This may be so, but 
controlling sexual behaviour was rarely the political purpose behind later canon 
or civil laws as this chapter will show.
 Around the turn of the first millennium, the Roman Church began to 
consolidate its power by collating centuries of doctrine which became the basis of 
stricter canon laws. Power rivalries ensued. Kings claimed the right to appoint 
clergy; the Church sought to control monarchs by increasing its moral authority 
(Fone ibid: 132-4). In the 12th and 13th centuries, various Church Councils 
ruled on sodomy. In 1102, the Church Council of London decreed:
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In this council, those who commit the shameful sin of sodomy, and especially those who of 
their own free will take pleasure in doing so, were condemned by a weighty anathema, 
until by penitence and confession they should show themselves worthy of absolution. As 
for anyone who is found guilty of this crime, it was resolved that if he were an ecclesiastic 
he should not be promoted to any higher rank, and should be deposed from his present 
order; while if he were a layman he should be deprived of his legal status and dignity in the 
whole realm of England. And let none but the bishop presume to give absolution for this 
offence, save in the case of those who are members of the regular clergy. 
(Concil Londin 28, quoted in Bailey 1955:124, author’s translation, latin text from Mansi 
1901 [1760s]: vol.20, col.1152) 
In penetentials, definitions of sodomy generally included all forms of adulterous 
and non-procreative sex between men and/or women, but this edict applies to 
men and included the clergy. Its claim to moral authority also indirectly extended 
to the Royal Court. Decreed early in the reign of Henry I (1100-1135) it was an 
attempt to discredit his predecessor, William (Rufus) II, whose preference for sex 
with men was well known (Bailey ibid: 123-4). A second edict ordered the weekly 
publication of excommunications for sodomy in every church in the land, but 
this was modified by the Archbishop of Canterbury who advised his archdeacon:
It must be remembered that this sin has been publicly committed to such an extent that it 
scarcely makes anyone blush, and that many have fallen into it in ignorance of its gravity. 
As for those who defile themselves with this sin after learning of the excommunication, 
they ought to be dealt with more severely by way of penance. 
(Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury 1093-1109, Epistle iii 62, quoted more fully in Bailey 
1955: 125, author’s translation, latin text from Migne 1850s: vol.159, col.95-6)
In the later 1100s and early 1200s, the Lateran Councils formalised canon law 
across the whole Roman Church. A purge of heretics followed for which the 
punishment of burning was revived but, as execution was the province of civil 
rulers, it was subject to political will and expedience. Charges of heresy and 
sodomy began to be used in tandem (Bullough 1974: 190). Sodomy became a 
catch-all category linked not only to non-procreative sex, but also to heresy, 
disease, contagion, foreigners and Jews. A treatise on English common law 
published at the court of Edward I in 1290 states: 
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Those who have dealings with Jews or Jewesses, those who commit bestiality, and 
sodomists, are to be buried alive after legal proof that they were taken in the act, and 
public conviction. 
(Fleta 1290 xxxviii.3, quoted in Bailey 1955: 145, author’s translation)
Edward I expelled Jews from England the same year, having made usury illegal 
in 1275 under pressure from the Church. They were allowed to take only what 
they could carry, the rest was confiscated by the Crown. The expulsion enabled 
the Crown to avoid paying its debts (Beller 2007: 14) and was made possible by 
the arrival of Italian and French financiers (Ackroyd 2000: 706). According to 
Bailey (ibid: 95), the reference to bestiality is traceable to a canon passed by the 
third Lateran Council (1179) which was misread for 400 years. By the time it was 
agreed that the canon referred to sodomy, the association was well established. 
Another legal treatise published in 1300 associates sodomy with sorcery:
Let enquiry also be made of those who feloniously in time of peace have burnt other’s corn 
or houses, and those who are attained thereof shall be burnt, so that they might be 
punished in like manner as they have offended. The same sentence shall be passed upon 
sorcerers, sorceresses, renegades, sodomists, and heretics publicly convicted. 
(Britton i.10, 1300, quoted in Bailey 1955: 146, translation Nichols 1865: 41-2)
Bailey (ibid:147) argues that the treatises represented the official view, but were 
not acted on. However, the associations persisted. In 1376 the Good Parliament 
petitioned Edward III to banish foreign artisans and traders, particularly Jews, 
Saracens and Lombard brokers because they were usurers and had introduced 
“the too horrible vice which is not to be named”, which the Parliament thought 
would destroy the realm (Hyde 1970: 36). 
 The first civil law against same-sex sex was one of a score of Acts passed at 
the start of the Reformation. The Clergy Act 1529 removed the legal privileges of 
the clergy. The Submission of the Clergy Act 1532 barred the clergy from law-
making without the King’s consent. The Conditional Restraint of Annates Act 
1532 ceased the paying of taxes to Rome. The Ecclesiastical Appeals Act 1533 
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forbade appeals to the Pope and made the King the final legal authority. Henry 
VIII was excommunicated in July 1533. The same year, ecclesiastical jurisdiction 
was moved to civil courts in both the Heresy Act and the Buggery Act:
Forasmuch as there is not yet sufficient and condign punishment appointed and limited by 
the due course of the Laws of this Realm, for the detestable and abominable Vice of 
Buggery committed with mankind or beast: It may therefore please the King’s Highness, 
with the assent of his Lords spiritual and temporal, and the Commons of this present 
Parliament assembled, that it may be enacted by the authority of the same, That the same 
offence be from henceforth adjuged Felony, and such order and form of process therein to 
be used against the offenders, as in cases of Felony at the Common-law. And that the 
offenders being hereof convict by Verdict, Confession, or Outlawry, shall suffer such pains 
of death, and losses, and penalties of their goods, chattels, debts, lands, tenements and 
hereditaments, as Felons be accustomed to doe according to the Common-laws of this 
Realm. And that no person offending in any such offence, shall be admitted to his clergy, 
And that Justices of Peace shall have power and authority within the limits of their 
Commissions and Jurisdictions, to hear and determine the said offence, as they do use to 
doe in cases of other Felonies. This Act to endure till the last day of the next Parliament. 
(25 Hen.VIII c.6, quoted in Bailey 1955: 147-8)
The Act expired and was renewed three times which suggests political expedience 
rather than moral certitude. This is supported by its Reformation context and 
use against the Roman Church. The Act of Supremacy 1534 made the King head 
of the Anglican Church. The Treasons Act 1534 made word or deed against the 
King, Queen or his heirs punishable by death. The Dissolution of the Lesser 
Monasteries Act 1536 took all institutions with tithes and rents under £200 a 
year into the King’s possession; it began: 
Forasmuch as manifest sin, vicious, carnal and abominable living is daily used and 
committed among little and small abbeys, priories, and other religious houses of monks, 
canons, and nuns ... 
(27 Hen.VIII c.28, quoted fully in Adams & Stephens 1901: 243) 
That the Buggery Act was used to support the seizing of church property is 
verified by two memoires Henry wrote to his envoy in Scotland in 1540 and 1543, 
which refer to increasing his revenue by establishing ‘abominations’ and ‘beastly 
living’ among the clergy (Knowles 1959: 204). The extent to which the Act was 
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intended to apply to the wider population is thus debatable. The Act was among 
those repealed by Edward VI in 1547. It was re-enacted with amendments in 
1548, then repealed again by Queen Mary in 1553 who returned it to church 
jurisdiction. It was re-enacted in its original form and given permanent force by 
Elizabeth I in 1563 after a contested parliamentary passage (Elton 1989: 110-1). 
Its retrieval from church jurisdiction was motivated by the early Elizabethan 
Parliament’s concern to protect the state from Catholic dissent (ibid: 190).
 Henry’s choice of the term ‘buggery’ is significant. Variants of buggery 
(bugerie, bulgari, bugari, bougrerie, bogerie, bougerie, buggerie) and bugger(s) 
(bougre(s), bugero(s), bulgaro(s), bulgar(s), boulgre(s)) became applied to religious 
sects of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries who had been branded heretics by 
the Pope. The term developed in reference to a section of the Manichean diaspora 
which settled in Bulgaria during the tenth century and became known as the 
Bogomils (Bailey ibid: 137). Their drift westwards ended in the 1208 massacre of 
the Albigensians in southern France who were accused of heresy and sodomy. 
Bailey (ibid: 141) cites evidence that ‘bugeros’ was also a common term for 
usurers in the 1200s, but claims that by 1533 buggery had lost its association 
with heresy. This is not supported by the definition of Edward Coke (1552-1634), 
Lord Chief Justice of England:
... crimen laesae majestatis, a sin horrible, committed against the King; and this is either 
against the King Celestial or Terrestrial in three manners: by heresy, by buggery, by 
sodomy. 
(Edward Coke, Institutes of the Lawes of England, Part 3, completed 1628, published 1644: 
58, quoted in Bray 1995: 20)
Coke warned that a valid indictment for buggery must describe it as “contra 
ordinationem Creatoris et naturae ordinem” (Bray 1995: 26). According to Bray 
(28), the references in the margin show the story of Sodom informs the section. 
However, as a crime against the terrestrial King, the definition conflates sodomy, 
heresy and buggery with treason. This association too reoccurs at later times.
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 Theory and Practice
 Legal theory is not legal practice. Few records of prosecutions for buggery 
exist before 1699. Bray (1995: 71-4) reports searches of the Essex Assizes 
1560-1680 and Quarter Sessions 1556-1680 which produced one case in 1669. 
The Somerset Quarter Sessions 1601-1660 produced two cases. The calendar of 
Home Counties Assizes 1559-1625 listed four cases. The prosecutions fell into 
three categories: those occurring at times of social upheaval, such as the Civil 
War, when scapegoats were needed; those initiated by malicious accusation; 
those involving a breach of the peace or social order. It was these factors that 
brought the cases to court. Bray (ibid: 75-6) argues that the lack of prosecutions 
was not tolerance, but a conceptual gap between known sexual habits and the 
doctrinal horrors of sodomy. Other factors may be relevant: Coke also specified 
that conviction must rest on proof of penetration and emission which made cases 
difficult to prove (Hitchcock 1997: 60). Nevertheless, the law’s existence enabled 
prosecutions to be pursued with vigour when political circumstances changed.
 Early in the reign of William and Mary (1689-1702), the newly founded 
Society for the Reformation of Manners began a puritan crusade against sabbath 
breakers, drunkenness and debauchery (Bray 1995: 82). Until 1738, it ran 
networks of informers and funded prosecutions with the support of Church and 
Crown. Crompton (1998: 60-1) defines the period as “triumphal protestantism”. 
Mass arrests for sodomy were recorded in 1699, 1707, and 1725-7 (Bray ibid: 
89-97). Many of the accused were held in Newgate prison. A few men were hung 
at Tyburn. Most were convicted of attempted sodomy for which the pillory, a fine 
and prison were imposed, although a spell in the pillory could result in serious 
injury or death (Hitchcock 1997: 73). Further mass arrests resulted from raids 
on meeting places in 1763-5, 1776, 1798 and 1810 (Trumbach 1989b: 409). 
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 Trial records from the early 1700s provide evidence of a subculture, in 
London at least, with its own meeting places and rituals, in which cross-dressing 
and female names were common; they also offered a useful disguise (Trumbach 
1991a: 138). Cross-dressing also peaked among women in the 1700s, though not 
within a subculture and not always for sexual reasons (Dekker & van de Pol 
1989). Known prosecutions (1746 and 1777) where a husband was found to be a 
woman, involved deception and/or theft. By contrast, in 1766, James How/Mary 
East who had run a pub with her wife for 36 years, took her blackmailer to court 
dressed as a woman and won (Norton 2009a). All surviving accounts of the case 
treat her sympathetically (Vicinus 1989: 181). 
 Trumbach (1989a: 150-8) argues that the 18th century saw a growing 
concern with gender divisions, thus sodomy became associated with effeminacy 
in the public mind and with lack of sexual interest in women (ibid: 1991a: 136). 
Whatever the public view, trial records show the arrested men came from all 
occupations, plus 35% were married, many with children (ibid: 1977: 15/18). 
The English trials, and those in Holland 1730-1810, attracted publicity. In a 
single two-year, mid-century period, “England published over two thousand 
newspaper reports of trials, arrests, and speculations about sodomites” (Fone 
2000: 249). The 1700s also saw a proliferation of political pamphlets, such as 
‘Satan’s Harvest Home’ which claimed sodomy was a “dammed fashion imported 
from Italy” and recommended:
Instead of the Pillory, I would have the Stake be punishment of those who in Contradiction 
to the Laws of God and Man, to the Order and Course of Nature, and to the most simple 
principles of Reason, preposterously burn for each other, and leave the Fair the charming 
Sex neglected. 
(anon. 1749, quoted more fully in Crompton 1998: 55-6). 
The references to burning (the Stake), the Laws of God and unnaturalness occur 
in the Roman edicts, but those to ‘reason’ and ‘women’ were an 18th century 
phenomenon. Sodomy was similarly cited in a legal treatise: 
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If any crime deserve to be punished in a more exemplary manner this does. Other crimes 
are prejudicial to society; but this strikes at the being thereof: it being seldom known that 
a person who has been guilty of abusing his generative faculty so unnaturally has 
afterwards a proper regard for women. 
(Matthew Bacon 1832 [1736] ‘New Abridgement of Law’, quoted more fully in Crompton 
1998: 50-1)
By contrast, William Blackstone gave the law a hefty Protestant heritage:
... a crime not fit to be named; “peccatum illud horribile, inter christianos non 
nominandum.” [ ... ] THIS the voice of nature and of reason, and the express law of God, 
determine to be capital. Of which we have a signal instance, long before the Jewish 
dispensation, by the destruction of two cities by fire from heaven: so that this is an 
universal, not merely a provincial, precept. And our ancient law in some degree imitated 
this punishment, by commanding such miscreants to be burnt to death ; though Fleta says 
they should be buried alive: either of which punishments was indifferently used for this 
crime among the ancient Goths. But now the general punishment of all felonies is the 
same, namely, by hanging: and this offence (being in the times of popery only subject to 
ecclesiastical censures) was made single felony by the statute 25 Hen. VIII. c. 6. and felony 
without benefit of clergy by statute 5 Eliz. c.17. 
(William Blackstone, 1769, ‘Commentaries on the Laws of England’ vol.4, ch.15: 216)
The addition of ‘reason’ acts as Enlightenment window-dressing on an otherwise 
archly establishment view remote from many realities of eighteenth century life. 
Land enclosures and industrialisation resulted in escalating urbanisation, waged 
labour and urban poverty, alongside a succession of trade wars.
 During “the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the numbers of buggery 
trials were directly related to whether or not Britain was at war or in a state of 
social turmoil” (Weeks 1977: 13). The War of Spanish Succession (1702-13), the 
Seven Years War (1756-63) and the Napoleonic Wars (1802-15) all saw increases 
in Navy court martials. Buggery was treated as seriously as mutiny or murder; 
those convicted were more likely to be executed and less likely to be pardoned 
(Gilbert 1976: 79-84). Between the Seven Years War and Napoleonic Wars there 
were no court martials for buggery and those for other ‘morals’ crimes fell from 
83.3% to 16.7% (ibid: 86). Civil convictions followed a similar pattern. In the later 
18th century, hangings for sodomy in Middlesex (at Tyburn and later Newgate) 
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averaged two per decade. From 1803 to 1814 they averaged two per year when 
hangings for other crimes were falling (Gilbert 1977: 102-3). Prosecutions peaked 
in 1810, most notoriously in a raid of the White Lion pub in Vere Street, London 
by police posing as ‘sodomites’. Thirty men were arrested and taken to prison for 
examination. Most were released but seven went to trial. Six were convicted of 
attempted sodomy and sentenced to the pillory and prison. (See Crompton 1998: 
164-6 for their harrowing time in the pillory quoted from an 1810 pamphlet). The 
pillory was finally abolished in 1837.
 Why 1810? The Napoleonic Wars and the Society for the Suppression of 
Vice (founded 1802) were factors. Gilbert argues (1977:112) that in 1810 “the 
fear of rebellion and disorder was acute”. Amidst economic crisis, food shortages 
and the worst depression of the wars, there was a paranoid government whose 
sending of a parliamentary reformer, Francis Burdett, to the Tower had triggered 
riots. In addition to the shortages caused by naval blockades, Crompton (1998: 
158-160) cites the constitutional crisis caused by the ‘madness’ of King George III 
and the Prince of Wales’ Regency, plus a reactionary government still nervous 
about the French Revolution. He suggests (ibid) “the government no doubt found 
the hangings and pilloryings of men belonging to an unpopular minority a safe 
diversion for the rough energies of London’s impoverished mobs”. The end of the 
Napoleonic Wars in 1815 saw the start of the ‘Imperial Century’ during which the 
British empire reached the peak of its dominance. However, in contrast to the 
end of previous wars, the rate of civilian hangings for buggery did not fall. A 
Commons Report in 1819 records 28 hangings 1806-1818; Home Office statistics 
in 1837 list 33 hangings 1819-1836 (Crompton ibid: 16). These were the last 
recorded hangings for buggery.
 The Offences Against the Person Act 1828 consolidated all laws on crimes 
classed as against the person into a single Act. The Buggery Act was repealed, 
but replaced by Section XV, while Section XVIII relaxed the required proof:
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XV And be it enacted, That every Person convicted of the abominable Crime of Buggery, 
committed with either Mankind or any animal, shall suffer Death as a Felon. 
XVIII ... for remedy thereof be it enacted, That it shall not be necessary, in any of those 
cases, to prove actual Emission of Seed in order to constitute carnal Knowledge, but that 
the carnal Knowledge shall be deemed complete upon Proof of Penetration only. 
(Offences Against the Person Act 1828, Statute Book 9 Geo.IV c.31)
The Act constituted a symbolic shift. Buggery, cited as “inter christiano non no-
minandum” (HC 5.5.1828 c.354), had become a violent offence. A law originally 
enacted to gain Royal control over the Roman Church and enrich the Crown, had 
become an imposition of imperial moral order. 
 This imperial moral order was extended to the colonies. India was taken 
under direct British rule after the 1857 mutiny. In 1860 the Indian Penal Code 
formalised British law under the Raj. Section 377 criminalised sexual activity 
‘against the order of nature’ with the punishment of life imprisonment (its 2009 
repeal in Delhi was reversed in 2013). The Code was later extended to all British 
colonies. Struggles for the decriminalisation of same-sex sex continue in 42/54 
Commonwealth countries (Lennox & Waites 2013: 1), 43 with the Indian reversal. 
 The Indian Penal Code came into force in 1862, a year after the Offences 
Against the Person Act 1861 had repealed hanging for buggery in England, Wales 
and Ireland (but not Scotland until 1889). Section 63 also formalised the offence 
of attempted buggery:
Unnatural Offences
61. Whosoever shall be convicted of the abominable Crime of Buggery, committed either 
with Mankind or with any Animal, shall be liable, at the Discretion of the Court, to be kept 
in Penal Servitude for Life or for any Term not less than Ten Years.
62. Whosoever shall attempt to commit the said abominable Crime, or shall be guilty of any 
Assault with Intent to commit the same, or of any indecent Assault upon any Male person, 
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and being convicted thereof shall be liable, at the 
Discretion of the Court, to be kept in Penal Servitude for any Term not exceeding Ten Years 
and not less than Three Years, or to be imprisoned for any Term not exceeding Two Years, 
with or without Hard Labour.
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63. Whenever, upon the Trial for any Offence punishable under this Act, it may be 
necessary to prove carnal Knowledge, it shall not be necessary to prove the actual 
Emission of Seed in order to constitute a carnal Knowledge, but the carnal Knowledge shall 
be deemed complete upon Proof of Penetration only.
(Offences Against the Person Act 1861, Statute Book 24 & 25 Vict.c.100)
The 1861 Act was a major reform of many capital offences against the person. 
Though buggery remained in this category, Sections 61-3 appear to have passed 
through Parliament without a single, even euphemistic, reference to it. 
 Science, Laws and Society
 The ‘Imperial Century’ saw a rapid increase in the use of Scientific Method 
and its unchecked extension to people and societies in which racism played a 
central role (Hobsbawm 1977: 305-6). The positivism of early social science 
constructed categories of racial types resulting in hierarchical objectification. 
Additional distinctions between ‘normal’ and ‘pathological’ led to the labelling of 
whole social groups in which values were camouflaged as facts (Smith 1998: 86-
91). The Victorian working class were also seen as a ‘race’ apart and “concepts of 
racial abnormality were superimposed on ideas of sexual and social deviance” 
(Rattansi 2007: 46). Categories for individuals having same-sex sexual attraction 
were first suggested by those seeking changes in the law and social attitudes, but 
these were soon overtaken by the fast expanding medical sciences.
 The first references to sodomy as a form of madness were in the 1830s. 
James Prichard, a physician, ethnologist, psychiatrist and member of the Royal 
Society, proposed the idea of moral insanity in 1835 which he later related to 
criminal law. In 1838, Alexander Morrison, a consultant at the Bedlam Hospital 
in London, found it a consolation to know that sodomy could be a consequence 
of insanity and stressed that juries should ensure the accused was in possession 
of his reason (Gilbert 1976: 85). There was no research into sexual habits in 
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Britain; the 1850s work of J. L. Casper, a German medico-legal expert, and 
Auguste Tardieu, a French forensic scientist, was little known, though Tardieu’s 
work was referred to in an 1870 London court case (Weeks 1991a: 199). It was 
Casper who made a distinction “between ‘innate’ and ‘acquired’ characteristics 
which [became] the poles of the debate for generations” (Weeks 1977: 26). 
 Tentative resistance began in the 1860s. In 1862, Karl Heinrich Ulrichs, a 
German lawyer, began writing pamphlets and books advocating rights for a ‘third 
sex’ that was not criminal or insane, but the result of an embryonic development 
in which the genitals did not match the sex drive in the brain (Weeks 1977: 26- 
7). He used the term ‘urning’. The term ‘homosexual’ was first used in 1868 by 
Karoly Maria Kertbeny, a Hungarian journalist, in a letter to Ulrichs, and again 
in an 1869 pamphlet advocating the abolition of anti-sodomy laws in Prussia. 
Reform was not within the developing medical view. In 1870, Carl Westphal, a 
German neurologist and psychiatrist, published ‘Contrary Sexual Feeling’. He 
saw this as a congenital reversal of sexual feeling which caused moral insanity 
(Weeks 1977: 27). According to Foucault (1987: 43), Westphal’s portrayal was the 
birth of the medical category of homosexuality, it turned “the practice of sodomy 
[into] a kind of interior androgyny, a hermaphrodism of the soul”. 
 The Victorian Parliament had no awareness of such ideas. It was under 
increasing pressure from purity campaigners: a puritanical alliance of the Society 
for the Suppression of Vice, the National Vigilance Association and feminists. 
According to Hyam (1990: 62-71) the ideology of women’s purity and virtue was 
upheld by the availability of prostitutes, who were then blamed for the spread of 
venereal disease. After a four year delay, the Criminal Law Amendment Bill 1885 
[HL] set out to limit child and female prostitution by raising the age of consent 
for girls from thirteen to sixteen and closing brothels. Towards the end of its 
passage through the Commons, Henry Labouchere introduced an amendment on 
“any act of gross indecency with another male person” (HC 6.8.1885 c.1397). The 
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brief exchange before it was accepted increased the term of imprisonment from 
one year to two. It became Section 11 of the Act:
Outrages on decency
11. Any male person who, in public or private, commits, or is a party to the commission of, 
or procures, or attempts to procure the commission by any male person of, any act of gross 
indecency shall be guilty of a misdemeanour, and being convicted shall be liable at the 
discretion of the Court to be imprisoned for any term not exceeding two years, with or 
without hard labour. 
(The Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885, Statute Book 48 & 49 Vict. c.69)
The Section criminalised all sexual acts between men. Weeks (1991a: 200) 
argues, it largely shaped the underworld in which sex between men took place. 
The Act also resulted in “a series of highly publicized court cases” (Weeks 2000: 
25), not least those of the Cleveland Street Brothel (1889) and Oscar Wilde 
(1895). In these and later trials, court officials were especially concerned about 
the mingling of classes that sex between men engendered (Weeks 1991a: 205). 
Reports in the Times refer to “foul crimes”, “unspeakable scandals”, “a disgrace 
to civilisation” (27.11.1889: 7), plus “an indescribably loathsome scandal”, and “a 
disgusting crime” (25.5.1895: 4). The popular press dubbed Wilde “High Priest of 
the Decadents”, fostering a stereotype of decadence, corruption and effeminacy 
(Rowbotham 2008: 193). Effeminacy especially offended the developing Victorian 
cult of manliness which was becoming a powerful middle-class moral code (Hyam 
1990: 72-3). According to Weeks (1977: 161), the trials also sharpened public 
perceptions of “normal and deviant”, “respectable and outlaw”. The legislative 
linking of prostitution with sex between men lasted until 1957.
 The efforts of reformers were well below the official radar. John Addington 
Symonds, a poet and literary critic, was the first known English writer to defend 
sex between men in a privately circulated essay ‘A Problem in Greek Ethics 
(1883). He used ancient Greece as an example to argue that homosexuality could 
be socially acceptable (Weeks 1977: 52). Social acceptability was remote; the fast 
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expanding medical sciences were busy creating an array of clinical categories. 
Richard von Krafft-Ebing, an Austrian psychiatrist, used the terms ‘homosexual’ 
and ‘heterosexual’ in his ‘Psychopathia Sexualis’, a medico-forensic study of the 
abnormal (1886; English edition 1892). While ‘heterosexual’ medically affirmed 
‘normality’, it was through his work that ‘homosexual’ became the official clinical 
term. The book included over 200 case studies and went through many editions, 
two in English, which illustrate conceptual shifts. Homosexuality was initially 
defined as a pathological state, but this was modified in the twelfth edition to a 
largely congenital condition with acquired characteristics (Weeks 1977: 26). From 
the 1880s, sexologists contributed their views from across Europe: notably the 
pathologising Veniamin Tarnovsky, Cesare Lombroso, Paolo Mantegazza and 
Albert Moll, alongside the reforming Magnus Hirschfeld. Although, as Foucault 
(1987: 101) argues, while nineteenth century discourses on homosexuality 
advanced social controls, they “also made possible the formation of a ‘reverse’ 
discourse: homosexuality began to speak on its own behalf, to demand that its 
legitimacy or ‘naturality’ be acknowledged, often in the same vocabulary, using 
the same categories by which it was medically disqualified”. 
 The reformers persevered. Symonds reviewed the history of moral censure, 
sickness and effeminacy in ‘A Problem in Modern Ethics’ (1891). While sceptical 
of Ulrichs’ concept of a ‘third sex’, he agreed same-sex desire was natural and 
healthy, and suggested changes in the law (Weeks 1977: 54-5). The essay was 
circulated privately and addressed to medical psychologists and jurists (ibid: 26). 
Similarly, Edward Carpenter, a socialist and writer, presented the situation as 
social predicament rather than sexual inclination in another privately circulated 
essay ‘Homogenic Love’ (1895). In a later essay collection ‘The Intermediate Sex’, 
(finally published in Germany in 1908) he argued that nature “in mixing the 
elements which go to compose each individual, does not always keep her two 
groups of ingredients⎯which represent the two sexes⎯properly apart” (quoted in 
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Weeks 1977: 75). The first reform book to be published in Britain was ‘Sexual 
Inversion’ (1897) by Symonds and Henry Havelock Ellis, a doctor and writer. It 
had been planned in 1892, but Symonds died in 1893 and Ellis completed the 
book. It contained essays by Symonds and 36 case studies, six of which were 
lesbian friends of Ellis’s wife, Edith. It argued that ‘inversion’ was innate, neither 
disease nor crime, and that the problem was social attitudes. In the wake of the 
Wilde trials, Symonds’ family panicked; his literary executor bought up the whole 
issue and ordered the removal of Symonds’ name from future editions. A second 
edition, minus Symonds’ name, was published later the same year. A small 
reform society, the Legitimation League, publicised the book, but Scotland Yard 
believed they were anarchists and used the book to prosecute them. Ellis was not 
charged, but as a result of the trial, in 1898, the book was effectively banned. 
However, the trial publicity resulted in Ellis receiving hundreds of letters, some 
with life histories, asking for information and views (Weeks 2000: 26-8). 
Meanwhile, the legislative regulation of sexual behaviour continued.
 The Vagrancy Act Amendment Bill 1898, set out to criminalise men who 
lived off the earnings of female prostitutes or solicited for immoral purposes. A 
Commons clause to repeal whipping was defeated in the Lords given that:
... during the last five years there have only been seven cases where whipping has been 
resorted to under the powers of the Vagrancy Act, and in each of those cases the offences 
were of such a seriously indecent character that I am sure your Lordships would not wish 
that the power should be parted with in such cases.
(Lord Belper HL 4.8.1898 vol.64 cc.23-4)
There was nothing to prevent the Act being used against men soliciting sex with 
women, but in practice it was used against men meeting for sex (Weeks 1991a: 
199-200). Similarly, the Criminal Law Amendment Bill 1912 set out to amend 
the 1885 and 1898 Acts, plus the Immoral Traffic (Scotland) Act. This Act too 
retained whipping for a second offence of soliciting “if a male” (HC 11.12.1912 
c.733). The target of the punishment was clear in a prior Commons debate:
27
Two persons of this class, found guilty of soliciting for immoral purposes, were sentenced 
to receive fifteen strokes of the birch rod. [ ... ] If ever there was a case for corporal 
punishment it is for that particular class of offence of which these applicants have been 
guilty - soliciting men for immoral purposes. The sentence was not too severe, and, 
possibly, in another case of the same kind, it might be necessary, in the event of appeal, to 
consider whether such sentences should not be increased. 
(Reginald McKenna HC 12.11.1912 vol.43 c.1856)
Whipping was finally abolished in 1948, but while this harsh establishment view 
prevailed, other views were consolidating. 
 The emerging view of both reformers and sexologists was that sexual 
preferences were innate. However, while the sexologists associated preferences 
for same-sex sex with pathology and degeneracy and became respectable through 
their “relationship with the medical profession” (Weeks 1987: 36), the publishing 
history of the reformers illustrates the weight of censure under which they were 
working. For decades after the Wilde trials, public access to their work was 
withheld in the British Museum Reading Room (Rowbotham 2008: 334). This 
was challenged by Carpenter in 1912, then by the British Society for the Study of 
Sex Psychology, founded in 1914 with Carpenter as its first president (Weeks 
1977: 117-8). The Society initially prioritised education, but in the 1920s became 
the British Sexological Society and an international movement for law reform 
(Weeks 1981: 114). Reform was a distant prospect; legislation was persisting in 
the opposite direction.
 In 1921, Frederick Macquisten attempted to extend gross indecency law to 
women. The Criminal Law Amendment Bill 1921, set out to amend the 1885 and 
1912 Acts. Macquisten’s amendment was passed in the Commons, but defeated 
in the Lords, who agreed that the resulting publicity would inform women that 
such ‘polluting practices’ existed (HL 15.8.1921 cc.567-577). The Bill lapsed, but 
was revived in 1922. Macquisten tried to reintroduce his amendment three times 
(Waites 2002: 331). Instead, Section 1 of the Act made gender-neutral reference 
28
to indecent assault and disallowed consent as a defence for people aged under 
sixteen, though neither law appears to have been used in relation to sex between 
women (ibid: 333). Six years later, in 1928, the publishers of Radcliffe Hall’s ‘The 
Well of Loneliness’, were tried under the 1854 Obscene Publications Act. This 
gave more publicity to sexual relationships between women than any law or, as 
Weeks (1977: 109-111) observes, the book itself, could ever have done. 
 Social Control and Social Change
 It is difficult to say at what stage the term ‘homosexual’ came into more 
general as well as clinical use, but its use in Parliament is representative of its 
status as the official term. The online Historic Hansard records a first use in the 
Commons in 1936 and 18 uses in both Houses 1936-1950. These references 
occur in the contexts of: psychological treatment for delinquents (1936), grounds 
for divorce (1937), ordinary criminals having to mix with homosexual prisoners 
(1946), criminal statistics (1946), criminal justice (1947, 1948, 1949), and the 
number of prisoners receiving treatment for homosexuality (1949). Parliamentary 
uses of ‘homosexual’ in the 1950s were 287, rising to 862 in the 1960s. However, 
as Baker and Stanley (2003: 18) point out in their study of merchant seamen, it 
was not a term individuals would use for themselves: in “the last century ‘queer’ 
and ‘homosexual’ had pejorative meanings [and in] the 1950s and 1960s some of 
these men had no words to describe their sexual orientation”. Neither did the 
participants necessarily see their sexuality as fixed or dichotomised (ibid: 19). 
Added to this gulf between self-perception and the official pathologisng view, was 
the Cold-War belief that homosexuality was politically traitorous and thus a 
danger to national security.
 During WWII, a wave of persecution began in the US in which Rorschach 
Tests (believed to identify homosexuals) were used to exclude men from military 
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service and later from government jobs during McCarthy’s purges (Hegarty 
2003). In Britain, after the disappearance of Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean in 
1951 (diplomats known to be homosexual), the US urged the British Government 
to root out homosexuals as a security risk (Weeks 1977: 159-60). Prosecutions 
escalated and led to a greater parliamentary focus on homosexuality. However, it 
was the trial of Lord Montague and Peter Wildeblood in 1953 that resulted in the 
1954 appointment of the Wolfenden Committee to review the laws on homosexual 
offences and prostitution. Burgess and Maclean’s defection to the USSR became 
public knowledge in 1955. The ensuing parliamentary debates took it for granted 
that homosexuals were a security-risk (HC 7.11.1955; HL 22.11.1955). Two 
months later, the Sexual Offences Bill 1956 [HL] set out to consolidate existing 
laws on prostitution, brothels and ‘kindred offences’. All existing legislation 
relevant to sex between men was gathered into the Act:
Existing Act     Re-enactment 1956  ________________________________________________________________________________
1861 Sections 61-3 on buggery:  Sections 12(1), 15(1), 16(1) & 44
1885 Section 11 on gross indecency  Section 13
1898 Section 1(1)b on male soliciting  Section 32
1912 Section 7(2) on male soliciting  Section 32
1922 Section 1 on indecent assault  Section 14(1)
1922 Section 1 on no underage consent Section 14(2)   ________________________________________________________________________________
(Sexual Offences Act 1956, Statute Book 4 & 5, Eliz.2 Ch.69)
Prosecutions increased; in fact the Act determined most of the police activity 
against men meeting for sex for the rest of the century (Stonewall 2009). 
 The Wolfenden Report was published in 1957. The Committee took a 
utilitarian view of the law, arguing that its purpose was to preserve public order 
and protect the weak rather than uphold a particular morality (Weeks 1981: 
242). It recommended that sex between men over 21 in private be decriminalised, 
but that penalties for street offences of all kinds be increased (ibid: 243). Even 
so, it presented homosexuality as an ‘unfortunate condition’. In recommending 
that prisoners desiring oestrogen should receive it and that there should be more 
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research on the ‘condition’, the report endorsed the medical view (Weeks 1977: 
166). Resistance to decriminalisation was strong in the medical profession. The 
Archbishop of Canterbury supported it; the Church of Scotland did not. The 
Report was finally debated over a year later (HC 26.11.1958 cc.365-508). The 
recommendations on prostitution were enacted in the Street Offences Act 1959; 
those on sex between men were resisted. Kenneth Robinson’s motion for the 
Government to take early action on decriminalising homosexuality was debated 
the following year (HC 29.6.1960 cc.1453-1514), but defeated by 213 to 99 votes. 
Amidst the delay in reform, the Homosexual Law Reform Society and the Albany 
Trust were founded in 1958, while the Manchester branch of the HLRS formed 
the Committee for Homosexual Equality in 1964, though they had little influence 
on subsequent legislation (Weeks 1977: 176). 
 The first attempt to change the law was made by Leo Abse, a Labour MP, 
with the Sexual Offences Bill 1962, but it lapsed at second reading. Lord Arran 
tried again with the Sexual Offences Bill 1965 [HL]; it was passed by the Lords, 
but lapsed in the Commons. In 1966 Lord Arran reintroduced the Bill. The 
Sexual Offences Act 1967 was finally enacted in July and had eleven Sections:
1.   Amendment of law relating to homosexual acts in private.
2.   Homosexual acts on merchant ships. 
3.   Revised punishments for homosexual acts. 
4.   Procuring others to commit homosexual acts. 
5.   Living on earnings of male prostitution. 
6.   Premises resorted to for homosexual practices. 
7.   Time limit on prosecutions. 
8.   Restriction on prosecutions. 
9.   Choice of mode of trial for certain offences.
10.  Past offences. 
11.  Short title, citation, interpretation, saving and extent.
(Sexual Offences Act 1967, Elizabeth II ch.60)
The Act partially decriminalised consensual sex between men over 21 in private, 
but was stricter than the Wolfenden recommendations. It restricted the meaning 
of private and tightened the law on underage sex and male soliciting. The Act 
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applied only to England and Wales and, under pressure from ex-armed-service 
officers in Parliament and the National Union of Seamen, excluded the armed 
forces and merchant navy. In its wake, prosecutions again increased, while the 
civilian atmosphere relaxed into a kind of repressive tolerance (Weeks 1977: 190). 
 News of the Stonewall riots in New York at the end of June 1969 spread 
fast (see Duberman 2013: 79-100 for a contemporary account). The story of the 
riots became much rehearsed (Plummer 1995: 90) and a tenet of gay mythology 
(Weeks 2011: 65). Stonewall continues to be widely seen as the trigger for the 
emergence of sexual liberation movements, initially in Western Europe and North 
America. While Weeks (1981: 283) argues the movements had no single origin, 
gay organisations and activism proliferated in post-Stonewall UK, for example: 
Year Organisation/Event________________________________________________________________________________________
1970 Gay Liberation Front (GLF) founded at the London School of Economics
1971 Committee for Homosexual Equality became a Campaign (CHE)
1971 GLF organised the first open gay dance in Kensington and published a manifesto
1971 Friend, a lesbian and gay counselling and befriending helpline founded
1971 GLF march, London, against the unequal age of consent on Stonewall anniversary
1971 Lesbians demanded recognition at a Women’s Liberation Conference, Skegness
1972 Gay News, the first gay newspaper began publishing
1972 Sappho, a lesbian social club founded which published a monthly magazine 
1972 Scottish Minorities Group (SMG) launched a campaign for Scottish law reform
1972 Gay Pride, the first annual march in London to commemorate Stonewall
1973 First UK gay helpline founded in Oxford
1973 CHE organised the first national gay rights conference in Morecombe
1974 London Gay Switchboard (now LLGS) helpline founded
1974 The first national lesbian conference held in Canterbury
1974 The first international gay rights conference held in Edinburgh
1975 Northern Ireland Gay Rights Association (NIGRA) founded
1975 Gay Sweatshop, the first lesbian & gay touring theatre company began performing
1975 Action for Lesbian Parents founded to support lesbians facing custody cases
1976 Lesbian and Gay Christian Movement (LGCM) founded
1978 International Gay Association (now ILGA) founded at CHE conference, Coventry
1979 Gay humanist group founded (now GALHA)
1979 Gays the Word Bookshop started trading in London________________________________________________________________________________________
(Weeks 1977 Chapters 16-17; Stonewall 2009; LGBT History Project UK 2014)
However, as Weeks (1981: 286) points out, the “emergence of the modern gay 
identity was uneven, an adjunct to existing homosexual ways of life rather than 
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its supplanter”. At the time, appropriation of the term ‘gay’ (and the composite 
‘lesbian and gay’) marked a cultural shift. It was self-chosen and constituted a 
public affirmation of validity (ibid). Ultimately, it was a positive move, but making 
the category positive does not challenge the categorisation itself and, at this 
stage, it had little effect on legal reform.
 An attempt to reduce the age of consent for sex between men to 18 was 
made by Lord Arran in the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Bill 1977 [HL], but was 
defeated at second reading. An attempt to extend the 1967 Act to Scotland was 
made by Lord Boothby in the Sexual Offences (Scotland) Bill 1977 [HL], which 
passed its second reading but lapsed before reaching the Commons. The 1967 
Act was finally extended to Scotland in the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1980. 
Reform took longer in Northern Ireland. In 1976, Jeff Dudgeon had applied to the 
ECtHR in respect of continuing criminalisation and police harrasment in the 
province. The following year, Reverend Ian Paisley, a DUP MP, fearing reform, 
launched his ‘Save Ulster from Sodomy’ campaign. Dudgeon’s case was accepted 
by the ECmHR and the case heard (ECtHR  22.10.1981 Dudgeon v UK). The 
court ruled that the UK Government was in breach of Article 8 of the ECvHR in 
respect of Ulster. This was the first time the court had supported gay rights. The 
1967 Act was subsequently extended to the province by Statutory Instrument in 
the Homosexual Offences (Northern Ireland) Order 1982. 
 By the 1980s, gay liberation had transmuted into concerns with identity, 
political alliances and working with the state (Cooper 1992: 24). Lesbian and gay 
groups, centres, helplines and publications were well established. In 1985 the 
Labour party began to accept claims for equal access to services and political 
representation. It is from this point that the legislative struggles under scrutiny 
in this study begin. The years 1986 to 2010 saw no fewer than 23 actual changes 
in laws affecting lesbians and gay men and 27 attempted changes, some of which 
became law at the second or third attempt (Appendix 1). 
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 Conclusion
 Like the laws discussed in this Chapter, each of the legislative struggles 
analysed in this study were instigated and shaped by a complex mix of historical 
conditions, social forces and political motivations. The legislative issues selected 
for analysis involved protracted conflict, while the parliamentary debates and 
press coverage of each issue expose a range of beliefs and presumptions about 
sexuality. The rationale for the study’s data selection is outlined in Chapter 2 
following an account of parliamentary allegiances, influences and protocols. 
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Chapter 2: Data
Political Struggles and Legislative Powers 
 The data for this study are selected parliamentary debates on legislative 
changes affecting lesbians and gay men 1986-2005. Three reasons underlie this 
choice. First, it is in Parliament that laws are made and repealed. MPs and Lords 
have institutionalised social power and are operating in a context in which they 
can, to varied extents, exercise that power. The laws they make and repeal affect 
people’s lives. Second, parliamentary debates are public and influential, not only 
in their legislative capacity, but also via media reports and commentary which 
may support or challenge attendant beliefs and values. Third, debate speeches 
are calculated to appeal not only to other MPs, but also to target sections of the 
wider public. As Wilson (1990: 50) notes, “one of the major aims of a politician is 
to gain people’s allegiance”. Speakers in parliamentary debates thus deploy the 
strategies and positions they deem will most easily gain support for their cause. 
However, while they draw on the beliefs and values of the sections of society they 
represent and indirectly address, they simultaneously reconstruct and reinforce 
those same beliefs and values. In the process, distinctions between political 
persuasion and popular prejudice are unclear and assumed addressee prejudices 
may be exploited for political ends. This makes parliamentary debates a rich 
source of data for exploring socially pervasive beliefs and values, in this case 
about sexuality, over a period of legislative struggle and change. 
 This chapter outlines the legislative process and the various influences on 
MPs and Lords, particularly that of the press. It then reviews protocols applying 
to parliamentary debates and evaluates Hansard as a data source. An account of 
how the debates were selected for analysis completes the chapter.
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 Legislative Process
 The primary functions of Parliament are the making, amending and 
repealing of laws, the raising and spending of taxes, and deciding when to deploy 
the armed forces. With the exception of finance Bills, which must originate in the 
Commons, the legislative process may begin in either House. After a period of 
consultation, a Bill’s First Reading is a formality akin to an announcement. The 
Bill is then printed and a date arranged for its Second Reading in the House of 
its origin. Second Reading debates focus on legislative purpose rather than detail 
and, if consensus is lacking, are followed by a vote. If approved the Bill passes to 
its Committee stage where each clause is considered and may be amended. This 
may be completed at a single sitting or last for months. Amendments accepted in 
Committee are debated at the Report stage and voted on if necessary. Further 
amendments may also be proposed and debated at this stage. In the Commons, 
the Third Reading is generally a short debate on the amended Bill, but in the 
Lords further amendments can be proposed, provided they have not previously 
been voted on. On passing its Third Reading, the Bill is sent to the other House 
for a Second Reading and the process repeated. If the Bill is amended by the 
other House, it must be returned to the House of its origin for consideration. In 
this way it may go back and forth between the Houses several times, but if either 
insists on its amendments against the will of the other, the Bill may be lost. If the 
Bill is passed by both Houses before it runs out of parliamentary time, it will 
receive Royal Assent and become an Act of Parliament (Field 2002: 286-7).
 Governments do not legislate in a vacuum; their legislative powers are 
modified by various factors. A major factor is the size of a government’s majority,  
but this is affected by the balance of MPs interests and influences beyond those 
of their party. Silk & Walters (1998: 53-60) discuss personal and constituency 
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influences, plus those of lobby groups, professional lobbyists and backbench 
groups, but say little about the press. Influences on the Lords are fewer in that 
they are not elected and may not belong to a party, but they do have personal 
allegiances and may represent lobby groups (ibid: 62-6). Other modifying factors 
are the obligation to ensure UK law complies with the European Communities 
Act 1972 and its subsequent amendments, and with the ECvHR 1950, now 
localised in the Human Rights Act 1998. 
 Beyond its law-making capacity, the wider influence of Parliament is via 
media coverage, to which MPs in general and governments in particular are most 
sensitive. However, the view of Epstein et al (2000: 13) that parliamentary debate 
“plays a key part in the production of public opinion” needs qualifying. While 
Parliament’s activities may provoke strong public reactions, production of public 
opinion is not simply a matter of reporting parliamentary business. If the media 
spotlights a topic which then gains popular condemnation or support, it may be 
debated in either House and may lead to legislation. The links between scurrilous 
newspaper stories in the 1980s and Clause 28 of the Local Government Bill 
1987-8 (Chapter 5) illustrate this process clearly. The influence is interactive and 
the relationship between press and politicians a self-interested balancing act.
 Newspapers are not bound by the neutrality regulations that apply to 
broadcast media. They also need stories that will catch their readers’ interest to 
maintain their paper’s circulation. A newspaper’s view of their readers’ interests 
rests largely on demographic factors but, as with parliamentary debates, unclear 
distinctions between popular prejudice and political persuasion may be exploited 
for political ends. The regular readers of a newspaper will inevitably absorb the 
views of that paper with repeated exposure over time. As Wise (2000: 2) points 
out, where readers lack alternative sources of information on a topic, newspaper 
reports may be the only view they get. In addition, the popular press can take “a 
leading role in promoting and actually orchestrating” a campaign for or against 
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legislation, as in the campaign against the attempted repeal of Section 28 of the 
Local Government Act 1988 in 2000 (Wise ibid). 
 Politicians and the Press
 Governments need the support of newspapers with large circulations in 
order to maintain popular support and stay in power. Newspapers also have 
interests to pursue. On the morning of the 1979 general election the Sun ran the 
headline “VOTE TORY THIS TIME” (3.5.1979). A well documented case of more 
interactive support is that between Rupert Murdoch, owner of The Sun and The 
Times, and Margaret Thatcher. For example in March 1982, Tony Benn (1995: 
530) noted that Mrs Thatcher had had lunch with Rupert Murdoch “no less than 
three times [the previous week because] the Tories were panic-stricken that The 
Times might come out for the SDP. So they were offering Murdoch all possible 
help in return for support”. At the 1987 election (11.6.1987), The Sun devoted 12 
pages to pro-Thatcher and virulently anti-Labour propaganda, including four 
full-page advertisements with the slogan “don’t let Labour wreck it”. The next 
day’s headline was “MAGGIE THE THIRD” (12.6.1987). When Margaret Thatcher 
resigned in 1990, The Sun extended its support to John Major and unremittingly 
undermined Labour at the 1992 election: 
At the climax of The Sun’s election coverage were two particularly negative and personal 
headlines directed against Lord Kinnock. “Nightmare on Kinnock Street” was followed, on 
election day itself, by the headline: “If Kinnock wins today will the last person to leave 
Britain please turn out the lights”. As is well known, Labour lost the 1992 election but 
tabloid coverage in the years running up to election, and in particular The Sun’s coverage 
during the campaign, has remained the subject of controversy ever since. 
Kelvin MacKenzie, then the editor of The Sun, famously proclaimed through a headline 
after the Conservative victory that: “It’s the Sun Wot Won It”.
(The Leveson Report 29.11.2012: 1134)
However, press support for John Major dwindled and became personally hostile. 
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Lord Leveson suggests that alongside antipathy to Government policies and the 
rise of New Labour, his lack of personal relationship with influential media 
figures “was probably a factor” (ibid: 1129). Major reported:
In the run-up to the 1997 election, in my third and last meeting with [Murdoch] on 2 
February he made it clear that he disliked my European policies which he wished me to 
change. If not, his papers could not and would not support the Conservative Government. 
So far as I recall, he made no mention of editorial independence but referred to all his 
papers as “we”. Both Mr Murdoch and I kept our word. I made no change in policy, and Mr 
Murdoch’s titles did indeed oppose the Conservative Party.
(John Major quoted in the Leveson Report 29.11.2012: 1131)
The Sun headlined its support for New Labour with “THE SUN BACKS BLAIR” 
(18.3.1997), followed by a double page spread (6-7) but, as Lord Leveson shows, 
Tony Blair had been seeking Murdoch’s support since 1994: 
He described this new era as one of “courting, assuaging and persuading the media”. Mr 
Blair confirmed that he met Rupert Murdoch on at least one occasion before becoming 
leader; this was on 15 September 1994 at a private dinner at a restaurant. Although Mr 
Murdoch could not recall the dinner, he accepted in evidence that much of what was 
attributed to him by a number of sources sounded plausible. From this it may be possible 
to infer that Mr Blair took the opportunity to explain that the Labour Party would not 
undertake an inquiry into cross-media ownership, and also the state of policy on the 
statutory recognition of Trade Unions.
(The Leveson Report 29.11.2012: 1139)
In his study of Murdoch’s politics, McKnight (2013: ch.7) shows that Murdoch’s 
“support for Labour was conditional” (ibid: 162). According to a former adviser to 
Blair, Lance Price (1.7.2006), Murdoch “seemed like the 24th member of the 
cabinet. His voice was rarely heard [...] but his presence was always felt”. When 
Blair resigned in 2007, Gordon Brown found himself in the position of John 
Major, his press support dwindled and became hostile (Leveson: 1150-5). Brown 
had tried to move away from preferential treatment of sections of the press. The 
Sun headline “LABOUR’S LOST IT” (30.9.2009) was “timed to coincide with [...] a 
key speech by Gordon Brown at Labour’s conference” (McKnight 2013: 6). 
 This symbiotic relationship between politicians and the press, particularly 
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the Murdoch press, during the period under study, makes press coverage related 
to the legislative issues an important secondary source of data. 
 Parliamentary Debates
 In the Commons the length of debates varies considerably depending on 
the issue, the degree of controversy and the Government’s agenda. Where there 
is no clear consensus, the issue is put to a vote, or ‘Division’, whereby MPs are 
recorded by ‘Tellers’ as they enter the ‘Aye’ or the ‘No’ lobby and for which the 
quorum is 40. Party policy usually determines how MPs vote and ‘Whips’ ensure 
compliance. Ministers and Whips are not free to vote against their party and MPs 
rarely risk doing so, though backbench rebellions among MPs dissatisfied with 
their party’s policy do occur. A party leader may offer members a ‘free vote’ on an 
issue, but this too is rare. Parliamentary procedures and protocols, published in 
successive editions of Erskine May since 1844, now extend to 1000 pages. 
However, as Chilton (2004: 95) points out “the existence of these rules does not 
prevent their being broken”.
 Speaker interaction in debates is highly ritualised and rule-governed. In 
the Commons the Speaker is the only person who may be addressed directly, as 
‘Mr/Madam Speaker’. MPs address each other in the third person, to which 
further rules apply: ‘my honourable Friend the Member for...’  signals an MP of 
the same party, ‘the honourable Member for...’  signals an MP of another party. 
The prefix ‘honourable and learned’ applies to MPs who are lawyers, while ‘right 
honourable’ applies to Privy Councillors (advisors to the monarch). References to 
‘the other place’ or ‘another place’ are to the Lords. In analysing forms of address 
in the Commons, Ilie (2010b: 896-7) sees the distancing effect of third-person 
address as a means of both mitigating and facilitating aggressive attacks and 
accusations, both of which are against the rules. Formalities aside, when MPs 
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speak they indirectly address other MPs, Hansard, the Lords, the public gallery, 
TV, radio, the press, their constituents and the wider public. The adage ‘playing 
to the gallery’ is relevant here.
 A debate is introduced with a supportive proposal and speeches addressed 
to the Speaker. MPs wanting to speak stand up, but must wait until called by the 
Speaker, in which case the MP’s name rather than his/her parliamentary title is 
used. The Speaker may also terminate a speech and call another MP. An MP 
wanting to intervene in a speech asks ‘Will my honourable Friend give way?’ if 
the MP speaking is of the same party; if s/he is of another party, ‘the honourable 
Gentleman/Lady’ is used. Giving way is at the speechmaker’s discretion unless 
directed to do so by the Speaker. The Speaker is also responsible for calling the 
House to ‘Order’ if it gets too rowdy. Order is usually addressed to the whole 
House in response to jeering, laughter, or uproar, but if the Speaker calls an 
individual MP to order, the MP’s name plus third-person pronouns are used. In 
her analysis of five debates during 1998-9, Shaw (2000: 407-9) found requests to 
‘give way’ were evenly distributed between men and women, but that men made 
90% of the ‘illegal’ interruptions (calling out), which constituted over 40% of the 
total. The Speaker intervened in only 30% of these illegal cases (ibid: 413-4). 
 Parliamentary rules may also be subverted. Ilie (2010a: 880) found “MPs 
use and take advantage of parliamentary practices to score points by exploiting 
each other’s weaknesses and vulnerabilities, as in the case of surreptitious use of 
unparliamentary language”. For example it is unparliamentary to accuse another 
MP of lying. Thus criticisms are made by suggestion, association, insinuation, 
indirect reporting, or irony. Epstein et al (2000: 11) add “posturing, innuendo, 
euphemism, artful and stinging asides, verbal and non-verbal heckling, and 
stylized harassment of various kinds”. A Clause 28 debate (15.12.1987) offers 
examples. With “I am not sure that I completely believe the stories that the hon. 
Gentleman has told us” (c.1001), Claire Short insinuates Harry Greenway is 
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lying. With “My hon. Friend the Member for Edgebaston has very sincere reasons 
for wanting to see this legislation go through” (c.995), Michael Brown suggests 
Jill Knight has an ulterior motive by means of irony. The parliamentary phrase ‘I 
am grateful to’ may serve a range of functions. With “I am grateful to the hon. 
Gentleman for giving way; it is very unusual” (c.1000), Tony Banks scorns Harry 
Greenway. With “I am grateful to the Minister. It is because I knew that he could 
not say a straight yes or no that use of the word ‘promotion’ is so dangerous” 
(c.1023), Joan Lestor scores a point against Michael Howard. Thus parliamentary 
language has some wide discrepancies between form and function. 
 In his pragmatic analysis of question use in the Commons, Wilson (1990) 
highlights this gap between form and function:
One might argue that the term question in this context is a misnomer, in that the 
politicians who are involved in the questioning of ministers seem to be doing much more 
than merely requesting information. This is undoubtedly true, but I would argue that any 
of the other actions they are attempting to perform (criticise, demean, insult) emerge from 
the primary action of the question itself, as it is used against the background of both 
stated propositions, and both general and shared knowledge. 
[...]
The reality is the oral session of parliament uses questions for frequently negative 
purposes.
(Wilson 1990: 155-6/160)
Similarly, in her study of politeness strategies in questions, Perez de Ayala (2001: 
158) argues that “politeness [is] the linguistic means used by MPs to produce in 
the Chamber FTAs [face threatening acts] which are forbidden”.As Crystal (1995: 
378) notes, “political questions and answers can rarely be taken at face value”.
 From a thematic perspective, Epstein et al (2000: 11) show storytelling is a 
factor in the legislative process. “Arguments for and against particular changes 
in law are substantively conducted through rival stories which are more or less 
realist or apocryphal in character.” Their analysis of three age-of-consent debates 
highlights the “nature and function of stories that are clearly spurious, yet 
believable⎯indeed widely believed⎯in their own time” (ibid:12). They conclude:
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In sum, parliamentary debates are cultural forms embedded in complex political 
transactions and formally deployed as legislative activity. This strongly cultural activity 
involves discursive struggles for hegemony which, in addition to the coercive force of law 
itself, intervenes in cultural currents and popular behaviours outside.
(Epstein, Johnson & Steinberg 2000: 14)
This makes parliamentary debates a complex as well as rich source of data.
 Lords debates tend to be longer and the pace slower. Lords who wish to 
speak are required to give advance notice and an order of speaking is prepared. 
As in the Commons, debates are introduced by a supportive proposal. Speeches 
are addressed to ‘My Lords’, but individuals are addressed and referred to in the 
third person as, ‘the noble Baroness, Baroness...’, or ‘the noble Lord, Lord...’. 
According to Silk & Walters (1998: 205) the “limit on a single debate is usually 
five hours”, but some debates in this study lasted for up to eight hours while 
others spanned two long sessions. It is usual for the proposer of a motion to 
conclude the debate after the closing opposition speaker and the Minister have 
had right of reply. With the words ‘the Question now be put’, the Lords voice 
whether they are ‘Content’ or ‘Not Content’. If the voiced vote is challenged, a 
division is held for which the quorum is 30. 
 Hansard
 Hansard (the Official Report) “is the edited verbatim report of proceedings 
in both Houses” (http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/pahansard.htm). 
This claim requires qualification. Parliamentary proceedings are recorded by 
teams of shorthand writers, stenographers and transcribers of taped recordings, 
who are also partly responsible for editing the transcript. Chilton (2004: 94) 
observes that “Hansard’s supposedly verbatim transcription [...] in fact ‘corrects’ 
interrogatives (and other features) to produce an idealised model of the session”. 
In a detailed comparison of the spoken and transcribed versions of four debates, 
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Slembrouck (1992) identifies four categories of editorial change. 
 His first category is ‘writteness’ (ibid: 104-108). This turns the speech into 
punctuated sentences which elide intonation, stress, disfluency, repetitions, 
incomplete utterances, pauses, false starts, reformulations and grammatical 
slips. The transcripts were also more formal than the speech: regional accents 
were unrepresented, contractions and informal variants were avoided. Further, 
unclear messages were ‘repaired’. As he notes (ibid: 107), this “is not a value free 
operation”, although Hansard does not allow factual changes. 
 Slembrouck’s second category is a focus on ideational meanings (ibid: 
108-110). The transcripts under-represented markers of speaker commitment, 
such as modal structures and hedges. He argues (ibid: 109), the “Hansard 
criteria of representational relevance appear broadly to entail a reduction of 
utterances to ideational claims and positions” which decontextualise the actual 
speech. While this is editorially rationalised in terms of clarity and brevity, it 
rests on assumptions about communicative efficiency.
 The third category concerns participant interaction (ibid: 110-113). 
Slembrouck acknowledges that the transcripts’ presentation as dialogue marks 
their spoken origin, but notes that interruptions such as cheering, shouting, 
laughter and heckling were largely omitted. The standard marker ‘[interruption]’ 
was sparsely used and elided its type, volume and duration. He also found mid-
utterance give-ways moved to a relevant point in the co-text, while overlapping 
speech and unintelligible parts of remarks were ignored.
 Slembrouck’s fourth category concerns forms of address and reference 
(ibid: 113-115). He found that the written records adjusted slippages in protocol 
to “make them conform to the prescribed conventions” (ibid: 114). He suggests 
(ibid: 115) that while these amendments provided “a definite marker of the 
interactive origin of the discourse [they prevented] the report from representing 
some inevitable aspects of speech habits” and functions. 
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 These are serious considerations when using Hansard as a data source. 
However, the importance of such editorial changes depends on what is being 
studied. Slembrouck is concerned with the written representation of speech. 
Both Slembrouck and Chilton seem to regard the spoken form as the definitive 
version of what is being communicated. In the case of Hansard this is debatable. 
Although Parliament is now systematically recorded for both radio and television 
(which also exclude some communicative features such as listener comments off 
microphone/camera or facial expressions in distance shots), Hansard remains 
the ‘Official Report’. It is this report that is consulted by all interested parties, 
particularly MPs, Lords and journalists. Debates in both Houses show speakers 
are acutely aware of Hansard and habitually cite it to support their arguments. 
In a Clause 28 debate for example (HC 15.12.1987), interventions ensured that 
unparliamentary listener comments were recorded (c.992, c.1009), while ‘the 
record’ (c.992, c.998, c.1004, c.1005, c.1006, c.1016, c.1018), ‘Official Report’ 
(c.997, c.1018) and ‘Hansard’ (c.995, c.1022) were referred to in the course of 
argument. This was in addition to quotes from speeches in the Lords and the 
Standing Committee for the Bill (c.989, c.990, c.991, c.995, c.996, c.997, c.998, 
c.1017). Thus in the case of Hansard, it is the written record that is the definitive 
and more influential version. 
 The categories of editorial change in Hansard are of limited relevance to 
this study. It seeks, firstly, to situate the arguments used for and against the 
legislative changes in their socio-political and historical contexts; secondly, to 
examine the significance of lexical divisions between each side of related debates. 
Hansard’s editorial changes make little difference to the former and, as the 
lexical analyses focus on statistically significant keywords and terms related to 
sexuality, they have minimal influence on the latter. Two final considerations are 
relevant. First, the online Historic Hansard pages have obvious typos. These are 
easily spotted in the qualitative analyses (and can be checked in the print edition 
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if necessary), while the large number of words in the more quantitative analyses 
minimizes misleading effect. Second, as a transcription of speech, Hansard has a 
large number of dashes many of which adjoin words which are therefore ignored 
by concordancing software. This is remedied by saving each debate in pdf and 
using the search facility to check for missing concordance lines. For a study 
focused on struggles between competing views of sexuality during this period of 
legislative change, Hansard is an appropriate data source. 
 Data Selection
 The period 1986 to 2005 was one of remarkable change for lesbians and 
gay men. The related legislative proposals generated long and heated debates in 
both Houses. However, this stream of legislative activity was rarely the result of 
government initiative; contextual factors played a major part. In the case of 
Section 28, it was the Thatcher Government’s agenda for disempowering Labour 
councils during the final throes of the Cold War. In the case of subsequent 
positive proposals, it was the courage of lesbians and gay men who took their 
cases to the European and/or UK courts that accelerated pressure for change 
(Appendix 1; Stonewall 2014a & b). Actual changes were also facilitated by 
provisions in the Treaty of Amsterdam 1997 and the Human Rights Act 1998, 
while the House of Lords Act 1999 reduced traditionalist opposition. Cooper 
(1993a: 261-3) argues that lesbian and gay rights activism was comparatively 
successful because it utilised “discourses of formal equality and citizenship [that 
concurred with] ideologies expressed by the state” and mobilised “around an 
agenda that prioritised state practice”. In addition to myriad campaign groups, 
out lesbians and gay men became state actors at local and national levels.
 Historic Hansard was searched for debates with a high concentration of 
search terms relating to sexuality. As Hansard frequencies refer to speaker turns 
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rather than an actual search-term count, and as debates vary in length, the 
frequencies are only an approximate guide to the focus on lesbians and gay men 
over a given period or in a particular debate. The most productive terms were 
homosexual (which included homosexuals and homosexuality), sexual orientation, 
lesbian, gay (which included their plurals, but from which a few non-sexuality 
uses of gay were excluded) and same-sex couples. The frequencies of individual 
terms varied over time and between legislative issues. The term homosexual was 
prominent in armed forces debates and its frequency gradually decreased over 
the period, while that of gay gradually increased. Conversely, lesbian was more 
prominent in Clause 28 debates after which its frequency declined. The term 
sexual orientation was little used in the early years, but gradually increased from 
the 1990s and was prominent in anti-discrimination debates. Similarly, the term 
same-sex couples was virtually unused until 2001 then soared with the Civil 
Partnership Bill 2004. 
 The frequencies of these five terms were recorded monthly from 1986 to 
mid-2004 (Appendix 2). Months with high overall frequencies were investigated to 
identify search-term use with specific debates. The monthly average of all terms 
for the period searched, excluding holiday months, was 35.6. A list of debates 
with an overall search-term frequency of 35 or above was compiled (Appendix 3). 
This yielded 39 debates, two of which were split into two sessions. Seven had 
search-term frequencies of over 100: three related to Clause 28 (1987-8), one to 
the second attempt to equalise the age of consent (1999), one to the attempted 
repeal of Section 28 (2000) and two to civil partnership (2004). Overall, the 39 
debates link to eight legislative issues: Clause 28, the age of consent, the armed 
forces, sexual-orientation discrimination, the Section 28 repeal, adoption and 
children, employment, and civil partnership. 
 Legislative issues for analysis were selected with five considerations in 
mind: the number and length of debates on an issue, the concentration of search 
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terms in debates, whether the issue had been previously researched, the need for 
a spread of issues in the study and over time. The selected issues fall into two 
periods: the latter part of the Thatcher Government and the Major Government 
(1986-1996) when resistance to change was strong and before any ECtHR cases 
had been won; the second term of the Blair Government (2001-2005) after the 
Treaty of Amsterdam, the Human Rights Act, Lords reform, and battles over the 
age of consent and the armed forces had been won. This enables a comparison of 
language and arguments used for and against the selected issues, in two distinct 
socio-political periods. Only one debate, in the second of these two periods, 
features briefly in a linguistic study. Existing linguistic studies (Baker 2004b/
2005; Burridge 2004) analyse debates in the Blair Government’s first term, 
which falls between the two periods selected for this study. 
 Baker’s (2004b/2005) study, first published in a journal then expanded in 
Chapter 2 of his book on ‘Public Discourses of Gay Men’, is a corpus analysis of 
three Lords’ debates on equalising the age of consent for gay men in 1998, 1999 
and 2000—a corpus of 100,000 words. He shows how gay men were constructed 
in the lexis of speakers for and against equalisation and illustrates his analysis 
with tables and quotes. His commentary falls into six themed sections: ‘Identities 
or acts’, ‘A discourse of tolerance’, ‘A criminal behaviour’, ‘Danger and ruin’, 
‘Unnatural and abnormal’, and ‘The thin end of the wedge’. He concludes with a 
discussion of sexual identity, socially imposed or individually adopted, and its 
indirect relation to sexual acts. He notes that while the Lords see themselves as 
an independent source of expertise, on this issue many were anachronistically 
rooted in pre-1967 criminal law and preoccupied with anal sex. 
 Burridge (2004) analyses disclaiming in Commons and Lords debates: six 
on the attempted repeal of Section 28 in 2000 and the two preceding its actual 
repeal in 2003. His focus is on how a homophobic discourse operates via the 
mitigation of prejudiced statements. He identifies two categories of disclaimers, 
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the absence of prejudice and the presence of tolerance, and discusses examples. 
His analysis shows that a significant number of anti-repeal speakers in the the 
attempted-repeal debates were trying to avoid being seen as prejudiced while 
advocating or legitimising discrimination, a strategy that was rarely challenged. 
While disclaiming was still evident in the actual-repeal debates, he notes that 
anti-repeal speakers in the Commons were more willing to concede a critique of 
tolerance. He concludes that raising awareness of how disclaiming functions as 
the subtle advocacy of discrimination is the first step to resisting it.
 These two linguistic studies each focus on a single legislative issue within 
a single timespan and therefore offer little insight into the range of arguments 
and language features evident in debates on other issues over the two decades of 
landslide legal change. In addition, while Baker adopts a single, albeit powerful, 
approach to language analysis, Burridge analyses examples of a single language 
feature. Both studies are important but limited. The data selected for this study 
covers a range of prominent legislative issues in the periods either side of the 
existing linguistic studies (see below) and approaches analysis of the language 
used in the relevant debates from multiple perspectives (see Chapters 3 and 4). 
 The following legislative issues were selected for analysis. In period one, 
the passage of Clause 28 of the Local Government Bill 1987-8 generated intense 
debates and scored highly in the frequency counts. Though well researched in 
sociology and cultural studies (Evans 1989; Smith 1990; Weeks 1991b; Reinhold 
1994a/b), it was selected because “what it did above all was to mobilize a lesbian 
and gay community that had been badly battered by the HIV/AIDS crisis” (Weeks 
2007: 95). As the catalyst mobilising struggle for legal change, it is the necessary 
starting point for this study and is the focus of Chapter 5. The reduction of the 
age of consent for gay men to 18 and the decriminalisation of lesbians and gay 
men in the armed forces in the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 were 
the main reforms under the Major government and also scored highly in the 
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frequency counts. An age-of-consent debate is analysed in a sociology thesis 
(Waites 1995). This initial, incremental, positive change is the focus of Chapter 6. 
The position of lesbians and gay men in the armed forces was debated regularly 
from 1986 to 1996, but these debates are unresearched. An attempt to repeal the 
ban on lesbians and gay men in the armed forces in the Armed Forces Bill 
1995-6 is the focus of Chapter 7. 
 In period two, an amendment to allow same-sex couples to jointly apply to 
adopt in the Adoption and Children Bill 2001-2 provoked strong resistance. Its 
enactment had important symbolic significance in that it acknowledged lesbian 
and gay partners as parents. Related studies are from a social policy perspective 
(Dey 2005; Hicks 2005). The amendment is the focus of Chapter 8. As secondary 
legislation (Statutory Instrument), the Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) 
Regulations 2003 bypassed the full parliamentary process of primary legislation. 
However, the Regulations were challenged in the Lords for non-compliance with 
the EU directive. The Regulations are analysed in a legal study (Oliver 2004). The 
Lords debate is the focus of Chapter 9. The major legislation of the period was 
the Civil Partnership Bill 2004, which scored highly in the search-term frequency 
counts and generated intense debates. It is well researched from sociological and 
legal perspectives (Barker 2004; Glennon 2006; Harding 2008; Weeks 2007 & 
2008b), but was selected for its major symbolic significance in terms of same-sex 
relationship recognition. It is the focus of Chapter 10. 
 The individual debates selected for qualitative analyses within these six 
issue-based Chapters are:
Period One:  The Local Government Bill    15.12.1987  Commons 
  The Criminal Justice and Public Order Bill  21.2.1994 Commons 
  The Armed Forces Bill    9.5.1996 Commons 
Period Two:  The Adoption and Children Bill   4.11.2002 Commons 
  The Employment Equality Regulations  17.6.2003 Lords
  The Civil Partnership Bill   12.10.2004 Commons 
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In addition to these six qualitative analyses, all debates in each period with above 
average search-term frequencies (Appendix 3) undergo a more quantitative 
corpus analysis. This enables an overview of shifts and stabilities in views of 
sexuality in the two periods by speakers who supported lesbians and gay men 
and those who did not (see Chapter 11).
 Conclusion
 The bank of legislative changes over the two decades marks significant 
change. However, as Angela Eagle MP emphasised (23.2.2011), they were not 
inevitable and were not achieved without struggle; they “were achieved in the 
face of fierce Conservative opposition and unremitting press hostility”. Struggle is 
evident in the debates on various dimensions: between the Commons and the 
Lords, between the political parties, between traditionalists and progressives in 
both Houses and between religious and secular values. This raises the question 
of how language use relates to views and values, and how the use of individual 
language items becomes associated with different evaluative positions. The 
social-constructionist theory of language use developed by Valentin Voloshinov 
and Mikhail Bakhtin in early twentieth-century Russia offers a theoretical basis 
for the construction and assimilation of views, values and social expectations via 
language use. Their ideas are the subject of the Chapter 3. 
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Chapter 3: Theory
Signs of Struggle: Voloshinov and Bakhtin
 The group of scholars known in the West as the ‘Bakhtin Circle’ met in 
post-revolutionary Russia between 1918 and 1928. It was in this period, in the 
flux of post-revolutionary idealism, that artists and intellectuals collectively 
adapted their ideas and practices to social utility for the new and fast-changing 
society. In this political atmosphere, it is not surprising that Voloshinov and 
Bakhtin, with other scholars, turned away from formalist (or structural) views of 
language, then epitomised in the work of de Saussure whose Course in General 
Linguistics was available informally to scholars from the early 1920s (Brandist 
2015: 125-8). Their solution was a social-constructionist view of language as 
used in everyday material realities. What Voloshinov and Bakhtin shared was the 
idea that all language use involves evaluation based on situated social experience 
and that meaning is constructed collaboratively in the fluctuating social contexts 
of its production and reception. Thus links between ‘signifiers’ and ‘signified’ 
were seen as variable. While there is considerable overlap between their ideas, 
their application differed. Voloshinov was mainly concerned with the role of 
language in social psychology and the pragmatics of its everyday use. Bakhtin 
was mainly concerned with language use in literature and only later applied their 
ideas to its everyday use. The political contexts of their writings also varied. 
Voloshinov’s works, written in the 1920s, more directly address class struggle in 
considering Marxism, language theory and language use. Bakhtin’s works, which 
span the Stalin era, draw on these ideas to more subtly address the forces of 
social control and resistance. It is this latter aspect of their work that makes it 
appropriate for this study. It offers a socio-political understanding of language 
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used by different social groups in struggles for social change.
 This Chapter summarises the migration of Voloshinov’s and Bakhtin’s 
ideas from the USSR to the West and outlines the three key aspects of their work 
most relevant to this study. Each aspect is discussed in turn and illustrated with 
contemporary examples related to the study’s concerns. A discussion of how 
their ideas about social struggle link to later theorisations concludes the chapter.
 Questions of Recognition 
 Stalin’s purge commissions were active by 1929. Bakhtin was arrested in 
1928 and exiled to Kazakhstan in 1929. Voloshinov kept his research post at the 
Institute for the Comparative History of the Literatures and Languages of the 
West and East in Leningrad, but died of TB in 1936. In the 1960s, after Soviet 
inquisitions had eased, their works received wider recognition, first in Russia, 
then in the West via translated publications in the 1970s and 80s. Controversy 
over the works’ authorship ensued (Vice 1997: 7-10). In 1973, “a distinguished 
Soviet linguist, V. V. Ivanov, [declared] that all significant writings signed by 
Voloshinov [and Medvedev were] written largely by Bakhtin” (Morris 1994: 2). The 
declaration was supported in the USA by Bakhtin’s main translator, editor and 
biographer, Holquist. However, Ivanov’s exclusion of a key work by Voloshinov, 
plus the chronology and diverse topics of Bakhtin’s and Voloshinov’s 1920s 
publications, counter the declaration (Titunik 1976: xvii-xix; Matejka & Titunik 
1986: ix-xi). Bakhtin also “refused to sign an affidavit on the alleged authorship 
[...] shortly before his death” in 1975 (ibid: ix). Given the machinations of Soviet 
politics and the anti-communist strictures of Cold-War USA, motivations for the 
declaration and for its acceptance are fathomable. Holquist also claims that the 
writings’ Marxist approach was “simply necessary window dressing aimed at 
making the work acceptable to the Soviet publishing authorities” (Morris 1994: 
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3). The Cold-War context offers motivation for this claim too. It is not supported 
by more recent archival research in Russia (Brandist 2008). In this study, it is 
the social-constructionist view of language use that is important. The concepts 
discussed in this chapter are identified with the original authors. 
 Three strands of Voloshinov’s and Bakhtin’s thinking are of key relevance 
to this study. The first links the evaluative aspects of language use to struggle 
between the views of different groups in society. The second links a person’s 
appropriation (and non-appropriation) of language items to the values they are 
perceived to carry. The third sets the construction of meaning and consciousness 
within interactive language use. However, as Brandist (2003; 2008; 2015: ch.5) 
and Brandist & Chown (2011) show, via research in the Russian archives, other 
Leningrad scholars (not published in translation) were also developing forms of 
sociolinguistics in the 1920s, decades before social approaches to language were 
being developed in the West. The scholars’ views of language use were informed 
by “lexical changes brought about by the flood of non-standard forms of speech 
into Russian cities and administration [which] clearly showed that language was 
not immobile, but undergoing significant adjustments under the pressure of 
social changes” (Brandist 2015: 129). Existing theories, whether structural or 
individualised, did not account for this. The scholars’ theorisations were born of 
socio-political need. In the 1920s, Soviet language policy was to enable national 
minorities and the peasantry to participate fully in social and political life and to 
bring local dialects and languages into “formal equality with Russian” (Brandist 
2003: 223). The policy fostered the scholars’ 1920s research. Their theorisations 
of how language works between socially partitioned groups, particularly where 
power differentials exist, are no less relevant in today’s fast-changing world.
 The Russian theorisations initially filtered into the West by indirect means 
and later surfaced in various strands of sociolinguistics. Voloshinov’s work was 
used by Roman Jakobson in Prague in the 1930s and he was responsible for its 
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translation and publication once he had an academic post in the USA (Morris 
1994: 2). In Britain, Firth (1957: 177-189) agreed with the social approach of the 
Russian linguists and references Jakobson. Gumperz & Hymes (1972) reference 
Firth and Jakobson, as does Halliday (1978)—along with Gumperz and Hymes. 
Many of Voloshinov’s and Bakhtin’s ideas are now implicit in social approaches 
to langauge analysis. Their work has also been of interest to social and cultural 
theorists in disciplines beyond linguistics. Their ideas are referenced, discussed 
or applied in for example: Williams (1976; 1977; 1986); Bourdieu (1977; 1991); 
Hall et al (1980); Kristeva (1980); Eagleton (1981; 1982; 1991); Fowler (1981); 
Billig (1987; 1997); Hodge & Kress (1988); Fairclough (1992); Slembrouck (1992); 
Hall (1993); White (1993); Chouliaraki & Fairclough (1999); Joseph (2004); 
Blommaert (2005); Cameron (2006a); Maybin (2006); Tolson (2006); Tannen 
(2007). In addition to the importance of their ideas to this study, it is hoped that 
by returning to their writings the originality of their thinking will be highlighted.
 Language and Social Struggle
 Voloshinov saw language as a series of fluctuating ideological signs which 
are formed and revised in the shifting social contexts of their use: 
The sign is a creation between individuals, a creation within a social milieu. Therefore the 
item in question must first acquire interindividual significance, and only then can it 
become an object for sign formation. In other words, only that which has acquired social 
value can enter the world of ideology, take shape, and establish itself there. 
(Voloshinov 1986 [1929]: 22, author’s italics)
Ideology here applies as much to an everyday view of experience, to a speaker’s 
situated view of life, as to a formulated belief system. Thus language use always 
conveys an evaluative as well as referential meaning. Accordingly, he argued that 
evaluations are produced within specific social situations; that is: language items 
function differently in different contexts and as used by different speakers with 
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different interlocutors. He saw this ‘extraverbal’ context as a largely internalised 
constituent of interaction spanning the historical conditions of the situation, its 
perceived atmosphere, the interlocutors’ spatial purview, their common 
knowledge, and their respective evaluation(s):
[T]he extraverbal situation is far from being merely the external cause of an utterance⎯it 
does not operate on the utterance from the outside, as if it were a mechanical force. 
Rather, the situation enters into the utterance as an essential and constitutive part of the 
structure of its import. Consequently, a behavioral utterance as a meaningful whole is 
comprised of two parts: (1) the part realized and actualized in words and (2) the assumed 
part. On this basis the behavioral utterance can be likened to the enthymeme. 
(Voloshinov 2012 [1926]: 164, author’s italics)
Shared assumptions thus “generate a community of value judgments” (ibid: 165):
Thus every utterance in the business of life is an objective social enthymeme. It is 
something like a “password” known only to those who belong to the same social purview. 
The distinguishing characteristic of behavioral utterances consists precisely in the fact that 
they make myriad connections with the extraverbal context of life and, once severed from 
that context, lose almost all their import⎯a person ignorant of the immediate pragmatic 
context will not understand these utterances. 
(Voloshinov 2012 [1926]: 165-6)
This applies to terms used in lesbian and gay contexts⎯as Zwicky (1997: 25) 
observes: “As with slang, we are dealing with shifting, local usages. Rapid change 
divides the generations, and locally restricted usages produce intergroup 
misunderstandings.” This is applicable to all socially partitioned groups but, as 
Voloshinov argued, pragmatic contexts are not mutually exclusive:
The immediate context may be of varying scope. [...] However, the unified purview on which 
an utterance depends can expand in both space and time: The “assumed” may be that of 
the family, clan, nation, class and may encompass days or years or whole epochs. The wider 
the overall purview and its corresponding social group, the more constant the assumed 
factors in the utterance become.
(Voloshinov 2012 [1926]: 166, author’s italics)
Language items are repeatedly open to re-evaluation in their transposition from 
one speaker and one context to another. The positive and negative connotations 
they acquire and lose thus reflect the social evaluations of their users: 
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The very same thing that makes the ideological sign vital and mutable is also, however, 
that which makes it a refracting and distorting medium. The ruling class strives to impart 
a supraclass, eternal character to the ideological sign, to extinguish or drive inward the 
struggle between social value judgments which occurs in it, to make the sign uniaccentual. 
(Voloshinov 1986 [1929]: 23)
Voloshinov also reviewed the role of language in wider social change:
New aspects of existence, once they are drawn into the sphere of social interest, once they 
make contact with the human word and human emotion, do not coexist peacefully with 
other elements of existence previously drawn in, but engage them in struggle, reevaluate 
them and bring about a change in their position within the unity of the evaluative purview. 
This dialectical generative process is reflected in the generation of semantic properties in 
language. A new significance emerges from an old one, and does so with its help, but this 
happens so that the new significance can enter into contradiction with the old one and 
restructure it. 
The outcome is a constant struggle of accents in each semantic sector of existence.
(Voloshinov 1986 [1929]: 106)
This constant struggle for significance within the ambiguities of everyday social 
interaction make distinctions in language use emblematic of struggle between 
social groups. Although Voloshinov’s point of reference was class struggle, his 
analysis applies equally to other socially partitioned groups. 
 An example of struggle for significance relevant to this study is the use of 
sodomite(s). The term invokes a emotionally loaded history. In Parliament, its use 
surfaced at times of resistance to social change and potential reform. Hansard 
records no use of it during the nineteenth century and only eight uses in the 
twentieth: one in a Homosexual Reform debate (HC 26.5.1965 c.615); two in a 
Sexual Offences Bill debate (HL 21.6.1965 c.303 & c.361); two during the Gay 
Liberation years (HC 5.4.1974 c.1651; HC 19.5.1976 c.1501); one in a debate on 
Homosexual Offences (HC 14.3.1994 c.722); plus two in provocative questions by 
Lord Tebbit: on definitions of family (HL 29.10.1997 c.242WA), and same-sex 
partner tenancy-succession rights (HL 18.11.1997 c.69WA). In each case the 
doctrinal horrors of sodomy were transported into a shifting twentieth century 
context. Lord Tebbit’s uses of the term especially attempt to relegate its referents 
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to a maligned position and claim judgmental superiority in his struggle against 
proposed reforms. Notably, three twenty-first century uses of sodomites in a Civil 
Partnership debate (HL 22.4.2004 c.416), occurred in a mocking critique of 
anachronistic Old Testament beliefs and practices. As Voloshinov emphasised:
Countless ideological threads running through all areas of social intercourse register effect 
in the word. It stands to reason, then, that the word is the most sensitive index of social 
changes, and what is more, of changes still in the process of growth, still without definitive 
shape and not as yet accommodated into already regularized and fully defined ideological 
systems. The word is the medium in which occur the slow quantitative accretions of those 
changes which have not yet achieved the status of a new ideological quality, not yet 
produced a new and fully-fledged ideological form. The word has the capacity to register all 
the transitory, delicate, momentary phases of social change.
(Voloshinov 1986 [1929]: 19, author’s italics)
As Cameron (2006a: 144) observes, Voloshinov saw attempts to “fix the meanings 
of words and utterances [as] imposing an illusory unity or consensus and 
denying the reality of continual struggle over the sign”.
 Bakhtin epitomised the social struggle inherent in language use with his 
concepts of ‘centripetal’ and ‘centrifugal’ forces. The former he characterised as 
authoritative and centralising discourse, which strives to unify “the verbal- 
ideological world” (1981 [1935]: 270), the latter as the diverse evaluations of 
different groups, in different social contexts and different historical periods. He 
saw the operation of these two forces as a constant source of dynamic tension at 
play in all language use: from the pronouncements of governments and religion 
which seek social control, to the everyday interactions of individuals who may 
seek to resist it. He termed the kaleidoscopic intersections and contradictions 
between these different social languages ‘heteroglossia’. This is best understood 
as social hierarchies within “genre, register, sociolect, dialect” (Vice 1997: 18), as 
well as between different languages where they co-exist in a society, each strata 
of language being associated with a particular way of seeing the world, with 
particular contexts, and particular social groups:
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But the centripetal forces of the life of language, embodied in ‘unitary language’, operate in 
the midst of heteroglossia. At any given moment of its evolution, language is stratified not 
only into linguistic dialects in the strict sense of the word [...] but also⎯and for us this is 
the essential point⎯into languages that are socio-ideological: languages of social groups, 
“professional” and “generic” languages, languages of generations and so forth. 
And this stratification and heteroglossia, once realized, is not only a static invariant of 
linguistic life, but also what insures its dynamics: stratification and heteroglossia widen 
and deepen as long as language is alive and developing. Alongside the centripetal forces, 
the centrifugal forces of language carry on their uninterrupted work, alongside verbal-
ideological centralization and unification, the uninterrupted processes of decentralization 
and disunification go forward.
(Bakhtin 1981 [1935]: 271-2) 
He also linked heteroglossia to internal struggle between authoritative discourse 
and internally persuasive discourse: the former requiring conformity regardless 
of belief, the latter corresponding to views, perhaps associated with a particular 
writer or speaker, that are convincing and alter consciousness:
Internally persuasive discourse⎯as opposed to one that is externally authoritative⎯is, as 
it is affirmed through assimilation, tightly interwoven with one’s own ‘word’. In the 
everyday rounds of our consciousness, the internally persuasive word is half-ours and 
half-someone else’s. [...] More than that, it enters into an intense interaction, a struggle 
with other internally persuasive discourses. Our ideological development is just such an 
intense struggle within us for hegemony among various available verbal and ideological 
points of view, approaches, directions and values. 
(Bakhtin 1981 [1935]: 345-6, author’s italics)
Thus the assimilation of internally persuasive discourse is an interactive process 
between available alternatives. Conversely, the non-assimilation of discourse and 
the values with which it is associated, requires an alternative view to be already 
persuasive in an individual’s consciousness.
 An example of limited alternatives in this study is the press hostility to 
lesbians and gay men in the 1980s (Lumsden 1988: 203-5) much of it exploiting 
the AIDS crisis to vilify gay men (Watney 1997: 77-96) and much of it in The Sun 
(Lumsden 16.1.1987). Heterosexuals without lesbian or gay friends or family had 
little access to alternative views. An effect of this press onslaught is evident in 
British Social Attitude Surveys which recorded negativity towards homosexuality 
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between 1983 and 1993: it peaked in 1987 (HC Research Paper 98/68: 29) at the 
height of press hostility preceding the general election and Clause 28 (Chapter 5). 
 The ways in which struggle between the views of different social groups is 
inherent in the language they use underpins this study. 
 The Collective Nature of ‘Word’ and ‘Voice’
 Bakhtin argued that the words available to a speaker derive from their 
exposure to other people’s use of them in specific contexts, for specific purposes. 
Thus the ‘voices’ and ‘words’ of others are continually (re)appropriated: 
The word in language is half someone else’s. It becomes ‘one’s own’ only when the speaker 
populates it with his own intention, his own accent, when he appropriates the word, 
adapting it to his own semantic and expressive intention. Prior to this moment of 
appropriation, the word does not exist in a neutral and impersonal language (it is not, after 
all, out of a dictionary that the speaker gets his words!) but rather it exists in other 
people’s mouths, in other people’s contexts, serving other people’s intentions: it is from 
there that one must take the word, and make it one’s own. 
(Bakhtin 1981 [1935]: 293-4)
This view is supported by contemporary work in corpus linguistics which, as 
Maybin (2001: 68) notes, “throws up consistent patterns of evaluative meanings 
and connotations for particular phrases, which are not open to intuition, or 
recorded in dictionaries”. Hoey’s (2005) corpus research explains collocation in 
terms of lexical priming: that is repeated exposure to co-occurring words “leads 
to a speaker unintentionally reproducing some aspect of language, [which] in 
turn primes the hearer” (ibid: 9). He argues that priming is “the driving force 
behind language use, language structure and language change” (ibid: 12). 
However, while Hoey’s work offers Bakhtin’s view of language appropriation 
empirical support, it does not explore its evaluative dimension and thus does not 
consider non-appropriation. According to Bakhtin, not all words to which an 
individual is exposed may be appropriated. The above quote continues:
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And not all words for just anyone submit equally easily to this appropriation, to this 
seizure and transformation into private property: many words stubbornly resist, others 
remain alien, sound foreign in the mouth of the one who appropriated them and who now 
speaks them; they cannot be assimilated into his context and fall out of it; it is as if they 
put themselves in quotation marks against the will of the speaker. Language is not a 
neutral medium that passes freely and easily into the private property of the speaker’s 
intentions; it is populated⎯overpopulated⎯with the intentions of others. 
(Bakhtin 1981 [1935]: 294)
This posits non-appropriation as a matter of avoidance associated with negatively 
perceived contexts, connotations and users of the word(s). It suggests people are 
unlikely to appropriate the words of others with which they cannot identify. As 
Zwicky notes in relation to lesbian and gay identities:
Identification: From the available potential models, we choose people we believe ourselves 
to be, or wish to be like. 
Avoidance: We avoid behaviors that are associated with people we do not believe ourselves 
to be, or do not wish to be like.
(Zwicky 1997: 29)
An example of (non-)appropriation related to this study relates to the adoption of 
gay instead of homosexual, by gay men in the 1970s:
The use of the word ‘gay’⎯our own word for ourselves⎯marked a decisive break with the 
institutions and discourses of heresy and disease within which all homosexuals were, by 
definition, previously confined. For the first time it became possible to make a positive 
homosexual self-identification in terms other than those of the dominant heterosexual 
culture. 
(Watney 1980: 64)
Its adoption was a conscious rejection of the clinical homosexual with its history 
of abnormality and illness and of other pejorative terms such as queer (Weeks 
2011: 63). While gay became mainstream over the two decades of this study, it 
was and is contested. The new usage of the term was disparaged in the Lords 
(18.12.1986 c.312; 1.2.1988 c.893/c.895; 16.2.1988 c.610) and homosexual was 
still widely used by speakers in both Houses who opposed Civil Partnership in 
2004. By the 1990s gay had “been used continually in the UK gutter press 
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alongside their words (‘poof’ and so on), and [was] contaminated with many of 
their resonances” (Sinfield 1994: 205). More recently, among teenagers, gay has 
been used to mean “lame, or unfashionable” (Baker 2005: 1). An Ofsted report 
(19.6.2012) found that gay was widely used to mean ‘rubbish’ and that pupils 
perceived to be gay were one of three groups at most risk of bullying. A Stonewall 
report (2012) found that 99% of gay pupils had heard gay used negatively at 
school, even by teachers, and that 55% had been bullied. Both reports cite good 
and bad practice in school policy and teacher response. The persistence of this 
trend in schools is partly a hangover from Section 28 and lack of teacher training 
on the issue; it is also symptomatic of pervasive resistance to legitimisation and 
acceptance of lesbians and gay men. Investigating the evaluative dimension of 
lexical choices is an important feature of this study. 
 The appropriation of ‘voices’ and ‘words’ are most easily discernable in the 
speech of children, in which the exact intonation of the words/voice they have 
appropriated for their own purposes may be identifiable. In her ethnographic 
study of schoolchildren’s talk in the process of socialisation Maybin found:
The central role of evaluation in children’s meaning making is expressed particularly 
through their use of reported voices, which constituted their main means of invoking other 
contexts away from the here and now and bringing them to bear in some way on what was 
happening in the present.
(Maybin 2006: 186)
Maybin’s research posits the appropriation of another’s voice/words as akin to 
intuitively acquiring a persona, to adopting an evaluative stance for the purpose 
of responding to a social situation. While adults may recognise this phenomenon 
in themselves when responding to something with an unwittingly absorbed 
expression or viewpoint, the origin of such stances is unacknowledged and thus 
rarely traceable in the speech of others. However, in reported speech, the words 
are acknowledged as belonging to someone else. Voloshinov focused on the 
relation between the reported speech and the reporting context: 
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[T]he true object of enquiry ought to be precisely the dynamic interrelationship of these two 
factors, the speech being reported (the other person’s speech) and the speech doing the 
reporting (the author’s speech). After all, the two actually do exist, function, and take 
shape only in their interrelation, and not on their own, the one apart from the other.  
(Voloshinov 1986 [1929]: 119)
He proposed two directions of evaluation within the reporting conventions of a 
given language. The first, ‘linear style’, he linked to the perceived authority of the 
report and its depersonalised relation to the reporter:
Within the scope covered by the first direction, we must also define the degree of 
authoritarian reception of an utterance and the degree of its ideological assurance⎯its 
dogmatism. The more dogmatic an utterance, the less leeway permitted between truth and 
falsehood or good and bad in its reception by those who comprehend and evaluate, the 
greater will be the depersonalization that the forms of reported speech will undergo. 
(Voloshinov 1986 [1929]: 120)
Whether or not the reporter’s view concurs with speech reported in this direct 
way, it is clearly demarcated from it. The second direction, ‘pictorial style’, he 
linked to the reporter’s paraphrasing and personalisation of the report:
Language devises means for infiltrating reported speech with authorial retort and 
commentary in deft and subtle ways. The reporting context strives to break down the self-
contained compactness of the reported speech, to resolve it, to obliterate its boundaries. 
We may call this style of speech reporting pictorial. Its tendency is to obliterate the precise, 
external contours of reported speech; at the same time, the reported speech is 
individualized to a much greater degree⎯
(Voloshinov 1986 [1929]: 120-121, author’s italics)
Reports in both styles are prevalent in parliamentary debates. On reporting in 
rhetorical genres Voloshinov argued:
It is important to determine the specific gravity of rhetorical speech, judicial or political, in 
the linguistic consciousness of the given social group at a given time. Moreover, the 
position that a specimen speech to be reported occupies on the social hierarchy of values 
must be taken into account. The stronger the feeling of hierarchical eminence in another’s 
utterance, the more sharply defined will its boundaries be, and the less accessible will it be 
to penetration by retorting and commenting tendencies from outside. 
(Voloshinov 1986 [1929]: 123)
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 An example of a fully demarcated and completely depersonalised ‘linear’ 
report is Ken Livinstone’s quoting of Heinrich Himmler’s decree on homosexuals 
during his speech in a Clause 28 debate (HC 15.12.1987 c.1013). Its origin was 
clearly identified and it was quoted verbatim to link the Clause to fascism, but 
had no observable effect on Conservative support for the Clause. A paraphrased 
and personalised ‘pictorial’ report in the same debate is Jill Knight’s citing of 
unidentified parents who had, she claimed, told her that they had been hit, spat 
on, urinated on and punched in the stomach when complaining about schools 
“promoting homosexuality” (c.1000). By linking her claim to unsubstantiated 
press reports and by reference to reports that had been found to be lies, Clive 
Soley was able to accuse her (within parliamentary rules) of lying (c.1008). This 
too had no observable effect on Conservative support. However, the authority of 
the demarcated quote is clear; it went unremarked except for a reference to Ken 
Livingstone having raised “the emotional level of the debate” (c.1015), but the 
paraphrased report was successfully challenged. That neither the quote nor the 
challenge had any discernable impact on Conservative views, shows that parents 
complaints about the alleged promotion of homosexuality was higher up their 
hierarchy of social values, and better served Conservative interests, than either 
the truth of Jill Knight’s report or their position being linked to fascism.
 The debates analysed in this study show that social hierarchies of value 
are also evident in reported arguments, situations and events. 
 Interaction and the Construction of Meaning
 Voloshinov distinguished between ‘meaning’ and ‘theme’: the former being 
the basic reproducible reference(s) or function(s) of words which give a language 
common currency; the latter being a response to specific instances of their use 
(1986 [1929]: 100). Thus theme corresponds to the process of understanding, to 
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a situated construction of significance via internal dialogue with assumptions 
derived from social experience. Dialogue here applies to the appraisal of any 
verbal medium with which a listener/reader engages: 
[E]ach of the distinguishable significative elements of an utterance and the entire utterance 
as a whole entity are translated in our minds into another, active and responsive, context. 
Any true understanding is dialogic in nature. Understanding is to utterance as one line of 
dialogue is to the next. Understanding strives to match the speaker’s word with a counter 
word. 
(Voloshinov 1986 [1929]: 102, author’s italics)
Accordingly, he argued: 
Therefore, there is no reason for saying that meaning belongs to the word as such. In 
essence, meaning belongs to a word in its position between speakers; that is, meaning is 
realized only in the process of active, responsive understanding. Meaning does not reside 
in the word or in the soul of the speaker or in the soul of the listener. Meaning is the effect 
of interaction between speaker and listener produced via the material of a particular sound 
complex. It is like an electric spark that occurs only when two different terminals are 
hooked together. 
(Voloshinov 1986 [1929]: 102-3, author’s italics)
Thus it is in social experience, at any given meeting point between the situations 
a speaker/writer has available from which to appropriate language and those the 
listener/reader has available to evaluate it, that meaning is constructed. It is an 
ongoing, interactive process between social experience, participants and context. 
 Voloshinov also applied this dialogic view to thought, or ‘inner speech’, 
which he saw as the evaluative re-running of links between language, people, 
situations and events which constitutes consciousness: 
These units of inner speech, these total impressions of utterances, are joined with and 
alternate with one another not according to the laws of grammar and logic but according to 
the laws of evaluative (emotive) correspondence, dialogical deployment, etc., in close 
dependence on the historical conditions of the social situation and the whole pragmatic 
run of life. 
(Voloshinov 1986 [1929]: 38, author’s italics)
Therefore neither ‘inner’ nor ‘outward’ speech, nor the meaning constructed via 
these multidimensional dialogic evaluations, belong to the individual. They 
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belong to people’s social experience, to the social groups and environments that 
gave them words, to their social milieu (2012 [1927]: 166). Thus the product of 
this evaluation⎯consciousness, also belongs to the groups and environments 
within which it was formed:
This ideological chain stretches from individual consciousness to individual consciousness, 
connecting them together. Signs emerge, after all, only in the process of interaction 
between one individual consciousness and another. And the individual consciousness itself 
is filled with signs. Consciousness becomes consciousness only once it has been filled with 
ideological (semiotic) content, consequently, only in the process of social interaction. 
(Voloshinov 1986 [1929]: 11)
He saw the continuity of both individual and group consciousness as the product 
of these ongoing, interactive processes throughout life.
 The continuity of consciousness, embedded in ongoing dialogues between 
language users, between inner and outward speech, between internalised and 
external experience, and competing evaluations, underpinned Voloshinov’s 
critique of Freud (2012 [1927]). He argued (ibid: Ch.8) that Freud’s concept of the 
unconscious and conscious minds was no more than a struggle of historically 
specific ideological motives. This led him to distinguish between an ‘official’ and 
‘unofficial’ conscious and hence between ‘official’ and ‘unofficial’ ideology:
The wider and deeper the breach between the official and unofficial conscious, the more 
difficult it becomes for motives of inner speech to turn into outward speech (oral or written 
or printed, in a circumscribed or broad social milieu) wherein they might acquire 
formulation, clarity and rigor. Motives under these conditions begin to fail, to lose their 
verbal countenance, and little by little really do turn into a “foreign body” in the psyche. 
Whole sets of organic manifestations come, in this way, to be excluded from the zone of 
verbalized behaviour and may become asocial. 
(Voloshinov 2012 [1927]: 145-6, author’s italics)
The potential for the ‘unofficial conscious’ to become asocial and die out, or to 
become social and gain strength, can be applied to the struggles of any group 
partitioned by social conditions. In this study, the distinction captures the pre- 
and post-1970s situation of lesbians and gay men and highlights the importance 
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of group solidarity in struggles for social change. The above quote continues:
Of course, not every area of human behavior is subject to so complete a divorce from verbal 
ideological formulation. After all, neither is it true that every motive in contradiction with 
official ideology must degenerate into indistinct inner speech and then die out⎯it might 
well engage in a struggle with that official ideology. If such a motive is founded on the 
economic being of the whole group, if it is not merely the motive of a declasse loner, then it 
has a chance for a future and perhaps even a victorious future. There is no reason why 
such a motive should become asocial and lose contact with communication. Only, at first a 
motive of this sort will develop within a small social milieu and will depart into the 
underground⎯not the psychological underground of repressed complexes, but the salutary 
political underground. That is exactly how a revolutionary ideology in all spheres of culture 
comes about. 
(Voloshinov 2012 [1927]: 146, author’s italics) 
A core focus of this study is shifts and continuities in strands of ‘official ideology’ 
relating to lesbians and gay men in the process of legislative change.
 Interaction was also central to Bakhtin’s thinking, but in a more abstract 
and generalised way. He distinguished between the linguistic significance of an 
utterance and its actual meaning: the former being understood via language 
knowledge, the latter via other utterances in the contexts of their viewpoints and 
values (1981 [1935]: 281). This corresponds to Voloshinov’s distinction between 
meaning and theme, but Bakhtin was less attentive to the process of meaning 
construction and more concerned with boundaries between meanings:
The way in which the word conceptualizes its object is a complex act⎯all objects, open to 
dispute and overlain as they are with qualifications, are from one side highlighted while 
from the other side dimmed by hetroglot social opinion, by an alien word about them. And 
into this complex play of light and shadow the word enters⎯it becomes saturated with this 
play, and must determine within it the boundaries of its own semantic and stylistic 
contours.
(Bakhtin 1981 [1935]: 276-277)
Here, agency is oddly downplayed, as if the word itself must determine its own 
boundaries, as if ‘this play’ is displaced from the social onto the word and the 
word becomes a surrogate for the social. This displacement is typical of Bakhtin’s 
disguising of political problems as cultural ones under Stalin’s rule (Brandist 
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1996a: 101). The boundaries of meaning are linked to internal resistance:
A conversation with an internally persuasive word that one has begun to resist may 
continue, but it takes on another character: it is questioned, it is put in a new situation in 
order to expose its weak sides, to get a feel for its boundaries, to experience it physically as 
an object. 
(Bakhtin 1981 [1935]: 348)
And the boundaries are here subject to re-evaluation.
 In his later elaboration of speech genres (1986 [1952-3]), Bakhtin was 
concerned with the boundaries of an utterance. Utterance here refers to any 
complete statement, from a single spoken word to a lengthy tome. He argued it 
“is not a conventional unit, but a real unit, clearly delimited by the change of 
speaking subjects” (ibid: 71-2). Therefore an utterance is always preceded by 
utterances to which it responds and is always followed by responsive utterances. 
Bakhtin saw speech genres as relatively stable types of utterance within specific 
contexts and for specific purposes, as socially accepted ways of talking or writing 
about a particular topic with particular addressees in mind:
An essential (constitutive) marker of the utterance is its quality of being directed to 
someone, its addressivity. [...] This addressee can be an immediate particpant-interlocutor 
in an everyday dialogue, a differentiated collective of specialists in some particular area of 
cultural communication, a more or less differentiated public, ethnic group, 
contemporaries, like-minded people, opponents and enemies, a subordinate, a superior, 
someone who is lower, higher, familiar, foreign, and so forth. [...] Both the composition and, 
particularly, the style of the utterance depend on those to whom the utterance is 
addressed, how the speaker (or writer) senses or imagines his addressees, and the force of 
their effect on the utterance. Each speech genre in each area of speech communication has 
its own typical conception of the addressee, and this defines it as a genre. 
(Bakhtin 1986 [1952-3]: 95, author’s italics)
Speech genres therefore encode communicative expectations. This makes them 
an essential factor in understanding relations between language use and social 
context as conceived by the speaker/writer in question. 
 In the case of this study, parliamentary protocols constitute an ‘official 
genre’ in that they exemplify an official encoding of expectations. Conversely, in 
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the Commons at least, MPs manipulations of the protocols can be seen as an 
‘unofficial genre’ which offers greater insight into their evaluations of the struggle 
over the legislative issue in question. 
 Theoretical Resonances
 Voloshinov’s and Bakhtin’s focus on the dynamic nature of social struggle, 
located in power differentials between the shared understanding, via language 
use, of differently situated social groups, is epitomised in both Voloshinov’s 
concept of official and unofficial ideology and Bakhtin’s concept of centripetal 
and centrifugal forces. Later social theorists came to similar conclusions. For 
example Hall’s (1980a: 35-40) dynamic concept of ‘hegemony’, derived from 
Gramsci’s prison notebooks (translated and published in 1971), emphasises that 
it is never a permanent situation and remains open to contestation. In fact Hall 
(1993: 12-18), upholds a debt to Voloshinov’s ‘Marxism and the Philosophy of 
Language’ over that of Gramsci in expanding the Birmingham Centre for Cultural 
Studies’ thinking on social struggle beyond the binary of class struggle. A similar 
idea is evident in Foucault’s (1987: 101) concept of reverse discourse. 
 In fact the resonance between the Russian scholars and Gramsci goes 
deeper and is of linguistic as well as political importance. Brandist (2015: 8-12/ 
25-50) shows, via his archive research, that a concept of hegemony was pivotal 
in Russian Marxism from the late nineteenth century, where it referred to the 
hoped for ‘power to the working class’, to the ‘hegemony of the proletariat’ which, 
importantly, was of necessity based on class alliances sufficient to overthrow the 
Tzarist autocracy. By the 1920s the concept had become a celebrated Bolshevik 
Party principle, and slogan—‘power to the Soviets’ (ibid: 9). Brandist goes on to 
show, via documents relating to Gramsci’s service on the Comintern’s executive 
committee in Moscow (1922-3 & 1925), how important the question of language 
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was in the 1917 aftermath and how ideas about language, culture and hegemony 
were closely interlinked. In prison, Gramsci was “relatively insulated from the 
enormous distortions of Stalinist doctrine” (ibid: 10) thus, with his knowledge of 
linguistics from his studies at Turin University under Bartoli, he was able to 
elaborate the concept of hegemony in a way that had become impossible in the 
USSR under Stalin. In fact the term disappeared from use in 1930s Russian 
documents, though the concept can be discerned in coded form in Bakhtin’s 
(1981 [1935]) essays, especially ‘Discourse and the Novel’ which reproduced the 
Lenningrad scholars’ ideas in coded form. After 1932, the Soviet linguists’ work 
on social dialects was excluded and Russian was imposed as the compulsory 
national language for all: the 1920s Bolshevik egalitarian hegemony was reversed 
and inverted. Brandist (1996b: 73) concludes that both Bakhtin and Gramsci 
show that “the concept of the vanguard party need not be synonymous with 
authoritarianism and, indeed, can be its antithesis” (see also Brandist 1996a). 
 Brandist (2015: 1-8) also argues that post-1970s appropriations of the 
term ‘hegemony’ in the West, through the translations of Gramsci’s notebooks, 
progressively loosened it from his “painstaking analyses of the shifting relations 
between class forces” (ibid: 4) and serially bypassed his attention to language in 
the process. Brandist outlines shifts in the term’s usage in cultural studies, post-
colonialism and post-structuralism respectively in discussing the appropriations 
of Williams (1977), Said (1985), the Birmingham Centre for Cultural Studies 
under Hall, and Laclau & Mouffe (1985). He sees the term’s use as a category for 
general cultural analysis on ideological grounds as severing Gramsci’s discussion 
“from its historical moorings” (ibid: 5) and separating it from Marxism, a process 
compounded by some post-structuralist thinkers’ “discussions of the relationship 
between culture and imperialism” (ibid: 7). The use of ‘hegemony’ as a synonym 
for imperialism is noted by Williams (1976) in his discussion of the term—along 
with ‘superpower politics’. These shifts in the term’s use say something about 
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influences operative in Western academic culture during the Cold War. The 
term’s appropriations and mutations also clearly illustrate a basic premise of 
Voloshinov’s and Bakhtin’s thinking: that the shifting relations of political 
struggle between social groups are ongoing and rooted in dialogic—whether 
external or internal—language use. 
 Conclusion
 If, as Voloshinov and Bakhtin argued, language use is always evaluative 
and is appropriated by exposure to ‘voices’ and ‘words’ deemed authoritative or 
convincing by the listener/reader, then language use is the primary means by 
which prejudiced beliefs are acquired, passed on, and institutionalised in laws 
and social habits. These in turn create social expectations, which may lead to 
social struggle when challenged. However, while their ideas underpin this study, 
they offer no systematic procedures for analysing stretches of language. This is 
addressed in Chapter 4.
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Chapter 4: Method
Reading the Signs: Baker, van Dijk and Wodak
 Operationalising the ideas of Voloshinov and Bakhtin requires methods 
focused on the evaluative nature of language use within specific socio-political 
and historical contexts. A combination of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and 
Corpus Linguistics (CL) is ideal. CL techniques can identify prevalent language 
items and their evaluative associations with the speaker group(s) from which the 
corpus was compiled. CDA considers the socio-political and historical contexts of 
the arguments in which the language items in question occurred. It thus offers 
ways to identify ideological stances, taken-for-granted beliefs and historical 
links. CDA is more a linguistic approach to social critique than a method, in 
which ‘critical’ is seen as making one’s own, as well as others’, ideological stance 
clear. Showing how powerful social beliefs are enacted, maintained and resisted 
via language used in specific contexts are its concerns. It has no fixed procedure, 
but includes a range of analytical categories via which the language in question 
may be interrogated. Thus CL techniques, as particular means of language 
interrogation, may be seen as categories within the broader concerns of CDA. 
 This chapter selects analytical categories from the work of three critical 
discourse analysts: Paul Baker, Teun van Dijk and Ruth Wodak. It outlines their 
approaches to CDA in turn and shows how they relate to the ideas of Voloshinov 
and Bakhtin. The final section sets out the study’s analytical procedures. 
 Baker, van Dijk and Wodak were chosen for their experience in analysing 
institutionalised prejudices in political, media and parliamentary contexts, 
notably: homophobia and gender boundaries (Baker 2004a; 2004b; 2005; 2008; 
2014), racism (van Dijk 1991; 1993; 1999; 2001; 2004; 2006a; 2008; Wodak 
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1996; 2000; 2008) and anti-Semitism (Wodak 1991; 1997; 2003a; 2003b; 2006a; 
2006b; 2007). Collectively, their working definitions, with the ideas of Voloshinov 
and Bakhtin (Appendix 4) show varying degrees of structural/non-structural 
organisation. Those of Voloshinov, Bakhtin and Baker are less structural, van 
Dijk’s are relatively structural in his compartmentalisation of categories, while 
Wodak’s fall somewhere between this artificial polarisation. As Hall (1981) argued 
in his ‘Cultural studies: two paradigms’ essay, neither is sufficient, but both have 
something to offer. This bridging of poles and the linguists’ distinct approaches to 
CDA also offer a useful means of triangulation (Baker et al 2008). 
 Frequencies and Associations
 Corpus techniques are a useful starting point for analysis because they 
can quickly identify salient features of large texts, though detailed analysis takes 
much longer. Baker’s work is especially relevant to this study. Homophobia is a 
recurring theme in his book on public representations of gay men (2005) and a 
residual feature of his book on gender and sexuality (2008). His theoretical 
perspective also concurs with that of Voloshinov and Bakhtin. He sees language 
use as derived from both conscious and unconscious assimilation of language 
patterns, along with the discourses they construct and maintain via repetition 
(2006: 13-15). This extends Hoey’s (2005) work on lexical priming to foreground 
evaluations as common-sense views of life. ‘Discourses’ here refers to the varied 
and competing ways language users construct aspects of the ‘world’ in which 
they live. It thus includes the flux of contemporary inconsistencies in how events, 
ideas, objects, people, practices and situations may be represented in everyday 
contexts. It focuses on the situated specificity of language use. As in Voloshinov’s 
view (2012: 161-8), this locates the habits of interaction within speakers’ taken-
for-granted expectations of a given time and place. 
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 Baker (2006: 47-8) argues that as words are combined in predictable 
ways, language users have limited choices at any communicative juncture. 
Choices are limited by the habits and rules of a language, by the communicative 
context, and by speaker/writer repertoire which relates to his/her identity and 
viewpoint as well as language experience. He stresses, it is the tension between 
rules and choices that makes the frequency and proximity of particular words 
important. Inevitably, where choices exist within both language and speaker/ 
writer repertoire, they are evaluative. In addition, Baker (2008: 95) argues, it is 
the frequency of patterns and associations in a corpus that shows evaluative 
meanings are socially shared. 
 Using corpus methods to analyse discourse has advantages (Baker 2006: 
10-17). The main advantage is that they reduce researcher bias by verifying or 
dispelling intuition and suggesting unanticipated typicalities. They can also 
identify changing frequencies and associations across time and reveal patterns 
beyond conscious awareness. Recurrent associations may indicate the presence 
of an underlying discourse. In studies of prejudice, the frequency of negative 
associations with specific groups of people enables the identification of socially 
shared constructions. Baker suggests five criteria for deciding whether negative 
representations of a particular group constitute an unacceptable bias on the part 
of the speakers and/or writers from whose words a corpus was compiled:
1. The cumulative frequency of the negative representations as a proportion of the total 
representations.
2. The proportional frequencies of negative and positive representations and the imbalance 
between them.
3. The social group under consideration depending on such criteria as social vulnerability, 
minority status, social power, or a history of prejudice and discrimination.
4. The strength of the negativity depending on judgments of negativity and considerations of 
collective effect.
5. The context of the representations depending on the power and influence of the speakers 
or writers and whether the representations reach large numbers of people.
(summarised from Baker 2012: 254-255)
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However, as he points out (ibid), researchers may disagree about what frequency 
levels are significant and/or the criteria for these considerations. They are thus a 
matter of researcher judgment.
 Corpus methods also have disadvantages (Baker 2006: 17-21), which 
either qualify the advantages or limit the data usefulness. The main qualification 
is that the methods can only reduce, not remove, researcher bias. The researcher 
must decide what is significant and interpretations must be justified. The main 
limitation is that the data is decontextualised; it excludes the visual presentation 
of texts and the prosodic features of speech, both of which have semiotic import. 
It may also obscure speaker/writer identity, his/her social or institutional power 
and the contexts of language production and reception. It is therefore important 
to document data sources, communicative contexts and speaker/writer identity. 
In addition, a corpus contains only what was said when what was not said may 
be equally important. Features such as presuppositions may only be identified 
via close qualitative analysis. To complicate matters further, meanings may be 
contextually specific and/or individualised. Participants may have used and/or 
understood the patterns found in different ways. As Voloshinov argued (2012: 
162-4), understanding depends on the extent to which the assumptions of a 
given social purview are shared within a given pragmatic situation. Interpreting 
corpus data requires care. Baker (2006: 21) advises, “other forms of analysis 
should be used in conjunction with” it. 
 The four basic data forms in a corpus analysis are: wordlists, keywords, 
concordance lines and collocates. In practice, they are used interactively. Where 
a corpus has been built from a specific source for targeted analysis, a word-
frequency list allows quick identification of its main focus. Where the opposing 
sides of a debate are being compared, as in this study, the wordlists for each side 
point to basic similarities and differences between them. Keywords take this a 
stage further by identifying statistically significant word frequencies on each side 
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of a debate. In line with Voloshinov’s (2012: 162-4) thinking, keywords offer an 
empirical means to identify differences in the words used by two groups of 
speakers. As Baker (2004: 348) notes, they are thus a “rapid and useful way of 
directing researchers to elements in each corpus that are unusually frequent 
[prior to] more complex linguistic analysis”.
 WordSmith 5 (Scott 2010) gives each keyword a measure of keyness, a 
statistical measure of word saliency relative to the size of each corpus, and offers 
either a chi-squared or log-likelihood test to obtain a probability value (p-value). 
The lower the p-value the more likely a keyword is due to speakers’ “(conscious 
or subconscious) choice to use that word repeatedly” (Baker 2006: 125). As word 
order is not random but determined by language habit, Baker suggests using log-
likelihood, which uses a log-normal distribution and allows for this (ibid: 126). 
While p<0.05 is the minimum level of significance in social and psychological 
research, keywords need a lower p-value to make their number manageable. 
WordSmith 5 uses a default value of p<0.001 which can be adjusted according to 
corpus size. This study uses log-likelihood set at p<0.01 for the single debate 
analyses (Chapters 5-10) and p<0.001 for the corpora analyses (Chapter 11). The 
researcher must also decide how many keywords to investigate and stick to the 
decided cut-off point. This study investigates each side’s top 10 keywords 
(Chapters 5-10) and keyword/sexuality-term collocates (Chapter 11).
 Statistically significant keywords may not be equally useful. For example 
proper nouns may reveal limited information and grammar words may only aid 
the location of features such as concessions or claims of common ground. It is 
lexical words that are more likely to signpost shared evaluations and warrant 
further investigation via a concordance and collocate analysis. Concordance lines 
list all examples of a target word or phrase within their immediate co-text which 
show how the word was used, though it may be necessary to refer to the wider 
co-text to identify reports and these may need to be considered separately in the 
76
analysis. This study uses AntConc (Anthony 2006) to compute concordances; 
unlike WordSmith it is Mac-compatible which eases frequent spot-checks. Where 
a large number of lines makes checking associations impractical, a collocation 
and collocate analysis can identify notable associations, for which concordances 
can then be made. Collocations are habitually adjacent words with established 
reference. In this study for example, lesbian and gay was habitually used in the 
1980s by speakers familiar with lesbian and gay politics. Collocates co-occur 
with greater disparity and openendedness. Thus Baker (2006: 87) argues, they 
relate more strongly to the language user’s choice and evaluation. In line with 
Bakhtin’s (1981: 293-4) thinking, they offer insight into the evaluative aspects of 
speakers’ language appropriation and conversely, the non-appropriation of terms 
used by others with different associations. 
 On WordSmith 5 (Scott 2010), a collocate chart can be calculated for a 
selected number of words either side of a target word or collocation. It offers a 
choice of statistical tests which measure the frequency of words in the corpus 
against their relative co-occurrence according to corpus size. All tests involve a 
“trade-off between frequency and saliency” (Baker 2006: 102). Tests geared to 
frequency tend to highlight grammar words, while those geared to saliency tend 
to highlight lexical words. This study uses Z-score, which tends to highlight 
lexical words, set at five words each side of the target with a stop at paragraph 
breaks. Collocates are useful in studies of prejudice, but the varied ways people 
may be referred to, including metaphors and pronouns which cannot be 
searched for directly, make associations more difficult to identify. 
 Baker’s studies exemplify the use of CL techniques in discourse analysis, 
but his analyses are only partly quantitative. He stresses that researcher choices 
are required at every stage and must be justified. The techniques point only to 
recurrent patterns, whereas discourses are identified via interpretation. As no 
interpretation is finite, all raw data must be included in appendices. He advises 
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that corpus techniques “should not replace other forms of close human analysis, 
but act in tandem with them” (2006: 183). In this study, the CDA approaches of 
van Dijk and Wodak complement the corpus techniques.
 Mind and Memory
 Over the past thirty years, van Dijk has undertaken extensive discourse 
research on racism. His approach is built round a socio-cognitive interface that 
mediates between discourse and society via mental models: specifically ‘context 
models’ and ‘event models’. The former relate to speaker/writer interpretation of 
the communicative situation and link language use to context (2008: 167). The 
latter relate to speaker/writer understanding of the topic in question and link 
language use to knowledge and ideology (2009: 77). Importantly, he sees these 
models as formed by social experience in which the workings of memory play a 
central part. Thus his approach offers a bridge between the cognitive and social 
aspects of language reception and production. As such, his models can be seen 
as relatively automatic and dynamic moderators of genre and topic within and 
between contexts. However, he emphasises, it is the language user’s subjective 
interpretation of context and topic, based on previous experience, that defines 
language production and understanding (2008: 165-6). The same situation may 
be interpreted in very different ways by different people. 
[C]ontexts can only influence what people say or understand when defined in terms of 
subjective, participant constructs. It is not the social or political situation itself that 
influences text or talk, but rather the way that individual participants represent, understand 
or otherwise construct the now-for them-relevant properties of such a situation. Thus, 
contexts are not objective, or ‘out there’, but subjective constructs of participants.
(van Dijk 2008a: 188, author’s italics)
This concurs with Voloshinov’s (2012: 162-4) emphasis on speaker/listener 
assumptions based on social experience in any given communicative situation. 
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 Van Dijk sees mental models as particularly relevant to the analysis of 
political discourse genres. Discourse here refers simply to interactive language 
use, spoken or written (2008: 104). In parliamentary debates, the introduction to 
a speech sets out the speaker’s models of both context and debate topic. How 
these are defined sets the speaker’s agenda and makes “policy understandable, 
reasonable and legitimate” (ibid: 191). Speakers’ context models are evident in 
references to the place and time of debate and to other participants, as well as in 
ritual procedures, lexical style and register, while their event models are evident 
in their evaluations of the legislative issue in question. Both are drawn from 
habitually reconstructed knowledge in long-term memory. He argues (2006b: 
164), “without such (mutual) knowledge, the participants would not know what 
to do, what to say or understand what is going on”. As Bakhtin (1986: 80) points 
out, competence in a language does not equip a person to function in unfamiliar 
speech genres. Van Dijk (2006b: 167) also argues, that “besides the contextual 
definition of the current political situation [speakers] need vast amounts of 
(social and political) knowledge”. Knowledge here refers to factually held belief 
verified by historically and culturally variable means: what is taken-for-granted 
as true by a society at a given time (2008: 170-1). 
 A distinction between the above definition of knowledge and ideology is 
key in van Dijk’s approach. He defines ideology as collectively held beliefs which 
specify a group’s identity, values and aims as distinct from those of other groups 
(2006a: 118): who we are (or are not), what we think, what we want and why 
(2009: 79). Ideology is here akin to class (or group) consciousness. Ideological 
aims may range from social control to social change, from maintaining privilege 
to resisting oppression (2001: 14). Thus these interest-dependent constructions 
of social conditions have varying degrees of social influence (2008: 35). Van Dijk 
(2001: 15) argues, the “power and prestige of each group will also carry over to 
the power and legitimacy of their beliefs and what beliefs count as knowledge in 
79
society at large”. Thus it is ‘knowledge’ he links to social power, but its status is 
unstable. Knowledge begins to lose its taken-for-granted status when challenged 
from within a society (2006a: 131). Conversely, the interest-dependent beliefs of 
social groups cease to be ideologies if they become assimilated into a society’s 
common-ground knowledge and widely accepted as true (2006a: 117). The two 
are thus in a constant state of dynamic tension akin to that between Bakhtin’s 
(1981: 217-2) centripetal and centrifugal forces.
 In political debates, van Dijk (2008: 170-1) argues that, as what speakers 
assume to be common-ground knowledge does not need to be mentioned, claims 
of common ground need to be seen as rhetorical strategies intended to persuade. 
Common ground may be claimed by the use of a generalised we, our or us, the 
persons referred to being decided by the co-text. Similarly, phrases such as 
everyone knows or most people agree claim a majority position. Asking what or 
whose interests such claims serve is a good starting point for unravelling their 
ideological stance. Presupposed knowledge must be gleaned from what is said. 
He advises noting: how speakers define the situation; how they positively present 
themselves and their views; how they negatively present others and their views; 
what use they make of rhetorical ploys such as repetition, claiming consensus, 
citing statistics or authoritative sources (2008: 191-210). Even so, he warns, 
“discourse is not always ideologically transparent, and discourse analysis does 
not always allow us to infer what people’s ideological beliefs are” (2001: 124).
 Van Dijk sees prejudices in terms of both knowledge and ideology. They 
may be the taken-for-granted knowledge of a society about groups or societies to 
which holders of the knowledge do not belong. An example related to this study 
is that even after reforms in many countries, heterosexuality is still taken for 
granted; many heterosexuals still assume people are heterosexual unless told 
otherwise. Reverse the assumption and it invariably requires denial and may be 
seen as an insult, thus assumptions of heterosexuality imply a value judgment. 
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Prejudices may also be actively pursued beliefs about a society or group. The 
violent attacks on Gay Pride marches by neo-fascist groups in Russia, or the 
hateful placards of Christian Voice at London Pride in recent years, come into 
this category. Whether prejudices are taken for granted or actively pursued, van 
Dijk (2008: 103) views them as socially shared representations of ‘others’ to 
which polarised values are attached: values into which groups or societies have 
been socialised via social interaction, which in turn passes them on. 
 The main category for analysing prejudice is how people are talked about. 
Van Dijk (2006a: 126) argues, “if ideologies are organized by well-known ingroup-
outgroup polarization, then we may expect such a polarization also to be ‘coded’ 
in talk and text”. Polarisation may be evident in pronoun use (us/them, we/
they), possessives (our/their), or demonstratives (this/that, these/those) where 
the latter term in each pair signals distance. Other categories are: lexical choice 
and/or topic selection negatively associated with the group in question; negative 
attributions of agency and/or responsibility; selective uses of generalisation and/
or specific detail; uses of euphemism, hyperbole, irony, metaphor or metonymy; 
interactional features such as sidestepping questions or interruptions (2008: 
104-5). Polarisation is also evident in forms of disclaiming, that is where a 
speaker’s face-saving statement is linked to a negative statement about the group 
in question. On the disclaiming of racism van Dijk (rather unsubtly) suggests 
seven categories: 
apparent denial: We have nothing against blacks, but...
apparent concession: Some of them are smart, but in general...
apparent empathy: Of course refugees have had problems, but...
apparent ignorance: I don’t know, but...
apparent excuses: Sorry, but...
reversal (blaming the victim): Not they, but we are the real victims...
transfer: I don’t mind, but my clients...
(van Dijk 2008a: 109-110, author’s italics)
He sees this polarising principle of positive self-presentation and negative other-
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presentation as the basic strategy of all prejudiced talk and text (2006a: 126).
 Van Dijk’s studies of racism focus on exposing such polarisation, but as 
he acknowledges, expressions of it may be very subtle, especially in the case of 
parliamentary discourse (1997: 62). He warns, “no discourse structure uniquely 
codes for one communicative and interactional function” (2006a: 127). Function 
must be considered in terms of who is speaking to whom, in what role, where 
and when, as well as by reference to the co-text. As Voloshinov (1986: 102-3) 
argued, meaning is situation and participant specific as well as extra to the 
reproducible meaning of the words used. 
 History and Heritage
 Wodak and her colleagues developed the discourse-historical approach 
(DHA) in an analysis of the anti-Semitism that re-surfaced in Austria during the 
1986 presidential campaign of Kurt Waldheim (Wodak et al 1990). The study 
sought to integrate “all available background information into the analysis and 
interpretation of many layers of a text [and] to trace in detail the constitution of 
an anti-Semitic stereotyped image” (Mitten & Wodak 1993: 205-6). 
 Wodak (2007: 219) argues “the analysis of [prejudiced] discourses needs a 
very precise definition of differing layers of context”. ‘Discourses’ here refer to 
mutating clusters of topic-related language acts which span the contexts of their 
occurrence and which are socially constituted by, and in turn constitute, strands 
of common-sense knowledge or shared truth (Reisigl & Wodak 2009: 89-90).  
DHA considers four layers of context: first, the co-text of specific language items; 
second, the relation of the text and its discourses to other texts and discourses; 
third, the socio-political variables and institutions that frame the texts and 
discourses; fourth, the wider socio-political and historical contexts in which the 
discourses are embedded (ibid: 93). In this study, these layers of context are: 
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first, the transcript of a parliamentary debate; second, references cited in the 
debate, plus related debates and press reports; third, parliamentary protocols, 
plus the legislative agendas of both government and interest groups; fourth, the 
legislative history of same-sex sex and its heritage of homophobic beliefs.
 These layers of context allow institutionalised prejudice to be documented 
across time via intertextual traces of knowledge and experience (Wodak 2006a: 
184). Evocations of internalised beliefs and stereotypes stored in long-term 
memory are therefore central to their manifestations. Unlike van Dijk, Wodak’s 
focus on is the political exploitation of memory rather than its structures and 
workings; she cites the calculated evocation of prejudice and stereotypes to gain 
votes as an example (2007: 205/208). She sees memory as both individual and 
collective (2006b: 127). A child grows up surrounded by adult memories of earlier 
pasts. People continually learn from the memories of others. Thus an individual 
memory is repeatedly informed by the accounts and views of others (ibid: 130). 
This corresponds to Voloshinov’s (1986: 11) concept of collective consciousness 
within a social group. Wodak (2006a: 185) argues that anti-Semitic folklore is 
passed from generation to generation and stored as common-sense knowledge. 
However, because of the taboo on explicit anti-Semitic utterances in public domains, 
specifically in official political discourses, a different⎯coded⎯mode of expressing anti-
Semitic prejudices and stereotypes was created after 1945, which was analyzed in detail 
elsewhere [...] and labelled as ‘discourses of silence’. This means that anti-Semitic contents 
can only be inferred by listeners/viewers/readers who know the background and also the 
genesis of such allusions/insinuations or presuppositions. The listeners/viewers/readers 
have acquired the necessary knowledge through collective memories or narratives handed 
down through generations. 
(Wodak 2007: 208, author’s italics)
That a similar if less profound taboo has begun to apply to overt homophobia in 
parliamentary debates, albeit with patchy effect, makes Wodak’s focus on coded 
language and latent meaning particularly relevant to this study. Her work shows 
how “an amalgam of ideological tenets is invoked by linguistic clues and traces, 
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in order to elicit a particular set of beliefs” (2007: 213). Such clues and traces are 
identified via exploration of intertextual links, utilising cross-references to a 
specific person, group, event, text, topic, time, place, or the use of specific terms, 
such as those related to sexuality in this study. 
 Like van Dijk, Wodak sees the discursive construction of us and them as 
the basis of prejudiced discourses. Accordingly, she (2003: 139) proposes five 
analytical categories for detecting positive-self and negative-other representation: 
nomination, predication, argumentation, perspectivisation and modification. The 
first two categories focus on how people are represented, the last three on 
speaker/writer perspective.
 Nomination covers the ways people are referred to in a text. For example 
by name (formal or informal), by deictics (such as pronouns), by social category 
(such as a role or a job), by metaphorical label, or by a collective term for the 
group to which the people in question are seen to belong. Wodak also discusses 
wordplay in this category. Playing with and distorting names “has to be seen as 
denying and threatening the identity of a specific person” (2007: 214). 
 Predication covers the ways people are described. This category includes 
adjectives, attributions, collocations, similes, comparatives, stereotypes and all 
forms of metaphorical association. Wodak (2007: 212) stresses the importance of 
allusions, in that negative meaning can be disowned by their use. They tap into 
specific repertoires of presupposed knowledge, without which only the literal 
meaning survives. If challenged, the speaker can affirm the literal meaning. If 
understood, they can trigger assent without much critical attention. 
 Argumentation covers the strategies a speaker/writer uses to present, and 
legitimate his/her views, or to challenge the views of others. It includes claims of 
truth and moral claims of rightness or wrongness, plus the assumptions they 
rest on and any evidence used to support them, such as an authoritative source. 
Claims may include sophistry, accusations, vagueness, or emotive appeals. Once 
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identified, they need to be examined for fallacies and inconsistencies. 
 Perspectivisation covers speaker/writer views to which intertextual traces 
can provide important clues. This category includes the way speech, texts or 
events are reported, for example by the choice of reporting verbs, and/or choice 
of quotations, references, examples, or anecdotes. The Waldheim study showed 
how “important terms were recontextualized [and] how their explicit racist/anti-
Semitic meanings turned into easily understandable insinuations due to the 
collective knowledge of the speakers/readers/listeners” (Wodak 2006a: 184). 
 Modification covers the degree to which points are intensified, qualified or 
mitigated “according to historical conventions, public levels of tolerance, political 
correctness [and] the specific context” (Wodak 2008: 295). It also covers the 
degree of certainty with which statements are made. Forms of emphasising, 
disclaiming and modality are central to this category of analysis.
 Ultimately, Wodak’s view of institutionalised prejudices is bleak. She sees 
them as complex and enduring phenomena in that new experience is habitually 
interpreted via an individual’s existing schema: 
[I]f belief systems are cognitively and emotionally deeply embedded and also have historical 
roots, a change of frames⎯should this be more then a superficial change of language⎯ 
turns out to be very difficult. Whole belief systems and ideologies would need to be 
reformulated and substituted by others. [...] such changes⎯if possible at all⎯would take a 
long time and would need to produce some kind of deep insights (‘catharsis’) which would 
allow substituting certain mental representations and long-stored event models by new 
ones.
(Wodak 2006a: 185)
Wodak’s reservation is apt, but this study takes a more fluid and incremental 
approach to social change. It sees the push and pull of different interest groups 
in contemporary societies as in a state of perpetual flux. The ebbs and flows of 
homophobia may well endure and remain open to political exploitation, but its 
taken-for-grantedness has shifted. Sexuality has become a site of struggle within 
and between countries largely because of the collective activism of LGBT people 
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in many and varied contexts, locally, nationally and internationally, over the past 
45 years. There are backlashes, but they now face opposition. As Voloshinov 
(2012: 146) argued, where the whole group engages in a struggle with official 
ideology “it has a chance of a future and perhaps even a victorious future”. 
 Analytical Procedure
 The approaches outlined above have been incorporated into a four-stage 
analytical procedure for each of the six debates selected for qualitative analysis 
(Chapters 5-10). The stages relate broadly to Wodak’s four levels of context 
following the triangulatory approach of DHA (Reisigl & Wodak 2009: 89/93). 
 Stage 1 relates to Wodak’s third level of context and concerns the socio-
political variables and institutions framing the debate. It aims to gain an 
overview of the debate content, its place in the legislative passage of the Bill and 
the significance of the legislative issue within wider socio-political agendas. Step-
by-step details of the procedure for all four stages are in Appendix 5. 
 Stage 2 utilises Baker’s analytical categories and relates to Wodak’s first 
level of context concerning the co-text of specific language items. In preparing the 
corpus data it aims to identify the uses of prominent language items and terms 
related to sexuality in preparation for more detailed analysis. 
 Stage 3 utilises Wodak’s and van Dijk’s analytical categories and relates to 
Wodak’s second level of context concerning the debate’s intra- and intertextual 
discursive links. It aims to identify polarising strategies, evaluative stances, 
taken-for-granted beliefs and questionable absences. Where relevant these are 
related to other documents such as press reports and/or other debates. 
 Stage 4 relates to Wodak’s fourth level of context and concerns the 
historical contexts in which the strategies, stances and beliefs are embedded. It 
aims to assess links between these features and the heritage of homophobic 
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beliefs passed down and around through the centuries. 
 Chapters 5-10 each have the following sections: Political Context; Relevant 
Research (where it exists); The Passage of the Legislation; The Debate; Words and 
Themes; Views of Sexuality; Associations and Implications; Conclusion.
 The more quantitative analyses (Chapter 11) interrogate the lexical choices 
and associations made by each side during the two periods in question. Together 
they offer an overview of continuities and changes in views of lesbians and gay 
men as the legislative landslide progressed. All debates with an above average 
search-term frequency (Appendix 3) are the basis of eight corpora:
PLG1: Speakers against Clause 28 and for attempted reforms 1986-1996
ALG1: Speakers for Clause 28 and against attempted reforms 1986-1996
PLG2: Speakers supporting reforms 2001-2004 
ALG2: Speakers against reforms 2001-2004
PLG1+2: Speakers supporting reforms overall
ALG1+2: Speakers against reforms overall
LG1: All speakers in the first period
LG2: All speakers in the second period
This enables four dimensions of comparison. The comparison of PLG1 and ALG1 
reviews the language and associations used for and against lesbians and gay 
men 1986-1996. The comparison of the PLG2 and ALG2 reviews the language 
and associations used for and against lesbians and gay men 2001-2004. The 
comparison of PLG1+2 and ALG1+2 reviews the language and associations used 
for and against lesbians and gay men overall. The comparison of LG1 and LG2 
reviews the language and associations related to lesbians and gay men in each 
period. As an added triangulation (Baker et al 2008), to cross-check the analyses 
and strengthen the validity of the conclusions, the comparisons are approached 
differently. Comparisons one and two start from the keyword/sexuality-term 
collocate themes. Comparisons three and four start from the sexuality terms in 
their lexical categories: adjectives, nouns for people, and abstract nouns. Step-
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by-step details of the analytical procedures for both approaches are in Appendix 
6. Chapter 11 examines each of these four comparisons in turn with minimal 
commentary. The findings are then discussed together in the final section: 
Continuity and Change. 
 Conclusion
 The more qualitative analyses (Chapters 5-10) allow the language used in 
each selected debate to be considered in terms of the specific legislative issue 
and the socio-political struggle that brought it about. The more quantitative 
analyses (Chapter 11) enable a collective overview of the language used for and 
against the most contested legislative issues in each period. They thus highlight 
significant similarities and differences between speaker groups within and 




 The election of the Thatcher Government in May 1979 brought a decade of 
polarisation and confrontation between economic libertarianism and job losses, 
centralised control and local resistance, moral conservatism and social change. 
The Government prioritised: cutting public expenditure, privatising state-owned 
industries and services, centralising local government, revising taxation in favour 
of the wealthy, disenfranchising the trade unions, and expanding the nuclear 
armoury. Eleven years of protest included: hunger strikes in Northern Ireland, 
the women’s peace camp at Greenham Common, four major riots (St Paul’s, 
Toxteth, Brixton, Broadwater Farm) caused by heavy-handed policing in black 
communities, and two major strikes (the miners and the print-workers). It ended 
following the 1990 riot against the Poll Tax, which many people refused to pay. 
 This chapter outlines the political context of Clause 28 and shows how 
homophobia was mobilised for political gain. Related research is reviewed from 
this perspective. A summary of the Clause’s parliamentary passage is followed by 
an account of arguments deployed in the selected debate and two comparisons: 
one of each side’s top-ten keywords and their collocates, the other of each side’s 
sexuality terms and their collocates. A discussion of the findings follows.
 Political Context
 Dialogue between lesbian and gay groups and urban Labour councils 
began in the early 1980s after Ken Livingstone committed the GLC to fighting 
discrimination in 1981 (Jeffrey-Poulter 1991: 203). Dialogue was strengthened 
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by Labour Party members who came out to their constituency parties after the 
scurrilous treatment of Peter Tatchell during the 1983 Bermondsey by-election 
(Cooper 1992: 27) and by lesbian and gay support for the striking miners during 
1984-5 (Kelliher 2014). By 1985, local initiatives were “percolating through to the 
main body of the party” (Otitoju 1988: 228). That autumn, with NUM support, 
both the TUC and Labour Party conferences passed resolutions “calling for an 
end to discrimination in employment and housing, changes in our legal status 
and further developments in equal opportunities” (Cant 1988: 219). Yet as Tobin 
(1990: 58) points out, equality policies were largely forced on a reluctant Labour 
leadership by members who were also feminist, black and/or gay. At the 1986 
Labour conference, delegates complained some Labour councils were excluding 
lesbians and gay men from their equal opportunities policies; a resolution to 
outlaw discrimination against lesbians and gay men received sufficient majority 
to become a manifesto commitment (Linton et al 1.10.1986). 
 The propaganda that led to Clause 28 emerged at the 1986 local elections. 
Two days before polling, the Sun headlined ‘VILE BOOK IN SCHOOL’ (6.5.1986). 
The book, ‘Jenny Lives with Eric and Martin’, about a girl being brought up by 
her father and his partner, was described as perverted and available in schools, 
which it was not. Critical quotes (ibid: 2) were followed by one from ILEA’s equal-
opportunities officer, described as “gay council boss Bob Crossman”, who 
defended the book. The next day, a full-page ‘Sun special on tomorrow’s vital 
polls’ was headed ‘WILL YOU VOTE FOR A LABOUR LOONY?’ (7.5.1986: 9). After 
highlighting that “control of vast sums of ratepayers money [was] up for grabs”. 
the article caricatured three Labour candidates and blatantly exploited multiple 
prejudices. “LOONY 1” was a male-to-female transsexual committed to equal 
opportunities for women, ethnic minorities, lesbians and gays. “LOONY 2” was 
the deputy head of a South London comprehensive school and member of the 
Black Parents Association which was addressing racism in the police and seeking 
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eviction of racist tenants. “LOONY 3” was an out-of-work Irish father of ten, 
described as “Guinness supping”, who wanted to start a ratepayers scheme to 
support unemployed building labourers. Nevertheless, Labour gained control of 
16 councils and the Conservatives lost control of 24 (Guardian 10.5.1986). 
 By the time the Press Council ruled the Sun’s ‘Vile Book’ report inaccurate 
(Guardian/Times/Sun 3.2.1987), a campaign against it had gained momentum. 
Baroness Cox raised it in the Lords the day after the original report (7.5.1986 cc.
726-7). Tottenham Conservative Association sent it, with other gay-themed 
books, to the press that Summer. Haringey Parents Rights Group planned a book 
burning in September (Reinhold 1994a: 91-2). At the Conservative conference in 
October, Kenneth Baker, Secretary of State for Education, called it “distorted 
propaganda” (ibid: 97). To this extent Mars-Jones’ (1988) article ‘The Book that 
Launched Clause 28’ is apt. ‘Jenny Lives with Eric and Martin’ became notorious 
via the Sun’s report and was deployed to further discredit Labour councils. 
 The Environment Secretary, Nicholas Ridley, made a searing attack on 
Labour councils in November (HC 17.11.1986 cc.332-408). Two days later, in a 
Financial Times interview, Margaret Thatcher claimed two more terms of office 
would eliminate socialism. She hoped to “get rid of socialism as a second force” 
in British politics (Owen & Rutherford 19.11.1986). The Conservative chairman, 
Norman Tebbit, followed up with a dossier. He claimed Labour councils rather 
than its leadership were “the true face of the modern Labour Party [and rated 
them] alongside defence as a major weapon with which the Conservatives hope[d] 
to turn the next election” (McKie 13.12.1986). Parliamentary debates on local 
government (HC 5.12.1986 cc.1182-1252; HL 4.2.1987 cc.205-301) slated 
locally-elected Labour councils on such issues as their support for: CND, peace 
groups, withdrawal from NATO, the ANC, SWAPO, Sinn Fein—and lesbians and 
gay men. They were cast as socialist, anarchist, anti-police, anti-democratic, 
Militants, mini-Soviets and Trotskyists bankrupting London with irresponsible 
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spending. Even in the political climate of the time, this was all-out attack.
 A specific target was Haringey’s positive-images policy. It had been raised 
in the Lords (28.7.1986 cc.552-4) and twice reported in the Times (26.6.1986; 
29.7.1986). The first attempt to legislate against such policies was the Earl of 
Halsbury’s Local Government Act 1986 (Amendment) Bill, which sought to stop 
local councils ‘promoting homosexuality’. On the day of its second reading (HL 
18.12.1986 cc.310-338), the Times published an editorial on parents protesting 
in Haringey which some speakers cited. The parents were linked to Tottenham 
Conservative Association (Reinhold 1994a: 140-177) and, as Durham (1989: 68) 
notes, “local Conservatives were crucial in launching and sustaining the Parents 
Rights Group”. Baroness Cox, who supported the Bill, was “directly involved in 
the local dispute in Haringey” (Reinhold 1994b: 69). She also belonged to the 
ultra-right-wing Committee for a Free Britain which went public after the 1987 
election. It had undisclosed sources of funding and an agenda to dismantle state 
control (Milne 23.6.1987/Gunn 23.6.1987). The Committee’s chair, David Hart, 
had been instrumental in breaking the miners strike and was a columnist on the 
Times. He too was linked to the Parents Rights Group (Reinhold 1994a: 150-1) 
which had received funds from the Committee (ibid: 184). Hart confirmed the 
Committee’s funding policy at its public launch: it “would offer help and money 
to people fighting the state [or] denied freedom by local authorities” (Durham 
1989: 69). Such covert funding of British right-wing groups was known to come 
from the USA Heritage Foundation since 1982 Conservative alarm at the growth 
of peace groups and anti-nuclear politics (Gavshon et al 29.5.1987). Hart was 
also funded by Rupert Murdoch for his work on British Briefing, a secretive anti-
communist newsletter (McKnight 2012: 99-104). 
 Even so, Lord Halsbury’s Bill was not supported by the Government; the 
Minister, Lord Skelmersdale, argued it was unworkable and unnecessary in view 
of existing legislation (18.12.1986 cc.332-337). The Bill completed its passage 
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through the Lords nonetheless. Jill Knight presented the Bill to the Commons 
(8.5.1987 cc.997-1014). Rhodes Boyson, Minister for Local Government, put the 
Government view (cc.1002-5), but voted for the Bill. As the debate had been 
scheduled for a Friday afternoon with few MPs present, the vote was declared 
inquorate and the Bill lost. The next week Jill Knight asked the Prime Minister if 
she would legislate in the next Parliament to “protect children and the concept of 
the family” (14.5.1987 c.413). Margaret Thatcher congratulated Jill Knight for 
bringing the Bill and regretted its incomplete passage; she hoped Jill Knight 
would bring it back. Whatever the Prime Minister’s reasons for this diplomatic 
avoidance of association with the Bill, the Conservative election campaign, led by 
Norman Tebbit, mobilised homophobia to undermine support for Labour.
 Hodges (6.2.1989: 158) and Smith (1990: 42) recall an election poster 
featuring books: ‘Young, Gay and Proud’; ‘Police Out of School’; ‘Black Lesbian in 
White America’; ‘Playbook for Kids about Sex’ (reproduced in Smith 1991: 133). 
The caption read “Is this Labour’s idea of a comprehensive education?” (Durham 
1989: 71). Hodges (ibid) also recalls an election broadcast promising control over 
council spending: the camera followed a hand pouring tea into small white cups 
each labelled with an area of council spending, as the voice-over urged support, 
the camera zoomed in on one labelled ‘gay seminar’. Anti-Labour advertisements, 
mostly on ‘defence’ issues, were placed in the Sun, Times and Evening Standard 
by the Committee for a Free Britain at a cost of over £210,000. One featured 
Betty Sheridan of Haringey and read “If you vote Labour they’ll go on teaching 
my kids about gays and lesbians instead of giving them proper lessons” (see 
Reinhold 1994b: 65). In a wider analysis of the election, Hall (July 1987: 33) 
shows how the subliminal themes of race and sex were locked into the discourse 
of ‘loony left’. A check of ‘loony left’ on Lexis-Nexis shows its frequency peaked in 
May 1987⎯a count which excludes the tabloids. The Thatcher Government was 
re-elected on 11.6.1987 with a reduced but still large majority of 102. 
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 What became Clause 28 was Lord Halsbury’s Bill tabled as a backbench 
amendment to the Local Government 1987 (Amendment) Bill. The only proviso, 
added by Michael Howard, Minister for Local Government, was that it should not 
prohibit initiatives for treating or preventing the spread of disease. After heated 
debates in both Houses, it was enacted with few changes. The Section applied to 
England, Scotland and Wales, but not Northern Ireland:
28 Prohibition on promoting homosexuality by teaching or publishing material
(1) The following section shall be inserted after section 2 of the [1986 c.10] Local 
Government Act 1986 (prohibition of political publicity) - 
2A Prohibition on promoting homosexuality by teaching or publishing material
(1) A local authority shall not -
(a) intentionally promote homosexuality or publish material with the 
intention of promoting homosexuality;
(b) promote the teaching in any maintained school of the acceptability of 
homosexuality as a pretended family relationship.
(2) Nothing in subsection (1) above shall be taken to prohibit the doing of anything 
for the purpose of treating or preventing the spread of disease.
(3) In any proceedings in connection with the application of this section a court 
shall draw such inferences as to the intention of the local authority as may 
reasonably be drawn from the evidence before it.
(4) In subsection (1) (b) above ‘maintained school’ means -
(a) in England and Wales, a county school, voluntary school, nursery 
school or special school, within the meaning of the Education Act 1944; 
(b) in Scotland, a public school, nursery school or special school, within 
the meaning of the Education (Scotland) Act 1980
(Local Government Act 1988, c.9, Part IV, Miscellaneous, Section 28)
As all previous legislation on sexuality had applied to sexual acts, Section 28 
constituted the first (albeit negative) acknowledgement same-sex relationships in 
British law. It also “produced an unparalleled mobilisation of lesbian and gay 
people and almost certainly strengthened the public identities it was designed to 
delimit” (Weeks 1989a: 304). Numerous campaigns formed in its wake, including 
Stonewall (1989), Outrage (1990) and Rank Outsiders (1991), plus cases were 
taken to the British and European courts during the 1990s (Appendix 1). While 
Section 28 was a catalyst for change, as law it was purely symbolic. From its 
enactment to its repeal it was never used. 
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 Relevant Research
 Both the enactment and repeal of Section 28 are widely researched. The 
four studies reviewed here (Weeks 1991b; Reinhold 1994b; Smith 1990; Evans 
1989) relate to its enactment and examine its meanings. All four make reference 
to parliamentary debates, but only Reinhold and Smith do so in any detail.
 Weeks (1991b: ch.8) reviews the subterranean existence of unconventional 
families “in a moral and political climate which gives powerful obeisance to ‘the 
family’” (ibid: 135). He acknowledges that support for lesbian and gay issues was 
used against ‘loony left’ councils to try and alienate working-class voters, but 
this is not his focus. His observation that Clause 28 offered a snapshot of the 
balance between political and moral power in late 1980s Britain is not explored. 
He examines the moral rather than political agenda of the Conservatives whose 
actions resulted in the Clause. His starting point is the two key Clause phrases, 
‘promoting homosexuality’ and ‘pretended family relationships’. The former he 
relates to the positive-images policies and the view that homosexuality is not, 
and cannot be shown as, equal to heterosexuality. Analysis of the parliamentary 
debates supports this. The latter Weeks relates to alternative relationships that 
challenged Conservative ideals of ‘the family’. He sees this as key to the whole 
legislative episode. However, the debates show that the ‘protection’ of children in 
schools was the focus of Conservative arguments, albeit not all children and not 
all schools, only those funded by LEAs via the rates. Nor is Weeks’ argument 
upheld by an electronic word-count of the seven debates devoted to the Clause: 
167 mentions of family contrast with: local 677, authority(ies) 631, school(s) 303, 
children 270, education 194 and council(s) 125. Later in his discussion, Weeks 
cites opinion polls from 1983, 1985 and 1987 showing a slight rise in tolerance 
of homosexuals, but a sharp rise in hostility towards homosexual relationships 
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and disapproval of homosexual adoption. He rightly links the hostility to the 
AIDS panic, but not more widely to the press. In conclusion, he considers the 
extent to which it is acceptable for the state to legislate on private life. This is an 
important consideration, but this study shows that the agenda of Clause 28 was 
much wider than private life.
 Reinhold (1994b) focuses on the meanings of ‘family’ in British society and 
how homosexuality became constructed as a threat. Although her introduction 
appears to sideline wider Conservative agendas and conflate rhetoric with policy, 
she offers important contextual information. She illustrates her argument with a 
scurrilous Tottenham Conservative Association leaflet and the Betty Sheridan 
advertisement (ibid: 64 & 65). The leaflet was distributed in Haringey at the 1986 
local election. Labour won in Haringey, but as Reinhold notes, the “local conflict 
opened up a window of opportunity for a Conservative Party hostile to local 
government” (ibid: 62). She argues, the campaign against positive images showed 
that ‘family’ had become a contested concept, and cites Commons debates on the 
Lords’ 1986 Education (No.2) Bill in support. Debates on sex education before 
the summer recess concerned single-parent families, contraception, teenage sex, 
marriage and divorce. In the October debates, when positive images had become 
a dominant issue, definitions of family had shifted: sex education had become 
tied to homosexuality such that ‘family’ now included pre-recess “less than ideal 
families by default” (ibid: 68). Reinhold’s additional reference to the very wide 
definition of family in the 1980 Housing Act, suggests definitions of family were a 
matter of political expedience. She then examines inconsistencies in Conservative 
arguments to show how “tenuous the ideological logic of the family actually is” 
(ibid: 70). Her final section cites a string of references which conflate family, 
society and nation which expose the term’s symbolic power. “The family was seen 
in these debates as the strength⎯or potential weakness⎯of the nation.” (ibid: 
76). In “a nation of free people” (ibid), it was viewed as “the supreme guarantor of 
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nation and society [and] freedom as well” (ibid: 77). “If the ideal family is under 
attack, then the contemporary forms of society, nation and freedom are under 
attack” (ibid). This is classic Cold-War rhetoric, the relevance of which is not 
pursued. Reinhold (1994a: ch.9) does take this theme further, but only as far as 
the Burgess and Maclean defections and attendant beliefs about security risk. 
She notes the 1980s fears of communist infiltration, but does not relate them to 
President Reagan’s push to ‘win’ the Cold War, or David Hart’s links to the CIA 
and Murdoch (Rose 17.12.1988/9.12.1990/23.12.1990; Norton-Taylor & Rose 
14.12.1989; Norton-Taylor 10.12.1990; Milne 1994: 270-3).
 Smith (1990) uses the parliamentary debates on Clause 28 to explore ‘New 
Right’ discourse, though her use of ‘discourse’ is undefined. Her article outlines 
the history of the Clause and identifies the claimed promotion of homosexuality 
as enabling the Government to further limit local-council autonomy. She sees the 
claim as a deployment of “strategic anti-gayness” (ibid: 43) rather than mobilised 
homophobia, based on a definition of homophobia as irrational fear rather than 
socialised beliefs. Her analysis begins with truth claims: that a campaign to 
promote homosexuality existed, that it was subversive and dangerous, that it 
was upheld by the circulation of books, that public opinion wanted prohibitive 
legislation. She asks why these claims gained credibility, but overlooks the role of 
the press. In exploring why anxiety about homosexuality was so pervasive, she 
links the AIDS panic to other contemporary fears about immigrant populations 
and communist infiltration, marked by Mrs Thatcher as the ‘enemy within’. She 
then notes incongruities in pro-Clause arguments: that ‘natural’ heterosexuality 
does not develop naturally so must be protected from homosexuality; that for 
heterosexuality to be defined as ‘normal’ “depends on an ever-present threat 
from the not-normal” (ibid: 49). This shifts her analysis to a framework informed 
by Žižek and Lacan, with Derrida’s concept of ‘differance’ at its centre. From this 
point, the personas of the closeted ‘good homosexual’ and the uncontained gay 
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activist, the ‘invader/seducer/pretender’, populate a divide and rule argument. 
Smith argues that the closeted homosexual “does not disrupt the social order, 
but must be included [in it] for strategic purposes” (ibid: 50). This ‘imaginary’ 
inclusion, which recurs as a trope in her later work (1991; 1994a; 1994b; 1997), 
is not supported by this study. The empirical analysis in this chapter shows the 
clinical terms (homosexual/homosexuals/homosexuality) were most negatively 
associated by pro-Clause speakers. In fact these terms were more negatively 
associated than gay on both sides of all debates analysed in this study, but while 
supportive speakers located the negativity in society, unsupportive speakers 
linked it, directly or indirectly, to (homo)sexual acts, a finding that concurs with 
that of Baker (2004b/2005: Ch.2). This positions the clinical terms within the 
heritage of sin, crime and pathology from which gay was dissociated. Smith 
devotes a later section to why arguments against the Clause failed and selects 
three factors: failure to confront the ‘loony-left’ charge, an equivocal position on 
the Clause, and the idea that promotion is impossible as sexuality is fixed early 
in life. This inflates the importance of the arguments used. The Government had 
a large majority and powerful beliefs had been mobilised. Ultimately, she fails to 
ground her analysis in the aspects of political context she initially identifies. 
 In a fully contextualised article, Evans (1989) addresses the complexities 
of Section 28. He begins by arguing: firstly, that the Conservative concern with 
moral decline, which had AIDS and homosexuality at its centre, was influenced 
by exaggerated and inaccurate media coverage; secondly, that the conditions set 
by 1967 Sexual Offences Act, awarded homosexuality an unequal status (ibid: 
75). The main sections of his article review the legal, ideological and paradoxical 
complexities of Section 28 in turn. He identifies five weaknesses in law: it applied 
only to local authorities; the words ‘intentionally’, ‘promote’ and ‘homosexuality’ 
require interpretation; its censoring of family relationships rivaled moral rhetoric 
on the spread of AIDS; the 1986 Education (No.2) Act had shifted responsibility 
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for sex education from LEAs to school governors; the cost of taking a case to 
court would be prohibitive. Though as he notes, these factors did not prevent a 
succession of self-censoring decisions by councils fearing prosecution. The 
ideological myths Evans identifies concern ‘the family’, ‘the homosexual’ and ‘the 
bureaucratised intelligentsia’. Like Weeks, he sees ‘the family’ as the ideological 
core of the Section, but for political rather than moral reasons. He argues the 
‘New Right’ view of ‘the family’ as the ‘natural’ economic unit weakened by state 
provision, made it a defence against socialism; thus the myth of the beleaguered 
family amid moral decline became “an instrument of social policy” (ibid: 84). 
About ‘the homosexual’, he argues that in an increasingly sexualised culture, 
fear of AIDS transmuted into moral imperatives; homosexuality was constructed 
as a disease of lifestyle and required separation from the ‘natural’ family. Thus, 
the ‘bureaucratised intelligentsia’, such as teachers or local-authority officials, 
became seen as a threat to parental authority and were cast as “purveyors of 
homosexual propaganda” (ibid: 86). Evans’ final section highlights a string of 
ironies. The most salient are: that while the Section defended an idealised family, 
its inclusion of ‘pretended’ acknowledged that not all families conform to the 
ideal; that while the Section was intended to obstruct lesbian and gay politics, it 
had the reverse effect; that while the 1967 Act stressed privacy, during the AIDS 
panic even private homosexual behaviour was seen as a threat; that ‘natural’ 
heterosexuality needed protection, but ‘unnatural’ homosexuality could convert. 
Finally, the relational form of ‘pretended family’ contradicted “the stockpile of 
cultural meanings which present homosexuality as a pathological perversion” 
(90). He concludes that the Section failed as both law and myth. “In a sense, the 
government could hardly have done more to promote homosexuality if it had set 
Haringey up as a moral council” (ibid: 91).
 These reviews contribute to an understanding of factors relevant to the 
enactment of Section 28, but throw selective light on the wider political struggles 
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that contextualised it. Conflicts between central and local government, between 
reactionary Conservatism and reformist Labour, between the forces of social 
control and social change, and the tensions inherent in the final throes of the 
Cold War all played a part. 
 The Passage of the Clause
 The Local Government Act 1987 (Amendment) Bill was the 45th piece of 
legislation on local government since 1979. It required councils to put service 
contracts out to competitive tender instead of giving them to council employees 
and banned non-commercial considerations, such as boycotting companies 
involved in the arms trade, the nuclear industry, or apartheid South Africa. It 
also banned councils from publicising support for political campaigns. 
 The amendment that became Clause 28 was introduced by David Wilshire 
(HC Standing Committee A 8.12.1987) armed with a dossier containing extracts 
from books and council advertisements for lesbian and gay officers. He linked a 
gay teachers’ group to paedophile activity (c.1203), construed positive images as 
promotion (c.1204) and claimed millions of pounds were involved (c.1205). Jack 
Cunningham, Shadow Minister for Local Government, was taken in. In his haste 
to distance Labour from the insinuations, he supported the amendment (c.1211). 
Had he waited, Michael Brown and Simon Hughes might not have equivocated, 
Allan Roberts might have been stronger and Bernie Grant supported. Bernie 
Grant declared the Government was “being stampeded by a bunch of loony, 
rabid, Right-wing fanatics” (c.1226). The amendment was included in the Bill 
without a vote. 
 The Clause served multiple Conservative agendas. Durham (1989: 59) 
argues that sexual morality was peripheral to Thatcherism, that there was “a 
vast gap between rhetoric and policy” (ibid: 70). Weeks too (2007: 96) identifies 
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the Government’s main agenda as economic liberalism and privatisation. Yet a 
moralising faction, the Conservative Family Campaign, formed prior to the 1986 
local elections, “claimed 30 groups across the country and 24 MPs” (Reinhold 
1994a: 96). That the Clause targeted Labour councils was expedient: it weakened 
the strongest opposition to government policies, justified further restriction of 
council budgets, contributed to the dismantling of what was seen as socialism, 
and facilitated the dominance of capitalism in the final throes of the Cold War. It 
was also a concession to moralising factions in the Conservative Party.
 Opposition amendments to what was at that stage Clause 27, were 
debated at the Report stage of the Bill (HC 15.12.1987). This debate is analysed 
in full below. Three amendments were each defeated by over 100 votes. The Bill’s 
third reading followed, during which the Speaker suspended the hearing to have 
the public gallery cleared. The Bill was passed by 308 to 215 votes. However, it 
was the clearing of the gallery that made the next day’s headlines (16.12.1987): 
“Screaming gays bring Commons to a halt” (Sun) and “Commons suspended in 
‘gay rights’ row” (Daily Telegraph). In reporting campaigns forming against the 
Clause, Pink Paper (17.12.1987) pinned lesbian and gay hopes on the Lords, 
which had voted against the Government 186 times since 1979.
 In the Lords, the Bill’s second reading lasted six hours (11.1.1988 cc.947- 
1033). Twelve of the 20 Lords who spoke defended local councils and disputed 
sundry aspects of the Bill, including Clause 28. By then, anti-Clause campaigns 
included the Arts Council, theatres, galleries, museums, libraries, publishers, 
voluntary organisations and the NCCL, as well as local councils and lesbian and 
gay groups. A ‘Stop the Clause’ benefit was held at the Playhouse Theatre in 
London (de Jongh 26.1.1988). Fearing defeat, the Government acknowledged 
concern about arts censorship and tabled two amendments for the Lords. One 
required promotion to be intentional; the other placed the inference of intention 
with the courts. An article in The Observer (Smart 31.1.1988) reported Viscount 
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Falkland, on behalf of the Arts Council, as saying that the amendment did “not 
meet [their] concerns at all” and more worryingly that there were “several well- 
funded extremist groups, financed from the United States, waiting for a chance 
to exploit Clause 28”. The article also reported that the Conservative Family 
Campaign was confident the Clause would be passed.
 The Lords Committee took up eight sessions. In the first of three sessions 
devoted to the Clause (1.2.1988 cc.864-899), Viscount Falkland’s Arts Council 
amendment sought to limit prohibition to materials representing “homosexual 
relationships or homosexual acts as being more acceptable than heterosexual 
relationships or acts [excluding works with] artistic, scientific or educational 
purpose” (cc.864-5). It was defeated by 166 to 111 votes. Pink Paper (4.2.1988) 
reported Jill Knight and David Wilshire watching the debate and handing out 
briefings, accompanied by Michael Howard. 
 Eleven amendments were debated in the second session (1.2.1988 cc.928- 
974). Two Government amendments were accepted without a vote and two pro-
Clause amendments withdrawn. Only Lord Peston’s anti-Clause amendment on 
libraries was put to a vote, but defeated by 42 to 28 votes. The others were not 
moved or withdrawn, which meant they could be re-tabled. They sought to retain 
counselling and sexual-health services, exclude theatre performances and works 
of literary merit, ensure the availability of support on sexuality in schools, and 
protect lesbians and gay men from discrimination. 
 The third session (2.2.1988 cc.993-1023) debated Lord Willis’ amendment 
to delete the Clause from the Bill. Eight Lords spoke against the amendment and 
10 in support. Lord Grimmond argued, “it is time that some protest was made 
against the growing habit of legislating whenever something is raised in the 
press” (c.1002), while Lord Peston noted “so many of the examples [of promotion] 
put forward turn out not to be the case” (c.1012). The amendment was defeated 
by 202 to 122 votes but, as it was announced, the “[Interruption]” in Hansard   
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(c.1023) omits three lesbians abseiling from the visitors gallery to the chamber. 
The next day’s papers seized on it (3.2.1988): “Tarzan lesbians vow to fight on” 
(Evening Standard) and “Lesbian protesters drop in on Lords” (Daily Telegraph). 
The Times later added (5.2.1988) “Apology by unrepentant peer angers the 
Lords” on Lord Monkswell’s admission that he had signed the women’s passes.
 The Report stage of the Bill took up seven sessions. In the debate devoted 
to Clause 28 (16.2.1988 cc.585-643) twenty amendments were considered. Anti-
Clause amendments sought to limit its applications or clarify the wording. Lord 
Longford sought to restrict it to schools, but was defeated by 90 to 48 votes. Lord 
Henderson sought to omit ‘pretended’ from ‘family’, but was defeated by 43 to 20 
votes. Other anti-Clause amendments were not moved or withdrawn. There was 
more discussion of families than in earlier debates. Lord Gifford read a letter to 
the Guardian from Stonewall founder Angela Mason about the children of lesbian 
parents including her own daughter (c.607). Lord Rea spoke about being brought 
up by two women (c.617-9). Three minor Government amendments were 
accepted as small, if inadequate, concessions. 
 At the Bill’s third reading (29.2.1988), conflict over Clause 28 ran on after 
the Minister had proposed the Bill be passed. Lord McIntosh (cc.72-4), Baroness 
Seear (cc.74-5) and Lord Houghton (cc.77-80) continued criticising it. Baroness 
Blatch (c.74), Lady Saltoun (cc.75-6) and Lord Boyd-Carpenter (c.76-7) continued 
defending it. On the stated intention of Bill and Clause to deal with the ‘militant 
tendency’ of some Labour councils, Lord Houghton pointed to the Tory ‘militant 
tendency’ which “consists of an authoritarian, puritanical and highly illiberal 
group of people who pursue a political and a moral philosophy which stops just 
short of donning a uniform in order to show the public where it stands” (c.78).
 Before the Commons debate on the amended Clause began (9.3.1988), 
opposing MPs raised points of order with the Speaker about the management of 
the Bill. Simon Hughes queried the exclusion of Liberal amendments (c.340). 
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Jack Cunningham queried the debate’s timing which had rushed the drafting of 
amendments (c.341). Frank Dobson felt “the House [was] being treated with 
contempt by the Government’s business managers” (c.342). 
 In the debate that followed (9.3.1988 cc.370-432) speakers on both sides 
were persistently heckled; at times the collective participation reads like a Music 
Hall performance. Geoffrey Dickens (c.416) likened it to “addressing an audience 
from the stage of ‘La Cage Aux Folles’”. An extraordinary range of topics emerged: 
a Franklin cartoon in the Sun; a 1930s Nazi cartoonist (c.376); David Hockney’s 
paintings (c.380); Shakespeare on Sir Thomas More (c.381); the Greek and Latin 
meanings of ‘homo’; Socrates and hemlock (c.382); Richard Branson’s condom 
campaign (c.384); the Labour anti-discrimination resolution (c.385); definitions 
of ‘promote’ back to 1623 (c.391); Wittgenstein and the meaning of words (c.401); 
the South African embassy picket; the Marquis de Sade (c.402); Benjamin 
Britten’s setting of Michelangelo’s sonnets (c.403); Freud’s essay on Leonardo (c.
404); Cambridge in the 1930s; Communism (c.416); a Mother’s Union leaflet on 
‘Understanding Homosexuality’ (c.426). Parliamentary protocols were neither 
observed nor enforced. Jill Knight’s claims about the availability of gay books in 
schools and parents’ protests were challenged by Tony Banks, John Fraser (cc.
377-8) and Peter Pike (c.386), while Stuart Holland offered evidence to the 
contrary (c.400). When Tony Banks pressed her for evidence she offered none (c.
408). David Wilshire’s claim about a safer-sex leaflet was exposed as false by 
Jack Cunningham (c.376-7) and Stuart Holland (c.400). Nicholas Fairbairn was 
cast as “sick” for his obsession with anal sex by Tony Benn (c.383) and likened to 
the Scarlet Pimpernel for his absences from the chamber by Stuart Holland (c.
402). Mark Fisher distinguished genuine intolerance (Nicholas Fairbairn) from 
misguided mischief (David Wilshire) (c.393). The two Labour amendments, one to 
protect civil rights, the other to protect anti-discrimination measures, were 
barely mentioned. Michael Howard mustered only two pieces of circumstantial 
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evidence (c.421) and urged their rejection (c.425). They were defeated by 254 to 
201 votes but, while the anti-Clause vote was stable, the pro-Clause vote had 
shrunk. As only two Conservative MPs, Michael Brown and Robin Squire, voted 
against it and only one other, Andrew Rowe, voiced non-support, at least 50 
previously supportive Conservatives had abstained or were absent.
 Margaret Thatcher did not vote in either Clause debate, nor did at least six 
members of her cabinet. Weeks (2007: 96) notes, she seemed “relaxed about the 
sexual behaviour of her closest supporters (her Parliamentary Private Secretary 
towards the end of her tenure was well known to be homosexual)”. Also Matthew 
Parris was her correspondence secretary when she was leader of the Opposition. 
Her support for the Clause was unapparent. Whatever the machinations behind 
its backbench introduction, once the Clause was accepted into the Bill, the 
Government could not vote against it. 
 The Debate
 The debate was held at the Report stage of the Bill (HC 15.12.1987 cc.
987-1038) to hear Liberal and Labour amendments to the Clause. Twenty-nine 
MPs spoke, 16 made speeches, 12 against the Clause (Appendix 7). The 
amendments sought the inclusion of sexual orientations in sex education, the 
protection of lesbians and gay men from discrimination, and the protection of 
advice to school pupils on sexuality. As the Minister had indicated that he would 
not accept the amendments, given the large Conservative majority, anti-Clause 
MPs could only ensure that the strongest possible protest went on record. 
 Simon Hughes (c.988) began by linking the Clause to Lord Halsbury’s Bill 
which Ministers in both Houses had argued was unworkable and unnecessary. 
This led him to quote extensively from Lord Skelmersdale’s speech the year 
before to highlight the apparent Government U-turn. These ‘linear style’ quotes 
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(Voloshinov 1986: 120) were indisputable and thus went unremarked. The U-
turn was also pursued by Michael Brown and Jack Cunningham, again without 
response. These first three speakers conceded that homosexuality should not be 
promoted and that children should be protected (c.990; c.995; c.996). Thus the 
core pro-Clause claims were reaffirmed. This set the debate in the Conservative’s 
direction and left other anti-Clause speakers with limited choices. They could 
either argue about what constituted promotion which, as it was undefined, gave 
them little to argue against, or that homosexuality could not be promoted, for 
which they had no evidence. Similarly, on the protection of children, they could 
only offer alternative views of children’s best interests, or of what they should be 
protected against. 
 Michael Brown declared the Committee was “bounced into accepting the 
Clause” (c.995); he was the only Conservative to speak against it. In assent, Jack 
Cunningham admitted he had accepted the amendment in Committee on the 
basis of prohibiting the “promotion of an act” as opposed to “the act of promoting 
homosexuality” (c.996). However, pro-Clause speakers reversed the word order to 
“promoting activities” (Harry Greenway c.1001) and “the promotion of an activity” 
(David Wilshire c.1005). Jill Knight cited parents who wished “to protect their 
children and complain about what was happening to them” (c.1000) and the 
“strong objection of parents in those local authorities [to what had] been done to 
their children” (c.1007). Nicholas Bennett referred to “homosexual teachers who 
abused their position” and viewed “the homosexual act as intrinsically immoral 
and evil” (c.1015). These references plant the misleading impression that sexual 
acts were being promoted in schools, while Jill Knight insinuated sexual abuse. 
Chris Smith, the only out gay MP, noted “the act as they put it, of encouraging...” 
(c.1007), but the allusion was otherwise unexposed. It triggered assent “without 
much critical attention” (Wodak 2007: 214).
 Misleading impressions relating to David Wilshire’s dossier were exposed. 
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It can be gleaned from the debate that it included extracts from: ‘Young Gay and 
Proud’ which was on the Conservative election posters, ‘Playbook for Kids about 
Sex’ and ‘The Milkman’s on his Way’, which were cited in the Lords, plus ‘Jenny 
Lives with Eric and Martin’. Simon Hughes (c.991) exposed how David Wilshire 
had let the Committee think ‘Playbook for Kids about Sex’ was a local authority 
publication. Chris Smith (c.1008) exposed how the inclusion of ‘Jenny lives with 
Eric and Martin’ was misleading, although stocked at an ILEA teacher centre, it 
had never been used in a classroom. Ken Livingstone added: 
Nowhere have the hysteria and bigotry been whipped up more than on the issue of the 
book ‘Jenny lives with Eric and Martin’. It filled acres of newsprint. What was the reality? 
One copy of one book in one teachers’ centre that one teacher had taken out to read 
became the centre of a wave of hysteria that has turned it into a best seller. The people 
who published the book will probably want to make a donation to the popular press for 
advertising it. Should such nonsense be the basis of legislation? (c.1010)
None of the books were council publications and evidence for their use in school 
was scant. The only evidence Michael Howard (c.1017) mustered was that ‘Young 
Gay and Proud’ was on a Haringey reading list for thirteen-year-olds. 
 A notable feature of the debate is the profusion of questions asked by anti-
Clause speakers (57 to 5). Of these 32 were rhetorical and easily ignored, but 25 
were directed at individuals. The rhetorical questions mostly concerned potential 
applications of the Clause, as did a third of the direct questions, others asked for 
clarification of, or evidence for, pro-Clause claims. This multitude of questions 
suggests confusion. The Committee had been ‘bounced’ into accepting the Clause 
and with the debate only a week later, opposing MPs had been caught unawares. 
While the direct questions were answered, the answers were moralistic, evasive, 
circumstantial, based on questionable sources or “generalised hearsay” (c.1008). 
As Archy Kirkwood noted in his summary (c.1026), the questions had not been 
satisfactorily answered. 
 There is also a difference in the range of arguments deployed by each side. 
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Pro-Clause arguments were narrow and moralistic: the protection of children (20 
mentions), right and wrong (18 mentions), parents’ disapproval (13 mentions), 
and what schools were/should not be doing (12 mentions). Opposing arguments 
were wide-ranging: the imprecision of the Clause (33 mentions), pupil’s access to 
information and support (30 mentions), democracy, civil rights and equality (29 
mentions), the Government’s motivation (22 mentions), misleading press reports 
(19 mentions), misrepresented council policies and good practice in schools (13 
mentions), and the importance of funding services (11 mentions). Overall, anti-
Clause contributions were reasoned and their examples specific: identifiable 
council decisions (c.1004; c.1024), surveys (c.1011-2; c.1024), or quotes from 
specified letters (c.1011; c.1014). Chris Smith quoted an international treaty that 
Margaret Thatcher had signed with President Reagan and other heads of state: 
We believe in a rule of law which respects and protects without fear or favour the rights 
and liberties of every citizen and provides the setting in which the human spirit can 
develop in freedom and diversity. (c.1010) 
That this ‘linear style’ report (Voloshinov 1986: 120) went unremarked, left it 
hanging as pro-West Cold-War propaganda. Ken Livingstone’s quote of Heinrich 
Himmler’s decree on homosexuals (c.1013) was similarly bypassed. Linking the 
Government to fascism was in tune with the political atmosphere of the time; 
Tony Banks (c.1022-3) and Jeremy Corbyn (c.1025) also did so. The quote of 
Himmler may also have been an indirect appeal to the Michael Howard, who is 
Jewish. Any effect on him is unknowable, but his contributions to the debate 
were different from those of backbench pro-Clause speakers. 
 The backbench speakers focused on what they portrayed as parents’ and 
constituents’ outrage over the claimed promotion of homosexuality in schools. 
However, the children, parents and constituents they cited were unidentifiably 
generalised, as in Jill Knight’s intervention on behalf of Harry Greenway under 
questioning from Tony Banks: 
108
I wonder whether during my hon. Friend’s conference he heard from parents such as those 
who contacted me when they wished to complain about the way in which their children 
were being dealt with in schools promoting homosexuality. Those parents were hit, spat 
upon, urinated on and one, who was pregnant, was punched very hard in the stomach. I 
wonder whether my hon. Friend has heard similar complaints from those poor parents, 
whose only wish was to protect their children and complain about what was happening to 
them. (c.1000)
In this ‘pictorial style’ report (Voloshinov 1986: 120-1) Jill Knight personalises 
and conflates two separate news reports. One part echoes The Times editorial 
(18.12.1986) citing protests in Haringey on the day Lord Halsbury’s Bill was read 
a second time. It reported the “parents allege that they have been subject to 
abuse, to vandalism on their homes, to death threats and to such unpleasant 
experiences as being spat and urinated on.” The pregnant woman was also in 
Haringey. The Times (17.3.1987) reported that she “was taken to hospital after 
she claimed she was punched in the stomach at a gay and lesbian unit meeting 
at Haringey council”. The use in these reports of “alleged” and “claimed” suggests 
the stories were unsubstantiated. Reports of these incidents have not been found 
in other broadsheets. When Chris Smith (c.1008) requested specific examples of 
promotion, Clive Soley intervened: 
[W]e discussed the matters raised by him and by the hon. Member for Birmingham, 
Edgbaston [Jill Knight]. They were known to be and had been found to be lies by 
newspapers. Those lies have now been picked up by certain people who have used them to 
create hatred and fear. Does it not bring into disrepute hon. Members who peddle those 
lies in that way? (c.1008)
Clive Soley had introduced the Press Freedom debate (HC 27.11.1987 cc.509- 
574) with a report on ‘Media Coverage of London Councils’ (Curran et al 1987). It 
traced various 1980s news items to their different or non-existent origins and 
showed how they were picked up and distorted by other papers. The Sun, Daily 
Mail, Mail on Sunday and Evening Standard were the worst offenders. When 
asked directly, neither Harry Greenway (c.1002), nor Jill Knight (c.1007), nor 
109
David Wilshire (c.1008) could provide an example of a child harmed by Labour 
council policies, or of local authority employees who had encouraged any adult or 
child to be lesbian or gay.
 Michael Howard’s speech was different. He began by accepting Chris 
Smith’s invitation to condemn the fire-bombing of Capital Gay and other acts of 
violence against gay people and condemned them “unreservedly [and] without 
qualification” (c.1016). Elaine Kellett-Bowman had earlier called out it was quite 
right Capital Gay should have been fire-bombed, to a spate of protests (c.1009). 
In response to the Speaker’s intervention, she was “quite prepared to affirm that 
it is quite right that there should be an intolerance of evil” (c.1009), a point she 
repeated in response to Joan Lestor, who said “the hon. Member for Lancaster 
should be ashamed of herself for sanctioning arson” (c.1024).
 As a barrister, Michael Howard would have known the Clause was 
unworkable as law and unnecessary in the context of existing legislation. He 
confined his speech to the Standing Committee, two circumstantial examples of 
‘promotion’ from Haringey, the amendments, and Labour policy. He claimed, “the 
influence of local authorities on what goes on in schools [had] given rise to much, 
if not most, of the public concern” (c.1018). He ruthlessly ensured the clause was 
passed without amendment, but did not engage in the backbench moralising. 
This raises the question: was the Government using backbench homophobia to 
pass an unworkable and unnecessary Clause for the purpose of weakening their 
political opponents, or had backbench pressure got the upper hand?
 Anti-clause MPs were unsure. Claire Short (c.992) noted “the nasty games 
that are being played here”. Simon Hughes (c.993) inferred “an effort to capitalise 
on a populist view and to gain the maximum political advantage from the scares 
and fears about AIDS”. Michael Brown (c.995) saw “a degree of populism that is 
becoming a symptom of a less tolerant society”. Jack Cunningham (c.998) judged 
that the U-turn was “for the most base and contemptible politically opportunist 
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reasons”. Joan Ruddock (c.1004) referred to, “people in my constituency who 
believe the ugly propaganda that has emanated from the Conservative Benches”. 
Chris Smith cited two clear motives:
The first is the use of anti-gay sentiment for political ends. I shall say no more about that, 
because it is one of the most disreputable political activities in which anyone could indulge 
[...] The second motive is a desire to change the climate so that to be gay or lesbian is to 
feel and to be treated as a second-class citizen. The climate has changed. There is more 
intolerance now than there was five or 10 years ago. (c.1009).
Jack Cunningham concluded that the Minister’s “misrepresentations of Labour’s 
position [were] deliberate and for the basest of political motives” (c.1021).
 There was no openness to alternative views on the Government side of the 
debate, nor was its outcome based on rational argument or solid evidence. It was 
a single battle in a wider war in which anti-Clause MPs were outnumbered. 
 Words and Themes
 The following analyses focus on each side’s top-ten keywords (Appendices 
11 & 12) and their collocates (Appendices 13 & 14). Core features of each side’s 
contributions to the debate are shown on Flowcharts 1 and 2 below. 
*       *       *
 On Flowchart 1, the anti-Clause keywords (Appendix 12) WILL and OR are 
pivotal. WILL collocates with the keywords GOVERNMENT, MINISTER, HE and 
CONSERVATIVE which, along with members, clause, hope and amendment link to 
debate process and party politics. By contrast, OR links widely to sexuality terms 
and their collocates and hence to clause content and its implications. 
 In terms of clause content, the flowchart shows that OR links to the clause 
wording (promoting, homosexuality, teaching, local, authority, promote, education) 
and to its possible effects on lesbian and GAY civil rights. However, only 58/103 
concordance lines for OR (Appendix 15) are clear alternatives requiring OR as a 
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conjunction. Thus its use is questionable in 45 lines. In 25 of these lines, the 
linked items overlap in meaning, for example: 
12 that is not a result of the promotion  or  advancement of arguments about homose     SH 15.12.anti.txt
26 clause should be allowed to prevent  or  hinder the discouragement of discriminati   JCu 15.12.anti.txt
51 selling and advice to such a worried  or  concerned teenager to be regarded as pro  CSm 15.12.anti.txt
66 ture of such a concept as promoted  or  encouraged normality? I thought that only  CSm 15.12.anti.txt
88  retation can be put on the purpose  or  nature of the amendments that we tabled    JCu 15.12.anti.txt
89  so without any fear of intimidation  or  threat, either from within the House or fro     TB 15.12.anti.txt
The overlap suggests hesitation as if the speakers were unsure what to say next. 
In 15 lines, OR appears to preface an afterthought, for example: 
7 n a few localised examples of abuse  or  possible abuse. The second is that the cla     SH 15.12.anti.txt
16 hon. Lady to regard those practices,  or  any others, as civilised. I am merely askin     SH 15.12.anti.txt
33  o. 37. If banning promotion means  or  carries the risk of meaning the banning of   JCu 15.12.anti.txt
85 d never has been the responsibility  or  the duty of a local authority or a local edu   JCu 15.12.anti.txt
92  perform in local authority theatres  or  local authority-funded theatres. For exam     TB 15.12.anti.txt
The afterthoughts suggest a concern to cover all possibilities, as if there were too 
many to consider. The large number of unanswered questions supports this. 
In five lines ‘and’ seems a more appropriate conjunction: 
6 ent of a non-discriminatory society  or  local government. My colleagues and I hav     SH 15.12.anti.txt
13  otion”, “acceptability”, “pretended”  or  “family”. Subsection (1)(b), if unamended,      SH 15.12.anti.txt
17 and in 1987 where, just as in 1887,  or  1787, those practices go on. From the begi     SH 15.12.anti.txt
25  close to them, such as their family  or  friends. “Promote” should not be taken to    JCu 15.12.anti.txt
82 oes it exclude Eton, Harrow, Rugby  or  Winchester, from which Conservative Me     NB 15.12.anti.txt
The use of OR instead of ‘and’ in these lines creates unnecessary alternatives, as 
if the uncertainty had pervaded more finite information. 
 While categorising the lines in this way is a matter of judgement, arguably 
all 45 questionable lines signal uncertainty. Obvious reasons for this are the 
undefined wording of the clause and the unexplained Government U-turn, but 
uncertainty is not evident in the lines for all speakers. It is most evident in the 
lines spoken by Simon Hughes and Jack Cunningham, who introduced the anti-
Clause position in terms of ‘concessionary moderation’. 
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Flowchart 1: Anti-Clause Keyword and Collocate Network
key: BOLD CAPITALS: keywords in the top ten
 BLACK CAPITALS: keywords
 RED CAPITALS: sexuality-term keywords and keywords collocating with sexuality terms
 black lower case: keyword collocates
 red lower case: sexuality terms and sexuality-term collocates
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In terms of debate process, the uses of the three most significant keywords, 
MINISTER, GOVERNMENT and HE are predictable (Appendix 15). Of the lines for 
MINISTER, 56/60 refer to Michael Howard, while 64/80 lines for HE refer to pro-
Clause speakers. Of the lines for GOVERNMENT(’s), 63/80 refer to the Thatcher 
Government and 13 to local government. Less predictable are the uses of WILL 
once eight requests and two consents to ‘give way’ are excluded.
 Of the 90 remaining lines for WILL (Appendix 15), 44 occur in predictions, 
while hope occurs in 15 and perhaps in two. Of these, 36/44 predict effects of 
the clause. These predictions are confidently phrased, but as the parameters of the 
clause were undefined, they had no firm basis, they were simply a means of raising 
concerns and fears, for example:
13 mosexuals is taught in school, they  will  be taught away from the classroon, in pr     SH 15.12.anti.txt
22 d that those with possible infection  will  be more reluctant than ever to come forw  JCu 15.12.anti.txt
40 es to, the lesbian or gay community  will,  in the minds of local authorities, come t  CSm 15.12.anti.txt
47 irrelevant. What the Minister thinks  will  not matter: it is what the judges think th     KL 15.12.anti.txt
54 ve the clause should be interpreted  will  cause genuine fear about the direction in      PP 15.12.anti.txt
78  going on in the House tonight, they  will  undoubtedly be far more afraid, if the cla     TB 15.12.anti.txt
87 without amendment many teachers  will  be worried about the role that they can a      JL 15.12.anti.txt
93  for years to come. Such censorship  will  create fear in librarians, theatre manage    JCo 15.12.anti.txt
95 led Conservative election smears. It  will  lead to an increase in human misery. It i     DA 15.12.anti.txt
The predictions which include hope or perhaps focus on Minister or Government 
(re)actions and are less confident, for example: 
14  something from which I hope they  will  resile. It is about time we had some prin     SH 15.12.anti.txt
18  intentions. I hope that the Minister  will  accept the amendments. If he does not,    JCu 15.12.anti.txt
24  d to those points and perhaps they  will  question him on his answers because we   JCu 15.12.anti.txt
33  rights. I hope that the Government  will  reconsider.        JR 15.12.anti.txt
57 sincerely hope that the Government  will  think again about the way in which clau      PP 15.12.anti.txt
60 endments, I hope that the Minister  will  give assurances that clause 27 will be lo      PP 15.12.anti.txt
98 ct children. I hope that the Minister  will  look carefully at the arguments advance     AK 15.12.anti.txt
As the Minister was not accepting the amendments, hopes for compromise were 
futile. Uncertainty remained. Nine more lines for WILL occur in first-conditional 
sentences. Four relate to the feared effects of the clause: 
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31 ession and attacks that they believe  will  follow if the clause is passed unamended     JR 15.12.anti.txt
53 ntributes. If the clause is carried, it  will  open the way to a load of homophobia an     KL 15.12.anti.txt
55 d notions. If this Bill becomes law I  will  be prohibited from doing what I see as a       PP 15.12.anti.txt
78 going on in the House tonight, they  will  undoubtedly be far more afraid, if the cla     TB 15.12.anti.txt
Five relate to the Minister:
18 intentions. I hope that the Minister  will  accept the amendments. If he does not,    JCu 15.12.anti.txt
19 the amendments. If he does not, he  will  have a difficult job to explain to the Hou   JCu 15.12.anti.txt
73       If the Minister  will  not accept the amendment, will he give a     AR 15.12.anti.txt
84 k the Minister a straight question; I  will  sit down if he will do me the courtesy of       JL 15.12.anti.txt
85 raight question; I will sit down if he  will  do me the courtesy of answering it. I agr      JL 15.12.anti.txt
The last condition (84-85) was used by Joan Lester to highlight the undefined 
nature and thus unbounded implications of the Clause. Michael Howard did not 
give a straight answer and she knew he could not (c.1023). 
 Uncertainty is also evident in 21 lines where WILL occurs in questions, of 
which 19 relate to the clause. Eight were rhetorical, but 11 were addressed to the 
MINISTER asking for definition of the clause wording or its applications. As Archy 
Kirkwood noted, the Minister gave no satisfactory answers (c.1026). Also 13/14 
lines for FEAR also refer to uncertainty about the clause and/or GOVERNMENT 
policy. Tony Banks captured the atmosphere amid unspecified heckles:
I must confess immediately that I do not think I have ever felt so frightened in the House 
as I do now. [Interruption] That is the reason. If this clause goes through, the House will 
have taken a dangerous step down the road of intolerance (c.1022)
Intolerance also underlies 19/23 lines for SOCIETY (Appendix 15), which refer to 
the feared effects of the Clause. Ken Livingstone put the situation clearly:
If Conservative Members wish to raise the rights of lesbians and gay men in society, it 
should he done through a major piece of legislation that is properly debated throughout 
the land. Conservative Members are responding to a wave of hysteria and bigotry that has 
been whipped up by the popular press. It has been absolutely disgraceful. Some people 
have the misfortune to believe what they read in the Daily Express, the Daily Mail and The 
Sun. They have come to accept that in some areas children are being taught how to be 
lesbians. It is easy for those outside who live with the day-to-day prejudice against lesbians 
and gay men to laugh it off, but that pernicious lie has bitten deep into the popular 
conscience. (c.1010)
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Overall, anti-Clause speakers had been pushed into the position where they 
could assume little about the nature of the clause or government intentions. In 
Voloshinov’s terms they lacked sufficient ‘extraverbal context’ (2012: 161-8), 
hence the multitude of questions and the uncertainty evident in uses of OR and 
WILL. However, even if they had been able to mount a better-informed and co-
ordinated defence, it would have been no match for the Conservative majority.
*       *       *
 On Flowchart 2, the pro-Clause keywords (Appendix 11) I and WAS are 
pivotal. While I links to all aspects of the claimed promotion, WAS occurs in the 
reported speech, views, events and situations that were produced to support the 
claim; it also relates more closely to the LABOUR target. 
 Of the concordance lines for I (Appendix 16), 35/167 relate to debate 
process: statements of intent, refusals or consents to give way, directions to the 
House, and a procedural query. Of more interest are the 52 lines where I is used 
with a stative verb or verb with stative meaning:
 am + adjective (9 lines)           think (4 lines)                    wonder (2 lines)          recognise (1 line)
 believe (8 lines)                      want (4 lines)                     accept (1 line)             regard (1 line)
 was + adjective (6 lines)         have + noun (2 lines)         consider (1 line)          regret (1 line)
 hope (4 lines)                         know (2 lines)                    doubt (1 line)              remember (1 line)
 see (4 lines)                           wish (2 lines)                      feel (1 line)                share (1 line)
Excluding five lines where wish or want relate to debate process and two where 
wonder occurs in questions, 45 lines state or report personal views, for example: 
6  s on what one means by “civilised”.  I  do not regard the practice of sodomy or bug    EKB 15.12.pro.txt
15 ssential that children are protected.  I  do not believe that the House would ever sa     HG 15.12.pro.txt
26  that it is a misuse of public money.  I  share their view. Only last week I received c     HG 15.12.pro.txt
48 ber for the beginning of the debate,  I  was not sure whether it would be necessary     DW 15.12.pro.txt
77 verything that has been sent to me,  I  am absolutely clear in my mind that the thi     DW 15.12.pro.txt
87  if he wishes to do so, but, as far as  I  can see, ratepayers’ money was made avail     DW 15.12.pro.txt
100  many homosexuals in the country.  I  do not want to preach, because it is invidio      NB 15.12.pro.txt
157  the hon. Member for Copeland, but  I  am less sure about some of his hon. Friend     MH 15.12.pro.txt
167  is growing and I said, “Quite right.” I  believe that intolerance of evil should grow.    EKB 15.12.pro.txt
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Flowchart 2: Pro-Clause Keyword and Collocate Network
key: BOLD CAPITALS: keywords in the top ten
 BLACK CAPITALS: keywords
 RED CAPITALS: sexuality-term keywords and keywords collocating with sexuality terms
 black lower case: keyword collocates
 red lower case: sexuality terms and sexuality-term collocates
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This suggests pro-Clause speakers were entrenched in the social power of their 
beliefs. They had no evidence of harm to children and no credible source of 
support for their claims, though some MPs would have seen Harry Greenway’s  
(c.1002) and Nicholas Bennett’s (c.1015) invocations of religion as authoritative. 
 Similarly, all but two of the 74 lines that occur in reports, are self-reports 
of speech or actions. The following categories are not mutually exclusive, but 
illustrate the point. Sixteen reports occur in refutations, for example:
2 r that I presented to the Committee.  I  was speaking about a book entitled “The pl     DW 15.12.pro.txt
4 ctor of Public Prosecutions in 1983.  I  was seeking not to say that it had been use     DW 15.12.pro.txt
52 authority. The record will show that  I  made no such claim.       DW 15.12.pro.txt
56 t I was in favour of negative images.  I  did not say that, and I do not say it now. F     DW 15.12.pro.txt
69 wrong to promote either of them. All  I  was saying is that there are those who seek     DW 15.12.pro.txt
164 ment about Labour party policy. All  I  did was to quote a resolution which was pa     MH 15.12.pro.txt
Sixteen reports occur in answers to questions, for example:
17     I  did not invite gay groups, but it was open f     HG 15.12.pro.txt
35     I  was approached by children with all kinds      HG 15.12.pro.txt
76 e contradicts any of the things that  I  said. Therefore, the amendments are not ne     DW 15.12.pro.txt
82 e to ask for the information, which  I  gave them. I shall gladly give it to the hon.       JK 15.12.pro.txt
133 resent on the Friday morning when  I  made it perfectly clear that my view was ex      RB 15.12.pro.txt
144  in the past tense. I supported what  I  had said, and it was put to a vote that mor      RB 15.12.pro.txt
Fourteen reports invoke the Standing Committee, for example:
63 em fly in the face of the evidence —  I  presented that evidence to the Committee a     DW 15.12.pro.txt
73 oted what I said in Committee, and  I  stand by it. The clause is not a criticism of      DW 15.12.pro.txt
85 ple is required, I shall repeat what  I  said in Committee. One of the books that w     DW 15.12.pro.txt
126 ilable in Committee, and I said that  I  could not believe that any Member of the C     MH 15.12.pro.txt
147     I  dealt with this matter in Committee. The Bi     MH 15.12.pro.txt
Thirteen reports recall a previous utterance, for example:
148 ties and local education authorities.  I  said that if a case were made out for it to be    MH 15.12.pro.txt
150 ity in the classroom, in the way that  I  suggested a short time ago, would be perfec     MH 15.12.pro.txt
153 mendment, as it is unnecessary. As  I  said, it is more limited in its scope than the     MH 15.12.pro.txt
155 ot only by the Government, but, as  I  said earlier, by the Opposition. I accept that     MH 15.12.pro.txt
115 e clause. When I began my remarks  I  said that I hoped that I would succeed in sa     MH 15.12.pro.txt
Ten reports recount actions or experience, for example:
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12 nd to express their opposition to it.  I  decided to promote a full discussion on it, a     HG 15.12.pro.txt
14      Children are vulnerable.  I  taught in schools for 23 years and saw that     HG 15.12.pro.txt
65  homosexuality cannot be changed.  I  have tried to look at the evidence for and ag     DW 15.12.pro.txt
97 er, and latterly an education officer.  I  came across examples of homosexual teach      NB 15.12.pro.txt
These reports expose the weakness of pro-Clause arguments, compounded by a 
scarcity of ‘linear style’ quotes to give them greater authority (Voloshinov 1986: 
120). All reports are in ‘pictorial style’ and infused with the speaker’s view (ibid: 
120-1). However, in terms of a social hierarchy of values (ibid: 123), the claims of 
promotion and parents’ concern were not weak. They were more powerful than 
the reasoned and better-supported anti-Clause arguments because they tapped 
into the well of mobilised homophobic beliefs.
 The disproportionate frequency of I also questions the extent to which pro-
Clause MPs were speaking on the Government’s behalf. The ratios of I to we are 
indicative: 6.2 to 1 for pro-Clause speakers, 2.1 to 1 for anti-Clause speakers. Of 
the 29 lines for we (Appendix 16A), 16 refer to the House, three to Conservative 
MPs, while four are unidentifiably generalised; only six refer to the Government: 
2 ific point that she has raised is yes.  We  take the view that the form of the amend     MH 15.12.pro.txt
14 tion has been questioned. However,  we  think that it is necessary. We do not thin     MH 15.12.pro.txt
15 wever, we think that it is necessary.  We  do not think that it is damaging. It is the      MH 15.12.pro.txt
16 osexuality by local authorities, and  we  wish to make it clear that the promotion      MH 15.12.pro.txt
19 orm would be stopped by clause 27.  We  believe that to be right.       MH 15.12.pro.txt
27  rise to widespread public concern.  We  have sought to deal with them in a way t     MH 15.12.pro.txt
These lines were spoken by the Minister but, although he was representing the 
Government, they are only 6/16 lines for we he spoke. Pro-Clause speakers 
appeared to be acting largely on their own initiative.
 All 63 lines for WAS (Appendix 16) occur in reports. Twenty-two lines 
report events in COMMITTEE: what David Wilshire claimed WAS or WAS not the 
case (14 lines) and Michael Howard’s references to LABOUR’s acceptance of the 
amendment without a vote (8 lines). The former relate to claims of promotion, but 
the latter target LABOUR. A divide between the moralising promotion claims and 
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the LABOUR target is evident in other lines. Those related to protecting children 
(6 lines), Harry Greenway’s CONFERENCE on the family (5 lines), public support 
for the clause (4 lines) and EALING council policies (3 lines) fall within backbench 
moralising. Michael Howard’s citing of the LABOUR CONFERENCE resolution on 
non-discrimination in 1985 (3 lines) further targets LABOUR. He also spoke all 
five lines for CONFERENCE that refer to the 1985 LABOUR CONFERENCE, plus 
22/27 lines for AUTHORITIES and all 8/13 lines for OPPOSITION that refer to 
LABOUR. Conversely, he spoke none of the lines for PARENTS. 
 The keyword PARENTS relates most strongly to the backbench moralising. 
Eleven lines occur in reports, but apart from Harry Greenway’s PARENTS being 
located in his EALING constituency, they are generalised⎯a strategy recognised 
“to influence socially shared beliefs” (van Dijk 2006c: 370). Yet, the invocations of 
parental concern are dissimilar. Those of Harry Greenway and Nicholas Bennett 
were motivated by religious views and though homophobic are credibly sincere. 
Those of Jill Knight were apparently derived from unsubstantiated reports in the 
Times, while David Wilshire’s dossier resembles that cited at the second reading 
of Lord Halsbury’s Bill (18.12.1986: c.311/c.317/c.321). This suggests the two 
main Clause promoters were implicated in an agenda beyond their moral stance.
 While Michael Howard circumvented the moralising claims, his focus on 
discrediting LABOUR rested on the mobilised homophobia:
Let us consider some of the things that some local authorities have considered doing, or 
might consider doing, with those intentions. We need look no further than the report of the 
annual conference of the Labour party in 1985. In 1985 the Labour party conference voted 
to call upon Labour local authorities to adopt practices and policies to prevent 
discrimination against lesbians and gay men What did the Labour party recommend under 
that heading? We need to look no further than the third item, which states: to support 
financially and otherwise special lesbian and gay phone lines, centres and youth groups”. I 
draw the attention of the House to the last two words, “youth groups". There could be no 
clearer notice of what we can expect to see some local authorities continuing to do if we 
accept the amendment. The Labour party conference voted to support homosexual youth 
groups and to prevent discrimination against homosexuals. (cc.1020-1)
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His statement is factual, but following the backbench arguments on protecting 
children, it alludes strongly to the corruption of youth and thus to homosexuals 
as corrupters facilitated by LABOUR. It makes no allowance for teenagers who 
are clear about their sexual attractions and, more damningly, casts measures to 
prevent discrimination as the protection of corrupters. Although the statement 
did not go unchallenged, the allusion to corruption passed without “critical 
attention” (Wodak 2007: 214).
 Views of Sexuality
 Terms related to sexuality used in the debate fall into three categories: 

























Anti-Clause speakers used all 24 terms with proportionately higher frequencies 
of sexuality, GAY and SEXUAL, the latter being keywords, though as the uses of 
SEXUAL divide between sexual and sexual orientation it cannot be considered as 
such. Pro-Clause speakers used only 11/24 terms, of which the clinical terms 
(homosexuality/homosexual/homosexuals) are proportionately salient. The 
terms are investigated via their collocates (Appendices 17 & 19) and concordance 
lines (Appendices 18 & 20) within each lexical category in turn.
*       *       *
 Of the abstract nouns, the clinical homosexuality was most used term 
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 54/84 (64.3% total)
 23/54 (42.6% uses)
72.5%
 30/84 (35.7% total) 
 11/30 (36.7% uses)
27.5%
 heterosexualism 1
 1/1 (100% total)
72.5% 27.5%
 heterosexuality 1
 1/1 (100% total)
72.5% 27.5%
 lesbianism 1
 1/1 (100% total)
72.5% 27.5%
 sexuality 20
 19/20 (95% total)
72.5%
 1/20 (5% total)
 1/1 (100% uses)
27.5%
 sexualities 1
 1/1 (100% total)
72.5% 27.5%
 sexual orientation 5
 3/5 (60% total)
72.5%
 2/5 (40% total)
 1/2 (50% uses)
27.5%
 sexual orientations 4
 4/4 (100% total)
 3/4 (75% uses)
72.5% 27.5%
 sex (in reference to
 sexual acts)
12
 10/12 (83.3% uses)
 9/10 (90% uses)
72.5%
 2/12 (16.7% total)
 2/2 (100% uses)
27.5%
 homophobia 2
 2/2 (100% total)
72.5% 27.5%
Key: grey text shows the number and % of uses occurring in reports
 red text: shows the proportionately higher frequency of use
The pro-Clause collocates for homosexuality (Appendix 17) link to the Clause 
wording in that 25/30 lines (Appendix 18) concern promotion. The promotion 
was presented as happening:
I wonder whether during my hon. Friend's conference he heard from parents such as those 
who contacted me when they wished to complain about the way in which their children 
were being dealt with in schools promoting homosexuality. 
(Jill Knight c.1000)
They have to deal with a fact that has hit every parent and grandparent—and many others
—hard in the teeth. That has now been going on for nearly two years, and they have a 
strong point of view. They want the Government to do what the Bill does, which is to 
prohibit the teaching and promotion of homosexuality. 
(Harry Greenway cc.1001-2)
Two central arguments are used by people promoting homosexuality: first, that people 
cannot be made to be homosexual and, secondly, that homosexuality cannot be changed. 
(David Wilshire c.1005)
It cannot be denied that ILEA has as part of its resources guide materials that are 
considered suitable for use in secondary schools, colleges of further education, the youth 
service and adult education institutes that positively encourage homosexuality. 
(Nicholas Bennett c.1015)
It was also presented as wrong:
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The Roman Catholic, Jewish, Sikh, Moslem and Hindu religions are absolutely clear in 
their teaching on this matter. They teach that homosexuality is wrong and it is wrong to 
promote homosexuality among children. Children must be protected. 
(Harry Greenway c.1002)
If it is right to encourage homosexuality, one might ask why it is not right to encourage 
racial hatred. I think that neither should be encouraged. 
(David Wilshire c.1005-6)
Most people in this country believe that our schools should not be used as vehicles for 
proselytising homosexuality. That is what the clause seeks to prevent. 
(Nicholas Bennett c.1016)
It is not right for pupils to be taught, in any school, that homosexuality is the norm. It is 
even less acceptable for local authorities to promote such teaching. 
(Michael Howard c.1019)
Harry Greenway’s “insidious and dangerous influences such as homosexuality” 
(c.1000) epitomises the pro-Clause view. More hazardous is David Wilshire’s 
incongruous equation (c.1005-6 quoted above). This confusing anomaly, with its 
double use of right, confounds challenge. Tony Banks did challenge it and asked 
if David Wilshire thought “racial hatred and homosexuality [were] equivalent”. He 
replied that it was “equally wrong to promote either of them” (c.1006), which 
oddly equates homosexuality with hatred. More straightforwardly misleading is 
Michael Howard’s use of the keyword NORM:
... the precise purpose of the new section 2A was to put into legislative form the principle 
set out in the recent Department of Education and Science circular on sex education that 
homosexuality should not be portrayed as the norm. It is not right for pupils to be taught, 
in any school, that homosexuality is the norm. It is even less acceptable for local 
authorities to promote such teaching. (c.1019)
To suggest that pupils must continue to be given the advice, information and counselling 
that they need about homosexuality is different from being taught that homosexuality is 
acceptable as a pretended family relationship. There is nothing in clause 27 that will 
prevent the legitimate provision of information, advice or unbiased counselling of pupils, 
but activities conducted by local authorities in a biased way or in a way that presents as a 
norm a sexual orientation that is not the norm would be stopped by clause 27. (cc1019-20)
The misrepresentation plays on reclamations of lesbian and gay sexualities as 
normal for the individuals concerned, as opposed to clinically abnormal; no-one 
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was claiming they were majority sexualities.
 Of the five pro-Clause uses of other abstract nouns (Appendix 18), all but 
one line for sexual orientation occur in reports. This positions sexuality outside 
speakers’ spontaneous repertoire (Bakhtin 1935: 293-4) and suggests sex, while 
alluded to, was not talked about openly. Notably, heterosexuality was not used:
The absence of a word does not mean absence of a phenomenon. On the contrary, the very 
absence is itself prime evidence for the overwhelming, potent unmarked presence of 
heterosexuality, generally seen as the universal, biologically given basis of reproductive 
and sexual life. 
(Weeks 2011: 79) 
The non-use of heterosexuality points to its taken-for-granted status (Voloshinov 
2012: 163-4; van Dijk 2008a: 170-1) and suggests pro-Clause speakers had no 
recognition of it as a social, as opposed to ‘natural’, phenomenon.
*       *       *
 The anti-Clause collocates for homosexuality (Appendix 19) plus 43/54 
lines (Appendix 20) address the claimed promotion. Its meaning is the concern of 
22 lines, of which 10 occur in questions about its application or incidence. Chris 
Smith’s were the most comprehensive:
James Baldwin, [...] wrote two books, [...] which undoubtedly celebrate the fact of 
homosexuality and the relationships of homosexuals. [...] If a local authority places those 
books in a public library, will it be regarded by the courts as promoting homosexuality? 
Secondly, if a pub or club that caters for a principally gay clientele applies for a music 
licence and the local authority grants that licence, will that local authority be regarded by 
the courts as promoting homosexuality? 
Thirdly, if concerned or worried teenagers seek help or guidance from a teacher, [...] is the 
giving of guidance, counselling and advice to such a worried or concerned teenager to be 
regarded as promoting homosexuality? 
Fourthly, if the London boroughs of Wandsworth and Merton, which are not controlled by 
the Labour party, fund, as they do respectively, the Gay Self-Defence Group and the 
Wimbledon Area Gay Society, are they promoting homosexuality as well? (c.1007)
A further 17 lines differentiate promotion from necessary social provision. Simon 
Hughes and Jack Cunningham tied their differentiation to the amendments:
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That amendment [...] seeks not to undermine the initial part of the clause regarding the 
promotion of homosexuality, but to ensure that it is natural and, indeed, perfectly proper, 
for education to include education about different sexual orientations ... (c.990)
The amendments make it clear, first, that we do not believe that any local authority has or 
should have a duty to promote homosexuality, but that this restriction relates solely to the 
promotion of homosexuality, and not to services or information to homosexual people or 
those personally close to them, such as their family or friends. (c.996)
Michael Howard dismissed two amendments as unnecessary, but cast the one 
protecting anti-discrimination measures as a “trojan horse” (c.1020) and used it 
to berate Labour policy (c.1020-1 quoted above). Jack Cunningham responded:
The first thing that I want to do is to reject as contemptible the Minister's sickening and, I 
suspect, deliberate, misrepresentations of the Labour party's position. As I made clear in 
Committee and again tonight, it is not and never has been the responsibility or the duty of 
a local authority or a local education authority to promote homosexuality, and it has never 
been Labour party policy that they should do so, either. The Minister has now heard me 
say that three times—twice tonight and once in Committee—so I can only conclude that his 
misrepresentations of the Labour party's position is deliberate and for the basest of 
political motives. (c.1021)
Before the vote was called, Jeremy Corbyn made a final appeal: 
I ask hon. Members to think for a moment before they vote. They know about the way in 
which the media have manipulated this issue, about the self-fulfilling prophecies and lies 
peddled by the Murdoch press and others, and about the fears about the alleged promotion 
of homosexuality in schools, of which there is not one shred of evidence. They know how, a 
week later, a telephone opinion poll is presented, claiming to support the views that have 
already been put forward by that same press. The House has a duty to protect the rights of 
people in our society, whatever their sexuality and opinions on these matters. (c.1025)
While homosexuality was linked to the Clause and promotion by both sides of the 
debate, the anti-Clause uses of other abstract nouns were wider-ranging. 
 The uses of heterosexualism and heterosexuality (Appendix 20) at least 
acknowledge heterosexuality, though the former suggests unfamiliarity with the 
usual term. Both are paired with a non-heterosexual term, thus heterosexuality 
had no independent consideration. The salient contrast between each side’s use 
of abstract nouns is in the anti-Clause uses of sexuality. All were spontaneous, 
none occur in reports. The term refers to lesbian and gay identities (11 lines) or 
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sexual identities in general (8 lines), but not heterosexuality. The topics covered 
span both references. The main topic (11 lines) is the claimed promotion:
I hope that the House does not want the role of local authorities to be to promote sexuality 
of any kind. [...] If it is believed that, by allowing people to be informed of different sorts of 
sexuality, they are suddenly converted to those forms of sexuality—
[...]
I do not believe that homosexuals want their sexuality to be promoted any more than 
anyone else does. 
(Simon Hughes c.992)
If we are trying not to promote different forms of sexuality, why do we not deal with 
television advertising, which often tries to sell products merely by appealing to people's 
sexual nature and motives?
(Simon Hughes c.993)
I believe that local government has no part to play in promoting any particular form of 
sexuality. I think that that is readily understood by councillors, local government officers 
and teachers.
(Joan Ruddock c.1002)
[I]f concerned or worried teenagers [...] seek guidance about their fears, their sexuality or 
what they have come to learn about their parents' sexuality, is the giving of guidance, 
counselling and advice to such a worried or concerned teenager to be regarded as 
promoting homosexuality?
(Chris Smith c.1007)
It is impossible to force or encourage someone into a different sexuality from that which 
pertains to them. What is needed is not to be involved in changing, persuading, forcing, 
encouraging people into different sexualities. What is important is to enable people to 
understand the sexuality that they have, and that cannot be changed.
(Chris Smith c.1007)
The variety of arguments suggests a concern to cover all possibilities in view of 
the undefined Clause. Ken Livingstone exemplified the anger: 
I have no doubt that the attacks on Capital Gay was a result of the climate to which the 
clause contributes. If the clause is carried, it will open the way to a load of homophobia 
and litigious fanatics trying to prevent open and honest discussion of people’s real 
sexuality.
If anyone feels that there is promotion, I ask him to give us examples. I am tired of 
debating with Conservative Members in radio and television studios and public meetings. 
When I ask them for examples of promotion, they always say that they have left them in 
the pile at home, or that they saw them in the paper. That is not an adequate basis for 
legislation. One does not legislate on the basis of gossip such as that— (c.1013)
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Other topics were equality and rights (3 lines), discrimination (3 lines), and the 
need for well-informed counselling facilities in schools (2 lines). Chris Smith’s 
use of sexualities clearly acknowledges sexuality in multiple forms. In both plural 
and singular forms the term entails recognition of sexual diversity. 
 Four uses of sexual orientation are also in the plural and cite the Liberal 
amendment for awareness of different sexual orientations to be taught in schools. 
In singular form, the term refers to lesbian and gay sexualities. These lines occur 
in criticisms of the Clause: its damaging “unqualified assertions” (Simon Hughes 
c.990-1), its “catch all prohibition” (Joan Ruddock c.1002), and its impact on 
“civil liberties and civil rights” (Archy Kirkwood c.1026). 
 Although sex functions as an adjective in sex education, its reference to 
sexual acts (as opposed to gender) aligns it with the other anti-Clause uses of 
sex. The lines for sex education (Appendix 20), relate to the Liberal amendment 
and the Education (No.2) Act 1986 which had removed sex education from local 
authority control. The uses of safe sex occur in a question on whether safe-sex 
publicity produced by government-funded organisations constituted promotion of 
homosexuality. The use of safe sex, rather than ‘safer sex’, suggests unfamiliarity 
with the issue, as does the non-use of ‘HIV’. Also the linking of safe-sex publicity 
to homosexuality rather than public health compounded the ‘gay plague’ view of 
AIDS popularised in the press (Petley 2005: 160-2). 
 Overall, the abstract nouns are tied to the Clause wording and claimed 
promotion on both sides. The contrast is between the narrow, moralising pro-
Clause claims of promotion and the catch-all anti-Clause arguments and 
questions using a wider range of related nouns. 
*       *       *
 Of the adjectives relating to sexuality used in the debate, by far the most 














 29/59 (49.2% uses)
72.5%
 8/67 (11.9% total)
 8/8 (100% uses)
27.5%
 lesbian 21
 15/21 (71.4% total)
 4/15 (26.7% uses)
72.5%
 6/21 (28.6% total)
 6/6 (100% uses)
27.5%
 homosexual 31
 22/31 (71% total)
 5/22 (22.7% uses)
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 9/31 (29% total)
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27.5%
 heterosexual 9
 5/9 (55.6% total)
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72.5%
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27.5%
 bisexual 1
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72.5% 27.5%
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 18/18 (100% total)
 9/18 (50% uses)
72.5% 27.5%
 sexually 2
 2/2 (100% total)
 2/2 (100% uses)
72.5% 27.5%
Key: grey text shows the number and % of uses occurring in reports
 red text: shows the proportionately higher frequency of use
 bold red text: keywords
The nouns to which GAY applies in 47/58 anti-Clause lines (Appendix 20) 
illustrate its main associations:
 men (13 lines)                             rights worker (2 lines)                    clubs (1 line)
 organisation(s) (3 lines)               theatre companies (2 lines)             community (1 line) 
 people (3 lines)                           theatre group (2 lines)                     helplines, centres etc. (1 line) 
 groups (2 lines)                           bashing (1 line)                              hon. Members (1 line) 
 clientele (2 lines)                         bookshops (1 line)                          teenagers (1 line)
More specifically, GAY occurs in:
 Capital Gay newspaper (3 lines)                               Gay Switchboard or Lesbian Line (1 line)
 London Gay Teenage Group (3 lines)                         Merton Gay Self-Defence Group (1 line)
 Gay Sweatshop Theatre Company (2 lines)               Wimbledon Area Gay Society (1 line)
Group, theatre, rights, attacks, capital, people and teenage are collocates along 
with local and authorities (Appendix 19). Except for men, people, bashing and 
hon. Members, the remaining 29 nouns present a positive picture of local 
initiatives and group ventures, though attacks on Capital Gay, bookshops and 
clubs are highlighted in six lines. The lines where GAY applies to men, people or 
bashing occur in arguments highlighting problems faced by GAY men/people, as 
do 6/7 lines where GAY is preceded by a form of the verb ‘to be’. In highlighting 
the problem of coming out, Tony Banks turned his argument on the House: 
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I am not gay, but I know one thing, and it is that, if I were, I hope that I would be able to 
stand up and say so without any fear of intimidation or threat, either from within the 
House or from outside in society generally. There are many gay hon. Members on both 
sides of the House who, I am afraid, do not have that courage. (c.1022)
The two lines for anti-GAY also highlight problems. The key point here is that the 
negativity applies to the social climate and not to (lesbian and) GAY people.
 GAY is paired with lesbian(s) in 25/59 lines, thus men and lesbian(s) are  
top collocates. Of the 34 independent uses of GAY, some refer to organisations 
which included lesbians, such as Capital Gay and Gay Sweatshop. Other general 
references probably include lesbians (people, groups, clientele, teenagers, centres, 
helplines, bookshops, clubs). Three uses clearly refer to men (he, brother and Tony 
Banks’ I). Many references are unclear. This leaves lesbians under-represented in 
the debate. In addition, only 1/9 lines which cite attacks or violence includes 
lesbians, which suggests GAY men were the target of greater hostility. The lines 
for queer also report attacks: one occurs in an account of their increase, the 
other in a quote from the Gay Teenage Group survey on intimidation at school.
 Of the lines for lesbian (Appendix 20), 13/15 are paired with GAY and one 
with homosexual. Thus most nouns lesbian applies to overlap with those for GAY:
 organisations (2 lines)           women (2 lines)                groups (1 line)           mothers (1 line)
 rights worker (2 lines)           community (1 line)            Line (1 line)
As with GAY, these nouns present a positive picture and the four lines where 
lesbian is preceded by a form of ‘to be’ occur in arguments highlighting problems 
faced by lesbians (and GAY men). However, the differing independent uses of 
lesbian(s) and GAY (2 to 34) compounds the under-representation and positions 
lesbian(s) as appendages. The extent to which the greater focus on men was a 
response to greater hostility or simply habitual assumption is debatable.
 The associations of homosexual are different: 11/22 lines are preceded by 
a form of ‘to be’ (Appendix 20) and the nouns it applies to are personal: 
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 people (6 lines)                           mother or father (1 line)                 young people (1 line)
 relationships (2 lines)                 oppression (1 line)
People, relationships, children, person, child and lesbian are collocates (Appendix 
19). Relationships occurs in reports of David Wilshire’s claim that homosexual 
relationships were being taught in schools. The other nouns occur in arguments 
highlighting difficulties faced by homosexual people. Inclusion of lesbians is 
evident in only one noun (mother), though lesbian is a collocate in three lines. 
The lines where homosexual is preceded by a form of ‘to be’ address the claimed 
promotion:
 person or child to be (2 lines)                     people who are (1 line) 
 a parent was (1 line)                                 percentage of the population who are (1 line) 
 a teacher who is (1 line)                            person is (1 line)
 people do not choose to be (1 line)             that children who were (1 line)
 people to be (1 line)
The supportive contexts of the lines mitigate homosexual’s clinical status. Yet its 
use is more focused on problems and thus less positively associated than GAY.
 Of the anti-Clause lines for heterosexual (Appendix 20), 3/5 are paired 
with non-heterosexual terms. The first occurs in a quote:
“I have said that I do not believe that it is part of a local authority’s duty to glorify 
homosexuality or to encourage youngsters to believe that it is on an equal footing with a 
heterosexual way of life.” 
(Simon Hughes quoting Michael Howard c.998)
Simon Hughes cast this as an “off-the-cuff answer” (ibid) to a question from Jack 
Cunningham in committee, but left glorify and the declaration of inequality 
unchallenged. Of the other paired lines: one affirms that recognition of lesbians 
and gay men is no threat to the heterosexual majority; the other presents 
heterosexual oppression as bigger a problem in schools than homosexual 
oppression. The two independent uses of heterosexual report abuse:
130
We need to ask how we are to protect children, but we must also ask from whom we are 
protecting them. I was a member of the Inner London education authority for 13 years. 
Every example of child abuse in our schools was reported to the chairman of the schools 
committee, and in every example we were dealing with a heterosexual male teacher 
sexually assaulting girls—[Interruption.] That is the reality that we face.
The figures that I gave for ILEA do not stand out from others, either. The FBI conducted a 
major survey more than a decade ago in America. Its conclusion was that well over 90 per 
cent. of all forms of child abuse were of a heterosexual nature. If we are worried about 
children, why, I wonder, are we not making the same efforts to tackle that? Why are we 
pandering to popular prejudice that comes in on the back of a wave of homophobia 
generated by the media?
(Ken Livingstone c.1012)
Thus 4/5 lines challenge the privileged position of heterosexuality. There is also 
an anti-Clause line for bisexual. This occurs in Ken Livingstone’s reference to a 
research project on the spread of AIDS, prior to reading the researchers’ letter 
raising their concerns about escalating anti-gay violence and the Clause. 
 The anti-Clause keyword SEXUAL was used independently of sexual 
orientation(s) in 18 lines (Appendix 20). All uses apply directly to a noun: 
 abuse (4 lines)            values (2 lines)           and social life (1 line)       nature and motives (1 line)
 behaviour (2 lines)      activity (1 line)            context (1 line)                 relations (1 line)
 matters (2 lines)          adulthood (1 line)       ethics (1 line)                   roles (1 line)
All but values, social life, ethics and roles link to SEXUAL activity. Only abuse is 
a collocate, but so is children (Appendix 19). Seven lines relate directly to child-
SEXUAL abuse. Simon Hughes’ lines link to David Wilshire’s insinuations in 
Committee, while Joan Lestor’s link to Nicholas Bennett’s speech. Both were 
responding to protection of children arguments, as was Ken Livingstone in his 
references to heterosexual abuse. The two lines for sexually also concern abuse. 
Joan Lestor’s research enabled her to locate most child-SEXUAL abuse in “the 
cloak of the family” rather than schools (c.1024). These responses illustrate the 
strength of the undercurrent created by pro-Clause allusions to sexual activity. 
*       *       *
 All pro-Clause lines for lesbian and gay (Appendix 18) occur in reports, 
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which positions them outside the speakers’ spontaneous repertoire (Bakhtin 
1935: 293-4). Even in reports, only Harry Greenway and Michael Howard used 
them. Lesbian is paired with gay in 5/6 lines and homosexual in one, while gay 
is paired with lesbian(s) in 6/8 lines. Harry Greenway’s lines occur in scathing 
reports of Ealing council’s lesbian and gay rights committee, for example: 
For the past 18 months all advertisements of teaching posts in Ealing have contained 
invitations to men and women of any sexual orientation — to gay men and lesbian women 
and the rest of it—to apply for posts. My constituents find that excessive and distasteful 
and think that it is a misuse of public money. I share their view. (c.1000) 
His “and the rest of it” betrays disdain if not contempt. Michael Howard’s lines 
occur in his attack on Labour’s anti-discrimination policy (quoted above). Of the 
independent uses of gay: one occurs in Harry Greenway’s confirmation that he 
did not invite gay groups to his conference on ‘the family’; the other occurs in 
Michael Howard’s citing of ‘Young gay and proud’ as evidence of promotion. 
 Homosexual was the preferred pro-Clause adjective, but the 8/9 lines in 
reports (Appendix 18), place this term too largely beyond speakers’ spontaneous 
repertoire. Homosexual applies directly to a noun in 8/9 lines:
 relationships (3 lines)             acts (1 line)                          teachers (1 line)
 act (1 line)                              propaganda (1 line)              youth groups (1 line)
The nouns summarise pro-Clause preoccupations: the teaching of homosexual 
relationships in schools, the undercurrent of homosexual act(s), promotion via 
homosexual propaganda, homosexual teachers who abused their position, and 
homosexual corruption of youth. The line where homosexual is preceded by ‘to be’ 
occurs in a report by David Wilshire:
Two central arguments are used by people promoting homosexuality: first, that people 
cannot be made to be homosexual and, secondly, that homosexuality cannot be changed. 
(c.1005)
He thus casts anti-Clause speakers making this argument as ‘promoters’ of 
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homosexuality, while his use of confronted in the non-report conjures aggression:
There is absolutely no need for me to stand here and apologise for seeking to prevent local 
government from doing something that I know that it should not be doing. I see no need to 
apologise for making it less likely that people are confronted by homosexual propaganda. 
(c.1006)
Nicholas Bennett put a ‘respectable’ slant on the proceedings:
We do not seek to deny that there are many homosexuals in the country. I do not want to 
preach, because it is invidious to do so, but an equally valid view is held by Christians, 
who hold to the teachings in the Old and New Testaments and believe that the homosexual 
act is intrinsically immoral and evil. That is a respectable view, even if Opposition Members 
do not accept it. We should not be browbeaten into accepting the argument that we should 
not seek to promote what most people believe to be the norm in our society, which is a 
heterosexual loving relationship. (c.1015-6)
His contrasting of the homosexual act (as if there was only one way of having sex) 
and a heterosexual loving relationship epitomises the pro-Clause polarisation of 
the two categories.
 Heterosexual was also used proportionately more by pro-Clause speakers 
and is contrasted with homosexual in all lines. Two occur in Harry Greenway’s 
reports of Ealing council’s recommendation that homosexual and heterosexual 
relationships be treated as equally valid, while Nicholas Bennett’s reference to 
“heterosexual teachers who abuse children” followed his report of “homosexual 
teachers who abused their position” (c.1015). The last line occurs in Nicholas 
Bennett’s polarisation quoted above. The pro-Clause polarisation of heterosexual 
and homosexual was stark: valid v invalid, moral v immoral, good v evil. 
 Overall, the adjectives illustrate the pro-Clause focus on a narrow range of 
polarising claims, in contrast to the anti-Clause highlighting of difficulties faced 
by lesbians and gay men in society and under the Clause.
*       *       *
 Of the nouns for people, homosexuals was the most used overall and 
proportionately more so by pro-Clause speakers: 
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 17/28 (60.7% total)
 9/17 (52.9% uses)
72.5%
 11/28 (39.3% total)
 5/11 (45.5% uses)
27.5%
 homosexual 3
 1/3 (33.3% total)
72.5%
 2/3 (66.7% total)
 1/2 (50% uses)
27.5%
 heterosexuals 3
 3/3 (100% total)
72.5% 27.5%
 lesbians 15
 13/15 (86.7% total)
 6/13 (46.2% uses)
72.5%
 2/15 (13.3% total)
 2/2 (100% uses)
27.5%
 lesbian 1
 1/1 (100% total)
72.5% 27.5%
 gays 1
 1/1 (100% total)
 1/1 (100% uses)
72.5% 27.5%
Key: grey text shows the number and % of uses occurring in reports
 red text: shows the proportionately higher frequency of use
Reports account for 5/11 pro-Clause lines (Appendix 18): Harry Greenway’s of 
Ealing council’s lesbian and gay committee and David Wilshire’s of arguments 
against the Clause. Few topics are covered: claims of promotion (3 lines), denials 
of malevolence (6 lines), plus Michael Howard’s rejection of Labour’s anti-
discrimination amendment (2 lines). Negativity pervades the lines:
 attack on (4 lines)           against (3 lines)           WRONG (2 lines)           criticism of (1 line)
While attack and against are collocates (Appendix 17), WRONG is a keyword. In 
seven lines the negativity applies directly to homosexuals, which undermines the 
denials of malevolence. These direct applications, plus Harry Greenway’s uses of 
for homosexuals, position homosexuals as the recipients of others’ actions, which 
in 10/11 lines undermine the protection of children argument. Homosexual is 
also a singular noun in two lines. One occurs in Harry Greenway’s report:
Only last week I received complaints in my surgery from parents who said that a 
homosexual recently appointed to a school makes up his face in front of the children, and 
they object to that. One has to support them. That is wrong. I do not believe Opposition 
Members would say otherwise. If they do not support it they should stand up and say that 
it is wrong. (c.1001).
While the authenticity of this hearsay is dubious, the censure is palpable and 
links directly to angst about male-gender boundaries. The other line occurs in 
Michael Howard’s denial: “Nothing in clause 27 will put a homosexual at a 
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disadvantage compared with any other person” (c.1017). Alongside the denials in 
the lines for homosexuals, this suggests a sensitivity to being seen as prejudiced, 
yet these most negatively associated nouns refer to people. Conversely, the non-
use of heterosexuals relates to the pro-Clause taken-for-grantedness (Voloshinov 
2012: 163-4; van Dijk 2008a: 170-1) of heterosexuality’s naturalised status such 
that it was not applied to people as a sexual identity.
 The only other pro-Clause noun for people is lesbians (Appendix 18). Both 
uses occur in reports: one of a meeting organised by the Ealing lesbian and gay 
committee in which lesbians is paired with homosexuals; the other of Labour’s 
anti-discrimination amendment in Michael Howard’s dismissal (discussed above). 
That all pro-Clause uses of lesbian(s) and gay occurred in reports suggests 
complete non-recognition of these positively self-chosen identities. 
*       *       *
 The anti-Clause uses of nouns for people are more varied. Of the lines for 
homosexuals (Appendix 20), 9/17 occur in reports. Three report David Wilshire’s 
claims in Committee in questions about promotion, another reports Conservative 
MPs in general in a criticism of the Clause. The other five occur in arguments 
presenting homosexuals as victims: 
James Baldwin [...] wrote two books, [...] which undoubtedly celebrate the fact of 
homosexuality and the relationships of homosexuals. They also explore the torment that is 
faced by many because of the social pressures that are forced upon them as homosexuals. 
(Chris Smith c.1007)
That group conducted a major, in-depth survey of over 400 young homosexuals between 
the ages of 15 and 21. [...] Its conclusions were horrifying. It was not propaganda, but the 
result of scientific analysis of what happens to young lesbians and gay men living in the 
city. [...]
The survey conducted by the Gay Teenage Group showed that 42 per cent. of children who 
turned to their parents were rejected, were told that they were suffering from some sort of 
disease and were virtually excluded from the family. [...] The survey revealed that at school 
25 per cent. of young homosexuals felt isolated, that 21 per cent. suffered verbal abuse, 




My hon. Friend the Member for Brent, East (Mr. Livingstone) read a statement that I hope 
many hon. Members found chilling. Conservative Members remember exactly what the 
Nazis did to homosexuals. [...] They herded them into concentration camps and liquidated 
them. 
(Tony Banks c.1022)
The combination of passivity and negative terms is striking:
 torment                      rejected                 excluded               abuse                     chilling
 forced upon               suffering               isolated                 beaten up               concentration camps 
 horrifying                  disease                 suffered                ostracised               liquidated  
The use of ‘victim’ arguments is understandable, but adds to the negativity. 
Negativity is also evident in the non-reported lines (rampaging, crime, sadly, 
struggled) and that for homosexual as a singular noun (disturbed and troubled):
I ask him sincerely and honestly whether during his 22 years of teaching he was ever 
approached by a child who thought that he or she was a homosexual or lesbian who was 
disturbed and troubled by it and needed his advice and guidance. 
(Claire Short c.1001)
That the lines occurred in arguments supporting people does not dissipate the 
negativity. This loading of negativity onto homosexual(s), albeit many in reports, 
supports Bakhtin’s (1935: 293-4) view that the evaluative aspects of words derive 
from other people’s use of them. Thus the clinical baggage and stigma associated 
with the clinical homosexual(s) offered a repository for the negativity when 
defending people.
 All three anti-Clause lines for heterosexuals are paired with homosexuals. 
They occur in arguments against promotion, sexual abuse and advertising: 
Homosexuals do not happen as a result of campaigns for their promotion, just as 
heterosexuals are not suddenly brought into active heterosexualism by having a campaign 
on their behalf. 
(Simon Hughes c.993)
There is no evidence of any greater incidence of crime against young people by 
homosexuals than by heterosexuals. 
(Simon Hughes c.994)
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On the contrary, such is the all-persuasive and all-pervasive culture of heterosexuality in 
advertising and the media that it is homosexuals who have struggled habitually to become 
heterosexuals. 
(Joan Ruddock c.1003)
All uses attempt to equalise conceptions of homosexuals and heterosexuals and 
thus dislodge heterosexuality’s privileged status. 
 The anti-Clause uses of lesbians were paired with gay in 11/13 lines and 
with homosexuals in one (Appendix 20). Thus gay and men are top collocates 
(Appendix 19). The one independent use of the term occurs in Ken Livingstone’s 
report of the popular press (c.1010 quoted above). In contrast to the uses of 
lesbian as an adjective, the preceding phrases in nine lines position lesbians (and 
gay men) as passive:
 recognition of                        taught how to be                  what happens to 
 attacks on                             prejudice against                 deeply offensive to
 raise the rights of                 reality of life for                    statements made about 
Half these phrases are negative. Negativity is also present in Ken Livingstone’s 
report from the Gay Teenage survey that one in five “young lesbians and gay men 
had attempted” suicide (c.1011) and in Joan Lester’s report of Conservative MPs 
who thought “lesbians and homosexuals” should not be allowed into schools (c.
1023). It is also present in Claire Short’s use of lesbian as a singular noun (c.
1001 quoted above). While the lines occur in supportive arguments, lesbians is 
less positively associated than lesbian as an adjective; this distinction is also 
evident between homosexual(s) and homosexual, but not between gays and gay. 
 Overall, the nouns for people illustrate the anti-Clause presentation of 
lesbians and gay men as victims of social beliefs and oppression, in contrast to 
clear indications of pro-Clause malevolence. 
*       *       *
 To summarise: the anti-Clause lines for lesbian(s), gay(s) and sexuality(ies) 
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occur in the most supportive arguments of which the core focus is quality of life. 
This positions the terms as markers of familiarity and support⎯as gay-friendly. 
By contrast, the pro-Clause lines for these terms occur in critical or defensive 
statements and all in reports. The clinical terms were used proportionately more 
by pro-Clause speakers and were more negatively associated on both sides. A 
comparison of each side’s use of these terms in reports shows how they vary:
TOTAL  PRO-CLAUSE USE  ANTI-CLAUSE USE
 CLINICAL TERMS 146
 52/146 (35.6% from
 27.5% debate words)
 94/146 (64.4% from 
 72.5% debate words)
 REPORTED CLINICAL TERMS  25/52 (48%)  37/94 (39.4%)
 GAY-FRIENDLY TERMS 126
 17 (13.5% from 
 27.5% debate words)
 109/126 (86.5% from 
 72.5% debate words)
 REPORTED GAY FRIENDLY TERMS  17/17 (100%)  39/109 (35.8%)
The larger overall proportion of pro-Clause reports, indicates lack of spontaneous 
engagement with sexuality issues as opposed to allusions to sexual activity. This 
suggests a disdain for talking openly about sex and sexuality while utilising them 
for political ends. By contrast, anti-Clause speakers’ more frequent uses of gay-
friendly terms and fewer reports indicate not only their greater familiarity with 
sexuality issues, but also that they were resisting the Clause in these terms. 
However, the machinations behind the Clause introduction and its overt anti-
Labour use in the debate by Michael Howard, emphasise the extent to which 
anti-Clause speakers were caught unawares.
 Associations and Implications
 The themes emerging from this analysis fall into two strands. The first 
concerns the relation of sexuality terms to social change. The second concerns 
the social power of widely-shared beliefs. 
 The clinical terms, homosexuality, homosexual and homosexual(s), were 
negatively associated by both sides of the debate, particularly homosexual(s). The 
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perception that homosexual and gay are less comfortable as nouns is mentioned 
by Zwicky (1997: 22) and Baker (2005: 22). In this debate, lesbian(s) as nouns 
were also more negatively associated. However, anti-Clause speakers’ extensive 
use of ‘victim’ arguments positioned the negativity in society, while pro-Clause 
speakers associated the negativity more strongly with homosexual(s) than the 
other clinical terms. More positively, as adjectives lesbian and especially gay 
were associated with local and community initiatives, an association also found 
by Baker (2004b: 92-3/2005: 24) in an analysis of gay in the BNC. With anti-
Clause speakers’ greater use of these adjectives and pro-Clause uses confined to 
reports, they were more positively associated than the clinical terms overall. This 
suggests that while the clinical terms retained their heritage of sin and crime, the 
uses of lesbian and gay by mainly heterosexual speakers marked social change. 
The spontaneous anti-Clause uses of these adjectives marked an acceptance of 
positive, self-chosen lesbian and gay identities within the changing “repertoire of 
social meanings and choices available” (Cameron 1990: 90). Conversely, pro-
Clause speakers’ non-spontaneous, reported uses of lesbian and gay marked 
their non-recognition of the positive associations and their resistance to social 
change. This absence of spontaneous use also protected the adjectives from the 
more negative associations which surrounded their more spontaneous uses of 
the clinical terms. This exemplifies Voloshinov’s (1986: 106) summary of the 
struggle that emerges between new uses of words and old evaluations, as well as 
Bakhtin’s (1981: 294) account of the non-appropriation of words.
 The centuries of negative meanings attributed to same-sex sex and lodged 
in the social belief system impeded this process of social change. In addition to 
pro-Clause speakers’ greater use of the clinical terms were their references to: 
sodomy and buggery (c.993), activities (c.1001; c.1021), activity (c.1005), 
behaviour, behave (c.1006), act(s) (c.1015; c.1017) and practices (c.1021), which 
show their frame of reference was sexual activity. This has its origins in pre-
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sexology notions of sin and crime, while their uses of private (quoted c.996;        
c.1006) invoke the conditions of the 1967 Sexual Offences Act. The pro-Clause 
non-recognition of lesbian and gay relationships and identities excluded lesbian 
and gay lives from consideration. By contrast, the anti-Clause frame of reference 
was people’s lives in which sexual identity was recognised and supported. This 
relates to Baker’s (2004b/2005: Ch.2) finding that homosexual was associated 
with sexual acts in homophobic discourses, while gay was associated with 
identity in reformist discourses. 
 In terms of shared beliefs, pro-Clause speakers, less so Michael Howard, 
cast homosexuality and/or homosexuals as: uncivilised (c.993), insidious and 
dangerous (c.1000), wrong (c.1001; c.1002), evil (c.1009; c.1015), and immoral  
(c.1015), while homosexual relationships were cast as disgusting (c.994), invalid 
(c.999; c.1002), and unacceptable (c.1017; c.1018; c.1019). The final pro-Clause 
contribution to the debate was Elaine Kellett-Bowman declaring “I believe that 
intolerance of evil should grow” (c.1024). No reasons were given. No evidence was 
cited. The repugnance was taken-as-given. By contrast, anti-Clause speakers 
based their case on lesbians and gay men as people. Their examples referred to 
the experience of specific groups or individuals who were already affected by the 
social beliefs and would be further affected if the Clause was enacted. However, 
both the under representation of lesbians and the indication of greater hostility 
towards ‘homosexual’ men are notable (and recur in subsequent chapters). That 
anti-Clause speakers’ more reasoned and realistic approach had no impact on 
the debate’s outcome, shows the power of beliefs about homosexuality that pro-
Clause speakers were able to draw on in addition to their parliamentary majority. 
 This taken-as-given stance also applies to beliefs about childhood. The 
basic pro-clause argument was the protection of children. In response to Harry 
Greenway’s repeated assertion that “children should be protected”, Tony Banks 
asked “From what?” (c.1000), to which the reply was “From any insidious and 
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dangerous influences, such as homosexuality”. While this concern seems to be 
rooted in middle-class Victorian views of childhood innocence (Evans 1993: 211- 
212), the belief that acceptance of lesbian and gay relationships were a danger 
was presented in terms of sexual motivation. Jill Knight’s references to “poor 
parents, whose only wish was to protect their children and complain about what 
was happening to them” (c.1000) and to the “objection of parents in those local 
authorities, of what has been done to their children” (c.1007) insinuated sexual 
abuse. There was no pro-Clause example of harm to children. The pro-Clause 
children constituted an idealised category removed from any concern for real 
children. Thus anti-Clause arguments for the protection of real children and 
teenagers, some of which cited examples of actual harm, were not acknowledged. 
Protection of the ideal was paramount, but the power of the protection argument 
rested on the pro-clause frame of reference in sexual activity. 
 In the wider political context, the protection argument extends to other 
ideals: heterosexuality, ‘the family’, conservatism, capitalism, and protection of 
the nation from communism in the final throes of the Cold War, but none of 
these could have drawn on a more powerful and pervasive system of belief than 
homophobia to target political opponents.
 Conclusion
 This chapter shows how easily negative beliefs about a category of people, 
especially where those beliefs have a very long history, can be drawn upon in the 
service of other politically expedient agendas. The political context of the Clause 
shows how the exploitation of homophobic beliefs, led by the Murdoch press, 
before the 1986 local elections and the 1987 general election, was an exercise in 
political scapegoating. It is clear in the attendant debates on local government 
(HC 5.12.1986 & HL 4.2.1987) that Labour’s support for CND, peace groups, 
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withdrawal from NATO, the ANC, SWAPO and Sinn Fein were among the prime 
targets. Labour’s support for lesbians and gay men was less prominent in these 
debates. As it was the metropolitan Labour councils that implemented Labour 
policy most actively, placing the Clause in a Local Government Bill was pointed. 
This aspect of the Clause’s political context is acknowledged in the research 
reviewed, but is not explored. In addition, none of the studies reviewed involve 
language analysis and only two refer specifically to parliamentary debates. 
 The debate analysed in this chapter shows that anti-Clause MPs were 
aware of the agenda to gain political advantage via the mobilised homophobia, 
but were caught in the social power of the mobilised beliefs. Their more reasoned 
arguments and better supported examples were ignored or distorted in favour of 
dubious claims and allusions. This, and the Conservative majority, ensured the 
opposition amendments were excluded and the Clause was passed. The Words 
and Themes section of the analysis reveals additional aspects of the pro- and 
anti-Clause speakers’ positions via the statistically significant keywords and 
keyword collocates they used. The anti-Clause keywords OR and WILL reveal the 
extent of speakers’ uncertainty about the nature and applications of the Clause. 
The pro-Clause keywords I and WAS reveal the extent of speakers’ reliance on 
personalised statements and reported speech, views, situations or events, often 
on the basis of generalised hearsay. These widely collocating grammar keywords 
yield useful insights, yet they would have been taken for granted in a content 
analysis. The concordance line and collocate analyses in the Views of Sexuality 
section identifies the differing associations of each side’s use of terms linked to 
sexuality. The clinical terms were more used by pro-Clause speakers and more 
negatively associated than other terms by both sides, but while the anti-Clause 
negativity was located in SOCIETY, the pro-Clause negativity, strongest in uses of 
homosexuals, was premised on allusions to sexual acts, abuse or corruption. By 
contrast, the clinical terms’ naturalised counterparts were little used by either 
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side. The pro-Clause non-use of heterosexuality and heterosexuals illustrates its 
taken-for-granted status, while speakers’ polarised pairing of heterosexual with 
homosexual compounds their negativity. The two sets of terms’ were also mostly 
paired by anti-Clause speakers, but in more comparative ways, while their uses 
of heterosexual attempted to dislodge the taken-for-granted superiority of 
heterosexuality. The most positively associated terms, the anti-Clause keyword 
GAY plus lesbian(s) and sexuality, were premised on identity, while lesbian(s) and 
GAY were associated with community initiatives. Pro-Clause speakers’ uses of 
gay, lesbian(s) and sexuality were few and occurred solely in reports. The overall 
implication of these uses is that the clinical terms were retaining their negative 
heritage, specifically adhered to in the pro-Clause view, while the gay-friendly 
terms, used by supportive and mostly heterosexual speakers, were a marker of 
social change. As Voloshinov (1986 [1929]: 19) argued “the word is the most 
sensitive index of social changes, and what is more, of changes still in the 
process of growth, ....”
 The period 1986-1988 was one of struggle against powerful negative 
images, propagated and inflated by the press and the Conservative party. The 
Clause was enacted, yet its unworkability in law rendered it symbolic which, with 
its lack of use, offers further support for its ulterior purpose. However, what the 
Conservatives underestimated was the extent to which social change had already 
taken place. It was from the notorious enactment of Section 28 that campaigns 
for legislative reform began in earnest. The next chapter analyses the first major 
attempt to equalise the age of consent for gay men. 
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Chapter 6
The Age of Consent (1994)
 The fall of the Berlin Wall late in 1989 marked the end of the Cold War and 
brought about the rise of European integration. Conservative divisions over the 
UK’s relationship to Europe and social discontent over the Poll Tax caused 
Margaret Thatcher’s leadership to be challenged. She resigned in November 1990 
and John Major took her place. The Major government was less confrontational 
than the Thatcher government. It was also weaker; the Conservative majority 
shrank to 21 after the 1992 election. Two early departures from Thatcher policy 
were replacement of the Poll Tax with Council Tax, which returned local taxation 
to rates based on property value, and the opening of talks with the IRA, which 
prefaced the peace process in Northern Ireland. At the start of his leadership, 
Major promised to keep Britain at the heart of Europe, which led to increasing 
discontent among anti-integration MPs. The Maastricht Treaty was agreed late in 
1991 and signed early in 1992. Major negotiated the UK’s exclusion from the 
Social Chapter because Conservatives saw it as a socialist charter. In September 
1992, the UK had to withdraw from the EERM, precursor of the Euro, because 
currency speculators had targeted a weakened pound. This bolstered the anti-EU 
position. The first vote to ratify the Maastricht Treaty (HC 22.7.1993) was lost: in 
protest against the Social Chapter’s exclusion, Labour and Liberal Democrat MPs 
voted with anti-EU Conservatives. Major held a vote of confidence the next day 
and won, but his position was weakened. Thereafter anti-EU MPs challenged his 
leadership repeatedly, while the press became increasingly hostile. 
 This chapter focuses on the first attempt to equalise the age of consent in 
1994, its parliamentary consideration having been prompted by an application to 
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the ECtHR. A review of relevant research is followed by a summary of the issue’s 
parliamentary passage and an account of the arguments deployed in the selected 
debate. Comparisons of each side’s top-ten keywords and of the sexuality terms 
used are followed by a discussion.
 Political Context
 In response to the enactment of Section 28, a group of lesbians and gay 
men founded Stonewall in 1989. It was set up as a professional lobby group with 
an agenda for Equality 2000 which prioritised legal reforms. Under the Major 
Government, both attempted and actual reforms constituted incremental change 
(Appendix 1). Waites (2000: 3) points to a lack of research on this period, but 
acknowledges it marked a “shift in the balance of forces which generated Section 
28”. He argues that the values of Conservative moralists and traditionalists were 
different from those of younger Conservatives. However, as Durham’s (1994) 
article shows, conflict between pragmatist and moralist Conservative factions 
became more public in the period, as did that between pro- and anti-EU MPs. 
 With Stonewall’s support, a legal challenge was launched to reduce the 
age of consent for sex between men from 21 to 16 and bring it in line with that 
for heterosexual sex. The case of Ralph Wilde, Hugo Greenhalgh and Will Parry 
was registered at the ECmHR on 29.7.1993. In December, the Government 
promised a free vote on the issue. Meanwhile, the EU Parliament was adopting a 
position on lesbian and gay issues. On 26.1.1994, the Parliament’s Committee 
on Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs published a report which, among other 
recommendations, “called on Member States to abolish all legal provisions which 
criminalise and discriminate against sexual activities between persons of the 
same sex, and to apply the same age of consent to homosexual and heterosexual 
activities alike” (HC Research Paper 98/68: 57). On 8.2.1994, a resolution 
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supporting the report was passed by 159 to 96 MEPs (ibid). This approval of the 
report was encouraging (Pink Paper 11.2.1994). 
 Although the prospect of a ECtHR case had prompted Major’s promise of a 
free vote, proposals to reduce the age of consent for sex between men were not 
new in Britain. Successive recommendations had been ignored by the Thatcher 
Government. The Home Office Policy Advisory Committee had recommended a 
reduction to 18 in 1979 and its 1981 report was endorsed by the Criminal Law 
Revision Commission in 1984. The Law Commission had also provided for a 
reduction to 18 in its draft Criminal Code of 1988-9. More comprehensively, the 
Howard League for Penal Reform had recommended an equal age of consent for 
all and a complete revision of consent law in 1985 (HC Research Paper 98/68: 
9-13). In addition, the Labour Party had promised a free vote on the issue in its 
1992 election manifesto and had voted to support an equal age of consent at 16 
at its 1992 Party conference (ibid: 53). 
 An amendment to equalise the age of consent at 16 was introduced into 
the Criminal Justice and Public Order Bill 1994. It was narrowly defeated, but a 
second amendment to reduce the age to 18 was passed and became the major 
reform of the period. The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act revised a wide 
range of court, police and prison powers. It had twelve parts and ran to 172 
sections; the reform was included in Part XI, Section 145: 
145  Age at which homosexual acts are lawful
(1) In section 1 of the [1967 c. 60.] Sexual Offences Act 1967 (amendment of law 
relating to homosexual acts in private), for “twenty-one” in both places where it 
occurs there is substituted “eighteen”.
(2) In section 80 of the [1980 c. 62.] Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1980 
(homosexual offences), for “twenty-one” in each place where it occurs there is 
substituted “eighteen”.
(3) In Article 3 of the [S.I. 1982/1536 (N.I. 19).] Homosexual Offences (Northern 
Ireland) Order 1982 (homosexual acts in private), for “21” in both places where it 
occurs there is substituted “18”.
(Criminal Justice & Public Order Act 1994, c.33, Part XI Sexual Offences: Homosexuality)
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By the time the Government had to submit its case to the ECmHR (28.3.1994), a 
change in the law was underway. By the time its second submission was due 
(10.11.1994) the age of consent had been reduced to 18. As the applicants were 
over 18 when the Commission reconsidered the case (19.1.1995) it was ruled 
inadmissible. A new case for equalisation had to be brought. The case of Euan 
Sutherland v UK was ruled admissible (21.5.1996). In 1997, the newly elected 
Labour Government submitted that it would propose equalisation in 1998. An 
amendment to the Crime and Disorder (Amendment) Bill 1998 was passed in the 
Commons (22.6.1998) but defeated in the Lords (22.7.1998), as was a proposal 
in the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Bill 1999 (HC 1.3.1999; HL 13.4.1999). The 
Bill was brought back to the Commons a year later and finally enacted via the 
Parliament Act without the Lords consent (30.11.2000). When Sutherland v UK 
came before the ECtHR (27.3.2001), there was no case to answer.
 Relevant Research
 Most research on the age of consent debates concerns the battles for its 
equalisation in 1998-2000. Two studies (Ellis and Kitzinger 2002; Epstein et al 
2000) include the 1994 debate(s) in wider analyses, while Waites (1995) offers a 
fully-contextualised analysis of the 1994 arguments.
  Ellis and Kitzinger (2002) include unspecified 1994 debates in a composite 
analysis of arguments opposing equality from a human rights perspective. They 
identify three major themes: the “Principles of right and wrong take precedence 
over equality: there can be no ‘equality’ between normality and abnormality, 
moral probity and sin” (ibid: 171-2); the “Principles of democracy take precedence 
over equality: the majority of the population opposes any lowering of the age of 
consent” (ibid: 172); the “Principles of care and protection take precedence over 
equality: young men are immature and vulnerable and need the protection of the 
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law” (ibid: 173). These themes need to be treated with caution. The authors’ data 
sources cover a wide period and are generalised: unspecified Hansard transcripts 
from 1994, 1998, 1999, plus “for example” newspapers including some from the 
gay press (ibid: 171), none of which are referenced (ibid: 177-180). Thus the 
analysis is limited by the authors’ failure to distinguish between them. 
 That there were differences between 1994 and 1998 at least, is evident in 
Epstein et al (2000) whose narrative analysis compares the Commons debates of 
22.6.1998 and 21.2.1994. They found that stories dominant in 1994 had become 
harder to tell by 1998, while stories that were “virtually untellable in the public 
domain in 1994 [were] emergent in the Commons of 1998” (ibid: 10). The less 
dominant stories in 1998 were those representing gay men as predatory (ibid: 
15-17). Modified stories related to sexual identity being fixed at a certain age in 
that sexual orientation was seen as less innate by 1998 (ibid: 17-18). Emergent 
stories related to a qualified acceptance of equality which preserved heterosexual 
institutions (ibid: 19-20). The authors argue that equality was recognised as a 
legitimate concern in 1998 and unmitigated bigotry less freely spoken, but that 
equality in law is not civil equality. Thus they warn against overestimating the 
‘transformation’ (ibid: 24).
 Waites’ (1995 Ch.3) analysis of the 1994 debate includes three sources of 
data: campaign materials, press coverage and the Commons debate (21.2.1994). 
His focus is on knowledge claims in the arguments used, specifically essentialist 
v constructionist views of sexual identity and their effectiveness in campaigns for 
lesbian and gay equality. In analysing the anti-equalisation arguments he selects 
the ‘seducing older homosexual’ as the dominant theme. His review of the press 
reports against equalisation surrounding the Commons debate (ibid: 68-731) 
shows how arguments for the protection of teenaged boys from homosexual 
corruption were linked to polarising categories :
1. Page numbers estimated from the Contents page of an electronic (txt) copy from the author
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In the schema which emerged, heterosexual sex was linked to equality of consent, whereas 
homosexual sex involved power and inequality. ‘Hetsex’ was linked to the family, ‘Homosex’ 
took place between strangers. ‘Hetsex’ was between people of the same age, ‘Homosex’ 
between different generations. Sometimes it appeared that ‘homosexual’ and ‘teenager’ 
were mutually exclusive categories... 
(Waites 1995: 74)
This “catalogue of binarisms [...] rendered homosexuality inferior, discrediting 
claims to equality by association with stigmatised practices” (ibid: 75). He then 
considers the relevance of social constructionism to this polarisation. In the 
Commons, for speakers who saw sex between young men as corrupting, an age 
at which sexual identity might become fixed mattered. Opponents of equalisation 
argued that sexual identity may not be fixed by the age of 16. This coincides with 
social-constructionist thinking and with the experience of individuals whose 
sexual identities do not universalise in this way. Thus, in constructionist terms, 
Waites suggests the opponents of equalisation had the better argument. He sees 
the ‘seducing older homosexual’ as a metaphor for anxieties about the origins of 
homosexuality and the social effects of legal change. Nevertheless, because the 
opponents saw homosexuality as threatening, they supported the criminalisation 
of consensual sex between young men. 
 In analysing the pro-equalisation arguments, Waites reviews Stonewall’s 
1993 leaflet ‘A Case for Change’ which was widely distributed to MPs before the 
debate. It made no reference to constructionist views. Instead, it adopted the 
Wolfenden Report’s 1957 view that an individual’s sexuality has its origins in 
early childhood and is usually fixed by the age of 16. This was supported by the 
BMA and RCP, neither of which offered an account of sexual identity formation. 
He acknowledges Stonewall’s adoption of this position was a pragmatic move. It 
allayed fears that equalising the age of consent could result in more gay men and 
endorsed the view that the law could not deter young men from being gay. He 
emphasises that his purpose is not to criticise Stonewall, which made the most 
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coherent and successful case for equalisation, but to highlight the absence of 
constructionist arguments:
Yet in the first debate on positive homosexual law reform for decades, there was no 
evidence of increased awareness of the cultural specificity of the nuclear family and 
compulsory heterosexuality, nor any attempt to suggest what the long term effects of a 
change in the law upon sexual identities would be. 
(Waites 1995: 94)
In the Commons, arguments for the beneficial effects of equalisation focused on 
short-term needs, such as safer-sex education, suicide prevention, counselling 
availability and reduced discrimination. Waites sees these as the most successful 
pro-equalisation arguments. He sees the failure to articulate a clear model of 
longer term social change as a major reason why the vote was lost, but accepts 
that this assumes “a correct argument is the most likely to succeed” (ibid: 95). 
 This is a question of means and ends. As Epstein et al (2000) argue, some 
stories were untellable in 1994. The lawyers and barristers among Stonewall’s 
founders were well placed to gauge what was achievable in Parliament. Waites 
may also be inflating the impact of argument on entrenched beliefs and interests. 
He does not consider other influences on knowledge and belief formation, such 
as repeated exposure, emotional allegiance, or personal experience, which may 
not be open to rational argument. He also neglects wider political interests such 
as anti-EU views. Nevertheless, he offers a careful and grounded analysis of the 
arguments. The same Commons debate is analysed below, but with greater focus 
on situating the arguments in their socio-political and historical contexts and the 
significance of lexical divisions between each side of the debate.
 The Passage of the Amendment
 At the second reading of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Bill (HC 
11.1.1994 cc.20-122), Edwina Currie, a former Conservative Health Minister, 
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announced her intention to table an amendment to equalise the age of consent at 
16 that would apply across the UK (cc.67-9). The cross-party amendment was 
drafted by Edwina Currie, Neil Kinnock, Mo Mowlem and Robert Maclennan. The 
free vote was held on 21.2.1994, but the amendment was narrowly defeated by 
307 to 280 votes. This debate is analysed in full below. Most Labour and Liberal 
Democrat MPs, plus 43 Conservatives, voted for 16; 35 Labour MPs voted against 
it. A subsequent amendment to reduce the age to 18, tabled by Anthony Durant, 
was passed by 427 to 162 votes. Of the 154 MPs who opposed both amendments, 
134 were Conservative, 11 Unionist, six Labour, two SDLP and one SNP. When 
news of the defeat reached lesbians and gay men holding a candlelit vigil outside 
Parliament there was shock, followed by uproar and a march to Downing Street 
for a sit-in (Pink Paper 25.2.1994). By contrast, the Times (Webster 22.2.1994) 
reported that some Tory MPs were so angered by the vote for 18 that they were 
threatening to vote against the whole Bill⎯though when the Bill was finalised 
(HC 12.4.1994 cc.35-80 & 13.4.1994 cc.214-395) no rebellion transpired.
 The Bill’s second reading in the Lords took up two sessions (25.4.1994 cc.
380-402; cc.413-510). In the second session, six Lords highlighted the age of 
consent as an issue for discussion. The Committee stage of the Bill took up 16 
long sessions, one of which was devoted to the age of consent (20.6.1994 cc.
10-67). Four amendments were debated. Lord MacIntosh proposed equalisation 
at 16, but was defeated by 245 to 71 votes. Lord Mayhew proposed an age of 18 
for all sexual practices except buggery, but withdrew. Lord Longford proposed 
the age remain at 21, but was defeated by 176 to 113 votes. Lord Ponsonby 
proposed a revision of punishments for gross indecency, but withdrew. Thus the 
age of 18 was unchanged. According to the Guardian (Travis 21.6.1994) “The 
tone of the debate was far more hostile to gays and lesbians than that which 
preceded the MPs’ decision”. The Lords debate was also little reported compared 
with the extensive press coverage surrounding the Commons debate. 
151
 The Report stage took up eight sessions and focused on other aspects of 
the Bill, but the age of consent was raised again at third reading (HL 19.7.1994 
cc.143-228) in amendments to penalties for sexual offences (cc.180-189), all of 
which were withdrawn. Various Lords remained dissatisfied with the reform but, 
as the alternatives had been voted against, they could not change it. Thus when 
the Commons considered the Lords’ amendments (19.10.1994 cc.282-396; 
20.10.1994 cc.445-519) and the Lords considered the Commons’ comments on 
their amendments (25.10.1994 cc.445-465; cc.477-525), the age of consent was 
not discussed. 
 The Debate
 The Commons debate was held at the Committee stage of the Bill and 
lasted three hours (21.2.1994 cc.74-123). Three amendments were considered: 
equalisation at 16, equalisation at 17, a reduction to 18, plus the status-quo 
position of 21. The interaction table (Appendix 21) shows this by staggering 
speaker allegiances from left to right: pro-16, pro-17, pro-18, pro-21. Forty-four 
MPs spoke, 11 made speeches: six for 16, one for 17, three for 18, one for 21. 
 Simon Hughes’ amendment for 17 required raising the heterosexual age of 
consent and the minimum age of marriage; he acknowledged it was an unlikely 
option and voted for 16. MPs supporting 18 or 21 made similar arguments. Thus 
the divide was between speakers arguing for and against equalisation. Excluding 
two undecided MPs, 7/22 pro-equalisation speakers were women, but women 
accounted for only 3/20 anti-equalisation speakers. Anti-equalisation speakers 
were Conservative or, in the case of Ian Paisley (DUP), a Conservative supporter. 
Pro-equalisation speakers came from all three main parties. There was also a 
pro- and anti-EU divide. Pro-equalisation speakers cited European countries as 
positive examples, while anti-equalisation speakers affirmed UK sovereignty. 
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 Edwina Currie opened the debate with a speech presenting the issue as 
one of human rights and “enforced discrimination” (c.75). UK law was out of step 
with equal, lower and unproblematic ages of consent in other countries and 
unlikely to survive a challenge in the ECtHR which, she pointed out, “we helped 
to set up in 1953” (c.75). She argued that consensual sexual practices are no 
business of the law. With reference to HIV prevention, she cited the BMA on the 
health benefits of 16, the WHO on openness facilitating safer sex, and the Lancet 
on sex education. She fended 15 interruptions with alacrity: 13 of which were 
from members of her own party and hostile. They focused on: protecting young 
men, unequal sexualities, child abuse, buggery, STDs, unnatural sexual activity, 
and the immaturity of 16-year-old boys. The hostility was premised on sexual 
acts; Edwina Currie’s speech was premised on sexual identity. On sexual identity 
formation, she cited the Wolfenden Report’s 1957 claim that “the main sexual 
pattern is laid down in the early years of life [and usually fixed] by the age of 
16” (c.79). On the claim that 16-year-old boys would be vulnerable to seduction 
by older men she commented, “No-one seems equally bothered about rapacious, 
middle-aged heterosexuals chasing young girls” (c.80). She concluded the image 
of gay men was changing, they are the human beings “we all know [...] even if he 
has not declared himself”, then hailed equality as “the only worthwhile and 
sustainable position” (c.81). 
 It was a positive speech, but the numerous interruptions with which she 
had to deal, plus her attempts to pre-empt anti-equalisation arguments, brought 
much of their agenda into play. An example is her use of ‘boys’ in an attempt to 
pre-empt the claim that teenage boys are less mature than girls. ‘Boys’ was then 
intermittently used by speakers on both sides in other contexts. This infiltration 
of ‘boys’⎯sometimes ‘young boys’, instead of ‘young men’, helped to keep anti-
equalisation claims of immaturity and arguments for protection ‘in the air’. As 
Bakhtin (1981: 280) observed, the word forms “itself in the atmosphere of the 
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already spoken”. Naming is significant (Wodak’s 2003: 140); the uses of ‘boys’ on 
both sides of the debate surreptitiously contributed to undermining the pro-16 
case by constructing the referents as immature. Similarly, Edwina Currie was 
first to use ‘uncertain’ in relation to sexuality which, intermittently taken up by 
various speakers, contributed to keeping anti-equalisation doubts about sexual 
identity formation ‘in the air’. That her inaugural uses of ‘boys’ and ‘uncertain’ 
were not in response to prior interruptions (though they prompted subsequent 
interruptions), suggests the extensive press coverage preceding the debate (see 
Waites ibid) had set the Commons agenda.
 The amendment was seconded by Neil Kinnock who saw the issue as one 
of gender equality, equality before the law, and the promotion of safer sex in the 
time of AIDS. He saw the purpose of equalisation as the decriminalisation of 
consensual sex between young men and argued that the 1967 Sexual Offences 
Act had “failed to deal with the realities of sexual orientation and civil liberties” 
(c.82). In personalising his speech, he undermined the pro-equalisation position 
by giving thanks that his children were not homosexual. When asked why, he 
replied by portraying homosexuals as an isolated and childless minority group. 
On sexual identity formation he cited the Wolfenden Report, the RCP and Project 
Sigma. On the effect of criminalisation on young men’s access to professional 
advice he cited the HEA, Barnardo’s, Project Sigma and the BMA. He concluded 
the amendment was about “encouraging respect [and] tolerance” (c.86). His use 
of ‘tolerance’ rather than ‘acceptance’ conveys lack of familiarity with gay politics 
and residual ambivalence. That he was interrupted only five times suggests anti-
equalisation MPs had little quarrel with his speech: John Butterfill agreed with 
much of what he said, Anthony Durant referred to his uncertainty about teenage 
sexuality and Michael Howard to his speaking as a parent. 
 Despite the undermining factors, the first two speakers made strong 
arguments against discrimination and criminalisation, and positive arguments 
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for gender equality, sexual health education and, most importantly, consent. 
These arguments underpinned the pro-16 case. Tony Blair focused on equality, 
discrimination and criminalisation. He upheld the example of other countries 
with equal ages of consent and related equal rights to a society with standards, 
principles and respect for others. Mike Watson focused on equality, human rights 
and criminalisation. He warned against waiting for an ECtHR judgment, and 
presented equalisation as an opportunity to end discrimination and increase 
access to advice and support. Tristan Garel-Jones focused on expert opinion in 
trying to sway his fellow Conservatives. He cited the BMA, THT and Barnardo’s 
on HIV prevention and the RCP on age and maturity, then warned against the 
risk of an ECtHR judgment. Chris Smith focused on equality and discrimination, 
then refuted successive assumptions underlying anti-equalisation claims. Thus 
his positive affirmation that gay sexuality was equally valid and worthy followed 
a major focus on opposing claims. 
 Factors undermining the pro-16 position vary between speakers, but 
responses to anti-16 claims that young men required protection recur, which 
positions it as a sensitive area. Tony Blair cast the protection of young men from 
conversion to homosexuality as the sole argument for discrimination:
The argument—and the only argument—advanced to justify that discrimination and its 
attendant tragedy is that it is necessary for the protection of young people. Without it, it is 
said, young men unsure of their sexuality may be preyed upon by older homosexuals and 
induced to become homosexual when they otherwise would not. (c.98)
He then devoted over half his speech to disputing it. Yet, while his observation 
points to ulterior angst about the protection of heterosexuality, this was absent 
from the debate. Pro-16 speakers took the ‘protection of young men’ literally. 
Edwina Currie’s protection arguments were against criminalisation, for example:
With respect to my hon. Friend, in those circumstances the worst possible thing that we 
can do is to make the boy a criminal, but that is what we do. There are better ways to 
protect our young people. (c.80)
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Neil Kinnock’s were for the benefits of decriminalisation, for example:
If passed, the new clause would help to protect young men. It would provide them with a 
basic legal framework for making vital decisions about themselves without the danger of 
criminality. (c.85)
Mike Watson argued equalisation would protect young men in a range of ways: 
An equal age of consent would protect young gay men in a variety of ways. First, as has 
been said, it would improve opportunities for safer-sex education, thereby leading to a 
reduction in the spread of HIV. (c.105)
It would protect people who are vulnerable by facilitating increased openness and support 
in their families; [...] It would also reduce the enormous stress and misery involved and [...] 
the suicide risk, which the current law and the isolation that it causes can create. (c.106)
We have the opportunity to introduce legislation that will bring this country into line with 
our European neighbours. Our citizens have a right to protection from the prejudice and 
discrimination that I described. (c.107)
Chris Smith examined protection from multiple angles: 
I must also say that those prejudices may be sincerely held, but none the less they are 
prejudices. One of our duties in a democracy is to protect the rights of minorities, even 
though those minorities may be unpopular. (c.112)
Thirdly, the argument about older men ignores the perversity of the law as it stands, which 
is that it may actually diminish protection for young men. A young man who is abused and 
exploited by an older man may be frightened of going to the police to report the incident. 
[...] Because that fear exists, the older man who made the advance and attempted the 
exploitation may be allowed to go free to do the same again. I do not think that the 
argument that setting the age of consent at 21 or 18 protects younger men holds water. 
(c.112)
The protection and the endorsement of that principle of diversity is what the new clause is 
all about. Let us back equality tonight, not because it is easy, not necessarily because it 
will win great applause from the tabloid press, but simply because it is the right thing to 
do. (c.113)
The pro-16 arguments were practical and reasoned. That ‘protection’ was taken 
literally pushes the status of heterosexuality into the ‘extraverbal’ context. It was 
assumed (Voloshinov 2012: 163-4) and taken for granted (van Dijk 2008a: 170-1). 
As Epstein et al (2000: 10) argue, some stories were untellable in 1994.
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 In proposing equalisation at 17, Simon Hughes faced interruptions from 
all sides. He began with a lengthy focus on an older person who “enters into a 
relationship with a considerably younger person” (c.88). Besides the imprecision 
of this statement, which discredited genuine and legal mixed-age relationships, 
he foregrounded an opposition argument before making any of his own. He then 
announced his intention to address three issues of concern: equality, protection 
of the young and criminality, but strayed into partnership registration, diverse 
Christian views and the school-leaving age. This suggests his proposal aimed to 
reduce the time available to anti-equalisation speakers. He concluded the choice 
was between 16 and 18 and hoped for equality. 
 In proposing his amendment for 18, Anthony Durant based his speech on 
sexually uncertain 16-18-year-old boys, although when asked if he felt confused 
about his own sexuality at 16, his denial provoked laughter. To support his case, 
he cited a radio phone-in, a quote from Relate (formerly the Marriage Guidance 
Council), the Policy Advisory Committee Report, a Wellcome survey of sexual 
attitudes and the need to amend Section 28 if the age of consent was equalised. 
He raised the “concern among many people about older men approaching young 
boys” only in passing and as unproved (c.87). Nevertheless, he stood by the idea 
that the law’s protection of the young should extend to 18-year-old young men. 
This was a flimsy case. He concluded by claiming the age of 18 was the age of 
male maturity and pleading for UK sovereignty against the influence of Europe.
 Uncertainty underlay the other pro-18 speeches. Michael Howard focused 
on the Wolfenden and Policy Advisory Committee reports, notably the former’s 
claim that 16-year-old boys were unable to make mature judgments. His basic 
argument was that a young man needed time and the protection of the law to 
“make up his mind” (c.94). He fielded 13 interruptions, 11 from pro-16 speakers 
which prompted repetitive references to these official reports. In concluding, he 
affirmed UK independence within Europe and appealed to individual conscience. 
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Michael Alison focused on “the great mass who may be uncertain about their 
sexual orientation” (c.101) who needed more time under the law’s protection. He 
saw the problems with equalisation as: the removal of a legal guideline, whether 
enforced or not; exposure to AIDS, which led him to cite unidentified statistics on 
anal intercourse; the admission of 16-21-year-olds to “homosexual community 
organisations” (c.104), which he saw as corrupting rather than supportive. He 
hoped the House would ignore advice on human rights and focus on “those who 
are bobbing about in an uncertain sea of sexual development” (c.104).
 The pro-18 focus on uncertainty is indicative. To be uncertain was to be 
non-heterosexual with the possibility of never becoming heterosexual, hence the 
importance placed on the fixing of sexual identity as a clear boundary. That the 
speakers were not concerned about conversion to heterosexuality exposes the 
underlying value judgment, exemplified in Michael Howard’s pleas for ‘time’: 
At the very least, he deserves time in which to make up his mind. (c.93)
This is one of those matters on which a young man needs time. In answer to the first part 
of my hon. Friend's question, that young man is likely to be assisted by that extra time. 
(c.93)
I have said that there are likely to be, not all, but a number of young men between the ages 
of 16 and 18 who do not have a settled sexual orientation and who may benefit from the 
extra time which may be available if a new clause other than the one which the hon. 
Gentleman supports is passed by the Committee. (c.94)
Michael Alison concurred:
We are not concerned, however, with those whose sexual orientation is crystallised and 
fully formed; we are concerned precisely with the "in between" group, between the ages of 
16 and 18, for whom the Home Secretary pleaded. He pleaded for a little more time for 
them, precisely because they have not reached the stage of crystallisation ... 
(c.101)
The ‘extra time’ was for socialisation into heterosexuality. That no need was seen 
for a higher age to apply to sex between women points to the greater importance 
placed on the protection of male gender boundaries. 
158
 The Reverend Ian Paisley supported 21 and gave a sermon. His dual focus 
was on the influence of Europe, with particular reference to MEP’s support for 
the civil-rights report, and the teachings of the Bible. The report’s supportive 
recommendations were cast as the “road the Committee can go down tonight” 
(c.114). He then warned of its threat to ‘the family’, society and the nation before 
affirming the “normal sex act within the marriage vow” as the happy way (c.114). 
Young boys should be “saved from going down the homosexual road [...] They need 
to be delivered” (c.114). He ended with a prayer that the young people of his 
church “will learn the ‘more excellent way’ [and] that hon. Members keep that 
point in mind as they vote” (c.115).
 The free vote enabled a more genuine debate in that there was potential 
for MPs to make up their minds on the basis of the debate. That the pro-16 
amendment was defeated by only 27 votes was an achievement to which the 
more reasoned and practical arguments of the pro-16 speakers contributed. 
However, the claims and fears of anti-equalisation speakers had an entrenched 
history to tap into, as the following analyses show.
 Words and Themes 
 The following analyses focus on each side’s top-ten keywords (Appendices 
25 & 26) and their collocates (Appendices 27 & 28). Core features of each side’s 
contributions to the debate are shown on Flowcharts 3 and 4 below.
*       *       *
 On Flowchart 3, the pro-equalisation keyword MEN and not, which 
collocates with eight of the top-ten keywords, are pivotal. While not relates to 
matters of principle, MEN relates to young MEN’s quality of life. MEN is the top 
keyword (Appendix 26), with young, GAY, homosexual, women and not among its 
top collocates (Appendix 28). 
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The concordance lines for MEN (Appendix 29), show how far speakers’ arguments 
were premised on sexual identity, which is clearly indicated in 39/93 lines: 
 young GAY MEN (12 lines)                       young boys and MEN who are GAY (1 line)
 GAY MEN (8 lines)                                   MEN who are homosexual (1 line)
 young GAY and bisexual men (1 line)       young MEN who are homosexual (1 line)
 homosexual MEN (8 lines)                        young MEN of 16 and above who are homosexuals (1 line)
 young homosexual MEN (3 lines)              heterosexual MEN (1 line)
 homosexual young MEN (1 line)                MEN, whether heterosexual or homosexual (1 line)
In a further eight lines, a GAY sexual identity is indicated in the context:
8        Last year, three young  men—  Will Parry, Hugo Greenhalgh and Ralp        EC 21.2.pro.txt
9 it had to be investigated. The young  men  found themselves in Rochester Row poli        EC 21.2.pro.txt
21 y men is at last changing. They are  men  whom we know, work with and whose w        EC 21.2.pro.txt
22  work we admire. They are business  men,  civil servants, artists, actors, soldiers, j        EC 21.2.pro.txt
39 esent law. This means that younger  men  are denied access to the advice which s        NK 21.2.pro.txt
51 oblem of society, not of those young  men.           TBa 21.2.pro.txt
79 eterrent and does not stop younger  men   from having sex with other men if their       MW 21.2.pro.txt
80 ger men from having sex with other  men  if their sexuality tells them that they sh       MW 21.2.pro.txt
Most lines where sexual identity is evident occur in negative arguments: against 
discrimination (8 lines), against lack of access to safer-sex advice (7 lines) or 
other advice (6 lines), and against criminalisation (4 lines). Positive arguments 
are for equality before the law (5 lines) and for the benefits of decriminalisation  
(2 lines). A further six lines address uncertain sexual identity: 
24  ajority and the age at which young  men  seem most able to decide for themselves        NK 21.2.pro.txt
44 tween the ages of 16 and 18, young  men  are converted to homosexuality rather t        JR 21.2.pro.txt
46 aints is something that some young  men  go through between 16 and 18, how doe       MM 21.2.pro.txt
48  the Home Secretary's words, young  men  may be unsure of where they stand bet         JL 21.2.pro.txt
49 rgument? If he is saying that young  men  who might be gay should wait because t        EC 21.2.pro.txt
52  people. Without it, it is said, young  men  unsure of their sexuality may be preyed       TBl 21.2.pro.txt
While the first line occurs in a positive argument that sees young MEN as able to 
decide their SEXUALITY, the others occur in arguments against criminalisation or 
conversion to homosexuality. A further 18 lines concern sex or relationships 
between MEN where sexual identity is not evident. Most occur in arguments 
against criminalisation and lack of access to sexual-health advice, for example:
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7 rison for consensual acts with other  men.  The fear of being arrested and question        EC 21.2.pro.txt
13 tremely damaging. It inhibits young  men  from seeking help, whether through cou        EC 21.2.pro.txt
32 ry fact of criminality inhibits young  men  from reporting crimes against them. It i        NK 21.2.pro.txt
39 esent law. This means that younger  men  are denied access to the advice which s        NK 21.2.pro.txt
58 an unquantifiable number of young  men  who will engage in homosexual relation       TBl 21.2.pro.txt
68 p. It is entirely understandable that  men  in that position feel inhibited from seeki       MW 21.2.pro.txt
76 nality of the sexual activity of young  men  between the ages of 16 to 21 is harmful.       MW 21.2.pro.txt
78 t of 21, 18 or 17 criminalises young  men,  whom the law claims to protect. Ultima       MW 21.2.pro.txt
Similarly, 10/17 lines for the keyword FEAR (Appendix 26) stress the effects of 
criminalisation and discrimination on young MEN’s access to advice, for example:
1 onsensual acts with other men. The  fear  of being arrested and questioned, and pe       EC 21.2.pro.txt
2 ho hide their sexual orientation for  fear  of discrimination or alienation … are pla        EC 21.2.pro.txt
3 relationships remains because, they  fear,  seeking professional advice from doctor        NK 21.2.pro.txt
4 y continuing criminal prosecutions,  fear  and the underwriting of prejudice by cri        NK 21.2.pro.txt
5 against them and they need not feel  fear  and outlawed. Let us tell them that they         NK 21.2.pro.txt
6 dmit their own sexuality and of the  fear  of imprisonment, and to any man who is       TBl 21.2.pro.txt
9 when gay men hid their sexuality in  fear.           TBl 21.2.pro.txt
These negative arguments position young MEN as victims which is not conducive 
to fostering respect. A further 15 lines address the anti-equalisation protection 
claims, some of which note the exclusion of young women or girls, for example:
11 tee should take the view that young  men  ought to be protected longer than young        DP 21.2.pro.txt
54 ain men being preyed upon by older  men,  but young boys and men who are gay b       TBl 21.2.pro.txt
57 t does happen—not just with young  men  but with young girls, yet no one would a       TBl 21.2.pro.txt
73 re is a fear that so-called predatory  men  will prey on young boys, what lessons c       MW 21.2.pro.txt
74 all cases, it is lower—vast hoards of  men  prey on younger men or, indeed, boys.       MW 21.2.pro.txt
84 . The first was that somehow young  men  can be enticed, encouraged or converted        CS 21.2.pro.txt
90 s the problem of the abuse by older  men  of younger women. That is something a         CS 21.2.pro.txt
Other lines including women focus on gender equality, for example:
23 or sexual relations common to both  men  and women, on three main grounds. Fir        NK 21.2.pro.txt
25  d made the assumption that young  men  and young women were somehow more         NK 21.2.pro.txt
27 evelopmental reason to treat young  men  and young women differently in the law         NK 21.2.pro.txt
31  embers want to ensure that young  men  as well as young women are afforded as        NK 21.2.pro.txt
43  another young man, and for young  men  and women who want relationships wit        SH 21.2.pro.txt
47 difference in the ages of consent for  men  and for women and that the age of cons        AE 21.2.pro.txt
87  law on going into a pub is equal for  men  and women of all sexualities and all sha        CS 21.2.pro.txt
As do most lines for women (Appendix 29A), for example:
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2 t to be protected longer than young  women?  If young women, with the age of con        EC 21.2.pro.txt
3 longer than young women? If young  women,  with the age of consent set at 16, are       DP 21.2.pro.txt
7 en who are homosexual and young  women  who are heterosexual. As a father, I         NK 21.2.pro.txt
10 wing up. That applies also to young  women,  who are equally in need of protection       SH 21.2.pro.txt
12 en no protection is offered so far as  women  are concerned.            PP 21.2.pro.txt
15 e argument does not apply to young  women.  Hon. Members should consider the i       MW 21.2.pro.txt
Arguments for gender equality were acceptable in 1994. The anti-equalisation 
claims that young MEN needed more protection than young women presented an 
opportunity to get behind the assertions of immaturity and explore why such 
protection was being claimed and what was being protected. This opportunity 
was not and could not be taken. While protection of male gender boundaries is 
deeply implicated in homophobic beliefs, such arguments were unthinkable in 
1994, or beyond ‘official ideology’ (Voloshinov 2012: 144-6)
 The collocates of not (Appendix 28A) include all the terms on Flowchart 3 
except FEAR, women, protect and protection. While not occurs in numerous 
contexts, three core categories of argument are evident in the lines (Appendix 
29B) with some overlap. The first category relates to the law (40 lines), especially 
to the damaging effects of criminalisation, for example: 
14 reaking the criminal law, so they do  not  come forward. Thus, the law has the opp        EC 21.2.pro.txt
32 ng people are immature, but that is  not  an argument for making them criminals.        EC 21.2.pro.txt
54 the protection of legality and should  not  be criminalised into disguising their relat        NK 21.2.pro.txt
78  try to do that. We certainly should  not  criminalise those who are having a relati        SH 21.2.pro.txt
94 ith deemed to be criminal? Does he  not  accept that the way in which society at p        AR 21.2.pro.txt
120 omosexuality is wrong, but they are  not  entitled to use the criminal law to force t       TBl 21.2.pro.txt
146 ally to marry at 16? Should the law  not  say that it is understood that the young        MW 21.2.pro.txt
151 oes not act as a deterrent and does  not  stop younger men from having sex with o       MW 21.2.pro.txt
175 re the law. At present, the law does  not  permit that in the case of young gay men        CS 21.2.pro.txt
Although these lines occur mainly in negative arguments—‘against’ rather than 
‘for’, arguments against existing law were more constructive than those against 
the anti-equalisation claims which served to keep them ‘in the air’. The second 
category of argument relates to discrimination (20 lines), which overlaps with that 
for law, for example:
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12              The law is  not  only prejudicial and discriminatory; it is         EC 21.2.pro.txt
26  a higher age of consent for all boys,  not  just for some of them. There is not a cou        EC 21.2.pro.txt
65 rs for personal happiness. We shall  not  tolerate discrimination against them and        NK 21.2.pro.txt
100 be set apart from society. Does that  not  say something about the discrimination t      TBa 21.2.pro.txt
109 t they are; it is different, but that is  not  a ground for discrimination. The vast bul       TBl 21.2.pro.txt
114 rity of other countries in Europe do  not  discriminate should mean that we neces       TBl 21.2.pro.txt
160          First, the age of 18 is  not  a happy compromise. Compromises work      TGJ 21.2.pro.txt
178 d them, but they say that one shall  not  discriminate. But the law discriminates i        CS 21.2.pro.txt
In addition, all 14 lines for the keyword DISCRIMINATE (Appendix 26) relate to 
the law: why the law should not DISCRIMINATE (5 lines), ways in which the law 
does not DISCRIMINATE (5 lines), how the age of consent law does DISCRIMINATE 
(2 lines), the absence of such discrimination in other countries (1 line) and a 
criticism of those who want the law to DISCRIMINATE (1 line). The third category 
of argument relates to equality (18 lines), in which examples of other countries 
with a COMMON age of consent are prominent, for example:
13  whatever why the same age should  not  apply to men, whether heterosexual or h        EC 21.2.pro.txt
27 , not just for some of them. There is  not  a country in the world that takes that lin        EC 21.2.pro.txt
47 legislate for just such a change. I do  not  refer to those other countries to offer a si        NK 21.2.pro.txt
48 a common age of consent at 16 has  not  damaged those societies or corrupted the        NK 21.2.pro.txt
74 ome countries do just that, too. I do  not  want to be distracted by this, but I shall         SH 21.2.pro.txt
88 e common age across the sexes—is  not  a view which they necessarily regard as a        SH 21.2.pro.txt
103 osexual sex. It is therefore an issue  not  of age, but of equality. By supporting equ       TBl 21.2.pro.txt
In addition, 5/15 lines for the keyword EQUAL (Appendix 26) apply to the age of 
consent, while the others apply to rights (4 lines), equality before the law (4 lines), 
plus membership of society on EQUAL terms (1 line) and giving EQUAL weight to 
medical opinion (1 line). Arguments for equality were among the most positive.
 Although pro-16 speakers were supportively focused on the practicalities 
of young MEN’s social and legal position where their SEXUALITY placed them 
outside heterosexual parameters, the repeated focus on the problems they faced 
outnumbered more positive arguments. In addition, the recurring focus on anti-
equalisation claims upheld their residual power.
*       *       *
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 On Flowchart 4, links between anti-equalisation keywords and collocates 
are sparse. The most significant keyword is COMMITTEE (Appendix 25), with 
POLICY, ADVISORY and Wolfenden among its top collocates (Appendix 27). The 
upper part relates to Government reports, the middle part to views of sexuality, 
the lower part to debate process. 
 In the concordance lines for COMMITTEE (Appendix 30) it refers to: the 
COMMITTEE stage of the Bill at which the debate was held (21 lines), the Home 
Office POLICY ADVISORY COMMITTEE (15 lines) and the Wolfenden COMMITTEE 
(9 lines), plus one line refers jointly to the last two. Michael Howard spoke 23/25 
lines referring to these two and their respective reports (1981 & 1957). Most lines 
paraphrase the reports’ conclusions and are thus infused with the speaker’s view 
(Voloshinov 1986: 120-1), but six lines introduce authoritarian quotes (ibid: 120):
6 oxamine these matters in 1954. The  committee  reported in 1957. Among its cent      MH 21.2.anti.txt
11  build a family life of their own. The  committee  put it in the following way at para      MH 21.2.anti.txt
16 again in the words of the Wolfenden  committee.  [Interruption.] It is an important       MH 21.2.anti.txt
17 n whatever view one takes of it. The  committee  said: a boy is incapable at the age      MH 21.2.anti.txt
26 hich, in the words of the Wolfenden  committee,  will set them apart from the rest       MH 21.2.anti.txt
28 mber for Islwyn. The Policy Advisory Committee  concluded that the majority of pa      MH 21.2.anti.txt
Lines 11 and 28 introduce the same Policy Advisory Committee quote:
The committee put it in the following way at paragraph 38: The majority of parents would 
surely wish their children to grow up with the desire and possibility of marriage and 
children, and anything which puts this expectation at risk would be deplored. (c.93)
The Policy Advisory Committee concluded that the majority of parents would surely wish 
their children to grow up with the desire and possibility of marriage and children. (c.97)
The other lines introduce the same Wolfenden quote repeated in whole or part:
Among its central conclusions, to be found at paragraph 71 of the report, was that a boy is 
incapable at the age of 16 of forming a mature judgement about actions of a kind which 
might have the effect of setting him apart from the rest of society. (c.92-3)
It is still true that in following a homosexual way of life a young man sets himself apart 
from the majority. (c.93)
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The committee said: a boy is incapable at the age of 16 of forming a mature judgment 
about actions of a kind which might have the effect of setting him apart from the rest of 
society. (c.94)
It is a question of confirming themselves in a way of life which, in the words of the 
Wolfenden committee, will set them apart from the rest of society. (c.96)
It is a fact that the way of life that we are currently discussing involves an abandonment of 
those possibilities which sets those people who choose it apart and which requires the 
criminal law to give all the protection that it can to the young and vulnerable before they 
are confirmed in that orientation and before they take that decision. (c.97)
Tony Banks (c.97) pointed out that the reports were old and times change, yet 
Michael Howard upheld them as expert (c.93/c.97) in contrast to contemporary 
expert medical opinion cited in 5/6 pro-16 speeches. This positions the pro-18 
social hierarchy of values (Voloshinov 1986: 123) with Government authority. 
Michael Howard’s repeated references to the two reports added weight to the 
otherwise flimsy pro-18 case. As van Dijk (2006c) shows, repetition and reliance 
on authoritative sources are rhetorical ploys characteristic of manipulative 
discourse. Yet, with the free vote, why did Michael Howard, as Home Secretary, 
need to make such a heavyweight speech? The free vote was prompted by the 
prospect of a ECtHR judgement. John Major was a pro-European. His party was 
divided between Tory modernisers and right-wing anti-Europeans. Despite the 
free vote, the pro-18 amendment was backed by John Major and his Cabinet. 
Arguably, they could not be seen to be voting for either 16 or 21 in the face of 
divisions over Europe. 
 The middle part of Flowchart 4 is in two parts. On the left, the collocates 
relate to views of non-heterosexuality in terms of sexual offences and homosexual 
acts. These views are discussed in the next section. On the right, the keyword 
PARENTS (Appendix 25) was used to support the heterosexual status quo. The 
lines for PARENTS (Appendix 30) occur in claims that: PARENTS expect their 
children to be heterosexual, get married and have children (3 lines), PARENTS 
want their children protected against homosexuality (3 lines), PARENTS accept 
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youthful heterosexual relationships (1 line), the law does not deter young men 
from seeking advice from PARENTS or professionals (1 line), plus a dismissal of 
the EU civil rights report recommendation that restrictions on lesbian and gay 
PARENTS be lifted (1 line). Thus PARENTS were presumed to be heterosexual and 
in 7/10 lines anti-gay. These were not real PARENTS, they were a generalised 
personification of the status quo calling on “socially shared beliefs” (van Dijk 
2006c: 370). What the majority of PARENTS were claimed to wish for is thus 
ideological, compounded by the keywords MARRIAGE and FAMILY (Appendix 
30A). In terms of a social hierarchy of values (Voloshinov 1986: 123), PARENTS, 
as the mouthpiece for the heterosexual status quo, mattered more than the 
young men to whom the amendment applied. 
 The lower part of the Flowchart 4 relates to debate process. The keyword 
WAY (Appendix 25) relates to requests to give WAY in 16/34 lines (Appendix 30), 
while the lines for HON (ibid) show anti-equalisation speakers addressed or 
referred to other MPs proportionately more often. Of the lines for HON, 69/94 
occur in challenges to pro-equalisation speechmakers, over half of which (36 
lines) were directed at the two Conservatives: Edwina Currie and Tristan Garel-
Jones. Both were also specific targets in Ian Paisley’s speech. In addition, Edwina 
Currie was addressed as ‘the honourable Lady’ instead of ‘my honourable Friend’ 
five times by fellow Conservatives (lines 9-13; c.79/c.80) as if she was not one of 
them. She was also repeatedly heckled (Pink Paper 25.2.1994). This exposes the 
depth of Conservative divisions. Of the Conservatives who interrupted the pro-16 
speechmakers, 12/14 supported an age of 21, four of whom had voted against 
the Maastricht Treaty, as did Ian Paisley (22.7.1993 cc.608-611). Plus all three 
pro-18 speechmakers dismissed the example of other countries. The extent to 
which homophobic beliefs and anti-EU sentiments fuelled each other is 
unknowable, but the two are linked.
*       *       *
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 Overall, pro-equalisation speakers supported the young MEN affected by 
the existing law, to whom the amendment applied, with practical and reasoned 
arguments based on the principles of equality. By contrast, anti-equalisation 
speakers relied on upholding institutionalised beliefs, which Michael Howard 
bolstered with assertions of Government authority. 
 Views of Sexuality
 The following terms relating to sexuality were used in the debate: 
 Adjectives and Adverbs  Abstract Nouns  Nouns for People
 homosexual
 heterosexual







 sex (in reference to sexual acts)














 sexes (in reference to gender)
Pro-equalisation speakers used 24/25 terms, with heterosexual, the keywords 
GAY and SEXUALITY, plus sex and homosexuals proportionately salient. Anti-
equalisation speakers used only 16/25 terms, with proportionately higher 
frequencies of sexual (excluding orientation), sexual orientation, orientation, 
homosexuality and heterosexuality. The terms are investigated via their collocates 
(Appendices 31 & 33) and concordance lines (Appendices 32 & 34) within each 
lexical category in turn. 
*       *       *
 Of the adjectives, the clinical homosexual was the most used term overall, 
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 40/64 (62.3% total)
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68.4%
 24/64 (37.5% total)
 5/24 (20.8% uses)
31.6%
 heterosexual 28
 21/28 (75% total)
68.4%
 7/28 (25% total)





 31/53 (58.5% total)
 7/32 (21.9% uses)
68.4%
 22/53 (41.5% total)
 5/22 (22.7 uses)
31.6%
 sexually 3
 2/3 (66.7% total)
68.4%
 1/3 (33.3% total)
31.6%
 gay 50
 44/50 (88% total)
 7/44 (15.9% uses)
68.4%
 6/50 (12% total)
 5/6 (83.3% uses)
31.6%
 straight 2
 2/2 (100% total)
68.4% 31.6%
 bisexual 1
 1/1 (100% total)
 1/1 (100% uses)
68.4% 31.6%
 lesbian 1
 1/1 (100% total)
68.4% 31.6%
 homophobic 2
 2/2 (100% total)
68.4% 31.6%
Key: grey text shows the number and % of uses occurring in reports
 red text: shows the proportionately higher frequency of use
 bold red text: keywords
In 14/24 anti-equalisation concordance lines for homosexual (Appendix 32), the 
nouns to which it applies refer to sexual acts:
 activity (5 lines)    sex (2 lines)                    relations (1 line)    experience (1 line)    offences (1 line)
 acts (3 lines)         INTERCOURSE (1 line)    conduct (1 line)      activities (1 line)
Activity and acts are collocates (Appendix 31), while INTERCOURSE is a keyword. 
The focus on ‘acts’ evades recognition of ‘the actor’ as a real person. In Wodak’s 
(2007: 205) terms, the prejudice becomes “de-referentialized”. It suggests the 
young men were seen as unimportant. They were not real, but personifications of 
a belief requiring protection, as Bill Walker exemplifies:
On the issue of equality before the law, does the hon. Lady realise that it is neither natural 
nor normal to carry out homosexual activity? That is why there has to be protection for 
young boys. It is a different matter if they participate in that which is normal and natural, 
but if they are guided into activities that are neither normal nor natural, protection is 
required. (c.79)
His use of NORMAL and natural invoke heterosexual acts, which feature in 5/7 
lines for heterosexual (Appendix 32): activity is a collocate, but the lines also 
include INTERCOURSE, sex and acts. Heterosexual and homosexual collocate 
reciprocally, but the two categories are polarised in all lines: 
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This last line of argument could suggest that boys under 18 should be protected from 
heterosexual intercourse as well as homosexual relations. However, we feel that it is far 
easier for them to cope with the usual complexities"— [...] — of youthful heterosexual 
relationships, which are accepted by parents, friends and society, than the greater 
complexity of homosexual relationships with all the difficulties and pressures involved. 
(Anthony Durant c.87)
Although current medical opinion seems more rather than less certain that sexual 
orientation is fixed in both sexes by 16 in most cases, there will still be some young men 
for whom homosexual experience after that age will have profoundly influential and 
potentially disturbing effects.
It is also still unquestionably the case that most parents hope and expect their sons to 
follow a heterosexual lifestyle and hope that in due course they will build a family life of 
their own.
(Michael Howard c.93)
Whatever the scientific evidence about the age at which sexual orientation is fixed, it would 
be wrong to ignore the instinctive and deeply-held concern of many people that a decision 
to have homosexual sex is quite different from a decision to have heterosexual sex. 
(Michael Howard c.96)
In my view, therefore, we shall not offend against any fundamental political or civil right if 
we continue to reflect in the criminal law a public understanding of the difference between 
homosexual activity and heterosexual activity. 
(Michael Howard c.96)
I hope that the Committee will not be misled by the fact that heterosexual activity is 
normal and homosexual activity, putting your penis into another man's arsehole, is a 
perverse—
(Nicholas Fairbairn c.98)
The resolution says that certain things must be swept away. First, it says that there should 
be an end to different and discriminatory ages of consent for homosexual and heterosexual 
acts. Of course, there is no agreed age in Europe, as we know. 
(Ian Paisley c.113)
Such polarised values, based on the “construction of ‘differences’, which serve 
ideological, political and/or practical discrimination” (Wodak 2007: 205) are the 
basis of prejudiced representations. 
 Sexual was also used proportionately more often by anti-equalisation 
speakers and in 15/22 lines (Appendix 32) it also relates, directly or indirectly, to 
sexual acts: 
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 offences (6 lines)               options (2 lines)             relations (1 line)           health problems (1 line) 
 relationships (2 lines)        relationship (1 line)        experience (1 line)        INTERCOURSE (1 line)
Offences is a collocate (Appendix 31) and INTERCOURSE a keyword. The dual 
focus of these lines is the immaturity of young men and the criminality of the 
acts, the latter reinforced by evidence related to Sexual Offences: 
The Home Office Policy Advisory Committee document, "Report on Age of Consent in 
Relation to Sexual Offences", stated: between the ages of 16 and 18 girls are more mature 
than boys in their approach to sexual relationships and that, insofar as it is possible to 
generalise, boys have caught up with the girls in the process of maturing by the age of 18.
(Anthony Durant c.87)
That committee received a similar variety of expert evidence on the psychological and 
sexual maturity of young men between the ages of 16 and 21. It was also able to reflect on 
the experience gained by the police and prosecuting authorities of the Sexual Offences Act 
1967.
(Michael Howard c.93)
In that area, one gets the best of both worlds from the point of view of the youngster who is 
seeking guidance and direction at an early stage in his sexual development and maturity. 
The framework of law is there, but it is at the discretion of the Crown Prosecution Service 
whether to invoke it. 
(Michael Alison c.102)
I have in my hand a pamphlet published by the Health Education Authority entitled "The 
Best Sex Guide". It lists a range of sexual options apart from penetrative sex, which is the 
most hazardous in terms of AIDS. The guide includes sexual options which technically 
come within the definition of gross indecency and, therefore, are potentially criminal. 
(Michael Alison c.103)
‘Maturity’ can be seen as a euphemism for heterosexual, while the references to 
offences, the police, prosecuting authorities, the CPS, gross indecency and criminal 
construct sex between (the de-referentialised) men as basically criminal. 
 Individually, the nouns relating the above adjectives to sexual acts, plus 
the keyword BUGGERY and salacious references to AIDS, are predictable. 
Together (Appendix 32A) they illustrate an extraordinary preoccupation with 
sexual acts, particularly anal sex, which seven speakers chose to highlight: Tony 
Marlow (c.78), Julian Brazier (c.78), Nicholas Fairbairn (c.98), Bill Walker (c.98), 
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Michael Alison (c.102), Robert Spink (c.106), Ian Paisley (c.114), while Anthony 
Durant referred to the “proper and improper uses of the human body” (c.88). 
Even gay was contaminated with “gay bowel syndrome” (c.78). The preoccupation 
betrays both ignorance and perversity. As Baker points out: 
Not all gay men have anal sex (and not all men who have anal sex identify as gay). 
However, despite this, anal sex has become one of the main signifiers of homosexuality, 
particularly in homophobic discourses. 
(Baker 2004b: 103/2005: 56)
The association with anal sex not only evokes and reinforces beliefs constructed 
around the criminalising history of sex between men, but also erases the 
humanity of the men concerned. 
*       *       *
 The pro-equalisation adjectives focus on the young MEN affected by existing 
law and to whom the amendment applied. Both MEN and young are among the 
top collocates for homosexual (Appendix 33), while over half the concordance 
lines for homosexual, 26/40 (Appendix 34), occur in arguments against the 
young MEN’s criminalisation, as Neil Kinnock argued:
The very fact of criminality inhibits young men from reporting crimes against them. It is 
also a factor in the emotional misery and isolation endured by young homosexual men. But 
apart from those psychological pressures, which sometimes end in the terrible tragedies of 
suicide and attempted suicide, the Health Education Authority, Barnardo's and Project 
Sigma are just three of the knowledgeable bodies that inform us that the present 
criminality of homosexual relationships can limit health promotion activities among the 
social group most vulnerable to HIV infection and AIDS: young homosexual men. (c.84)
A particular focus of the arguments against criminalisation was its effect on 
young MEN’s access to safer-sex advice (8 lines). That HIV is a pro-equalisation 
keyword indicates speakers’ greater awareness of sexual-health issues. Anti-
equalisation speakers did not use HIV and their references to AIDS (Appendix 
32A) were linked to sexual acts and pitched to elicit negativity. This exasperated 
Edwina Currie:
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It exasperates me that the moment that anyone mentions gay sex, AIDS comes up in the 
next breath. When we see a heterosexual couple, we do not instantly think of gonorrhoea; 
we see people trying to form a long-term relationship, caring about each other and falling 
in love. (c.78)
Homosexual and heterosexual are reciprocal collocates (Appendix 33) and linked 
in or by nine lines. The lines for heterosexual (Appendix 34) also link to GAY, 
homosexuals and relationships between MEN. In total, 16/21 lines link to non-
heterosexual terms, while comparison with non-heterosexuality is implied in four 
more. In contrast to anti-equalisation speakers’ polarisation of the categories, 
17/21 pro-equalisation lines for heterosexual occur in arguments against 
discrimination, or for equality. Tony Blair put it succinctly: 
It is not at what age we wish young people to have sex. It is whether the criminal law 
should discriminate between heterosexual and homosexual sex. It is therefore an issue not 
of age, but of equality. By supporting equality, no one is advocating or urging gay sex at 16 
any more than those who would maintain the age of consent for heterosexual sex advocate 
that girls or boys of 16 should have sex. It is simply a question whether there are grounds 
for discrimination. (c.98)
That heterosexual was more used by pro-equalisation speakers, suggests they 
were taking heterosexuality less for granted. However, its mention served as a 
comparator in all but one line referring to a Sunday Times poll which had 42% of 
respondents wanting the heterosexual age of consent raised. Thus independent 
consideration of heterosexuality was absent and its status unquestioned.
 The lines for sexual (Appendix 34) include 13 nouns linked to sexual acts:
 activity (6 lines)            relationship (3 lines)   practices (2 lines)   assault (1 line)    practice (1 line)
 encounters (3 lines)      behaviour (2 lines)      relations (2 lines)   experience (1 line)
 relationships (3 lines)   offences (2 lines)        activities (1 line)     perversion (1 line)
Activity, encounters, relationship and relationships are collocates, as are MEN, 
young and GAY (Appendix 33). Arguments against the criminalisation of young 
MEN’s sexual activity account for 12/31 lines, while six lines occur in arguments 
for equality before the law. Mike Watson reviewed the 1967 Sexual Offences Act: 
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That was not what I said. The hon. Gentleman was clearly not listening. I was talking 
about adult sexual activity. People between the ages of 16 and 21 enjoy rights and are 
protected by other legislation from sexual assault and exploitation. The law that is under 
discussion, the Sexual Offences Act 1967, is riddled with inconsistencies. If there is a fear 
that so-called predatory men will prey on young boys, what lessons can we learn from the 
effect of legislation in other countries? There is no evidence that in the countries that hon. 
Members have listed in the debate where the age of consent is lower than in this country—
in all cases, it is lower—vast hoards of men prey on younger men or, indeed, boys. (c.106)
Criminal law should have no place in a matter of private morality and that is what we are 
debating. The Sexual Offences Act 1967 put British legislation ahead of that in most other 
European countries. Today, we are lagging behind all those countries and we are in the 
shameful position of having the highest age of consent in Europe. (c.107)
Six lines for sexual address anti-equalisation protection claims by highlighting 
consent (Appendices 34A & 34B). The issue of consent was raised only by pro-
equalisation speakers: Edwina Currie (c.76/c.79/c.80), Neil Kinnock (cc.81-2), 
Simon Hughes (c.90), Mike Watson (c.106) and Chris Smith (c.112). Most uses of 
‘consent’ in the debate occur in ‘age of consent’, but as Waites points out:
[The age of consent] is typically used to refer to an age at which the law permits sexual 
behaviour without any straightforward assumption that this coincides with the law 
recognising a young person’s capacity to give consent, or that the law demands that 
consent be positively expressed. 
(Waites 2005a: 5)
The pro-equalisation speakers’ concern with the issue of actually consenting to 
sex contributes to their humanising focus on young MEN. 
 The keyword GAY was the most used pro-equalisation adjective. The lines 
(Appendix 34) occur in similar arguments to the other adjectives: the effects of 
criminalisation, especially on young MEN’s access to professional advice (13 
lines), the effects of discrimination (7 lines) and the need for equality (6 lines). 
Edwina Currie addressed prejudice:
It is interesting that once respondents know a gay man, attitudes change dramatically and 
bigotry disappears. We in this Chamber all know at least one gay man—possibly more. In 
any case, we are here to lead public opinion as well as to follow it. (c.76)
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The image of gay men is at last changing. They are men whom we know, work with and 
whose work we admire. They are business men, civil servants, artists, actors, soldiers, 
judges, bishops, priests, peers and Members of Parliament. We all know someone who is 
gay, even if he has not yet declared himself. It is time to take the dark shadow and turn it 
into a human being; it is time to seize our homophobic instincts and chuck them on the 
scrap heap of history where they belong. (c.81)
These arguments were among the most positive, along with those for rights:
Members who will support the new clause will demonstrate that it is not an issue for gay 
men alone, and no longer a minority issue, but one of human rights, which touches us all. 
(Edwina Currie c.75)
I am after not gay rights but equal rights for everyone. 
(Edwina Currie c.78)
I inform hon. Members who may have genuine doubts about which way to vote that, 
because it is an issue of equality, and because it concerns the equal rights of our citizens, 
this is an issue not just for those who are gay but for all of us who are concerned about the 
type of society in which we live.
(Tony Blair c.99)
In Scotland, 16-year-olds have even more rights. A 16-year-old may choose to set up a 
business or marry or join the armed forces, but if he is gay he cannot legally have a sexual 
relationship of his choosing. In 1994, that is nonsense. 
(Mike Watson c.105)
That GAY rather than the homosexual was used in these arguments shows pro-
equalisation speakers associated it more positively than the clinical homosexual. 
By contrast all six anti-equalisation lines for gay (Appendix 32) occur in negative 
contexts: two in an unnecessarily graphic report of STD incidence in the USA, 
one in a hypothesised claim of pressure on a 16-year-old from the militant gay 
lobby, and three in a denouncement of MEP’s support for the civil-rights report. 
 The adjectives effectively summarise each side’s approach to the issue. 
Anti-equalisation speakers premised their protection of heterosexuality on a 
criminalising preoccupation with homosexual acts. Pro-equalisation speakers 
premised their support for young GAY/homosexual MEN on equal treatment. 
*       *       *
 Of the abstract nouns, sex was most used overall, proportionately more so 
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 sex (in reference to 
 sexual acts)
27
 20/27 (74.1% total)
 3/20 (15% uses)
68.4%
 7/27 (25.9% total)
 2/7 (28.6% uses)
31.6%
 sex (in reference to 
 gender)
2




 2/22 (9.1% uses)
68.4%
 2/24 (8.3% total)
31.6%
 sexualities 1
 1/1 (100% total)
68.4% 31.6%
 sexual orientation 22
 14/22 (63.6% total)
 1/14 (7.1% uses)
68.4%
 8/22 (36.4% total)
31.6%
 orientation 5
 2/5 (40% total)
68.4%
 3/5 (60% total)
31.6%
 orientations 2
 2/2 (100% total)
68.4% 31.6%
 homosexual orientation 2
 2/2 (100% total)
68.4% 31.6%
 heterosexual orientation 1
 1/1 (100% total)
68.4% 31.6%
 homosexuality 18
 10/18 (55.6% total)
 1/10 (10% uses)
68.4%
 8/18 (44.4% total)
 2/8 (25% uses)
31.6%
 heterosexuality 3
 1/3 (33.3% total)
 1/1 (100% uses)
68.4%
 2/3 (66.7% total)
31.6%
Key: grey text shows the number and % of uses occurring in reports
 red text: shows the proportionately higher frequency of use
 bold red text: keywords
Twenty pro-equalisation uses of sex refer to sexual acts and two to gender. The 
lines referring to sexual acts follow a similar pattern to that of the adjectives: 
arguments against criminalisation (15 lines), for access to sexual health advice  
(8 lines), against discrimination (5 lines), and for equality (2 lines). Tony Blair 
offered an alternative need for protection:
Moreover, where such predatory conduct takes place—let us assume for the purposes of 
the argument that it does—it takes place in circumstances that we all know: in parts of our 
inner cities and around some railway stations late at night, where young boys and girls sell 
sex for money and shelter. Surely the question that we should ask is why those young 
people are in those circumstances when it is not the criminal law but a roof over their 
heads, a decent family and home and a chance of a job that will help them. (c.99)
The lines where sex refers to gender occur in arguments for equal protection. 
 The lines for the pro-equalisation keyword SEXUALITY (Appendix 34) also 
occur in a similar range of arguments to the adjectives. Thirteen lines refer to 
GAY SEXUALITY and one to heterosexuality; eight are apparently neutral. Of the 
13 lines referring to GAY SEXUALITY, 10 are preceded by phrases constructing 
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young GAY MEN as victims of the law, prejudice, or discrimination: 
 taboo of silence that has denied         stigma attached to                        treat a man as inferior
 disguising their relations                    hid their SEXUALITY in fear         not to criminalise 
 inhibited from discussing                   continuous harrassment               discriminate against
 frightened to admit 
These lines occur in variously overlapping arguments against criminalisation, 
discrimination, prejudice and claims of immaturity, plus alternative arguments 
for protection. Tony Blair related the arguments to society:
Indeed, I go further: the most basic civilised value is the notion of respect for other people. 
That is what creates and sustains any decent society. That is why crime is wrong; that is 
why violent and abusive behaviour is wrong; that is why racial abuse is wrong. It is also why 
it is wrong to treat a man as inferior because his sexuality is different.
A society that has learned, over time, racial and sexual equality can surely come to terms 
with equality of sexuality. That is the moral case for change tonight. It is our chance to 
welcome people—I do not care whether there are 50,000, 500,000 or 5 million; it matters not 
a damn —into full membership of our society, on equal terms. It is our chance to do good, 
and we should take it.  (c.100-1)
His penultimate sentence again points to ulterior angst about the protection of 
heterosexuality, which was otherwise overlooked by pro-equalisation speakers. 
The other six apparently neutral uses of SEXUALITY address anti-equalisation 
claims via alternative arguments for protection (3 lines) and arguments against 
immaturity (2 lines) or conversion to homosexuality (2 lines). 
 The referents of sexual orientation and its variants are more scattered:
 GENERAL REFERENCE  GAY REFERENCE  HETEROSEXUAL REFERENCE
 sexual orientation (6 lines)
 orientations (2 lines)
 sexual orientation (6 lines)
 orientation (2 lines)
 homosexual orientation (2 lines)
 sexual orientation (2 lines)
 heterosexual orientation (1 line)
Seven lines (Appendix 34) occur in core arguments: against discrimination or 
criminalisation and for equality. However 12/21 lines, across all three referents, 
relate to the view that sexual identity is fixed by the age of 16. The illogicality of 
anti-equalisation claims of young men’s immaturity was noted by two speakers:
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I have been listening to what the Home Secretary has said about the maturity of 16-year-
old boys and I do not understand why he is making a distinction between those who are 
homosexual and those who are heterosexual. Is he not arguing that there should be a 
difference in the ages of consent for men and for women and that the age of consent for all 
boys should be 18 rather than 16? I do not understand the distinction that he is drawing 
between the two orientations. 
(Angela Eagle c.95)
If the Home Secretary is being quite honest about that, why does he not address the point 
about female sexual orientation in respect of which there is no age limit? The Home 
Secretary's argument is destroyed when no protection is offered so far as women are 
concerned.
(Peter Pike c.96)
These interventions offered MPs an opportunity to think about what was being 
protected, but none made use of it. That sexual orientation was used in relation 
to the fixing of sexual identity suggests it was understood as a more dichotomous 
term than SEXUALITY (Waites 2005b: 545; Weeks 2011: 189-192).
 Most pro-equalisation lines for homosexuality (Appendix 34) occur in a 
cluster of arguments against criminalisation, discrimination and prejudice. One 
line occurs in a dismissal of contradictory public opinion polls. The other two 
lines, plus the line for heterosexuality, occur in refutations of claims that young 
men would be vulnerable to corruption, or conversion: 
The supposition that somehow homosexuals are made or converted from heterosexuality is 
not sustained by medical evidence or by any unprejudiced examination of the facts or 
experience of normal life. 
(Neil Kinnock c.83)
I must reply to that briefly, but I am sure that the hon. Gentleman is aware that any 
amount of evidence proves that homosexuals are not made or corrupted by their elders. 
They are not converted to homosexuality by having sexual encounters with older people 
who are also homosexuals. 
(Neil Kinnock c.84)
The Home Secretary's whole argument seems to be based on two assumptions. Will he 
confirm that those assumptions are, first, that between the ages of 16 and 18, young men 
are converted to homosexuality rather than discovering that they are homosexual and, 
secondly, that that conversion can be stopped by the threat of criminal action? 
(John Reid c.94)
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That such claims had to be refuted positions ‘conversion’ as a sensitive area. No-
one asked why it mattered how young men came to adopt a sexual identity, why 
it mattered that they should have one, or why it mattered if they were ‘converted’. 
*       *       *
 All seven anti-equalisation uses of sex refer to sexual acts (Appendix 32). 
Two occur in Michael Howard’s polarisation of homosexual and heterosexual sex 
and two in Michael Alison’s criticism of an HEA guide on safer-sex options; in 
two more lines he criticised the BMA’s age of consent report for advocating 
over-16s have access to the support of community organisations and clubs:
They will drop their membership age limit to 16. They will draw into that particular vortex 
exactly those whose sexual orientation is not properly determined and is open to alteration 
and redirection in the context of a highly organised, self-conscious community. If it does 
introduce young men to safer sex of a homosexual kind, it will have the effect of 
predetermining them perhaps to lose precisely that option of family life and normal 
parenthood which is what they should have held open for them. (c.104)
This oddly regards the experience of gay sex as a ‘one-way ticket’ to gay identity. 
It similarly regards non-heterosexuality and parenthood as mutually exclusive, 
which indicates ignorance of lesbian and gay parents and co-parents. Ian Paisley 
confined parenting to a more elevated heterosexuality:
I plead with the Committee not to despise, reject or to brand the cement of society as some 
kind of prejudice. The normal sex act within the marriage vow, bringing together male and 
female and producing offspring, is the happy way; it is the divine way; it is the creative 
way; and it is the best way. As one of the apostles said, it is the more excellent way. (c.114)
While some kind of prejudice dismisses equality, the citing of male and female 
highlights the centrality of the gender binary in both the heterosexual status quo 
and homophobic thought (Baker 2008: 91-154).
 The two anti-equalisation lines for sexuality (Appendix 32) have neutral 
reference and occur in claims of young men’s unsettled or confused sexuality, as 
do the lines for sexual orientation which was used proportionately more by anti-
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equalisation speakers. In 7/8 lines, plus 1/3 for orientation, the term has neutral 
reference and occurs in claims about the vulnerability of young men who do not 
have a settled, fixed or crytallised sexual orientation. In the remaining lines the 
term refers to homosexuality and concern its feared possibility: 
It is a fact that the way of life that we are currently discussing involves an abandonment of 
those possibilities which sets those people who choose it apart and which requires the 
criminal law to give all the protection that it can to the young and vulnerable before they 
are confirmed in that orientation and before they take that decision. 
(Michael Howard c.97)
However, it is a legitimate and important function of the criminal law to protect the young 
and the vulnerable before that orientation is fixed and determined. 
(Michael Howard c.97)
We are not concerned, however, with those whose sexual orientation is crystallised and 
fully formed; we are concerned precisely with the "in between" group, between the ages of 
16 and 18, for whom the Home Secretary pleaded.  
(Michael Alison c.101)
These lines implicitly dismiss young gay men as unimportant. 
 The largely neutral references of sexuality and sexual orientation concur 
with anti-equalisation fears of uncertain sexual identity, but though speakers 
used them in similar ways, sexual orientation was the preferred term. According 
to Weeks (2011: 189), sexual orientation came into use “in the 1970s largely as a 
synonym for homosexuality”, though he acknowledges the value of its extension 
to an essential homosexual or heterosexual nature in arguments for equality. As 
such, it preserves the category of heterosexuality which was the underlying anti-
equalisation objective. This may account for the speakers’ preference, but their 
linking of both terms to protection against homosexuality, illustrates their 
discomfort with potential for non-heterosexuality. 
 The nouns homosexuality and heterosexuality add little to what has been 
said. Both were proportionately more used by anti-equalisation speakers. Two 
lines (Appendix 32) occur in polarisations of homosexuality and heterosexuality, 
thus heterosexuality has no independent consideration. Four lines occur in 
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warnings against equalisation: that STDs would increase, Section 28 would need 
amending, homosexuality would be seen as uncontroversial and prosecutions 
would cease. The two remaining lines occur in refutations of pro-16 evidence: 
My hon. Friend has failed to listen to the evidence that I have given of the criminal 
statistics, aided and abetted by his intervention. There simply are not enough criminal 
prosecutions every year to suggest that most youngsters are even aware of the existence of 
the law on homosexuality. The Crown Prosecution Service hardly ever brings prosecutions 
and it cannot be said that youngsters are inhibited from seeking health advice.
(Michael Alison c.103)
Some people say, "No one ever changes; we were born this way; and this is the way that we 
have to remain." That is not true. Homosexuals have been converted from homosexuality 
and some of them have good marriages and are bringing up families. I know that from 
personal pastoral experience. 
(Ian Paisley c.115)
The views and experience of young gay men had been completely ignored in anti-
equalisation speakers’ quest to protect heterosexuality. 
 The abstract nouns show that for both sides of the debate, albeit for very 
different reasons, the issue of sexual identity was important. Anti-equalisation 
speakers needed young men to be uncertain about their sexuality in order to 
claim they needed protection from homosexuality. Conversely, pro-equalisation 
speakers needed sexual identities to be developmentally fixed in order to refute 
claims of young men’s vulnerability to conversion or corruption.
*       *       *
 Nouns for people were less used used in the debate. 










 19/24 (79.2% total)
 4/19 (21.1% uses)
68.4%
 5/24 (20.8% total)
 1/5 (20% uses)
31.6%
 homosexual 2 68.4%
 2/2 (100% total)
31.6%
 heterosexuals 6
 4/6 (66.7% total)
68.4%
 2/6 (33.3% total)
31.6%
 lesbians
3  1/3 (33.3% total)
 1/1 (100% uses)
68.4%
 2/3 (66.7% total)
 2/2 (100% uses)
31.6%
 sexes 7
 5/7 (71.4% total)
68.4%
 2/7 (28.6% total)
31.6%
Key: grey text shows the number and % of uses occurring in reports
 red text: shows the proportionately higher frequency of use
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The most used noun overall was homosexuals, proportionately more so by pro-
equalisation speakers. While this supports speakers’ focus on young men, it is a 
clinical term. However, its disproportionate use is accounted for by one speaker: 
Neil Kinnock spoke 12/19 lines (Appendix 34). Most lines occur in negative or 
defensive arguments: against criminalisation (5 lines), discrimination (4 lines) or 
conversion to homosexuality (4 lines), plus claims that sexual identity is fixed by 
the age of 16 (2 lines) and, more positively, arguments for the protective effects of 
decriminalisation (2 lines). Neil Kinnock argued these points well, but two of his 
lines display unquestioning acceptance of the heterosexual status-quo:
For the very reason that is understood by all heterosexuals: homosexuals in our society 
and in others are a minority. They are regarded as an isolated group. They do not have 
children. Moreover, in our society, even at the age of 16, they are regarded as criminals if 
they engage in sexual activity. That is a fair accumulation of reasons for not wanting one's 
children to be homosexual. We do not, however, have any control over it. (c.83) 
Let us tell young people that a heterosexual life, in the sense that it is what most of us live 
and want to live, is the norm; that it is and will remain the basic human relationship upon 
which the family is founded. But let us also tell young homosexuals that we still have 
regard for them and want them to live in a society that accepts their nature and will give 
them the same chance as others for personal happiness. We shall not tolerate 
discrimination against them and they need not feel fear and outlawed. (c.86)
These lines undermine his otherwise supportive stance and reveal his lack of 
familiarity with lesbian and gay politics. The incongruity of support for gay men 
using dispreferred terms relates to Bakhtin’s (1981: 271) centripetal forces which 
“develop in vital connection with the processes of sociopolitical and cultural 
centralization”. Neil Kinnock was a ‘mainstream’ Labour MP apparently no more 
in touch with the gay politics his party supported than when he was leader. 
*       *       *
 The anti-equalisation lines for homosexuals and heterosexuals are few, but 
include two uses of homosexual as a singular noun (Appendix 32). Together these 
lines also span familiar topics: sexual acts (3 lines), polarised categories (2 lines), 
UK sovereignty (1 line), and conversion to homosexuality (3 lines) which includes 
183
Michael Alison’s use of the singular nouns: 
He isolated two categories: the older, convinced and committed homosexual—whatever the 
nature of his condition, genetically or otherwise—and the youngster of 16, 18 or 21 who is, 
likewise, a committed, finally developed and fully oriented homosexual. 
We are not concerned, however, with those whose sexual orientation is crystallised and 
fully formed; we are concerned precisely with the "in between" group, between the ages of 
16 and 18, for whom the Home Secretary pleaded. (c.101)
The whatever the nature of his condition invokes a pathologising view, while the 
dismissal of the homosexual as of no concern, posits the absence of heterosexual 
identity as the threat. It was for this absence that anti-equalisation speakers 
required continuing criminalisation.
*       *       *
 Overall, criminalisation was the kernal of the debate. Arguments for 
equalisation were underpinned by its negative effects, while anti-equalisation 
claims were underpinned by references to sexual acts framed by criminality. The 
issues arising from the analysis are discussed below.
 Associations and Implications 
 The triad of issues arising from the analysis relates to sexual acts, sexual 
identity, and the relationship between the two. A final consideration is the 
influence of divisions over Europe. 
 The completely inappropriate anti-equalisation preoccupation with sexual 
acts, particularly anal sex, is relatively easy to position. Graphic phrases such as 
the buggery of adolescent males, gay bowel syndrome (c.78), or putting your penis 
into another man’s arsehole (c.98) exposed and constructed abhorrence, while 
references to the actual act/an unnatural act (c.98), anal intercourse (c.102), the 
act of buggery (c.106), an unnatural act/that unnatural act (c.114) compounded 
the preoccupation. This preoccupation was also found by Baker (2004b/2005: 
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Ch.2) in his analyses of the Lords debates on equalising the age of consent 1998- 
2000. None of the anti-equalisation references to sex between men were neutral; 
all occur in negative statements. References to buggery (c.78/c.101/c.106) and 
gross indecency (c.103/c.113) especially, evoke past laws and thus link sex 
between men to criminality, while the use of unnatural in relation to sexual acts 
(c.98/c.114) echoes religious edicts and links sex between men to sin. There was 
no anti-equalisation consideration of consent. 
 The anti-equalisation focus on sexual acts was accompanied by notable 
anxiety over uncertain sexual identity, to the extent that identity was considered 
only in terms of its absence; men with a ‘homosexual’ identity were dismissed. 
Absence of sexual identity was presented as ‘the’ problem in that the possibility 
of a non-heterosexual identity remained open. The implication of the ‘pleas for 
time’ is that young men’s experience of sex with a man was seen as decisive in 
the formation of a non-heterosexual identity rather than one of life’s experiences 
which may or may not be pursued. This is akin to the middle-class Victorian 
ideology of ‘the fallen woman’ in terms of its implied irreversibility; it was seen to 
debar young men from participation in ‘respectable’ life. That this irreversibility 
was not directly stated suggests it was less a deliberate feature of the argument 
than an underlying belief relating to corruption. If heterosexuality is viewed as 
‘natural’ and ‘normal’, as it was by anti-equalisation speakers, then a non-
heterosexual identity must have a cause. It posits gay identity as the product of 
corruption rather than positive choice. This links to the uncertainty associated 
with anti-equalisation speakers’ use of sexual orientation and sexuality. Their 
anxiety about the protection of heterosexuality was particularly linked to terms 
inclusive of alternative sexualities.
 The pro-equalisation emphasis on fixed mutually exclusive sexual 
identities was addressed by Waites (1995 reviewed above) and acknowledged to 
be a politically expedient argument. In the circumstances it was well deployed; 
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the vote for equalisation was nearly won. The positive side of this was that it 
brought young men’s lives into the debate, albeit in fairly passive form. However, 
MPs who supported equality as a matter of principle, had varying degrees of 
familiarity with gay life and/or sexuality politics. Thus the arguments assuming 
fixed sexual identities reinforced views of distinct blanket categories of sexuality. 
This is not to belittle the importance of lesbian and gay identities in the struggles 
for legal reform but, like all blanket categories, they mask shifting spectrums of 
practices and identities, in societies and individuals, past and present. 
 Extending from the pro-equalisation focus on sexual identity and the anti-
equalisation focus on sexual acts, an ‘either-or’ sexual identity was conflated 
with sexual practice. Bisexual men were referred to on one occasion by Edwina 
Currie (c.78), but no mention was made of, for example, the fact that a fair 
number of men who have sex with men (MSM) identify as heterosexual. As Weeks 
(2011: 188) points out “there is no necessary relationship between what your 
desires or sexual practices or behaviour are, and how you identify yourself”. This 
raises questions about how sexual practices and sexual identities may be seen in 
the wider public by people unfamiliar with sexuality issues.
 It is relevant that lesbian and gay identities were publicly claimed in the 
1970s and 80s as a means of resistance. Both Weeks (2011: 189) and Waites 
(2005a: 17) note the attachment that many lesbians and gay men have to their 
identities. Yet, as Weeks (2011: 191) argues, “social categorisations have effects 
in the real world, whether or not they are direct reflections of inherent qualities 
or drives”. In his analysis of later age-of-consent debates Waites (2005a: 158-180  
& 2005b: 545-552) argues that both Stonewall’s and pro-equalisation speakers’ 
continued reliance on pragmatic claims that young men’s sexuality is fixed by 
the age of 16 had repercussions. The claims were premised on “assurances that 
heterosexual identity formation was unthreatened” (2005a: 9). In continuing to 
protect heterosexuality, the claims perpetuated the prevailing social hierarchy of 
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the heterosexual/homosexual binary. Waites (2005b: 551-2) argues further that 
via the attendant mainstreaming of lesbian and gay identities in the media, fixity 
claims have entered “popular common sense” and are framing young people’s 
identity formation within the binary (ibid: 560-2). As Voloshinov argued:
 [N]ew currents in behavioral ideology, no matter how revolutionary they may be, undergo 
 the influence of the established ideological systems and, to some extent, incorporate forms, 
 ideological practices, and approaches already in stock.
 (Voloshinov 1986 [1929]: 92)
The tension between the need for a positive group identity to engage in political 
struggle and the difficulty of shifting the unequal social status that necessitates 
that struggle, is further discussed in this study’s Conclusion.
 Finally, in the case of the 1994 debate analysed above, the Conservative 
divisions over Europe suggest that even in a free vote other issues play a part. Of 
the 22 Conservative MPs who voted against John Major on the Maastricht Treaty 
(22.7.1993 cc.608-610), all voted against equalisation and 18/22 voted against 
reducing the age of consent to 18. None of the 43 Conservatives who supported 
equalisation voted against the Treaty. That John Major and his cabinet voted for 
18 positions it as a political choice to support a weakened Government. Whatever 
anti-equalisation speakers’ personal views, their claims tapped into homophobic 
beliefs in a way that completely sidelined the young men affected by both the 
existing law and the amendment for equalisation. 
 Conclusion
 As in Chapter 5, this chapter too illustrates the influence of the wider 
political context on the proposals, processes and outcomes. The Conservative 
divisions over Europe pervade the political context. John Major’s pro-European 
position in a divided party was feasibly a factor in his promise of a free vote when 
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faced with the prospect of an ECtHR judgement. The Conservative division was, 
arguably, a factor in the late addition of the pro-18 amendment and certainly 
correlated with the positions taken by MPs in the debate and the vote, broadly: 
pro-16 and pro-EU; pro-18 and pro-Government unity; anti-18 and anti-EU.  
The correlation is also evident in the positive examples of other countries in pro-
equalisation speeches and the affirmations of UK sovereignty in anti-equalisation 
speeches. This aspect of the political context does not feature in the research 
reviewed. While all three studies include the 1994 debate in content analyses, 
none analyse the language used. 
 The debate analysed in this chapter shows pro-equalisation arguments 
were generally practical and reasoned, in contrast to anti-equalisation reliance 
on the authority of official reports and metaphorical claims. The residual power 
of the claim that young men needed protection from ‘homosexual’ experience is 
evident in pro-equalisation speakers’ extensive rebuttal of it. That they took the 
claim at face value, illustrates the extent to which the status of heterosexuality 
was beyond question and thus protected. That young men were claimed to need 
more protection than young women exemplifies the importance of male gender 
boundaries in homophobic beliefs. The Words and Themes section of the analysis 
reveals an organisational contrast in each side’s contributions to the debate. On 
Flowchart 3, the integrated range of pro-equalisation keywords and collocates 
point to cohesive arguments. On Flowchart 4, the few minimally integrated anti-
equalisation keywords and collocates point to unrelated claims. The top pro-
equalisation keyword MEN and pivotal collocate not illustrate the extent to which 
arguments against anti-equalisation claims far outnumbered positive arguments 
for equalisation. The top anti-equalisation keyword COMMITTEE links to citings 
of official reports, while PARENTS functions as a generalised personification of 
the status-quo in which PARENTS are positioned as both heterosexual and anti-
gay. In the Views of Sexuality section, the adjectives mark each side’s stance. 
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Anti-equalisation speakers premised their protection of heterosexuality on a 
criminalising and often graphic preoccupation with homosexual acts, alongside a 
polarisation of homosexual and heterosexual relationships. Pro-equalisation 
speakers used homosexual largely in arguments against anti-equalisation claims, 
while their uses of GAY were more focused on equal treatment and rights. The 
abstract nouns sexuality and sexual orientation link to issues of sexual identity. 
The mostly neutral reference of anti-equalisation uses of these two nouns link to 
claims of young men’s unsettled or confused sexuality needing protection and 
mark their discomfort with potential for non-heterosexual identity. By contrast, 
only a third of the pro-equalisation uses of these nouns have neutral reference 
and occur in arguments for equal treatment. That pro-equalisation arguments 
were premised on sexual identity (as opposed to sexual acts) further supports the 
importance of group identity for engagement in political struggle.
 Overall, the period of the Major government was one of struggle for social 
and legal recognition. The assertion of positive sexual identities was central to 
this struggle. The strongest suggestion of change in the period is a rise in the 
social valuation of equality and the slightly widening recognition that lesbians 
and gay men should not be excluded from it. A series of debates on the position 
of lesbians and gay men in the armed forces also took place in this parliamentary 
period and are investigated in Chapter 7. 
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Chapter 7
The Armed Forces (1995-6)
 By 1996 the Major Government’s majority was further reduced. The 
Conservatives had done badly in the European and local elections and had lost 
seven parliamentary seats in by-elections. In addition, the press had exposed a 
string of Conservative MPs involved in sexual or financial scandals; some had 
been accepting cash for asking questions in Parliament, others had been involved 
in secret trade deals including illegal arms sales to Iraq. The Back to Basics 
campaign, which John Major launched at the 1993 Conservative conference to 
unite the Party after Maastricht, had floundered and the divisions had become 
entrenched. He had intended the campaign to focus on the economy, law and 
order, and education, but right-wing MPs had wanted a moral crusade based on 
‘family values’ with single mothers claiming benefit as a specific target (Durham 
1994: 14). Reports of sexual scandals led to accusations of hypocrisy. Back to 
Basics became widely ridiculed in the press, as was John Major himself. In 1995, 
he called his critic’s bluff by resigning as party leader (Wintour et al 23.6.1995). 
He won the ensuing leadership election, but Conservative in-fighting and press 
hostility persisted. It was prior to the 1997 general election that Rupert Murdoch 
asked Major to change his pro-EU policies or forgo his papers’ support in the 
forthcoming election (Leveson 29.11.2012: 1132).
 This chapter outlines attempts to allow lesbians and gay men to serve in 
the armed forces. The debates span 11 years, but no research on them has been 
found. A summary of the passage of the 1995-6 Armed Forces Bill is followed by 
an account of the relevant debate. Comparisons of each side’s top-ten keywords 
and the sexuality terms used are followed by a discussion.
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 Political Context
 The armed forces and merchant navy were excluded from the 1967 Sexual 
Offences Act. Calls for change in the law began in 1985 after the Cyprus ‘spy’ 
trial revealed details of custodial treatment including “unacceptable interrogation 
techniques which led to false confessions” (Civil Liberty 1986). Seven signals-
intelligence men were acquitted of passing secrets to Soviet agents said to be 
blackmailing them for holding homosexual parties (Keel et al 29.10.1985). The 
NCCL briefed MPs before the second reading of the 1985-6 Armed Forces Bill 
(21.11.1985 cc.433-468) and submitted evidence to its Select Committee which 
recommended changes in disciplinary procedure, questioning, and treatment in 
custody, plus discharge rather than imprisonment and an effective grievance 
procedure (Civil Liberty ibid). At the Bill’s Report stage (10.4.1986 cc.410-470), 
Kevin McNamara, Labour spokesman for defence and disarmament, proposed 
that homosexual conduct be exempted from service law unless it was “prejudicial 
to good order and discipline” (cc.442-6); he was defeated by 104 to 34 votes. At 
the Bill’s Committee stage in the Lords (19.5.1986 cc.23-69), Lord Graham 
moved an amendment to abolish the forces’ exemption from the 1967 Act; he 
withdrew for lack of support. 
 Under the Major Government, the issue was recurrent. At the annual 
approval of the Army, Air Force and Naval Discipline Acts (Continuation) Order 
(17.6.1991 cc.90-119), John Reid, Labour defence spokesman, welcomed cross-
party support for a Select Committee recommendation that “homosexual activity 
of a kind that is legal under civilian law should not constitute an offence under 
service law” (c.92). At the Lord’s Committee stage of the 1990-1 Armed Forces 
Bill (24.7.1991 cc.805-820), Lord Rea proposed enactment of the Committee’s 
recommendation; he withdrew for lack of support. 
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 In 1992, Rank Outsiders and Stonewall gave evidence to the Armed Forces 
Select Committee. The Committee again recommended that prosecutions should 
cease for ‘homosexual activity’ legal in civilian life. At the annual approval of the 
Discipline Acts (Continuation Order) (17.6.1992 cc.989-1012), Jonathan Aitkin, 
Minister for Defence Procurement, announced Government acceptance of the 
recommendation, having stressed “homosexual activity [was] incompatible with 
service in the armed forces [and that they] should not be required to accept 
homosexuals” (c.989). At the Lords approval of the Order (23.6.1992 cc.387-397), 
Viscount Cranborne, for the Government, emphasised that the Select Committee 
agreed with the MoD policy of excluding homosexuals. The MoD adopted a policy 
of administrative discharge instead of prosecution.
 The Government made no attempt to enact the recommendation during 
1993. As Pink Paper headlined (14.2.1993), ‘MoD defensive over forces ban’. The 
delay prompted Michael Brown to ask when legislation was planned and for a 
breakdown of discharged personnel (19.2.1993 c.358W). At the approval of the 
Continuation Order (21.6.1993 cc.121-145), Jeremy Hanley, the Armed Forces 
Minister, stated the recommendation was being followed “administratively until 
[the law was] changed” (c.124). Andrew Rowe pointed out that lesbians and gay 
men were still being “drummed out of the forces [even if their relationships were] 
well away from any Army establishment” (c.124). He was supported by John 
Reid, Edwina Currie and Menzies Campbell. Investigations into the lives of men 
and women suspected of being gay were continuing, plus gruelling interrogations 
and physical examinations of men. Tony Banks read out the instructions for 
physical examination. Edwina Currie noted, “if such an examination were carried 
out in civilian life it would almost certainly constitute an offence in itself” (c.137). 
Harry Cohen added that if a man refused “to undergo such an examination, a 
further disciplinary charge [could] be brought against him” (c.137). Mike Watson 
highlighted assumptions underlying the instructions’, including those of sexual 
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deviancy and mental illness (cc.139-40). When the Lords approved the Order 
(9.7.1993 cc.1689-1698). Lord Mayhew and Lord Williams queried Viscount 
Cranborne’s claim that no opportunity had arisen to enact the recommendation. 
 The delay prompted parliamentary questions after the summer recess: 
Harry Cohen (30.11.1993 cc.526-8W), Mike Watson (1.12.1993 c.607W), Edwina 
Currie (16.12.1993 c.824W), Lord Gainford (16.12.1993 cc.140-1WA), Edwina 
Currie (8.2.1994 c.235W), Chris Smith (11.3.1994 c.420W). The recommendation 
was finally included as a last-minute amendment to the Criminal Justice and 
Public Order Bill (12.4.1994 cc.169-172). It provoked no direct opposition, but 
noisy interruptions from the bar are recorded as it was introduced. While the Bill 
was in the Lords, Barbara Roche requested details of dischargees since 1991 and 
was told she would be written to (5.5.1994 c.587W). Two weeks later Paul Flynn 
followed up her request and was told a copy would be put in the Commons 
library (20.5.1994 c.603W).
 At the Lords Committee stage (20.6.1994 cc.74-168), Lord Boardman 
moved an amendment to ensure “homosexual conduct [would] continue to be a 
ground for administrative discharge” (c.86). His rationale was that without it 
further reforms would succeed and homosexuals would be allowed to serve. He 
was supported by a succession of peers with links to the military who scarcely 
feature in other debates in this study. Only Lord Monkswell challenged the 
amendment. Viscount Cranborne argued that although the Government agreed 
with the amendment’s aims, it was unnecessary as MoD regulations covered the 
issue. Lord Boardman called a vote and won by 82 to 61. At the Bill’s third 
reading (19.7.1994 cc.143-228) Viscount Cranborne’s amendment to ensure 
prosecution for behaviour contrary to good order and discipline was accepted 
with minimal debate (cc.190-1). 
 During the parliamentary recess, details of the discharged lesbians and 
gay men reached the press. Among 259 dischargees were four army majors, four 
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captains, two chaplains, a squadron leader, two fight lieutenants, plus two 
lieutenant commanders. In addition, lawyers had decided that unfair dismissal 
claims were feasible under EU law. This made the headlines, for example: ‘MOD 
FACING MASSIVE PAY-OUTS TO GAYS’ (Oborne 5.8.1994); ‘MPs fear sacked 
gays will sue the MoD’ (Pierce 5.8.1994); ‘Axed gays may claim millions’ (Travis 
5.8.1994). Some papers featured case-histories of investigations (Travis 5.8.1994; 
Harrison/Ward 6.8.1994; Cooper 8.8.1994). The Guardian (5.8.1994), revealed a 
‘Lesbian Index’ was held on the MoD criminal-record computer. MoD sources 
claimed “We dismiss without prejudice” (Travis 6.8.1994). Meanwhile Barbara 
Roche was pursuing the cost of training the dischargees (Travis 5.8.1994). 
 When the Commons considered the Lords amendments (19-20 October), 
the armed forces were not discussed. Sections 146-148 of the Act apply to the 
armed forces and merchant navy:
146  Extension of Sexual Offences Act 1967 to the armed forces and merchant navy
(1) Section 1(5) of the Sexual Offences Act 1967 (homosexual acts in the armed 
forces) is repealed. 
(2) In section 80 of the [1980 c. 62.] Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1980—
(a) subsection (5) (homosexual acts in the armed forces) shall cease to have 
effect;
(b) in subsection (7)—
(i) after paragraph (b) there shall be inserted the word “or”; and
(ii) paragraph (d) (homosexual acts on merchant ships) and the 
word “; or” immediately preceding that paragraph shall cease to 
have effect; and
(c) subsection (8) (interpretation) shall cease to have effect.
(3) Section 2 of the [1967 c. 60.] Sexual Offences Act 1967 (homosexual acts on 
merchant ships) is repealed.
(4) Nothing contained in this section shall prevent a homosexual act (with or 
without other acts or circumstances) from constituting a ground for discharging a 
member of Her Majesty’s armed forces from the service or dismissing a member of 
the crew of a United Kingdom merchant ship from his ship or, in the case of a 
member of Her Majesty’s armed forces, where the act occurs in conjunction with 
other acts or circumstances, from constituting an offence under the [1955 c. 18.] 
Army Act 1955, the [1955 c. 19.] Air Force Act 1955 or the [1957 c. 53.] Naval 
Discipline Act 1957.
Expressions used in this subsection and any enactment repealed by this section 
have the same meaning in this subsection as in that enactment.
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147  Homosexuality on merchant ships and in the armed forces: Northern Ireland
(1) In the [S.I. 1982/1536 (N.I. 19).] Homosexual Offences (Northern Ireland) Order 
1982, the following are revoked—
(a) in article 3(1) (homosexual acts in private), the words “and Article 5 
(merchant seamen)”; and
(b) article 5 (homosexual acts on merchant ships).
(2) Article 3(4) of the Homosexual Offences (Northern Ireland) Order 1982 
(homosexual acts in the armed forces) is revoked.
(3) Nothing in this section shall prevent a homosexual act (with or without other 
acts or circumstances) from constituting a ground for discharging a member of Her 
Majesty’s armed forces from the service or dismissing a member of the crew of a 
United Kingdom merchant ship from his ship or, in the case of a member of Her 
Majesty’s armed forces, where the act occurs in conjunction with other acts or 
circumstances, from constituting an offence under the Army Act 1955, the Air 
Force Act 1955 or the Naval Discipline Act 1957.
Expressions used in this subsection and any enactment repealed by this section 
have the same meaning in this subsection as in that enactment.
148  Amendment of law relating to homosexual acts in Scotland
In section 80(6) of the [1980 c. 62.] Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1980 (which 
defines “homosexual act” for the purpose of section 80), after “gross indecency” 
there is inserted “or shameless indecency”.
(Criminal Justice & Public Order Act 1994, c.33, Part XI Sexual Offences: Homosexuality)
In the military, the ban remained. Intrusive investigations including surveillance 
operations and prurient interrogations continued. Hall (1995) documents various 
investigations from interviews with discharged lesbians and gay men, plus cases 
of (then) still serving lesbians and gay men with identifying details changed. 
 In 1995, claims that the MoD kept a secret database of lesbian and gay 
personnel and their civilian friends in contravention of the Data Protection Act 
prompted investigation (Burdon 7.1.1995). Capital Gay (13.1.1995) reported that 
the police, Post Office and BT could access the list. Hall (1995: 46-7) also shows 
information was shared with Post Office and BT intelligence departments. David 
Clark, shadow defence secretary, asked questions; Nicholas Soames, the Armed 
Forces Minister, admitted databases were kept on “service personnel suspected of 
breaching service law” and that the civilian police could request and receive 
information from them (18.1.1995 c.550W; c.551W).
 With Stonewall’s and Rank Outsiders’ support, four dischargees secured a 
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judicial review under the EU Equal Treatment Directive. The press focused on 
Labour’s intention to repeal the ban (Lansdale 22.4.1995; Malone/Routledge 
23.4.1995; Lawson 25.4.1995). The review reached the High Court in May. 
Jeanette Smith, Graeme Grady, Duncan Lustig-Prean and John Beckett sought 
restitution. The careers of four suspended RAF officers who had refused to resign 
their commissions also depended on the outcome (Rayment 15.5.1995). The 
hearing lasted five days. The appellants argued that the ban was based on 
prejudice and intolerance, was incompatible with human rights and a waste of 
training (Aston 15.5.1995; 16.5.1995). The MoD argued that the ban preserved 
morale, efficiency and security and was a matter for Parliament and the military 
(ibid 16.5.1995; 17.5.1995). The Court reserved judgement (ibid 19.5.1995). 
 While the judges considered the case, Lord Boardman sought Government 
assurance that exclusion of homosexuals would continue (23.5.1995 cc.913-5). 
He was told the Government had no plans for policy change, but was challenged 
by Lords who opposed the ban. The judges reported in June. Lord Justice Brown 
concluded that they “could not overturn the ban [but doubted the policy could] 
survive much longer” (Ward 8.6.1995). Mr Justice Curtis would have liked “more 
evidence of the harm recruiting homosexuals was supposed to cause” (Fairhall & 
Dyer 8.6.1995). They referred the matter to Parliament, but gave the appellants 
leave to appeal and did not award costs. 
 The MoD announced a policy review in September, a month before the 
appeal hearing. The hearing lasted three days. The arguments were restated. The 
judgement was reserved (Aston 11.10.1995). The judges reported in November. 
They declared the ban legal, but stated the policy was “ripe for review and [...] 
replacement by a strict conduct code” (Johnson 4.11.1995). The lack of MoD 
evidence was again noted. Nicholas Soames welcomed the judgement, but said 
the MoD review would continue (Ward 4.11.1995). The review was considered by 
the Select Committee for the 1995-6 Armed Forces Bill.
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 The Passage of the Bill
 As required every five years, the Bill’s purpose was to renew the Armed 
Forces Discipline Acts. At its second reading (HC 13.12.1995 cc.1024-1069), 
Nicholas Soames deferred discussion of the clauses until the Select Committee 
had considered them. Alan Howarth asked if he would be legislating to allow 
homosexuals to serve; Nicholas Soames did “not intend to go into that matter” 
(c.1025). Robert Key supported the ban. Menzies Campbell wanted the House to 
review it. Harry Cohen read out the High Court appellants’ service records and 
condemned the First Sea Lord’s call “for a campaign to retain the ban”; the MoD 
review was compromised by a lack of anonymity and came close to encouraging 
hostility towards serving homosexuals (c.1054). Andrew Hargreaves disagreed 
profoundly. Nicholas Soames consigned the review to the Committee.
 A leaked draft of the MoD review report reached the press in January. It 
suggested a ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ policy’ (Fowler 1.1.1996)⎯to the fury of forces 
chiefs (Rayment 1.1.1996). The MoD survey of serving personnel was reported to 
be “risible” (Toynbee 3.1.1996), involving group hands-up votes and leading 
questions such as “Would you be frightened of going to the aid of a bleeding 
comrade if you knew he was gay ?” (ibid). A leaked army report suggested “a code 
outlawing sexual harassment if [it was] forced to admit homosexuals” (Bowcott & 
Fairhall 13.1.1996). A later report, headlining the forces intended refusal to lift 
the ban (Rayment 23.1.1996) claimed forces personnel did “not want to work 
alongside gay comrades” and gratuitously reiterated leading questions from the 
survey such as “Do you find acts of homosexual and lesbian sex abhorrent? [and] 
Would you feel comfortable sleeping in the same room as a homosexual?”. By 
contrast Matthew Parris (29.1.1996) compared the statements of the UK forces 
chiefs on discipline, morale and combat efficiency to those of the US chiefs in 
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1949 when racially integrated military units were proposed. See McGhee (2001: 
29-36) for a fuller discussion of the MoD review and its implications.
 In February, the Evening Standard reported Michael Portillo, Secretary of 
State for Defence, had “heeded the warnings of defence chiefs and the results of 
a survey which found an overwhelming majority of officers and other ranks in 
favour of maintaining an outright ban” (Reiss 6.2.1996). Michael Brown asked 
when the MoD review would be published and for confirmation of the Evening 
Standard claim; Nicholas Soames said he had not received the report and had 
not read the article (HC 6.2.1996 c.123). The Guardian reported an MoD attempt 
“to influence reporting of the armed forces internal review document” (Johnson 
26.2.1996) and published extracts from a leaked plan suggesting its release be 
managed to give “an impression of open-mindedness and conclusions based on 
rational, practical management considerations” (quoted ibid). 
 Michael Portillo announced the MoD’s decision to retain the ban the day 
its review was published (3.3.1996). The Independent reported the biased survey 
and plans to take the case to the ECtHR (Brown 4.3.1996). The Sun headlined 
‘OUR BOYS DON’T LIKE IT UP ’EM!’ (5.3.1996). Amid a two page spread, the 
Mirror listed comments from the survey both for and against the ban (Bradshaw 
5.3.1996). Many of the former brooded violence. For example: “The first gay who 
came out would get attacked or shot.” (Sergeant, Guards); “If a homosexual was 
on board he would have an accident waiting for him when no-one was looking.” 
(Able Seaman, Royal Navy); “I would never serve in a unit where a known 
homosexual is serving. And I, like many others, would quite happily smash their 
faces in if I found any.” (Corporal, Royal Signals). Nicholas Soames was reported 
to be fighting to retain the ban (Mills 5.3.1996). 
 Later in March, evidence given to the Select Committee reached the press. 
The Guardian reported service chaplains and doctors were under pressure from 
commanding officers to inform on sexual orientation in breach of confidentiality, 
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although the MoD pointed out that doctors were within the chain of command 
(Fairhall 20.3.1996). The Independent focused on a wren who had been raped 
then blackmailed by her attacker. When she confided in an officer she was put 
under investigation (Bellamy 20.3.1996). 
 In April, the Independent reported that Labour MPs would have a free vote 
when the Bill reached its report stage in May, as Tony Blair was “unlikely to run 
directly counter to the strong hostility of the armed forces chiefs to lifting the 
ban” (MacIntyre 29.4.1996). The Select Committee report (published 7.5.1996) 
endorsed the ban. The Committee was persuaded by the MoD review and the 
fierce opposition to policy change. It accepted the view that homosexuals would 
undermine morale and operational efficiency, but was concerned about lapses in 
chaplains’ and doctors’ confidentiality. It recommended chaplains’ confidentiality 
be protected and personnel be told doctors’ confidentiality was not guaranteed 
(ibid: xiv). The report reveals robust questioning of MoD representatives and 
forces chiefs which confirmed the use of agents provocateurs in investigations 
and covert lack of anonymity in the survey questionnaires (ibid: 90-98). 
Stonewall’s evidence (ibid: 99-105) included: 
Immediately [the review] was announced, and indeed prior to its announcement, there were 
very, very strong statements from the Chiefs of Staff, and indeed from politicians, which 
stated the Ministry of Defence’s absolute determination to fight to keep the ban, and 
indeed we have included in our evidence letters from the Head of Army Personnel and 
Discipline, which state quite clearly that the Ministry of Defence [was] going to conduct a 
review to find justifications for keeping the ban. 
(Angela Mason, HC Special Report from the Armed Forces Select Committee 7.5.1996: 99)
Paul Schulte, head of the MoD review team, was recalled for further questioning 
about the survey (ibid: 109-110), which did no more than confirm its invalidity. 
 In response to the Committee’s decision, Edwina Currie, Michael Brown, 
Gerald Kauffman and Menzies Campbell, tabled a cross-party amendment which 
proposed a code of sexual conduct applicable to all. 
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 The Debate
 The debate was held two days after publication of the Select Committee 
report and lasted two hours (HC 9.5.96 cc481-512). Twenty-eight MPs spoke: 17 
made speeches, 12 in support of repeal (Appendix 35). Only three women spoke, 
all supported repeal. Many speeches were short; most were self-contained. 
Interaction was sparse. Only five speakers were challenged, only two repeatedly 
(John Reid and Nicholas Soames). Labour and Liberal Democrat MPs had a free 
vote; Conservatives were under a three-line whip. Even so, seven Conservatives 
supported it, four of whom made speeches. Eight Labour MPs voted against. The 
amendment was defeated by 188 to 120 votes. Only 308/651 MPs voted. Notable 
among the Labour absentees was Tony Blair. His absence on top of allowing a 
free vote, was seen as a betrayal of Labour policy (Rentoul 10.5.1996). 
 Edwina Currie introduced the amendment: part one proposed the code of 
conduct, part two that discrimination based on sexual orientation be outlawed. 
She argued the code of conduct would protect all personnel by stipulating that 
inappropriate behaviour would not be tolerated; the amendment’s supporters 
disapproved “profoundly of irresponsible behaviour” (c.482). Noting that military 
law treated other offences as discretionary, enabled her to say the amendment’s 
supporters viewed the ban as based on prejudice⎯which remained unattributed. 
She then related the resulting discrimination to cost: 
All discrimination is inefficient—which is one reason why I, as a Conservative, object to it. 
But this discrimination, in particular, costs the taxpayer a great deal of money. It has been 
worked out that each investigation takes approximately 30 working days, and longer in the 
case of officers. The costs of basic training, including salary and administration, have been 
estimated at £30,000, and training costs for officers who are dismissed are substantially 
higher. [...] Hundreds of trained men and women are discharged, yet we are told that the 
MOD is short of money. (c.482)
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She illustrated the point by reading out the exemplary service records of the High 
Court appellants who were taking their cases to the ECtHR. In emphasising that 
most countries in Europe, NATO and the UN had no such ban, she pointed out 
that British troops had no difficulty serving alongside those from other countries. 
This prompted Julian Brazier to refer her to the forces’ survey. Her response was 
robust. She cast the MoD’s reaction as “curious” (c.484). It had not conducted a 
survey on whether women should serve alongside men and Parliament had not 
pandered to prejudice on that issue; it had ensured the new rules were obeyed. 
She then gave examples of SIB (Special Investigations Branch) officers acting as 
agents provocateurs and surveillance tactics. Such activities were time-wasting 
and costly. The forces were out-of-step with social change. 
 It was a strong and comprehensive speech. Despite the self-containment 
of subsequent speeches, the concerns of amendment supporters were habitually 
linked to discrimination and prejudice, which threaded like an ‘ideological 
chain’ (Voloshinov 1986: 11) through their speeches. Yet no-one attributed 
prejudice or discrimination directly to the forces chiefs.
 Menzies Campbell hoped not to do the Select Committee an injustice by 
seeing nothing new in its analysis as reported: 
Perhaps that is inevitable, because the ground that we are considering is well traversed. 
The only correct way to approach such an issue is on the basis of principle. I believe firmly 
as a matter of principle that there should be no discrimination against any person by 
virtue of race, colour or sexual orientation. (c.485)
This oblique criticism avoided identification of those seeking discrimination. 
 Michael Brown directed his criticism at Nicholas Soames, for following the 
Committee’s recommendation: 
Prejudice is prejudice, whether it is racial or sexual, and prejudice is wrong. It must be 
outlawed. [...] I want the House of Commons always to be the place where discrimination 
and prejudice are outlawed, ... (c.487)
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The focus of his argument was the inevitability of an ECtHR judgment: 
I believe that the House of Commons should be the place to which those who suffer 
injustice and prejudice should come, but although I am a Euro-sceptic, I cannot blame 
those who cannot obtain justice from the House for exercising their right to go to the 
European Court and using the European convention. (c.487)
He paid tribute to the discharged men and women, and the numerous others 
quietly serving their country who were not yet “grassed up” (c.488) by the SIB. 
 Kevin McNamara referred to his 1986 amendment after the Cyprus spy 
trial. Past and present, his concern was the incongruity of civil and military law:
First, it was basically wrong that two individuals could be engaged in a sexual act that 
would be completely legal for one person, but for another it would be a disciplinary fault for 
which he would be dismissed from the armed forces. [...] Secondly, [...] There could be 
nothing worse than for members of the armed forces to risk their careers, and perhaps [...], 
put their country at risk for doing something which, [...], was accepted in civilian life. [...] 
Those two reasons seemed compelling then, and they remain compelling. (c.488)
He regretted the lack of a Labour whip on the vote.
 Gerald Kaufman pointed out that the Government was not bound by the 
Committee’s decision. His main criticism was directed at the Commons:
Last night, I was reading "Roads to Ruin: The Shocking History of Social Reform" by E. S. 
Turner. He has looked at rearguard actions against sensible and decent reform over the 
centuries. What emerges from that great book is that the kind of untenable, illogical and 
prejudiced arguments that have been advanced against new clause 1, which I have signed, 
were advanced about all other kinds of social reform on which we would regard it as 
ludicrous that they should even have been debated. (c.492)
The Commons was a House of “belated reform” (c.492). 
 Alan Howarth saw prejudice as the core issue:
It is not fitting to condone prejudice and injustice in the armed forces any more than it is 
elsewhere in society. It is clearly prejudice that we are discussing. Some of the world's 
greatest and most famous soldiers have been homosexual. [...] It would have been right for 
the Government to give the lead in seeking to undo the culture of prejudice within the 
armed services by banning discrimination on the ground of sexuality. Sadly, the 
Government have not chosen to do so. (c.494-5)
Andrew Rowe gave a hypothetical example:
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What sticks in my craw, as much as anything, is the thought that, if a man has served in 
the armed service for perhaps 10 years—he may well have been decorated and subjected to 
the most extraordinary perils—and if by some mischance he has an accident and as a 
result of consequent medical examination is discovered to be a homosexual, even though 
he may have lived 180 miles away from the base and there has never been a flicker of a 
suggestion of improper, indecent or offensive behaviour, and he has been a model of 
discipline, he will lose his job. His livelihood and everything else will be lost. All he has 
done for the nation will be thrown away by sheer mischance and the prejudice that exists 
within the armed services. It is not fair, it is entirely improper, and it flies in the face of the 
causes for which the armed services claim to stand. (c.495)
Tony Banks targeted the lack of anonymity imposed on the forces’ survey: 
How can we possibly accept that the survey is socially just or statistically admissible?
It is no good saying that we will allow prejudice to determine policy. That is precisely what 
this is all about—not wanting homosexuals in the Army. [...] We should not abrogate our 
power and responsibility to the British people, because those who are prejudiced say that 
they do not want any change in the way in which we organise the armed forces. We cannot 
accept that survey as acceptable on any terms. (c.496)
Harry Cohen based his speech on an interview with a gay WWII veteran: 
There was no such discrimination in the second world war. According to statistics, at least 
250,000 homosexuals served in the British forces during that war. One of those was a Mr. 
Dudley Cave, now aged 75. He was quoted in The Guardian yesterday, and I shall just read 
a little bit of the article: [...] Contrary to the current fears of the generals, during the war 
there was no evidence that homosexual soldiers undermined unit cohesion: ‘All the gays 
and straights worked together as a team. We had to because our lives might have depended 
on it’. If that discrimination was unacceptable in wartime, it is unacceptable in peacetime 
as well, and I say that the ban should go. (c.497)
In citing the generals, he avoided attribution of discrimination by use of fears. 
 Clive Betts argued the case of his constituent, John Beckett: 
The House should know that John Beckett has not committed any crime—he has simply 
offended against bigotry and prejudice, and those who hold those views. The Select 
Committee has collected many pages of evidence, but, however many pages it collects, it 
cannot prove that bigotry and prejudice are right. (c.498)
If the amendment was not passed, the House would be guilty of preventing John 
Beckett and others from serving their country simply because of their sexuality. 
 The final pro-repeal speakers appealed to the Minister. Nigel Spearing was 
shocked by the Select Committee report. He wanted use of agent provocateurs 
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reviewed and chaplains’ duty of confidentiality protected. He hoped the Minister 
would explain why a code of conduct was unacceptable. Tony Banks pointed out 
that the Minister was “not even listening” (c.499). Gordon Prentice hoped the 
Minister would note Australia’s experience, where the chiefs of staff had opposed 
their ban being lifted but, after an initial outcry, it had become a non-issue. The 
parallel with Australia circumvented a focus on UK forces chiefs. 
 Speakers supporting repeal concurred in their views of the ban’s effects, 
the MoD review, and the Select Committee report. This is in contrast to the five 
MPs who made speeches opposing repeal, two of whom (Robert Key and John 
Reid) were at odds with their adopted position.
 John Wilkinson and Peter Viggers were both ex-military and resolutely 
supported the Select Committee recommendation. John Wilkinson justified the 
decision by invoking members of the armed forces who believed homosexuality 
was incompatible with forces life. With dismissive reference to the Maastricht 
Treaty, he argued that disciplinary decisions in the armed forces should rest 
with member states. Peter Viggars had chaired the Select Committee and wished 
to assure the House of “the care and concern” (c.496) it had put into considering 
the issue. In view of the forces’ overwhelming support for the status quo, he was 
confident the Committee had made the right decision. 
 Robert Key had sat on the Select Committee, put his name to its report 
and was voting against the amendment, but spoke largely in support of repeal. 
He outlined his experience of interviewing forces personnel:
We, the members of the Committee, talked to service men and women on and off duty in 
England, Northern Ireland and Germany. Initially, I thought that it was a put-up job. I 
thought that all the people lined up for us to speak to must have been hand-picked and 




I came to realise that, in the British armed forces, there is a deep and genuine conviction 
that homosexuals have no place in service life. (c.493)
He feared change would “be forced on the services too fast [and would] need a 
massive change of culture” (ibid). He had much sympathy with the amendment, 
but it was “not the time to press it” (c.494). His citing of evidence given to the 
Committee in support of lesbian and gay personnel, prompted Lynn Jones to 
suggest he support repeal. She asked for evidence that homosexuals were “more 
likely than heterosexuals to behave in an improper fashion”. He replied “there is 
no such evidence” (ibid) and went on to criticise both the chaplains’ breaching of 
confidentiality and the SIB’s surveillance tactics. This modifies his support for 
the ban at the Bill’s second reading (13.12.1995 c.1048) and suggests evidence 
given in Committee had changed his view.
 John Reid too had sat on the Committee and was in an awkward position, 
as noted by his challengers. Having for years supported repeal, he argued against 
it. He presented the issue as a clash between principle and practical problems⎯a 
balance between civil rights and military imperatives. He could speak only for the 
Labour members of the Committee whose approach to the problem had three 
premises: no moral judgments, a focus on practicality, and consideration of the 
armed forces. In qualifying these premises he highlighted prejudice:
On the basis of those premises, when we cut through the fog, the propaganda and the 
prejudice, three essential questions remain. First, would allowing homosexuals openly to 
join the armed forces tend to weaken operational effectiveness? Secondly, would it be 
possible in the imposed social intimacy of the armed forces to guarantee the right to 
privacy of the sexual preference of homosexuals and the right to privacy of heterosexuals? 
Thirdly, is there an obvious compromise that might satisfy both sides? (c.501)
This tri-partite formula was extended to operational effectiveness. He argued the 
fighting power of a force depended on strategy, resources and morale. It was the 
latter that was likely to be undermined by a special relationship between staff, 
especially if it was romantic or sexual. Edwina Currie reminded him that people 
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were discharged regardless of any relationship. George Galloway sympathised 
with his difficult brief, which suggests he had been asked to defend the ban. 
Andrew Bowden saw him as “indulging in disgraceful weasel words [and trying] 
to stand on both sides of the fence at the same time” (c.503). The reply was first, 
Labour had a free vote and second, he did not underestimate the civil-liberties 
arguments, but balancing homosexual and heterosexual rights to privacy was an 
“intractable conflict” (ibid). Peter Snape, another Labour Committee member, felt 
the forces’ views deserved “better consideration than being denounced as mere 
homophobia” (ibid). John Reid agreed, but qualified: 
Individuals have a range of feelings that are often difficult to classify because they range 
from irrational prejudices to moral perceptions. Sometimes, that distinction is not made, 
although I must say to my hon. Friend, who has been helpful, that there are hon. Members 
who will be in the same Division Lobby as me tonight who sometimes seem incapable of 
presenting a logical argument because they are blinded with prejudice. (c.503)
He emphasised, the Labour members’ decision “was not taken lightly or without 
agonising” (c.504). Michael Brown fully understood “the particular responsibility” 
of John Reid’s position (ibid), but the country needed to know what Labour would 
do with a ECtHR judgment. He replied, “we have not argued that the position will 
never change” (ibid). George Howarth asked, if the clause was defeated, whether 
the armed services should be persuaded not to “peddle prejudice as an excuse 
for excluding people” (ibid). John Reid replied that portraying the armed forces 
“as a bunch of redneck, thick-skulled bigots” was no way to advocate the case for 
change (ibid). He then acknowledged that George Howarth was not doing that, 
which suggests he was interjecting his own view. He concluded that there was no 
easy answer (c.505). Yet in defending the ban he exposed the force of prejudice 
behind the resistance to change.
 Nicholas Soames, was committed to defending the ban and presented the 
decision as a practical assessment rather than a moral judgment. Tony Banks 
asked if he was aware that there were many homosexuals in the forces at that 
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time. In reply, he acknowledged the fact, but said he would deal with it later. On 
the ECtHR case, he believed the Government’s decision was right and would be 
defended in any court. Robert Maclennan asked if the Government had consulted 
other Governments. The answer was yes, but that he would deal with that later. 
On cost to taxpayers, he suggested the figures “bandied about” were uncertain 
and that change would affect recruitment and retention bringing “considerable 
cost penalties” (c.506). On agents provocateurs, he said service police were not 
allowed to engage in such activity and he would not tolerate it. Terrence Higgins 
asked if it was a sensible use of resources to identify homosexuals who wanted to 
keep it to themselves. Nicholas Soames agreed, but argued:
While a new code of conduct might appear to be symmetrical in its effect on heterosexuals 
and homosexuals, it would not solve the problem of anticipated loss of cohesion or 
operational effectiveness caused by the knowledge or strong suspicion of the sexual 
identity of homosexual personnel. We do not believe that a code of conduct, no matter how 
rigorously enforced, would adequately address the issues of privacy or decency and it 
would not be possible or desirable to provide separate facilities for homosexuals and 
heterosexuals. (c.507)
Eddie Loyden, who had fought in WWII, pointed out:
There was no discrimination then. I was in no fewer than seven troop ships carrying men 
and women to the four corners of the globe to fight on behalf of the nation. There were no 
questions about homosexuality then. What the Government are saying is the height of 
hypocrisy. If there was a war tomorrow, there would be no discrimination against 
homosexuals or lesbians. They would be dragged in just as they were in 1939. (c.507)
Nicholas Soames called this intervention a “splendid sally” and turned to 
comparisons with other countries, which he did not see as relevant to Britain. 
Nor did he see comparisons to race and sex discrimination as relevant because of 
the “insoluble problems of decency and privacy” (c.508). He refused all further 
requests to give way and moved on to the High Court recommendation of a policy 
review. Both the Select Committee and Government had accepted the review’s 
recommendation of no change. It was his duty to maintain the effectiveness of 
the armed forces and he urged the House to reject the amendment.
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 Edwina Currie thanked MPs for their cross-party support and stressed 
she would rather the House repealed the ban. The vote was followed by the Bill’s 
third reading (cc.512-21) which included views on an ECtHR judgment. Amidst 
recriminations, the next days’ papers had Tony Blair supporting the ban’s repeal 
in principle, but arguing it had to follow careful negotiations with the military 
chiefs (Shaw 10.5.1996; White 11.5.1996). However, it was the ECtHR judgments 
(27.9.1999: Smith & Grady v UK; Lustig-Prean & Beckett v UK) that finally got 
the ban lifted (HC 12.1.2000 cc.287-301) and replaced by a code of conduct. Yet, 
while this enabled lesbians and gay men to serve, McGhee (2001: 45-52) shows 
that the code of conduct was premised on passing as heterosexual.
 Words and Themes
 The following analyses focus on each side’s top-ten keywords (Appendices 
39 & 40) and their collocates (Appendices 41 & 42). Core features of each side’s 
contributions to the debate are shown on Flowcharts 5 and 6 below. 
*       *       *
 On Flowchart 5, the pro-repeal keyword WHO is pivotal. It refers mainly to 
forces personnel or people blocking repeal, as do most keywords (Appendix 40) 
and collocates (Appendix 42) on the chart. 
 The lines for WHO (Appendix 43) show that it refers specifically to:
 serving forces personnel (8 lines)                                      Michael Portillo (2 lines)
 people opposing reform/the new clause (8 lines)             ‘Who knows?’ (2 lines) 
 the High Court/ECtHR appellants (6 lines)                       an Israeli serviceman (1 line)
 SIB investigated/dismissed personnel (4 lines)                anyone who studies Hansard (1 line)
 supporters of reform/the new clause (4 lines)                 Australian chiefs of staff (1 line)
 MoD survey participants (3 lines)                                   men who go cottaging (1 line)
 MPs in general (3 lines)                                                     not only nice girls who love a sailor (1 line)
 SIB investigators (3 lines)                                               Robert Key (1 line)
 heterosexual soldiers dismissed for murder (2 lines)        troops from other NATO countries (1 line)
 John Wilkinson (2 lines)
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Flowchart 5: Pro-repeal Keyword and Collocate Network
key: BOLD CAPITALS: keywords in the top ten
 BLACK CAPITALS: keywords
 RED CAPITALS: sexuality-term keywords and keywords collocating with sexuality terms
 black lower case: keyword collocates






















Twenty-six lines refer to UK forces personnel. These include serving personnel:
1 e of living soldiers, men and women  who  are serving in the armed forces right no          EC 9.5.pro.txt
2  would protect those in junior ranks  who  might be at risk of sexual harassment. I          EC 9.5.pro.txt
19 undreds of service men and women  who  the special investigations branch have n         MB 9.5.pro.txt
20 e are gay people in the armed forces  who  have not yet been grassed up by the spe         MB 9.5.pro.txt
32 d forces, not those homosexual men  who  loyally serve their country and are ready          TB 9.5.pro.txt
37  alienate those gay men and women  who  have loyally served, and will continue so          TB 9.5.pro.txt
51 nt use of resources to identify those  who  are homosexual and who, in his own wo          TH 9.5.pro.txt
52 tify those who are  homosexual and  who,  in his own words, wish to keep it to the          TH 9.5.pro.txt
the High Court appellants:
4 consider the cases of several people  who  are currently taking the MOD to the Eur          EC 9.5.pro.txt
5 ntious and hardworking tradesman  who  could be relied on to achieve the highest          EC 9.5.pro.txt
17  should be the place to which those  who  suffer injustice and prejudice should co         MB 9.5.pro.txt
18  Euro-sceptic, I cannot blame those  who  cannot obtain justice from the House for         MB 9.5.pro.txt
40           John Beckett is a young man  who  had an exemplary record, to which the           CB 9.5.pro.txt
41 as an honest and open young man,  who  was concerned about the situation and           CB 9.5.pro.txt
investigated and dismissed personnel:
3 ,000, and training costs for officers  who  are dismissed are substantially higher.           EC 9.5.pro.txt
9 IB men making approaches to men  who  were of service appearance and attempti          EC 9.5.pro.txt
10   In 1995, four RAF officers  who  had been anonymously informed on wer          EC 9.5.pro.txt
13 ations. They are degrading for those  who  are the subject of them and, I suspect, p         MC 9.5.pro.txt
MoD survey participants:
33 at no anonymity was given to those  who  were questioned. Who will come forward          TB 9.5.pro.txt
34 given to those who were questioned.  Who  will come forward and say that they thi          TB 9.5.pro.txt
35  the armed forces? Even if a person  who  did so was heterosexual, one could imag          TB 9.5.pro.txt
and SIB investigators:
8 d in a gay pub in Torquay by a man  who  later invited him home. Upon leaving th          EC 9.5.pro.txt
14  suspect, pretty degrading for those  who  have to carry them out. That type of inv         MC 9.5.pro.txt
42  it was as humiliating to the person  who  conducted it as it was to John Beckett,           CB 9.5.pro.txt
In these lines, WHO occurs in defining relative clauses. Only the High Court 
appellants are named in the co-text, although the reports of SIB investigations 
are specified by time, place and sometimes rank. The personnel are otherwise 
generalised. In the case of serving lesbian and gay personnel, anonymity was 
important, even had MPs known who they were. Thus the generalisation was not 
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a strategy to “influence socially shared beliefs” (van Dijk 2006c: 370). The above 
examples are supplemented in lines for WAS and HE, which are more specific.
 In total, 70/75 lines for WAS (Appendix 43) occur in reports, 26 concern 
gay forces personnel. These include the High Court appellants’ service records:
2 n Lustig-Prean enlisted in 1983 and  was  discharged in 1994. The officer's report           EC 9.5.pro.txt
3 of 31 December 1993 stated that he  was  A most able, conscientious and industri          EC 9.5.pro.txt
4 erbyshire. She enlisted in 1989 and  was  discharged in 1994. Her discharge repor          EC 9.5.pro.txt
5 lishments", yet that qualified nurse  was  dismissed.             EC 9.5.pro.txt
6 John Beckett, from the Royal Navy,  was  a weapons engineer mechanic serving o          EC 9.5.pro.txt
7 e enlisted for 22 years in 1989 and  was  discharged in September 1993. Sir Mich          EC 9.5.pro.txt
8 nnel, said of him: We accept that he  was  a loyal and patriotic man and that he ha          EC 9.5.pro.txt
9 oyal Air Force, enlisted in 1980 and  was  discharged in 1984. His squadron leader          EC 9.5.pro.txt
SIB investigations:
15  weeks ago—a former Royal Marine  was  approached in a gay pub in Torquay by           EC 9.5.pro.txt
16  Former Able Seaman Brett Burnell  was  investigated after being photographed en          EC 9.5.pro.txt
17  ed entering the pub by the SIB. He  was  shown the photos and has been dischar          EC 9.5.pro.txt
18 at the evidence from that operation  was  the justification for discharge.           EC 9.5.pro.txt
and details of John BECKETT’s case which account for 12 lines (49-60):
 There is a similar pattern in the lines for HE (Appendix 43) which refers to:
 John Beckett (20 lines)                  a hypothetical gay soldier (7 lines)         Michael Portillo (2 lines)
 Nicholas Soames (13 lines)            men under SIB investigation (5 lines)     an Israeli soldier (1 line)
 John Reid (9 lines)                        the late Lord Joseph (3 lines)                 Dudley Cave (1 line)
 a High Court appellant (8 lines)     John Wilkinson (2 lines)                         E. S. Turner (1 line)
In total 40/72 lines concern UK forces personnel. In addition to John BECKETT’s 
case (lines 36-55), these include: the High Court appellants’ service records:
1 y, of 31 December 1993 stated that  he  was A most able, conscientious and indus          EC 9.5.pro.txt
2 esourceful, versatile and perceptive,  he  is a most effective manager and organiser           EC 9.5.pro.txt
3 ort … has great all round potential.  He  is an outstanding prospect for early prom          EC 9.5.pro.txt
4 hanic serving on HMS Collingwood.  He  enlisted for 22 years in 1989 and was dis          EC 9.5.pro.txt
5 rsonnel, said of him: We accept that  he  was a loyal and patriotic man and that he          EC 9.5.pro.txt
6 s a loyal and patriotic man and that  he  has not committed a civilian or naval disc          EC 9.5.pro.txt
7 n to achieve the highest standards.  He  has displayed sound personal qualities a          EC 9.5.pro.txt
8 riors, peers and subordinates alike.  He  was recommended to any future employer          EC 9.5.pro.txt
hypothetical examples of a gay soldier’s position:
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25 uld be a disciplinary fault for which  he  would be dismissed from the armed force         KM 9.5.pro.txt
28 rmed service for perhaps 10 years— he  may well have been decorated and subject         AR 9.5.pro.txt
29 ry perils—and if by some mischance  he  has an accident and as a result of conseq          AR 9.5.pro.txt
30 ed to be a homosexual, even though  he  may have lived 180 miles away from the b          AR 9.5.pro.txt
31 ndecent or offensive behaviour, and  he  has been a model of discipline, he will los          AR 9.5.pro.txt
32 d he has been a model of discipline,  he  will lose his job. His livelihood and everyt          AR 9.5.pro.txt
33  and everything else will be lost. All  he  has done for the nation will be thrown aw          AR 9.5.pro.txt
and reports of SIB investigation tactics:
11  card and tried to arrest the person.  He  obviously did not know that the chap had          EC 9.5.pro.txt
12 wn cruising area by two men whom  he  knew were members of the Army special i          EC 9.5.pro.txt
13  Army special investigation branch.  He  knew that because they had conducted hi          EC 9.5.pro.txt
14 e time previously. During the visits  he  observed the SIB men making approaches          EC 9.5.pro.txt
15 raphed entering the pub by the SIB.  He was shown the photos and has been disch          EC 9.5.pro.txt
These lines for WHO, WAS and HE show the pro-repeal focus was mostly on the 
situation of gay men in the military. Passive structures pepper the lines:
 who might be at risk of                  who are the subject of them           was investigated
 who have not yet been                  who were questioned                     he was shown 
 who suffer injustice                       was discharged                             he was recommended
 who are dismissed                        was dismissed                              he would be dismissed
 who had been informed on           was approached                            he may have been decorated
These structures place the personnel at the receiving end of others actions, while 
the reports offer illustrative details. The High Court appellants’ service records 
are reported authoritatively in ‘linear style’ (Voloshinov 1986: 120), plus reports 
of SIB investigations are authentically specific with little ‘pictorial infiltration’ 
(ibid). Andrew Rowe’s hypothetical example is more emotive. However, whether 
reported or argued, the clarity of detail places the injustice of the BAN high on 
speakers social hierarchy of values (ibid: 123). 
 A further 12 lines for WHO refer to people opposing the BAN’s repeal:
21 es sense is being proposed by those  who  are trying to prevent what is inevitably g         GK 9.5.pro.txt
26 elieve, surely the logic is that those  who  oppose the new clause are prejudiced.           LJ 9.5.pro.txt
29 enness of the arguments from those  who  oppose the new clause shows that up. T          TB 9.5.pro.txt
30 e new clause shows that up. Those  who  oppose it are scraping the barrel. They s          TB 9.5.pro.txt
36 to the British people, because those  who  are prejudiced say that they do not want         TB 9.5.pro.txt
43 st bigotry and prejudice, and those  who  hold those views. The Select Committee           CB 9.5.pro.txt
50  that have been referred to by those  who  oppose the amendment?           RM 9.5.pro.txt
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and to specific anti-repeal MPs:
15 d the Secretary of State for Defence,  who  I regret is unable to be here today, will h         MB 9.5.pro.txt
16 inister. Perhaps he will ask himself,  "Who  made such an excellent job of my dirty          MB 9.5.pro.txt
38 Ruislip-Northwood (Mr. Wilkinson),  who  was concerned about the threat of black          CB 9.5.pro.txt
39 on. Member for Salisbury (Mr. Key),  who  was concerned about the threat of victi          CB 9.5.pro.txt
47 on. Member for Ruislip-Northwood— who  I believe was himself an officer in Her M          NS 9.5.pro.txt
The references to specific MPs occur in non-defining clauses. Except for Michael 
Brown’s satirical references to Michael Portillo, criticisms are distanced in the co-
text. The non-specific referents occur in defining clauses. This enabled speakers 
to attribute them with blocking reform, prejudice, barren arguments, scraping 
the barrel, bigotry, and putting up barriers of difficulty if the BAN was repealed. 
Notably, these criticisms of ‘obscured actors’ (Baker 2006: 165-6) exclude even 
indirect reference to the role of the military chiefs.
 Criticisms also occur in the lines for WAS and HE. Those for WAS occur in 
comparisons with the lack of discrimination in WWII:
42        There  was  no such discrimination in the second wo          HC 9.5.pro.txt
43 orces during that war. One of those  was  a Mr. Dudley Cave, now aged 75. He was          HC 9.5.pro.txt
44  Mr. Dudley Cave, now aged 75. He  was  quoted in The Guardian yesterday, and I          HC 9.5.pro.txt
45 f the generals, during the war there  was  no evidence that homosexual soldiers u          HC 9.5.pro.txt
46 pended on it'. If that discrimination  was  unacceptable in wartime, it is unaccepta          HC 9.5.pro.txt
65 ve had ideas or suspicions, but that  was  as far as it went. It was what they did th          NS 9.5.pro.txt
66 ns, but that was as far as it went. It  was  what they did that counted, and I knew           NS 9.5.pro.txt
67 s under a misapprehension. When I  was  commissioned, we were given a number           NS 9.5.pro.txt
68 f his late Majesty George VI, so this  was  some time ago. We were lectured about           NS 9.5.pro.txt
69              That code  was  fairly clear. Surely, in the end, it is code          NS 9.5.pro.txt
73 hole of the second world war. There  was  no discrimination then. I was in no fewe          EL 9.5.pro.txt
74 There was no discrimination then. I  was  in no fewer than seven troop ships carry          EL 9.5.pro.txt
plus the inadequacy of the MoD evidence and Select Committee decision:
19               The issue  was  considered by the Select Committee on t         MC 9.5.pro.txt
21 rrent policy. That recommendation  was  based primarily on the report that was c         MB 9.5.pro.txt
22 s based primarily on the report that  was  commissioned by the MOD last year and         MB 9.5.pro.txt
33 ent are bound by it. I only wish that  was  so in the case of the Select Committee o          GK 9.5.pro.txt
40      I understand that no anonymity  was  given to those who were questioned. Wh          TB 9.5.pro.txt
41  forces? Even if a person who did so  was  heterosexual, one could imagine what w          TB 9.5.pro.txt
63                I  was  rather shocked by the Select Committee'          NS 9.5.pro.txt
64 that evidence, the Select Committee  was  particularly convincing.           NS 9.5.pro.txt
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The comparisons with WWII displace attributions of discrimination by focusing 
on ‘then’ rather than ‘now’, while criticisms of the Select Committee and MoD are 
muted or personalised. Criticisms in the lines for HE refer to Nicholas Soames:
10 n the amount of wise-cracking that  he  has been indulging in this evening, perha          EC 9.5.pro.txt
16 e fairness and courtesy with which  he  has received my representations on behalf         MB 9.5.pro.txt
17 e past year. However, I believe that  he  will invite the House to reject the new cla         MB 9.5.pro.txt
22 een promoted to Secretary of State,  he  will be required to stand at the Dispatch          MB 9.5.pro.txt
23 the special investigations branch. If  he  cannot do so tonight, I believe that one da         MB 9.5.pro.txt
24 ute to him for the manner in which  he  has always received the delegations that I          MB 9.5.pro.txt
57 on agents provocateurs. I hope that  he  will make it clear that the Government ac          NS 9.5.pro.txt
58     He  is not even listening.             TB 9.5.pro.txt
59            I hope that  he  will listen. I hope that administrative actio          NS 9.5.pro.txt
60 pe that the Minister will tell us why  he  cannot accept new subsection (1)—if not           NS 9.5.pro.txt
61 ow, at a later stage—rewording it as  he  wishes, but concentrating on responsible           NS 9.5.pro.txt
62 hen the Minister replies, I hope that  he  will touch on the report of the homosexua          GP 9.5.pro.txt
72 xuals within the armed forces now?  He  must know that to be a fact. How is that           TB 9.5.pro.txt
John Reid:
63 nd in his difficult job with his brief.  He  must be aware of the inherent and enorm         GG 9.5.pro.txt
64 ormous contradiction between what  he  is saying and the obvious fact that it is po         GG 9.5.pro.txt
65 riend another contradiction in case  he  is not aware of it. I shall put to him a fant         GG 9.5.pro.txt
66 ulging in disgraceful weasel words.  He  has tried to stand on both sides of the fen          AB 9.5.pro.txt
67  sides of the fence at the same time.  He  represents the Opposition Front-Bench te          AB 9.5.pro.txt
68  an's position, the more so because  he  aspires to occupy the Treasury Bench, bu         MB 9.5.pro.txt
69 iend tonight and disagree with what  he  says, I respect the way in which he is putt        GH 9.5.pro.txt
70  he says, I respect the way in which  he  is putting his argument. On returning to t         GH 9.5.pro.txt
71 turning to the issue in future, does  he  agree that, if the new clause is defeated to         GH 9.5.pro.txt
and John Wilkinson:
26 espect for him, but the speech that  he  made just now is the kind of speech, on s          GK 9.5.pro.txt
34 n showed no compassion. In effect,  he  said that it was too late. We have been tol          TB 9.5.pro.txt
These criticisms are more direct, notably of John Reid. MPs knew he was arguing 
against his convictions to protect Blair’s electability. This also accounts for the 
absence of many Labour MPs when the Government was nearly without majority. 
*       *       *
 On Flowchart 6, the top-ten anti-repeal keywords (Appendix 39) have very 
few collocates (Appendix 41). The upper part of the chart relates to the claimed 
effects of the ban’s repeal, the lower part to justifying the ban.
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Flowchart 6: Anti-repeal Keyword and Collocate Network
key: BOLD CAPITALS: keywords in the top ten
 BLACK CAPITALS: keywords
 RED CAPITALS: sexuality-term keywords and keywords collocating with sexuality terms
 black lower case: keyword collocates















 The top anti-repeal keyword, EFFECTIVENESS, collocates reciprocally with 
OPERATIONAL. The co-text preceding OPERATIONAL (Appendix 44) reveals loss of 
OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS was the main reason given for retaining the ban: 
 threat to discipline      if they are diminished     reduction in               a detrimental effect on 
 undermining               destroy                            maintenance of          professional judgments about
 securing maximum     would weaken                 anticipated loss of     sets aside 
 tend to weaken           preserve                          be maintained at       to maintain the
 the question of            concerns about                would also affect      
No evidence was offered to support this view, nor was it straightforwardly that of 
the speakers. For example, Robert Key’s report of the Select Committee’s visit to 
see multinational troops in Bosnia distances him from the belief: 
In none of those forces did the nationals concerned believe that there was any threat to 
discipline, to undermining of command relationships or operational effectiveness on the 
battlefield because of the presence of homosexuals. There was no suggestion in the British 
forces that in NATO British troops would not accept orders from those who might be 
homosexuals in other forces, or would refuse to serve alongside them. 
I have much sympathy for the terms of the new clause. (c.493) 
Similarly, John Reid’s concession modifies his stance: 
However, it is honourable and legitimate to say that the weight of the civil liberties 
argument is sufficiently great to overcome both the operational reduction in effectiveness 
and the case for privacy for heterosexuals. There is nothing dishonourable in making that 
balance and in arriving at a judgment that is different from mine, but the Labour Members 
of the Select Committee were not persuaded that that change was necessary. 
I say again, however, that the decision was on balance. (c.503-4) 
In addition, the co-text preceding Nicholas Soames’ lines shows the feared loss of 
OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS was attributed, directly or indirectly, to others: 
 the prime concern of the armed forces (line 10)     the assessment team’s detailed report (line 13)
 the problem of anticipated loss of (line 11)           the majority of service men and women (line 14)
 the assessment team concluded that (line 12)      If collective professional judgments about (line 15)
The extent to which he saw the armed forces’ view as more authoritative, or was 
distancing himself from the claim is unclear, though his first line does subtly 
differentiate Government policy from the feared loss:
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The current policy of excluding homosexuals from the armed forces is not—I repeat, not—
the result of a moral judgment. The prime concern of the armed forces is the maintenance 
of operational effectiveness and our policy derives from a practical assessment of the 
implications of homosexual orientation on military life. (c.505)
The same feared loss is evident in the co-text of COHESION (Appendix 44A):
 diminished               which damage               would affect the                      and disrupt unit
 undermine that        anticipated loss of          adverse effect on morale        put at risk the
However, distancing is evident only in Nicholas Soames’ use of apparent:
These are not simple, since they summon up an apparent conflict between individual 
rights and wishes—which none of us lightly sets aside—and the moral cohesion, 
effectiveness and fighting power of the armed forces. (c.509)
His use of moral here could be a typo for morale (as in line 6). 
 The lower half of Flowchart 6 follows a similar pattern. In the lines for 
MILITARY (Appendix 44) not wanting ‘homosexuals’ is attributed to: 
 serving personnel (line 1)                                     the need for morale (lines 10-12)
 military constituents and their families (line 2)      practical problems (line 14) 
 the military ethos (line 3)                                      practical assessment of the implications (line 15)
 the chain of command (line 4)                               the MoD review (line 18)
 the MoD (line 5)                                                   MoD policy (line 19)
 military imperatives (line 6)                                  the wishes of the military (line 20-21)
 conditions of military life (lines 7-9, 13, 16-17)     service men and women (line 22)
Robert Key’s report is clearly critical:
As a former military chaplain told the Church Times recently, those who have been 
offended by the practice of “outing” prominent people should remember that the Ministry of 
Defence has been doing it to its personnel for years. That is not something of which anyone 
can be proud. (c.494)
John Reid’s concession clearly distances: 
I do not underestimate the weight of the arguments that have been advanced tonight 
because no liberty held to be precious in civilian society can be negated in the military as a 
matter of course or without justification. Prejudice is no ground on its own for the 
continuation of past practice, but nor can practical problems be wished away. (c.502)
The exact nature of the practical problems is debatable. 
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 The attributions of agency in the lines for CHANGE (Appendix 44) vary as 
to whether the agents want it or not and whether it has past or future reference:
 NO CHANGE  POSSIBLE CHANGE  PAST CHANGE  WANTING CHANGE
 members of the armed 
 forces (lines 1-2 JW)
 the Select Committee 
 (lines 8 JR/15 NS)
 the MoD review team 
 (lines 13-14 NS)
 the courts (line 3 RK)
 equalisation supporters 
 (line 4 RK)
 no agent (lines 5-6 RK)
 the Government 
 (line 7 JR)
 the next Parliament 
 (line 9 JR)
 the Government 
 (lines 10-11 NS)
 the amendment’s proposers 
 (line 12 NS)
 those who gave evidence to 
 the Select Committee 
 (line 16 NS)
 those who steamroller aside  
 the wishes of the military 
 (line 17 NS)
The attributions to agents not wanting CHANGE are straightforward, but those to 
agents of possible CHANGE were referred to only by Robert Key and John Reid, 
which concurs with their doubts about the ban. In Robert Key’s references to 
CHANGE within the MILITARY, the agent of CHANGE is obscured: 
Change will come slowly when it comes. It will need a massive change of culture, and a 
massive re-education programme in the armed forces. (c.493)
and is only tenuously attributed to Labour by John Reid:
We have not argued that the position will never change. It will obviously be reviewed again 
during the next Parliament. (c.504)
while Nicholas Soames became more assertive towards the end of his speech:
The team recommended that there should be no change in current policy. My Department 
has accepted that recommendation and, as I said earlier, the Select Committee, after much 
careful deliberation, agreed that there should be no change in the policy. (c.508)
and resorted to diminishing those seeking change:
In the face of all the evidence presented by my Department, of substantial submissions 
both oral and written from those who wished to change the policy, and also of the evidence 
that it gathered privately, the Select Committee concluded that the policy should continue.
[...]
The not so hidden agenda of those who want to change Ministry of Defence policy is to 
steamroller aside the judgments, experience and wishes of the military. (c.509)
‘Steamrollering aside’ better fits Nicholas Soames’ dismissal of all those who gave 
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evidence to the Select Committee on behalf of lesbians and gay men, plus the 
views of the High Court judges and supporters of CHANGE in Parliament. It thus 
constitutes a case of reversal (Wodak 2003: 134).
 The MILITARY view is more directly represented in John Wilkinson’s lines 
for VALUES (Appendix 44) which link to the MILITARY not wanting homosexuals:
 appropriate values             family values                                particular standards and values
 those values                      traditions, values, history             a pattern of values
VALUES here reads as a euphemism for, and disclamation of, homophobia: 
We recommended also that homosexual behaviour was not compatible with remaining in 
the armed forces, because members of them did not want any change. After all, they are 
the best judges of the appropriate values for the organisations in which they serve. Those 
values may not seem to us identical to those that we normally share, but the profession of 
arms is a calling distinct from civilian life. Although those values may appear a bit 
traditional, for those who serve in the armed forces they are greatly appreciated. (c.489)
This suggests he was keen to present the MILITARY view in an ‘acceptable’ way 
and is supported by his uses of MAY which lend caution to his presentation.
 The keyword is MAY brings indefiniteness to the anti-repeal statements. 
Indefiniteness is also evident in the five uses of SOMETIMES and in other modal 
verbs (would, might, could) preceding NOT (Appendix 44B), which is pivotal in the 
lower half of Flowchart 6. In addition, MAY is followed by a stative verb or verb 
with stative function in 17/24 lines:
 be (8 lines)             seem (2 lines)            feel (1 line)             offend (1 line) 
 like (2 lines)           appear (1 line)           have (1 line)           recall (1 line)
as is NOT in 24/91 lines:
 be (7 lines)                 believe (2 lines)             have (1 line)                 think (1 line)
 want (4 lines)             agree (1 line)                 pretend (1 line)             tolerate (1 trust)
 like (3 lines)               consider (1 line)             seem (1 line)                trust (1 line)
These verbs bring an element of subjectivity to the lines for MAY and NOT. While 
there is no consistency among the agents or objects of the verbs, the combination 
219
of indefiniteness and subjectivity compounds the lack of evidence for the feared 
loss of OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS. 
 Although the keyword PRIVACY (Appendix 39) has no collocate links to 
Flowchart 6, it requires explanation. In their evidence to the Select Committee, 
Stonewall argued for a right of privacy on behalf of lesbian and gay personnel. 
This was extended to heterosexual privacy by John Reid and Nicholas Soames in 
opposing repeal. John Reid presented privacy as a right in 5/8 lines (Appendix 
44) and as the case for in another. The other two lines quote a woman soldier:
Dr Reid, even in the imposed social intimacy of the Army, you and your colleagues at 
Westminster would defend my right to refuse to share the most intimate experiences of 
sleeping, sharing and bathing with a man. You would do that not because you assume evil 
intention on the part of the man, but because it offends my sensibilities as a woman, 
because it may offend my sense of privacy or decency or because I may feel that I am the 
object of inquisitive sexual observation by the man, but all the reasons why you would give 
me that right would be on my perceptions, not on the intentions of the man. If you change 
this rule, will you give me the right to protect my privacy if I refuse to shower with one of 
my lesbian colleagues? (c.503)
The quote positions lesbians as potentially threatening, but John Reid used it to 
support retention of the ban; he added “I did not have a satisfactory answer for 
her then and, frankly, I do not now” (c.503). As a response presumably given 
when the Committee went to interview forces personnel, the quote is not in its 
report, but John Reid put the scenario to Stonewall in Committee. Following 
Angela Mason’s point that “the problem is not the conduct or behaviour in any 
way of the lesbian or gay man, [but] the apprehension of the heterosexual person 
who may be showering with them” (HC 7.7.1996: 102), he asked Edmund Hall if 
he accepted the right of a woman not to shower with a man; the answer was a 
qualified yes (ibid). John Reid continued:
That is based on the perception of the woman, of her sense of decency, of her belief in 
privacy, perhaps on the fact that she thinks she would be regarded with sexual curiosity by 
the man, or perhaps there would be a threat; it is all on her, not on the intention of the 
man, or accusations of promiscuity against the man, but on her. Do you accept the right of 
a woman to refuse to shower with a lesbian? (ibid)
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This proposition ignores both gender and sexuality social-power differentials, as 
Angela Mason pointed out (ibid). Given John Reid’s past support for repealing the 
ban, this line of questioning suggests either his retention of commonly held 
assumptions about gender and sexuality, or the need for a ‘credible’ basis from 
which to argue for retention of the ban. Nicholas Soames took up the issue of 
PRIVACY and presented it as a direct obstacle to repeal. All his lines occur in 
reports: of John Reid, the Government’s position, or the MoD review. 
 Final points relate to Nicholas Soames’ lines for NOT, 14/28 of which 
occur in reports, mostly of the Government’s position. Overall, they exert his own 
and Government authority: 
The not so hidden agenda of those who want to change Ministry of Defence policy is to 
steamroller aside the judgments, experience and wishes of the military. Although we have 
no desire to discriminate against homosexuals, or indeed against any other minority, the 
Government will not capitulate to such doctrinaire attitudes. What is special about the 
military is the fact that we expect them to exhibit commitment and self sacrifice beyond 
that of any other professional group and, if need be, to sacrifice their lives. They put their 
trust in the Government and it would be immoral, as well as operationally highly 
detrimental, to overrule or ignore them. Let me make it clear—this is not about 
homophobia in the armed forces. (c.509)
The lines place the ban’s retention firmly with the wishes of the MILITARY, who 
were not to be overruled or ignored. Given the reasoned and well-supported 
arguments of pro-repeal MPs in the debate, and of Stonewall and Rank Outsiders 
in Committee, the doctrinaire attitudes better fitted the MILITARY hierarchy to 
which the Government had capitulated and thus constitute a case of transfer 
(van Dijk 2008a: 110). Similarly, his denial that the Government desired to 
discriminate and his claim that the issue was NOT about homophobia suggest 
that being seen as homophobic was becoming less acceptable. Significantly, the 
homophobia was unattributed. His references to self sacrifice, trust, immoral and 
operationally detrimental constitute emotive appeals and therefore expose the 
weakness of arguments for retaining the ban. Similar appeals followed:
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I know no member of the House will vote on the new clause without having carefully 
weighed up the issues. These are not simple, since they summon up an apparent conflict 
between individual rights and wishes—which none of us lightly sets aside—and the moral 
cohesion, effectiveness and fighting power of the armed forces (c.509)
The services of this country are very special, and they are a unique and extraordinary asset 
to our nation. They serve us faithfully and well and they are—by and large—men and 
women of quality not found in any other institution in the land. (c.509)
My overriding duty must be to maintain the effectiveness of our armed forces. In my view, 
the armed forces have earned the right to be allowed to get on with the job they do so well 
and not be bludgeoned out of the standards, traditions and esprit de corps that has won 
Great Britain every war in which we have engaged since 1812. (c.509-510). 
His use of standards and traditions echo John Wilkinson’s use of VALUES, while 
bludgeoned refers back to the doctrinaire attitudes. On the note of winning every 
war since 1812, despite Harry Cohen’s and Eddie Loyden’s points about WWII, 
he urged rejection of the amendment. These statements illustrate the importance 
the Government placed on getting the decision the MILITARY wanted. 
 Views of Sexuality
 The frequencies of terms related to sexuality were low in this debate:





















 sex (in reference to gender)
 sex (in reference to sexual acts)
 homophobia
Pro-repeal speakers used 19/23 terms of which GAY and GAYS are keywords. 
Anti-repeal speakers used 15/23 terms of which the clinical terms (homosexuals, 
homosexual, homosexuality) are salient. The terms are investigated mainly via 
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their concordance lines (Appendices 46 & 48) as the few collocates (Appendices 
45 & 47) contribute little.
*       *       *
 Homosexuals was the most used term in the debate, proportionately more 
so by anti-repeal speakers: 










 15/38 (39.5% total)
 4/15 (26.7% uses)
57.1%
 23/38 (60.5% total)
 10/23 (43.5% uses)
42.9%
 homosexual
6  3/6 (50% total)
 3/3 (100% uses)
57.1%  3/6 (50% total)
 2/3 (66.7% uses)
42.9%
 heterosexuals
9  4/9 (44.4% total)
 2/4 (50% uses)
57.1%  5/9 (55.6% total) 42.9%
 heterosexual
1 57.1%  1/1 (100% total) 42.9%
 straights
1  1/1 (100% total)
 1/1 (100% uses)
57.1% 42.9%
 gays
7  7/7 (100% total)
 4/7 (57.1 uses)
57.1% 42.9%
 lesbians
6  5/6 (83.3% total)
 1/5 (20% uses)
57.1%  1/6 (16.7% total) 42.9%
Key: grey text shows the number and % of uses occurring in reports
 red text: shows the proportionately higher frequency of use
 bold red text: keywords
Of the anti-repeal lines for homosexuals and homosexual as a singular noun 
(Appendix 46), those that report or argue the military view predictably include 
negative phrases:
 do not want                    horrified at the thought of             the policy of excluding
 have no place in             exclusion of                                  would have a detrimental effect on
However the negativity was mitigated in the co-text by Robert Key and John Reid:
 they accepted                     no suggestion in                                 makes that judgment ... anguished
 genuine acceptance            accept orders from                             not relate to prejudiced allegations
 In none of those forces       but the blanket nature of the ban       no easy or painless answer
Robert Key also criticised the forces’ double standard:
Whatever the courts may say, it is unacceptable and uncivilised for the forces of the Crown 
to recognise on the one hand that homosexuality in the armed forces is not a criminal 
offence, and then to make use of agents provocateurs or covert surveillance to expose 
homosexuals. The Select Committee was told that the Ministry of Defence has never 
discharged homosexuals for criminal offences; just being a homosexual is enough. (c.494)
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and John Reid defended the commitment of homosexuals in the military:
The first was that it was no part of our task to make moral judgments on sexual 
orientation; nor are there grounds for questioning the professionalism, dedication, courage 
or patriotism of homosexuals, individually or as a group. (c.501)
while Nicholas Soames adhered to the military view:
It would be quite wrong to ignore the strongly held views of the majority of service men and 
women that the admission of homosexuals would have a detrimental effect on operational 
effectiveness, and I shall not do so. (c.509)
A feature of the lines spoken by John Reid and Nicholas Soames is the pairing of 
homosexuals with heterosexuals. All five uses of heterosexuals, plus heterosexual 
as a singular noun, are linked to homosexual(s). This stems from their extension 
of privacy to heterosexuals as a means of defending the ban, which polarised 
homosexual and heterosexual rights. Stonewall’s request for privacy was based 
on Article 8 of the ECvHR and the right of lesbians and gay men not to be 
investigated, interrogated and discharged because of their personal relationships. 
Stonewall’s request is of a very different order from the ‘heterosexual privacy’ 
based on an aversion to showering or sharing accommodation with homosexuals. 
In adopting this line of argument John Reid and Nicholas Soames not only 
defended a heterosexual separatism based on homophobia, but also appealed to 
such sentiments in other MPs. 
*       *       *
 The pro-repeal nouns for people occur in varied contexts, although 7/15 
lines for homosexuals (Appendix 48) refer to serving personnel past or present, as 
Gerald Kaufman chided:
The hon. Gentleman said that homosexuality is not compatible with membership of Her 
Majesty's forces. That is very strange to me, because I have a slight suspicion that there 
are large numbers of homosexuals in our armed forces today. I have a further suspicion 
that there have been homosexuals throughout history in our own armed forces and those 
of other great powers, and, somehow or other, we have managed to win wars all the same. 
(c.491)
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In three lines homosexuals is paired with lesbians (see below), and in two lines 
with heterosexuals. The latter pairs occur in references to the proposed code of 
conduct and applied to sexual behaviour in both categories. Of the two remaining 
lines for heterosexuals: one is paired with lesbians and gay men in highlighting 
the equal application of the proposed code of conduct; the other occurs in Tony 
Banks’ reference to Gerald Kaufman’s report of three heterosexual soldiers who 
brutally murdered a woman in Cyprus: 
My right hon. Friend the Member for Gorton gave us the example of the three sub-human 
heterosexuals in Cyprus. Is it so wonderful to be heterosexual in those circumstances? 
They are the sort of people who bring shame to our armed forces, not those homosexual 
men who loyally serve their country and are ready to die for it, yet are still treated 
abysmally by the House and the Government. (c.496)
As the only independent use of the term it challenges the heterosexual ideal, but 
its pairing with non-heterosexual terms in other lines, albeit in contexts which 
attribute equality, denies it further independent scrutiny.
 The pro-repeal keyword GAYS was not used by anti-repeal speakers. Like 
homosexuals, it also occurs in varied contexts. It is paired with straights in Harry 
Cohen’s report of Dudley Cave’s WWII experience:
Cave recalls that neither the top brass nor fellow soldiers showed any concern about gay 
enlistees. ‘There were none of the witch hunts that we have nowadays ... Homosexual 
soldiers were more or less accepted. The visible gays were mostly drag performers in 
concert teams. Regarded with considerable affection, their camp humour helped lift the 
men’s spirits’. [...] ‘All the gays and straights worked together as a team. We had to because 
our lives might have depended on it’. (c.497)
and with lesbians by Edwina Currie: 
Other countries regard this type of ban as completely unnecessary and find it perfectly 
feasible to employ gays and lesbians. (c.483)
The more frequent and less paired uses of GAYS and homosexuals is significant 
when compared with the five uses of lesbians all of which are paired. The ban 
applied equally to lesbians and GAYS, but speakers’ focus was on GAY/
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homosexual men. The pairings of men and women (Appendix 48A) make an 
interesting contrast:
















 1    total 21 = 75%
 lesbians  5 uses  5 paired = 100%
 men  24 uses  13 paired = 54.2%  11 = 45.8%
 women  19 uses  13 paired = 68.4%  6 = 31.6%
The frequencies and mid-range pairings of men and women are similar, but those 
of lesbians and the male-aligned terms are unbalanced. The imbalance is even 
greater between the anti-repeal pairings of men and women (Appendix 46A) and 
those of lesbians and the male aligned terms:




 1 use    total 24
 1 paired
 1 paired    total 2 = 8.3%
 22 uses
       total 22 = 91.7%
 lesbians  1 use  1 paired = 100%
 men  12 uses  10 paired = 83.3%  2 uses = 16.7%
 women  12 uses  10 paired = 83.3%  2 uses = 16.7%
The armed forces offer a context in which qualities associated with ‘masculinity’ 
are expected and enforced, and in which its boundaries are rigorously policed. 
That since the eighteenth century masculinity has been defined largely through 
the exclusion of what became termed homosexuality (Weeks 2011: 112), makes 
the focus on non-heterosexual men predictable. It also illustrates the extent to 
which homophobic anxieties pertained to men and the protection of male gender 
boundaries which subordinate gay men to straight men (Connell 2005: 78-9).
*       *       *
 Homosexual was the most used adjective, proportionately more so by anti-
repeal speakers, notably John Wilkinson and Nicholas Soames who spoke 11/12 
lines (Appendix 46). 
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 14/26 (53.8% total)
 7/14 (50% uses)
57.1%
 12/26 (46.2% total)
 8/12 (66.7% uses)
42.9%
 heterosexual 10
 8/10 (80% total)
 4/8 (50% uses)
57.1%
 2/10 (20% total)
 1/2 (50% uses)
42.9%




 5/12 (41.7 uses)
57.1%
 9/21 (42.9% total)
 3/12 (25% uses)
42.9%
 sexually 1
 1/1 (100% total)
 1/1 (100% uses)
57.1% 42.9%
 gay 13
 13/13 (100% total)
 10/13 (76.9% uses)
57.1% 42.9%
 lesbian 2
 1/2 (50% total)
 1/1 (100% uses)
57.1%
 1/2 (50% total)
 1/1 (100% uses)
42.9%
 homophobic 1
 1/1 (100% total)
57.1% 42.9%
Key: grey text shows the number and % of uses occurring in reports
 red text: shows the proportionately higher frequency of use
 bold red text: keywords
 green text: proportionate use
Reports account for 8/12 anti-repeal lines and relate primarily to the Select 
Committee’s recommendation and the Government’s acceptance of it. Robert 
Key’s report of evidence given to the Committee is the exception:
The Standing Committee was told of harrowing events, such as the homosexual sailor who 
set off on a tour of duty of some months and realised after a few weeks that he had a 
genital problem. He realised that the ship's medical officer would be bound to take action 
leading to his discharge from the service. The sailor waited for four months before going to 
his family general practitioner at home. That is unacceptable and dangerous. (c.494)
Most lines occur in contexts that straightforwardly support the ban, thus the co-
text includes negative phrases linked to homosexual behaviour or identity: 
 was not compatible with                can do without                                allegations of
 did not want any change               do not include condoning               strong suspicion of 
 is a complication that                     not solve the problem                     an adverse effect on 
The nouns to which homosexual applies divide between sexual acts (behaviour, 
conduct, dimension, acts, activity) and sexual identity (sailor, personnel, men and 
women, movement). John Wilkinson emphasised:
Suffice it to say that differences of responsibility of rank accentuate the potential mutuality 
of attraction or the influence that one person may have over another. A homosexual 
dimension is a complication that the armed services can do without. 
[...]
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We are selective and have particular standards and values, which do not include 
condoning homosexual behaviour. (c.490)
while Nicholas Soames conceded:
There may well be some homosexual personnel in the armed forces but they choose to keep 
that to themselves. That is a matter for them. [Interruption.] I will deal with that later. 
(c.506)
but went on to assert:
Both the evidence contained in the assessment team's detailed and thorough report, and 
that given in open session to the Select Committee, show that the presence of openly 
homosexual men and women in the armed forces would have an adverse effect on morale 
and unit cohesion. (c.508)
While Nicholas Soames acknowledged sexual identity, John Wilkinson did not. 
 The anti-repeal lines for sexual (Appendix 46) typify four concerns. John 
Wilkinson’s lines concern sexual conduct in his dismissal of the amendment, but 
while in the amendment conduct applied to all sexualities, his concern, via that 
form, was same-sex sexual conduct; he offered no justification for the distinction:
Again, that is true where there is favouritism—particularly of a sexual kind. That form of 
bonding can impair the necessary discipline and mutuality of respect inherent in the 
command relationship. (c.490)
John Reid’s lines concern privacy: 
Secondly, would it be possible in the imposed social intimacy of the armed forces to 
guarantee the right to privacy of the sexual preference of homosexuals and the right to 
privacy of heterosexuals? (c.501)
and sexual relationships: 
Relationships which damage cohesion, such as those of a romantic or sexual nature, are 
particularly damaging. In situations in which such special relationships are most likely to 
develop in the armed forces, personnel are separated by gender. Therefore, as a matter of 
course in the armed forces, in the most intimate situations that are likely to lead to special 
relationships, a heterosexual is separated from the potential object of his or her sexual 
preference. Precisely the opposite circumstances would obtain for homosexuals, as they 
would be integrated in units with members of their own sex. That is the key problem, and 
it does not relate to prejudiced allegations of increased potential for promiscuity among 
homosexuals. (c.502)
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While he does not specify same-sex relationships as more damaging, he locates 
need for the ban in the conditions of forces’ life. In so doing he implies sexual 
activity is likely under such conditions which undermines his warning against 
prejudiced allegations. He also ignores the situation of personnel whose same-sex 
relationships were with civilians. The final concern is Nicholas Soames’ reference 
to suspicions of (homo)sexual identity disrupting unit cohesion: 
While a new code of conduct might appear to be symmetrical in its effect on heterosexuals 
and homosexuals, it would not solve the problem of anticipated loss of cohesion or 
operational effectiveness caused by the knowledge or strong suspicion of the sexual 
identity of homosexual personnel. (c.507)
As he had acknowledged homosexuals were then serving without suspicion and, 
as Hall (1995) shows, investigations disrupted working relations as well as 
individual careers, his argument had no factual basis. 
*       *       *
 The pro-repeal lines for homosexual as an adjective (Appendix 48), like 
those for homosexuals and GAYS, occur in varied contexts. These include the 
proposed code of conduct, social change, recruitment, famous soldiers, serving 
personnel, WWII soldiers, the ban’s incongruities and the cost of investigations. 
Of note is the reciprocal collocation of homosexual with both heterosexual and 
sexual (Appendix 47). If the terms are considered jointly, the code of conduct 
emerges as a recurrent theme:
Part of the new clause spells out a proposed new code of conduct. It would apply to all 
inappropriate sexual behaviour, whether heterosexual or homosexual. It would protect 
women as well as men. It would protect young people, and it would protect those in junior 
ranks who might be at risk of sexual harassment. 
(Edwina Currie c.482)
Among the NATO countries that have no ban are [...] The Australians have a strict code on 
sexual behaviour, which is what I am proposing, but it has no ban. 
(Edwina Currie c.483)
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Sexual conduct of any kind that prejudices good order and discipline is unacceptable and 
is an offence, as is sexual conduct of any kind which undermines the command 
relationship and the use of rank or position to obtain sexual favours. Those principles 
stand robustly behind the principle of non-discrimination at the centre of the new clause. 
(Menzies Campbell c.486)
Has the hon. Gentleman never heard of a man in a senior position using his seniority to 
make unwanted sexual advances to a woman of junior rank, in civilian or Army life? The 
logic of the hon. Gentleman's argument is that there should be no women in the armed 
forces either. 
(Maria Fyfe c.490)
We were lectured about codes of conduct for officers—I should like to think that those 
codes now extend to all ranks, but that is by the way—and particularly about heterosexual 
behaviour with people in the area or with other officers’ wives. 
(Nigel Spearing c.499)
I hope that the Minister will tell me what is wrong with the proposal for a code of conduct 
of the sort specified in new subsection (1). The subsection states that sexual conduct, 
whether heterosexual or homosexual"— which really means sexual conduct of any 
description— shall not constitute an offence except in certain circumstances. It would even 
be possible to remove the words "heterosexual" and "homosexual" from the legislation. 
(Nigel Spearing c.499)
Homosexual collocates reciprocally with both heterosexual and sexual, and the 
three are more widely linked in the co-text, but heterosexual and sexual do not 
collocate. This leaves homosexual more closely associated with sexual conduct. 
However, the greater pro-repeal use of heterosexual, including five independent 
uses, illustrates speakers more balanced focus on the two sexual categories.
 The pro-repeal keyword GAY, like GAYS, was not used by anti-repeal 
speakers—in Bakhtin’s (1981: 293-4) terms they were unappropriated, or too full 
of other people’s contexts. The nouns to which GAY applies in the pro-repeal 
lines (Appendix 48) premise its use on sexual identity:
 men (2 lines)          enlistees (1 line)       gay or lesbian people (1 line)       service members (1 line)
 people (2 lines)       Hussar (1 line)          men and women (1 line)
Both GAY and GAYS apply to sexual identity, neither are associated with sexual 
conduct. As in the lines for GAYS, over half the lines for GAY were spoken by 
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Edwina Currie and in varied contexts. Ten lines occur in reports, of which her 
reports of SIB investigations offer most thematic consistency: 
What bothers me is the continued harassment and hounding of officers and ranks. It is 
official hounding and it appears to be encouraged the moment sexual orientation becomes 
suspect. In December 1995—a matter of only a few weeks ago—a former Royal Marine was 
approached in a gay pub in Torquay by a man who later invited him home. Upon leaving 
the bar, the man produced a Royal Marine military police warrant card and tried to arrest 
the person. He obviously did not know that the chap had left the Royal Marines some three 
years earlier, so no action could be taken. (c.484)
Between September and November 1995, near Aldershot, a member of Rank Outsiders—
the campaigning organisation—working on a gay men’s health project observed frequent 
visits to a known cruising area by two men whom he knew were members of the Army 
special investigation branch. He knew that because they had conducted his investigation 
some time previously. During the visits he observed the SIB men making approaches to 
men who were of service appearance and attempting to pick them up. (c.484)
So we have official agents provocateurs in the armed forces. Not only that, but we are 
spending quite a lot of money on surveillance. Portsmouth Royal Naval SIB put up a 
camera observation point in a building opposite Drummonds public house, a known gay 
bar. Former Able Seaman Brett Burnell was investigated after being photographed entering 
the pub by the SIB. He was shown the photos and has been discharged. (c.485)
The other lines concern issues that have already been discussed, the exception is 
Edwina Currie’s rebuke of Nicholas Soames: 
I believe that my hon. Friend the Minister was a sub-lieutenant for three years in the 11th 
Hussars. Given the amount of wise-cracking that he has been indulging in this evening, 
perhaps one should dub him the gay Hussar, but there we are. (c.484)
This suggests he was undermining her speech by cracking defensive jokes while 
she was speaking. GAY is here apparently used in its joyful meaning, but with a 
sharp edge given his position on the ban and that he is not known to be gay. 
Alongside Tony Banks’ observation that the Minister was “not even listening” 
(c.499), the rebuke positions Nicholas Soames as disdainfully indifferent to pro-
repeal arguments; his inattentiveness also suggests he was confident of the 
debate outcome.
*       *       *
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 Homosexuality was the most used abstract noun, proportionately more so 











 8/27 (29.6% total)
 6/8 (75% uses)
57.1%
 19/27 (70.4% total)
 14/19 (73.7% uses)
42.9%
 heterosexuality 1
 1/1 (100% total)
57.1% 42.9%
 sexual orientation 11
 8/11 (72.7% total)
 1/8 (12.5% uses)
57.1%
 3/11 (27.3% total)
 1/3 (33.3% uses)
42.9%
 orientation 2





 2/2 (100% total)
 1/2 (50% uses)
42.9%
 sexuality 7
 4/7 (57.1% total)
 1/4 (25% uses)
57.1%
 3/7 (42.9% total)
 3/3 (100% uses)
42.9%
 sex (in reference to 
 gender)
3 57.1%
 3/3 (100% total)
42.9%
 sex (in reference to 
 sexual acts)
1
 1/1 (100% total)
57.1% 42.9%
 homophobia 2 57.1%
 2/2 (100% total)
42.9%
Key: grey text shows the number and % of uses occurring in reports
 red text: shows the proportionately higher frequency of use
 green text: proportionate use
Nicholas Soames spoke 10/19 lines (Appendix 46). As with other anti-repeal uses 
of the clinical terms, the co-text contains negative words and phrases:
 if homosexuality is condoned           do not want                                     open/overt homosexuality 
 because of its nature                        discharged on the ground of           remained incompatible
 bound to be problems                       creates insoluble problems             disrupt unit cohesion 
The use of open and overt imply homosexuality should be hidden, while that of 
condoned implies unwarranted approval. Twelve lines occur in reports, of which 
10 cite authoritative sources to bolster the military view: 
 the armed forces (5 lines)                                                          the MoD review (2 lines)
 the High Court judgment of the ban’s legality (1 line)                 General Colin Powell (1 line)
 the High Court recommendation of policy review (1 line)
While these authoritative sources are typical of manipulative discourse (van Dijk 
2006c: 375-6) and compound the lack of MoD evidence, Nicholas Soames’ quote 
of Colin Powell undermines his dismissal of other countries’ policies and places 
the US view above that of Europe: 
232
I shall quote an extract from a report by General Colin Powell, the former chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff in America: Unlike race or gender, sexuality is not a benign trait. It is 
manifested in behaviour. While it would be decidedly biased to assume certain behaviours 
based on gender or membership in a racial group, the same is not true for sexuality. We 
have successfully mixed rich and poor, black and white, male and female, but open 
homosexuality in units is not just the acceptance of benign characteristics such as colour 
or gender or background. It involves matters of privacy and human sexuality that, in our 
judgment, if allowed to exist openly in the military, would affect the cohesion and well-
being of the force. ... ”. (c.508)
This casts homosexuality as not a benign trait and treats it as a behaviour. As in 
Butler’s (1997: 112) view, the US “military takes every ascription of identity as 
equivalent to the doing of an act”. However, heterosexuality is not treated as a 
behaviour, Powell ignores it. Only Robert Key’s lines dispel the negativity: one 
reports his conversations with NATO troops in Bosnia where he found no threat 
to discipline; the other criticises the forces’ double standard (quoted above).
 Other abstract nouns were little used by anti-repeal speakers. As in the 
Powell quote, the non-use of heterosexuality suggests it was completely taken for 
granted (Voloshinov 2012: 163-4; van Dijk 2008a: 170-1) as a ‘natural’ rather 
than social phenomenon. The few lines for sexual orientation and sexuality refer 
to homosexuality, while the two lines for homosexual orientation clearly dispel 
potential for inclusiveness. 
*       *       *
 The pro-repeal lines for homosexuality (Appendix 48) add little to the 
analysis. Reports account for 6/8 lines: of British forces in Bosnia, the 1986 
amendment, the Calcutt Inquiry on the Cyprus ‘spy’ trial, John Wilkinson, the 
ban’s repeal in Australia, and enlistment in WWII. The other two concern the 
MoD review. The one line for heterosexuality is paired with homosexuality, thus 
the former has no independent consideration. 
 The lines for sexual orientation, orientation and sexuality (Appendix 48) all 
occur in examples of, or arguments against, discrimination or prejudice:
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 because of their (2 lines)              becomes suspect (1 line)              discovered (1 line)
 on the ground of (2 lines)             be condemned for (1 line)             irrespective of (1 line)
 whatever their (2 lines)                discharged if (1 line)                    on account of (1 line)
Only two lines for sexual orientation, plus the two for orientation have inclusive 
reference, the others refer to homosexuality; none refer to heterosexuality. The 
case against discrimination was clearly argued by Edwina Currie:
The other part of the proposed new clause provides that the armed forces shall not 
discriminate on the ground of sexual orientation. The supporters of the new clause want to 
make it absolutely clear that we disapprove profoundly of irresponsible behaviour—by 
whomever, and whatever their sexual orientation might be. We would prefer to see each 
case dealt with on its merits or demerits, on the details of the case as presented. (c.482)
and threaded through the debate with varying degrees of reproach, for example:
I believe firmly as a matter of principle that there should be no discrimination against any 
person by virtue of race, colour or sexual orientation. 
(Menzies Campbell c.485)
At the time, during the cold war, the pressures to which members of the armed forces [...] 
were subjected because of their sexual orientation and particular way of displaying it 
seemed very wrong. 
(Kevin McNamara c.488)
It seems to be all right to promote a convicted murderer in our armed forces, but it would 
appear that people of a particular sexual orientation are more dangerous to the good name 
of our armed forces. 
(Gerald Kaufman c.492)
It is plainly an injustice that men or women, on account of their sexuality, should be 
denied the opportunity to serve their country in the armed services. 
(Alan Howarth c.495)
They start by paying fulsome tribute to those homosexuals whom they know have served 
the country and continue to serve the country. But still they say that they will, in effect, be 
condemned for their sexual orientation. 
(Tony Banks c.495-6)
I first say to [John Wilkinson] who was concerned about the threat of blackmail if we 
passed the new clause, and [Robert Key] who was concerned about the threat of 
victimisation: what on earth do they think is happening in the armed forces today? There 
is blackmail and victimisation because people are frightened that they will lose their jobs 
and be discharged if their sexuality is discovered. That is the situation. 
(Clive Betts c.497)
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If we fail to pass the new clause tonight, John Beckett will not stand guilty of any crime, 
but we in the House will stand guilty of failing to allow him and hundreds, perhaps 
thousands, of other young people the opportunity to serve Britain in the way that they 
have chosen simply because of their sexuality. 
(Clive Betts c.498)
Surely, in the end, it is codes of conduct rather than the letter of the law that count. I 
suggest to [John Wilkinson] that what is important is the way in which our extremely 
wonderful instincts are used, and the degree of responsibility or irresponsibility with which 
they are used, irrespective of orientation. 
(Nigel Spearing c.499)
It was the ostensibly neutral or inclusive reference of these terms that was used 
to highlight discrimination and prejudice; they thus link into the ‘ideological 
chain’ (Voloshinov 1986: 11) that threads through the pro-repeal speeches. 
*       *       *
 Overall, each side’s uses of sexuality terms, and their contributions to the 
debate in general, can be seen in terms of authoritative and internally persuasive 
discourse (Bakhtin 1981: 345-6). With the partial exceptions of Robert Key and 
John Reid, anti-repeal speakers capitulated to the authority of the forces chiefs. 
Pro-repeal speakers based their arguments on real-life examples and principles 
of justice and equal treatment.
 Associations and Implications
 Four features of the debate require further discussion. First, the non-
attribution of responsibility for ensuring the ban’s retention to the Chiefs of Staff. 
Second, anti-repeal speakers concern to distance themselves from being seen as 
homophobic. Third, the greater use of homosexuals when nouns for people is the 
least used lexical category in all other debates analysed Chapters 5-10, as well as 
in the wider corpus analysis Chapter 11. Fourth, the sidelining of lesbians when 
the ban applied equally to lesbians and gay men. 
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 Most anti-repeal speakers had sat on the Select Committee; most pro-
repeal speakers had read its report. They could not fail to be aware of the MoD 
survey’s invalidity, that its leading questions and covert lack of anonymity had 
served the Chiefs of Staff determination to retain the ban. As Angela Mason 
noted during Stonewall’s evidence, there is “a very clear case for a genuine and 
independent review of these issues” (HC 7.5.1996: 99). The survey represented 
only 0.26% of forces members (ibid: 100) and Edmund Hall had discovered the 
postal survey was sent mainly to older members (ibid: 101). Rob Hayward, an 
expert in polling and statistics, had submitted a report of the survey on behalf of 
Stonewall. His evidence was unwelcome; the Chair, Peter Viggers, saw it as “a 
peripheral issue, not absolutely central” (ibid: 100). Yet, in the evidence given by 
MoD representatives and Chiefs of Staff (ibid: 89-98), the survey constituted sole 
justification for retaining the ban. The Chiefs of Staff were not mentioned in the 
debate. Where pro-repeal speakers attributed responsibility for discrimination or 
prejudice, it was displaced. Where anti-repeal speakers attributed need for the 
ban’s retention, it was to generalised categories such as: serving personnel, the 
armed forces, forces members, service men, serving men and women, the review 
report, the assessment team, collective professional judgments, or the wishes of 
the military. There was no evidence for the feared effects of the ban’s repeal; the 
available evidence was to the contrary. That speakers on both sides by-passed 
the role of the Chiefs of Staff suggests criticisms of the military hierarchy were 
‘off limits’. However, this positioning of the Chiefs as a force not to be crossed 
was specific to the ban. As Edwina Currie pointed out, MPs overruled objections 
in the case of women serving alongside men. This positions the prejudice and 
discrimination against lesbian and gay personnel as more powerful in that the 
Government was not prepared to overrule it and the Labour leadership was not 
prepared to vote against it. A sense of threat underlies these capitulations to 
military authority, as if trouble was anticipated if the ban were repealed.
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 While references to prejudice and discrimination threaded through the 
pro-repeal speeches, anti-repeal speakers were careful to distance themselves, 
the armed forces, and/or the Select Committee from being seen as homophobic. 
This took different forms. John Wilkinson deployed platitudes and euphemisms:
We must not be in any sense censorious—that is the last thing we want—but must 
seriously consider the evidence. (c.488-9)
Those values may not seem to us identical to those that we normally share, but the 
profession of arms is a calling distinct from civilian life. (c.489)
Although those values may appear a bit traditional, for those who serve in the armed forces 
they are greatly appreciated. (c.490)
Peter Viggars opted for reassurance and displacement: 
I wish only to assure the House of the care and the concern that the Select Committee put 
into considering this issue. (c.497)
I think that it is right that we should take account of the overwhelming response that came 
back, which is that they wish the status quo to continue. (c.497)
Robert Key came closest to suggesting responsibility:
The argument stems from the military ethos, which filters down through the whole chain of 
command, and says straightforwardly that the military are different. (c.493)
John Reid alluded to prejudice six times: 
On the basis of those premises, when we cut through the fog, the propaganda and the 
prejudice, three essential questions remain. (c.501)
That is the key problem, and it does not relate to prejudiced allegations of increased 
potential for promiscuity among homosexuals. (c.502)
Prejudice is no ground on its own for continuation of past prejudice (c.502)
Individuals have a range of feelings that are often difficult to classify because they range 
from irrational prejudices to moral perceptions. (c.503)
... Members who will be in the same division lobby as me tonight who sometimes seem 
incapable of presenting a logical argument because they are blinded with prejudice. (c.503)
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If I were advocating the case to members of the armed services, I would first stop trying to 
portray them as a bunch of redneck, thick-skulled and prejudiced bigots, although I am 
not saying that my hon. Friend is doing that. (c.504)
Nicholas Soames resorted to outright denial and disclaimation:
The current policy of excluding homosexuals from the armed forces is not - I repeat, not - 
the result of a moral judgment. (c.505)
Although we have no desire to discriminate against homosexuals, or indeed any other 
minority, the Government will not capitulate to such doctrinaire attitudes. (c.509)
Let me make it clear - this is not about homophobia in the armed forces. (c.509)
This suggests that being seen as homophobic was becoming less acceptable. The 
extent to which this was linked to changing perceptions of lesbians and gay men, 
or simply a response to the pro-repeal speakers chain of references to prejudice 
and discrimination is unclear. However, in voting for the ban’s retention, anti-
repeal speakers were complicit in retaining a ban based on homophobic beliefs.
 A third feature of the debate is the primary use of homosexuals. The 
Hansard searches for key debates (Chapter 2) found that homosexual(s) featured 
more prominently in debates on the armed forces. This prominence of clinical 
terms suggests a contextual effect that links to the term’s criminal and clinical 
heritage which was formally retained in the armed forces after the 1967 Sexual 
Offences Act. Given the strength of support for the ban in the military hierarchy, 
it is no surprise that the clinical terms permeated MPs speech on the issue. As 
Bakhtin (1981: 294) put it: it is not “out of a dictionary that the speaker gets his 
words [they exist] in other people’s mouths, in other people’s contexts, serving 
other people’s intentions”. However this does not explain the more frequent use 
of nouns for people. The uses of homosexuals, gays and heterosexuals (not 
lesbians) are all more frequent than in other debates analysed, while straights is 
not used elsewhere. The focus of argument is on the sexual identity of men. Two 
points are relevant here. First, decriminalisation (administrative in 1992 and by 
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repeal of the 1967 Act in 1994) applied to sexual acts between men. This shifted 
the post 1992 target of exclusion onto people’s non-heterosexual identities, to 
which the male aligned homosexuals was applied. This also accounts for the 
greater use of heterosexuals, which functioned largely as a comparator rather 
than an indicator of wider heterosexual identity recognition—heterosexuals was 
less used in later debates (Chapters 8-10). Second, as mentioned above, the 
focus on homosexual men relates to beliefs about masculinity and the policing of 
its boundaries, within which homosexuality and femininity are subordinated 
(Baker 2008: 152). As Connell (2003: 50-1) argues, by the eighteenth century 
military performance had become “an unavoidable issue in the construction of 
masculinities”. Although bisexual orientation was included in the amendment, 
bisexuals were not mentioned in the debate. The erasure of bisexuals is nothing 
new (Murphy 1997: 35-57; Baker 2008: 145-152). As Baker (ibid:150) argues, it 
is “a powerful strategy for maintaining the illusion of the binary system of 
homosexuality and heterosexuality”, an issue also discussed by Waites’ (2005b). 
This binary can also be seen in terms of Bakhtin’s (1981: 271-2) centripetal and 
centrifugal forces. While by the 1990s the centrifugal forces of lesbian, gay and 
bisexual resistance were loosening the taken-for-granted naturalisation of 
heterosexuality, the centripetal forces of official nervousness were tightening the 
demarcation of certain categories. As Weeks (2011: 121) notes, “sexuality has 
become a terrain of acute uncertainty”. 
 The final theme is the debate’s marginalisation of lesbians. That the 
majority of forces’ personnel were (and are) men, does not account for the scant 
use of lesbian(s) or their lack of independent use. The ban’s repeal applied 
equally to both lesbian and gay personnel. Hall (1995: ch.2) shows that women 
in general and lesbians in particular faced additional difficulties in the military. 
Of cases cited by pro-repeal speakers, Jeanette Smith, a High Court appellant, 
was the only lesbian. Eight cases of gay men were cited as examples and largely 
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account for HE and HIS being pro-repeal keywords. That two lesbian members of 
Rank Outsiders, Lis Campion, a former lieutenant and Karen Greig, a former 
navy engineer, gave evidence to the Select Committee, shows that their cases at 
least were available for mention. The imbalance relates to the preoccupation with 
men’s non-heterosexuality and to the policing of male gender boundaries, which 
further illustrates the extent to which homophobic anxieties pertained to men. 
 Conclusion
 The political context of this chapter illustrates the power the military 
exerted in and over Parliament in retaining the criminalisation and discharge of 
homosexuals. The armed forces gained exemption from the 1967 Sexual Offences 
Act and resisted successive attempts to change the law after the 1985 Cyprus 
Spy trial revealed the imprisonment and torturous interrogation techniques to 
which individuals suspected of non-heterosexual behaviour were subjected. It 
took until 1992 to achieve decriminalisation, formalised in 1994, which shifted 
the focus of surveillance, interrogation and discharge from sexual acts to sexual 
identity. Politicians’ capitulation to the military chiefs is clearest following the 
judicial review in 1995, which recommended that the MoD review the exclusion 
and suggested it be replaced by a code of sexual conduct applicable to all. The 
MoD review was rigged. Despite the review’s well-publicised rigging, the Select 
Committee accepted its recommendation that exclusion should continue. At the 
code-of-conduct amendment debate, the Government put a three-line whip on 
the vote against it. Blair bypassed Labour policy in allowing a free vote at a time 
when the Government was almost without majority. This was seen as his refusal 
to risk the hostility of military chiefs the year before an election. 
 In the debate analysed, references to prejudice threaded through the pro-
repeal speeches, but it was unattributed or displaced. Similarly, discrimination 
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was attributed to the law rather than people. Anti-repeal speakers distanced 
themselves, and sometimes forces personnel, from prejudice and discrimination 
by means of euphemism, displacement or denial. Criticism of the military chiefs 
was absent on both sides. As in Chapter 6, the Flowcharts in the Words and 
Themes section reveal a contrast between each side’s contributions to the debate. 
On Flowchart 5, the more integrated pro-repeal keywords and collocates point to 
consistent argument. On Flowchart 6, the very sparse anti-repeal links point to 
isolated and unsupported claims. The pro-repeal keywords WHO, WAS and HE 
reveal the extent of speakers’ reports of forces members affected by the ban. As 
in Chapter 5, these statistically significant grammar words would have been 
taken for granted in a content analysis. The anti-repeal keywords OPERATIONAL, 
EFFECTIVENESS and COHESION reveal the extent of speakers reliance on the 
rigged MoD review as an authoritative source. In the Views of Sexuality section, 
the nouns for people reveal an almost total focus on men on both sides of the 
debate, even though lesbians were equally affected by the ban. This links to the 
protection of male gender boundaries in both the military ethos and homophobic 
beliefs. Homosexual was the main anti-repeal adjective and occurs mainly in 
reports of the Select Committee and Government acceptance of the MoD review. 
The pro-repeal adjectives were more varied. The proposed code of conduct was a 
recurrent theme in uses of homosexual, heterosexual and sexual, while GAY 
occurs mainly in reports of SIB investigations and the experiences of GAY forces 
personnel. Notably, neither gay nor gays were used by anti-repeal speakers.
 The ban’s repeal in 2000 resulted in the anomaly that from 2000 to 2003, 
forces personnel were the only lesbian, gay and bisexual employees protected by 
employment equality legislation. This chapter completes the analyses in the first 
legislative period. The first analysis in the second period focuses on the Adoption 
and Children Bill 2001-2 which is examined in Chapter 8.
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Chapter 8
Adoption and Children (2001-2)
 Labour won the 1997 election with a landslide majority of 179 and, with 
Rupert Murdoch behind him, Tony Blair as prime minister (Davies 2014 ch.9). 
After 18 years of Conservative rule there were hopes for change “across a range 
of social policies” (Epstein et al 2000: 6). Various changes in Blair’s first term 
eased the passage of later reforms. The Amsterdam Treaty 1997 included sexual 
orientation in a provision to ban workplace discrimination. The Human Rights 
Act 1998 incorporated the ECvHR into UK law. The Scottish Parliament and the 
Welsh and Northern Irish Assemblies were created in 1998. The latter was based 
on the principle of power sharing set out in the Good Friday Agreement, which 
brought an uneasy peace to Northern Ireland. Section 75 of the Northern Ireland 
Act included sexual orientation in its obligation to promote equality. The Greater 
London Authority Act 1999, which reinstated an autonomous council for Greater 
London, also included sexual orientation in its anti-discrimination section. The 
House of Lords Act 1999 reduced hereditary peers from 758 to 92. Legislation 
specific to lesbians and gay men included the age of consent equalisation and an 
attempt to repeal Section 28 (Appendix 1).
 The 2001 election was again won by Labour with another large majority of 
167. However, support for the Government waned with Blair’s commitment to US 
military action after 11.9.2001. Afghanistan was invaded on 7.10.2001. The Anti-
Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 was rushed through amid controversy. 
Other controversial legislation included the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum 
Act 2002 and incremental privatisation of the health and education services in 
the Health and Social Care Act 2001 and the Education Act 2002. Legislation 
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affecting lesbians and gay men shifted from repealing discriminatory laws to new 
legal protections and recognitions (Appendix 1). 
 This chapter outlines the context of an amendment to the Adoption and 
Children Bill which shows the Government’s cautious and strategic approach to 
the deletion of ‘married’ as a requirement for joint applicants. A review of relevant 
research follows, plus a summary of the amendment’s parliamentary passage 
and an account of the selected debate. Comparisons of each side’s top-ten 
keywords and the sexuality terms used are followed by a discussion.
 Political Context
 The Adoption and Children Bill was introduced late in 2000, but lapsed 
before the 2001 election. It was revived early in Blair’s second term. The Bill’s 
main purpose was “to increase the number of children adopted from care” by 
improving the adoption service (HC Research Paper 01/33: 15). Existing law 
required that couples applying to adopt were married, but individuals, including 
lesbians and gay men, could apply whether or not they were in a relationship. 
The first Bill made no provision for unmarried couples to adopt, but did enable 
two unmarried people to apply jointly for a Special Guardianship Order whereby 
the child could retain a link to its birth parent(s). 
 The British Agencies for Adoption and Fostering (BAAF) welcomed the Bill. 
Among the issues raised by individual agencies in the consultation, NORCAP 
(National Organisation for Counselling Adoptees and Parents) argued:
We also regret that there is no change to the status quo that adoption orders are granted to 
married couples or individuals. MPs may be concerned that provision for adoption orders 
to be made to couples who are [not married] would be interpreted by their constituents and 
others as promoting adoption by gay couples. This is not the key factor. Please re-examine 
this from a child-centred perspective - 
(HC Research Paper 01/33, 23.3.2001: 38). 
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Unless there is legislation, which few people would welcome, that children should only be 
placed with married couples or single people who live alone then placements with 
unmarried couples both heterosexual and gay will be made. If they are the people who 
together can meet the child’s needs then the child needs to be adopted by both of them. 
(ibid p.39)
In the House of Commons Research Paper accompanying the Bill’s revival, the 
Government acknowledged that: 
Several of the organisations giving evidence to the Select Committee were critical of the fact 
that unmarried and/or same-sex couples will not be able to adopt, although the Bill does 
not rule out the possibility, which exists now, that a single person who is cohabiting could 
become the adoptive parent. 
(HC Research Paper 01/78, 26.10.2001: 27)
Among the BAAF’s and NORCAP’s concerns in the Paper’s response section are:
We [the BAAF] are concerned that the Bill continues to restrict adoption to married couples 
or single people. We believe it does a disservice to children not to allow two adults in a 
stable long term relationship to adopt a child jointly.
[...]
If we restrict joint adoption to married adults we can only reduce the opportunity for 
children to find adoptive parents – there is already a shortage of adopters for many groups 
of children. While it remains impossible for both partners in a cohabiting relationship to 
adopt, the child will be deprived of the joint legal and lifetime commitment by these 
parents. (ibid p.40)
NORCAP remains greatly concerned by the inappropriateness of placing children for 
adoption with two adults who share a household but who are not married to one another 
whilst not providing for both adults to become adoptive parents to the child. People in non-
marital relationships can and do parent children most successfully, they are needed within 
the pool of potential adopters. What the child needs is the opportunity to be adopted by 
both of them. (ibid p.48)
A combination of adoption agency submissions, Labour backbench pressure and 
support in the Guardian, resulted in an amendment to delete ‘married’ from the 
Bill. Blair gave Labour a free vote and the Commons passed the amendment, but 
the Lords reinserted ‘married’. Back in the Commons ‘married’ was again deleted 
with increased support from Conservative rebels, which eased acceptance of the 
change in the Lords’. The Act included many necessary adoption-law reforms. 
Sections 45, 50 and 51 apply to adopters:
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45 Suitability of adopters
(1) Regulations under section 9 may make provision as to the matters to be taken 
into account by an adoption agency in determining, or making any report in 
respect of, the suitability of any persons to adopt a child.
(2) In particular, the regulations may make provision for the purpose of securing 
that, in determining the suitability of a couple to adopt a child, proper regard is 
had to the need for stability and permanence in their relationship.
50 Adoption by couple
(1) An adoption order may be made on the application of a couple where both of 
them have attained the age of 21 years.
(2) An adoption order may be made on the application of a couple where—
(a) one of the couple is the mother or the father of the person to be adopted 
and has attained the age of 18 years, and
(b) the other has attained the age of 21 years.
51 Adoption by one person
(1) An adoption order may be made on the application of one person who has 
attained the age of 21 years and is not married.
(2) An adoption order may be made on the application of one person who has 
attained the age of 21 years if the court is satisfied that the person is the partner 
of a parent of the person to be adopted.
(3) An adoption order may be made on the application of one person who has 
attained the age of 21 years and is married if the court is satisfied that—
(a) the person’s spouse cannot be found,
(b) the spouses have separated and are living apart, and the separation is 
likely to be permanent, or
(c) the person’s spouse is by reason of ill-health, whether physical or 
mental, incapable of making an application for an adoption order.
(4) An adoption order may not be made on an application under this section by the 
mother or the father of the person to be adopted unless the court is satisfied that—
(a) the other natural parent is dead or cannot be found,
(b) by virtue of section 28 of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 
1990 (c. 37), there is no other parent, or
(c) there is some other reason justifying the child’s being adopted by the 
applicant alone, and, where the court makes an adoption order on such an 
application, the court must record that it is satisfied as to the fact 
mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b) or, in the case of paragraph (c), record 
the reason.
(Adoption and Children Act 2002, Chapter 3, Sections 45, 50, 51)
Adoption by same-sex couples is not mentioned, but with the omission of 
‘married’ is not excluded. With no potential for discrimination claims, the Act 
complied with the Human Rights Act.
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 Relevant Research
 The Adoption and Children Bill is briefly discussed by Waites (2005b). It is 
the main focus of a social-policy study (Dey 2005), and contextualises a study of 
narratives by and about lesbian and gay adopters and foster carers (Hicks 2005).
 Waites (2005b) reviews the persistence of essentialist thinking on sexual 
identity in key parliamentary debates since 1997. While such thinking was less 
evident in the adoption debates than those on the age of consent or Section 28, 
he qualifies the extent to which this suggests “new patterns of discourse” (548). 
On the adoption debates he acknowledges that, despite “deep-rooted prejudice 
against lesbian and gay parenting” and its believed threat to securing children’s 
heterosexual identity, a majority of MPs and children’s organisations supported 
same-sex couples as adopters (550-1). Yet, in both the Section 28 and adoption 
debates, it was claimed that “encounters with lesbian and gay people in the 
contexts of education and parenting do not influence sexual-identity formation” 
(551). His concern is that essentialist claims have infiltrated “popular common 
sense” (552) and are structuring young people’s sexual-identity formation within 
the polarising heterosexual/homosexual binary which protects heterosexuality. 
He accepts that political responses need to be strategic “to a degree” (562) and 
points to the wider context through which sexuality politics must find a path. 
Thus his suggestion that completion of the above debates offers an opportunity 
“to change the terms of debate” (ibid) may be optimistic. The Adoption and 
Children Act did mark a legislative shift towards social inclusion, but MPs’ and 
Lords’ support was not only focused on non-heterosexual parenting. 
 Dey (2005) evaluates the passage of the Bill in terms of policy issues. He 
views it as an example of how state and society are responding to changes in 
family composition, but his focus is the Government’s motivation and strategy. 
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He argues that the Government’s focus on administrative delay in the adoption 
process allowed them to “navigate the political debate around adoption with 
minimum opposition and maximum comfort” (5). He charts their navigation of 
the Bill’s two major controversies: first over the policy of racial matching; second 
over the policy of married couples. He views the Government’s approach as an 
exercise in political pragmatism. On the elegibility of unmarried couples, he 
argues that they had anticipated resistance and acceded only when the adoption 
agencies had made the case for change (10). While he sees the free vote as lack of 
Government courage rather than strategic, he sees the absorption of lesbian, gay 
and heterosexual couples into the category of ‘unmarried’ as a means to avoid 
conflict with human rights law and charges of discrimination. On the Commons 
response to the Lords’ reinsertion of ‘married’, he sees the Labour emphasis on 
expanding the pool of adopters in the interests of children in care as Government 
spin to overcome opposition to same-sex couples adopting. However, his view of 
the Conservative rebellion as marker of the spin’s success is questionable. Other 
factors were at play, not least in ongoing Conservative divisions (Watt 4.11.2002). 
Dey argues that the case for not discriminating against same-sex couples was 
passed by default, but notes there is good evidence on children’s well-being to 
support adoption by same-sex couples had the case been argued⎯evidence that, 
as he shows, was informing other northern European legislatures. He concludes 
with statistics showing the Act only slightly increased adoption rates. While his 
reference to “the gay movement” (12) is oddly unfamiliar, he recognises the Act’s 
positive response to more “diverse forms of family life” and that the Government’s 
failure to oppose popular prejudices “tacitly legitimated them” (13).
 Hicks (2005) analyses narratives by and about lesbian and gay adopters 
and foster carers with reference to the application process, the Lords debates, 
and a lesbian and gay parenting magazine. His analysis has four sections. The 
first reviews narratives that treat lesbian and gay parenting as an unremarkable 
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activity, characterised by assertions of similarity to heterosexual families and 
accounts of the mundane activities of parenting. He notes that some feminist and 
queer theorists see such assertions as assimilationist, but argues that parents 
may make them to claim legitimacy and counter prejudice. Hicks’ second section 
reviews narratives that treat lesbian and gay families as radical or oppositional. 
As he notes, such claims can be made for opposing reasons. He cites Baroness 
O’Cathain as an example of a social conservative who views lesbian and gay 
parenting as a threat to society, marriage and ‘the family’. By contrast, lesbian 
and gay parents may refer to alternative kinship networks or claim they are 
redefining ‘the family’. He argues that they may make such claims to counter 
heteronormative assumptions about ‘the family’ and that they often “sit next to 
and in contradiction with claims of normality and legitimacy” (302). Hicks’ third 
section explores these contradictions. He argues that both radical and conformist 
views of lesbian and gay parenting have “fixed views” of such families’ intentions 
and experiences (303). Accounts designating “inherent radicalism or assimilation 
do not adequately deal with the ways that family narratives by lesbians and gay 
men demonstrate complex assertions about their everyday ethics and struggles” 
(304). Hicks’ fourth section reviews the narratives in a social work context: 
My view is that many foster care or adoption applicants are faced with, and wish to 
challenge, routine experiences of homophobia. Apart from the wide range of 
heteronormative ideas that question the moral or practical legitimacy of lesbian and gay 
foster or adoptive care, those applicants who do manage to be assessed by social work 
agencies nevertheless have to negotiate a path strewn with strange and limiting notions 
about ‘sexuality’ (304). 
In this context, he concludes that lesbian and gay parents “use legitimacy and 
conformity claims to challenge heteronormative practices [and] rebellion 
narratives to assert their ‘difference’ and the importance of their sexuality” (305). 
In analysing these narrative selves, he hopes to stimulate questions about 
intimacy, care and parenting in social-work practice.
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 Both Waites and Dey see the passage of the Adoption and Children Bill in 
terms of response to social changes in family composition, but as Hicks shows, 
social workers’ suspicions and fears related to adoption and fostering applicants’ 
sexuality were lingering on despite the adoption-agency submissions.
 The Passage of the Bill
 Before the Bill’s revival, the BAAF commissioned a MORI poll which found 
7% of married couples but 14% of unmarried couples would consider adopting. 
The Guardian published this finding the day of the Bill’s second reading (Collier 
29.10.2001). The debate (HC 29.10.2001 cc.649-726) was wide-ranging and 
lasted five hours. Alan Milburn, Secretary of State for Health, introduced the Bill. 
He presented its primary focus as the best interests of the child and its specific 
target as children in institutional care. MPs from all main parties voiced support 
for unmarried couples (Debra Shipley, Evan Harris, Meg Munn, Liz Blackman, 
Hilton Dawson, Andrew Lansley, Kevin Brennan, Jonathan Shaw). The Bill had 
cross-party support and was passed to a Special Standing Committee.
 In January 2002, an early-day motion for unmarried couples to adopt 
attracted cross-party signatures. There was support in the liberal press (White & 
Blackstock/Woolf 23.1.2002) which noted some Conservatives wanted to restrict 
the definition of couple to ‘man and woman’. Ministers were reported to favour a 
free vote; Downing Street was said to be resistant to change. Tony Blair’s silence 
prompted Evan Harris to seek the Government’s view of the motion (24.1.2002 c.
1023; 31.1.2002 c.443); it was non-committal. Two months later, a Guardian 
leader (14.3.2002) cast the Government’s non-commitment as “pusillanimous”.
 At the Report stage of the Bill (20.3.2002 cc374-379), unmarried couples 
were among issues given more time for discussion. Uncontroversial parts of the 
Bill were then passed (cc.380-408). Two months later, Alan Milburn announced 
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an amendment to delete ‘married’ tabled by David Hinchliffe, the Committee’s 
chair, and a free vote (7.5.2002 cc.7-10). Evan Harris queried the absence of a 
Labour whip (ibid c.8) and was told it was a sensitive issue. Another amendment, 
tabled by Andrew Lansley, sought to have ‘couple’ defined as ‘man and woman’. 
 This got the tabloids interested. Headlines ranged from a moderate if 
inaccurate ‘Blair will allow gay couples to adopt’ (Revill 7.5.2002) to ‘OUTRAGE 
AT LAW MOVE TO LET GAYS ADOPT CHILDREN’ (Walker & Lee 8.5.2002). The 
Independent too opted for sensation ‘HOMOSEXUAL RIGHTS: GOVERNMENT 
BACKS CALL FOR ADOPTION BY GAY COUPLES’ (Woolf 8.5.2002). Only the 
Mirror was accurate and supportive ‘GAY PARTNERS GET THE CHANCE TO 
ADOPT’ (Hardy 8.5.2002). Condemnation rumbled on in the right-wing press 
(Phillips 13.5.2002; Bonthrone & Jones 14.5.2002).
 The amendment debate (16.5.2002 cc.967-1004) was limited to two hours. 
Two amendments were proposed. Evan Harris began with his Liberal Democrat 
amendment. He focused on social change, research on same-sex parenting, and 
human rights, but the timing of Labour interruptions suggests these were topics 
Labour sought to avoid. David Hinchliffe, by contrast, meandered through the 
scurrilous press coverage and his social-work credentials before focusing on legal 
anomalies, relationship stability and the rigorous adoption assessment. He cast 
adoption by same-sex couples as a “red herring” (c.981), but conceded it could be 
in the interests of some children. He appealed for children’s best interests to be 
paramount. MPs on both sides of the debate commended his measured tone, 
while Evan Harris was castigated and eventually withdrew. David Hinchliffe’s 
amendment was passed by 288 to 133 votes. Tony Blair supported it, as did four 
Conservatives against their party whip, while three Shadow Cabinet members 
abstained. Eighteen Labour MPs voted against, including nine Cabinet members 
⎯hence the free vote; three more Cabinet members abstained. The vote was 
widely reported in the press (17.5.2002). All featured ‘gay adoption’ and most 
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reviewed Conservative dissent. By contrast, Pink Paper (ibid) reported Stonewall’s 
“refusal to comment on the future of gay adoption despite the homophobic media 
furore that had greeted the Government’s announcement” of the free vote.
 Andrew Lansley’s amendment to limit the definition of couple was debated 
the following Monday (20.5.2002 cc.22-96) and defeated by 301 to 174 votes. The 
Bill’s third reading followed (cc.97-122). Press reports (21.5.2002) varied. Some 
featured Conservative divisions, others predicted a battle in the Lords. 
 The Bill’s second reading in the Lords spanned two sessions (10.6.2002 
cc.20-33; cc.46-115) and lasted five hours in total. Lord Hunt introduced the Bill 
for the Government. It was fully discussed, but marriage was a recurring theme. 
Baroness Young led the opposition to David Hinchliffe’s amendment, but there 
was considerable support for unmarried couples. Of the 28 peers who spoke, 22 
mentioned the issue: 13 in support, seven against and two non-committal. Lord 
Hunt commended the Bill to the House. 
 At the first Committee session (24.6.2002 cc.1-60GC) it was announced 
that amendments on which the Committee could not agree should be withdrawn 
until the Report stage. The Committee took up seven sessions. Amendments on 
unmarried couples were discussed during the first (ibid cc.20-35), the fourth 
(4.7.2002 cc.212-221GC) and the fifth (11.7.2002 cc.227-259GC). In the first, 
Lord Campbell sought to avert discrimination against homosexual couples. In the 
fourth, Lord Northborne sought to include assessment criteria for relationship 
stability and commitment to the child regardless of marital status. In the fifth, 
Earl Howe sought to reinsert ‘married’. Ten speakers took his claims apart. 
Baroness Gould noted the presence of peers who were absent when assessment 
criteria were discussed. There was no agreement. All three withdrew. 
 The Report stage took up four sessions. Unmarried couples were debated 
during the second (16.10.2002 cc.860-950). The day before the debate, the Mail 
cited a Christian Institute poll in Tony Blair’s constituency which claimed 71% of 
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the 500 respondents opposed gay couples adopting (Paveley 15.10.2002). The 
Telegraph and the Guardian quoted Baroness O’Cathain’s opposition at length 
(Jones/Ward 15.10.2002). On the day of the debate, the Telegraph reported the 
opposition of religious leaders and that the Christian Institute was proposing a 
‘donor card’ for (heterosexual) parents in case the Lords backed the Commons 
(Petre 16.10.2002). All papers highlighted ‘gay adoption’.
 The debate lasted three hours (16.10.2002 cc864-913). Earl Howe again 
presented his amendment. He concluded:
My greatest objection, if the Bill were to pass as it stands, is that for the purposes of 
adoption the law would place marriage, cohabitation and gay partnerships on a platform of 
legal equivalents. (c.868)
Lord Jenkin had not attended Committee debates but proposed an amendment 
limiting the definition of ‘unmarried’ to heterosexual couples. His concern was:
Just as a child must have both a father and a mother to come into the world, it is right 
that a couple adopting a child and becoming its adoptive parents should consist of a father 
and a mother. (c.871)
Twenty peers made speeches. Of the 11 who supported Earl Howe, most had not 
participated in previous debates and some appeared unfamiliar with the Bill. 
Baroness O’Cathain acknowledged her previous non-participation, but explained:
I do so because, the evening before she died, our late noble friend Lady Young asked me to 
do so. She had been feeling frail and wished to ensure that the cause of children would not 
go by default if she had not recovered before today. Your Lordships should note: “the cause 
of children”. Sadly, within 12 hours of my being able to take that concern off her 
shoulders, she died. (c.881) 
This had powerful emotional appeal. She then echoed much of Baroness Young’s 
speech at second reading and asked:
What is the justification for amending the Bill in the other place? Is it political correctness? 
Is it social engineering? Or—perish the thought—is it the permanent downgrading of 
marriage and the family? I repeat that it is the children I am concerned about. (c.882)
252
Baroness Blatch owned to missing Baroness Young and was “proud to follow in 
[her] noble friend’s footsteps” (c.897). The privileging of marriage and by proxy 
heterosexuality, along with belief in the necessity of a ‘mother and father’, were 
the core concerns of Earl Howe’s supporters, amplified by injections of Christian 
idealism. As Weeks notes: 
Marriage matters because it promotes and naturalises heterosexuality as the norm, and 
thus by definition excludes non-heterosexual people. 
(Weeks 2011: 109)
All nine speakers who argued against Earl Howe had spoken in previous debates. 
They focused on: relationship quality, the ability to offer a child a secure home, 
the life chances of children in care, the lack of threat to marriage, social change, 
and need for a wide range of adopters for a wide range of children. Lord Campbell  
reviewed the human rights position. In summarising, Lord Hunt, after echoing 
tributes to Baroness Young, highlighted the life chances of children in care, 
invoked the widespread professional support and refuted the charge of political 
correctness: two legal parents offered more security than one. Lord Jenkin then 
withdrew his amendment and Earl Howe’s was passed by 196 to 162 votes.
 The next day’s papers again highlighted ‘gay adoption’ (Blackman/Cecil/ 
Eastham & Paveley/Jones/Russell/Wintour 17.10.2002), while the Times also 
presented the vote as a defeat for Blair (Kite 17.10.2002). After the Bill’s third 
reading (30.10.2002 cc.199-251), it was returned to the Commons. The debate 
on unmarried couples is analysed below.
 The Debate
 On the Bill’s return, David Hichliffe re-tabled his amendment to delete 
‘married’ and the issue was debated again (4.11.2002 cc.24-96), for five hours. 
As before, Labour MPs had a free vote and Conservatives were under a three-line 
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whip. Thirty MPs spoke, 16 made speeches, 12 in support of the amendment 
(Appendix 49). All speakers against the amendment were Conservative and 8/9 
were men, as were the four speechmakers. Of the cross-party speakers for the 
amendment, 15/21 were Labour⎯five of whom were women, four of whom made 
speeches. In addition, seven Labour speakers had worked in social services, 
children’s homes, or for Barnardo’s (David Hinchliffe, Dari Taylor, Meg Munn, Liz 
Blackman, Jonathan Shaw, Hilton Dawson, Julie Morgan) and two were adoptive 
parents (Michael Jabez Foster, Dari Taylor). Of Conservatives complying with 
their party whip, Jonathan Djanogly had chaired a social services committee.
 David Hinchliffe introduced the debate by proposing “this House disagrees 
with the Lords in the said amendment” (c.24): 
I take the view that the purpose of the original amendment was fundamentally 
misunderstood and misrepresented in another place. I should like to address my concerns 
about that misrepresentation of the purposes of the original amendment agreed to by this 
House. (c.24)
He wanted to consider the main theme of the Lords anxieties. He was puzzled as 
to “why so-called gay adoptions had dominated their lordships’ concerns” (c.27): 
Certain myths are doing the rounds in the other place that perhaps underpin their 
lordships’ misunderstanding of what we, I hope, will propose in the Commons. (c.28)
The Lords lacked knowledge about pre-adoption assessment:
The peers do not seem to understand that there is an extremely thorough and complex 
process that leads to a large number of applicants being rooted out. (c.29)
I genuinely feel that the Lords fundamentally misunderstood the processes that occur 
before people are allowed to adopt. (c.29)
They seemed to have accepted “all the tabloid tales of so-called politically correct 
social workers’ rejections of adoption applications” (c.29): 
I suspect that their lordships have fundamentally misunderstood the difficulties that may 
be involved in defending those decisions. (c.29)
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On social engineering, he cited the Lords’ concern about married couples losing 
their priority and asked “who is involved in social engineering?” (c.30). 
 By representing the Lords’ position as ‘misunderstanding’ he avoided 
criticising their ‘protection-of-marriage’/‘man-and-woman’/‘mother-and-father’ 
agenda. As this very long debate progressed, previously aired arguments were 
restored, restated and repeated. Concessions and qualifications on both sides 
suggest caution, not least in relation to same-sex couples, albeit for different 
reasons. Speakers who disagreed with the Lords generally circumvented this 
most contentious topic. Speakers who agreed with the Lords were wary of being 
seen as homophobic. Speakers who disagreed focused on the need to increase 
the number of potential adopters and the rigorous assessment of applicants. 
Speakers who agreed focused on multifarious statistics claiming the instability  
of unmarried relationships and Social Services’ bureaucracy. Both sides hung 
their arguments on children’s best interests. Both sides highlighted the plight of 
children awaiting adoption to maximise emotive appeal. Marriage was a recurring 
theme and became a proxy for underlying concerns.
 Speakers disagreeing with the Lords carefully respected the institution of 
marriage amid concessions to traditional views and qualifications of adoption 
applicants. David Hinchliffe believed in marriage:
I should like again to stress my personal strongly held belief in marriage. I do not want to 
cover ground that I covered in detail last time we debated the Bill, but I believe that if we 
had more marriage in society, we would have a much more stable society in which children 
are happier and perhaps stand a better chance in later life. Perhaps we as a society should 
spend more time considering how we support and promote marriage. (c.24)
His amendment’s supporters had no wish to undermine it:
Many of my friends are Catholics, and they are divided. Some are strongly in support of the 
amendments’ aims and objectives. They understand that the supporters do not wish to 
undermine the institution of marriage. (c.25)
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He did not defend the decline of marriage:
Within the House and elsewhere in wider society, apparently more and more people choose 
to live in long-term stable relationships without going through the marriage ceremony. I do 
not defend that necessarily, but I respect the fact that people have the right to take that 
course if they so wish. (c.25)
I cited figures in our previous debate to show that in 25 years, approximately 20 per cent. 
of couples will live together without going through a marriage ceremony. I do not defend 
that trend, but we must live in the real world and understand that, simply because people 
are not married, it does not mean that they cannot bring up children appropriately in 
stable relationships. (c.25-6)
Although its stability was not guaranteed:
As I said in our previous debate, I have a background in adoption and guardian ad litem 
work. I know of cases of married couples who adopted children and whose marriages 
subsequently broke down. In many instances, that cannot be predicted. (c.26)
Yet he restricted the appropriacy of adoption by unmarried partners:
The amendments to the Lords amendments secure the best interests of children by 
acknowledging that in some circumstances, they may be served by adoption by unmarried 
partners. (c.26)
His caution is palpable. He conceded the primacy of marriage while arguing for 
the integrity of unmarried couples, then restricted the appropriacy of adoption by 
unmarried partners while maintaining its irrelevance to children in care. Michael 
Jabez Foster conceded marriage may be the best if not the only option:
I acknowledge that the best option for bringing up children may be a man and a woman in 
a committed relationship, which will often mean marriage, but to suggest that marriage is 
the only relationship that will provide a satisfactory outcome is patent nonsense. (c.33)
He argued for confidence in professional judgment, but conceded:
It is true that many opponents acknowledge the right of individuals to live as they wish, 
but they simply consider that placing the precious lives of children in such a situation is 
wrong. I would go so far as to accept that, although this is not necessarily the case, the 
best chance of a successful adoption may be with a married couple including a mother and 




We may be right or wrong that the wife-husband married partnership is the best option for 
the placement of a child in most circumstances, but, again, that is not the issue. The issue 
is, as I say, choosing between an orthodox family perhaps and none at all. (c.35)
Among speakers disagreeing with the Lords, the primacy of marriage continued 
to be, if not upheld, then conceded, or at least unquestioned. Andrew Lansley 
took concessionary issue with marriage-stability claims:
Although I do not disagree [with] the general proposition that married circumstances offer 
children a better home, success depends on the individual decisions on placement and the 
characteristics of the home. Given that 95 per cent. of current adoption placements are 
with married couples, 20 per cent., on average, will end in disruption. (c.40)
Jonathan Shaw, in reply to a question, exposed the Lords’ subtext:
Gay people cannot marry. (c.48)
Evan Harris distinguished marriage from the qualities of good parents:
Given the stringent application process and the rigorous assessments that are made on a 
case-by-case basis, there is no justification for disqualifying a couple from adopting jointly 
simply because they do not possess a marriage certificate, if they clearly possess all the 
characteristics that the agency would expect of suitable adoptive parents. (c.51)
Meg Munn affirmed marriage was a voluntary arrangement:
To suggest that people who do not believe in marriage should marry and, therefore, be 
hypocritical—as in the example the hon. Gentleman cites—would fundamentally 
undermine the trust relationship at the beginning of the process. (c.52)
Evan Harris agreed:
One cannot claim to be supporting marriage by forcing people into it for other motives, 
whatever our views on the value of marriage. (c.52)
John Bercow hailed David Hinchliffe’s commitment to marriage:
He is a champion of marriage and he is practising his commitment to it. I, too, believe in 
marriage. (c.65)
Dari Taylor conceded the ideal of marriage:
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Members are putting to the House their clear committed ideas on married couples and 
saying that they are the best and the ideal. Nobody denies or doubts that, but often we are 
not dealing with the best or the ideal. We live with the reality. (c.81)
She lauded the approach of voluntary agencies:
Through innovative and pioneering practice in the Voluntary Adoption Sector over two 
decades, many excellent placements have been achieved for older children with troubled 
histories with single carers, who would not previously have been considered suitable for 
adoptive parenting because of their lone status during a time when marriage was perceived 
by society as the ‘norm’. (c.81)
And she affirmed the rigour of adoption assessment:
The scrutiny of potential adopters does not involve the marriage contract, but, importantly, 
it is rigorous. It attempts competently to define whether they could produce a stable home 
and a loving relationship. (c.82)
Kevin Brennan implied unmarried couples were less than ideal:
We are not arguing that adoption by unmarried couples is the ideal, but it is wrong to 
make the ideal the enemy of the good when we are considering the interests of the child.  
(c.86)
Hilton Dawson prioritised children’s needs:
Whatever well founded principles one has about marriage or Christian principles governing 
the way that people should live their lives, it cannot be right to put them above the 
individual needs of children who require placements. (c.91)
Surely we cannot say that any individual child should lose out on the lifetime opportunity 
of stability and family life because we think that we should put off a decision until we have 
got the law right, that we should stand on our principles about marriage, or that we should 
put anything before the needs of individual children. (c.91-2)
In her summary, the Minister, Jacqui Smith was direct: 
Some have seen these amendments as an attack on marriage. That is rubbish. (c.95)
For speakers disagreeing with the Lords, believing in marriage and conceding it 
as ideal defended them against the charge of undermining it. Criticising marriage 
was politically risky. The prevalence of concessions is significant. Many occur in 
disclaimers (van Dijk 2008a: 109-10) that either concede the primacy of marriage 
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while not excluding alternatives, or counterbalance the amendment with factors 
such as the rigorous assessment of adoption applicants. Together they illustrate 
the continuing social power of marriage. In addition, seven speakers highlighted 
their own married credentials. For David Hinchliffe it was a choice:
When I met my wife, we determined to marry; we both chose to marry. I respect the fact 
that others may not choose the same course of action— (c.25)
For Michael Jabez Foster it was stereotypical:
My wife Rosemary and I have two adopted sons, Damien and Luke, who have been a great 
joy to us. I hope that we have provided the stability in their lives that stereotype adopters 
can perhaps best and most easily provide. However, the issue is not who are the best 
adopters; this is not a competition, but a market. It is a fact that there are young people, 
many with disabilities and other challenges, who are not easily adoptable in terms of the 
stereotype husband and wife family, ... (c.34)
For Dari Taylor it was distinct from her commitment to her child:
Would he say that my loving, caring commitment to my child is a consequence of my 
marriage vows, or that it comes from my being naturally loving and caring, and has 
nothing to do with those vows at all? (c.49)
For Meg Munn it was incidental to her experience of children needing adoption:
Finally, a lovely group of boys, aged four to 12, smile out at us—Leonard, Thomas, Jamie 
and William. For 30 seconds I look at them and think, “Wouldn’t it be great to take those 
four boys home?” If my husband is listening, he will be panicking by now. The children 
look nice and are smiling out from their photos, but they have all had a difficult start in 
life. They have experienced rejection and they have behavioural difficulties. They will test 
the patience of the most loving, caring and resilient person, not because they are bad 
children or because they want to behave like that, but because of their experiences. (c.60) 
For John Bercow it was a forthcoming commitment:
I am—I hope, God willing—soon to demonstrate my commitment to marriage, when in 33 
days’ time, here in the House of Commons, I get married. I look forward to the joys of 
marriage, and I ought to have the humility to put on record my extreme gratitude that I 
have been lucky enough to find a gracious future wife who has, rather generously, agreed 
to slow down the process of my inevitable deterioration. That said, and fan of marriage 
though I am, I do not think that that institution is or should be the centrepiece or defining 
feature of the debate about adoption. It certainly should not be. (c.65) 
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Hilton Dawson congratulated John Bercow:
It is appropriate to congratulate him on both his speech and his forthcoming marriage. 
(c.90) 
And hailed the length of his own marriage:
I am pleased to point out to the hon. Member for Buckingham [John Bercow], who brought 
up the subject, that I have been married for much longer than my hon. Friend the Member 
for Wakefield (Mr. Hinchliffe). By the time of the marriage of the hon. Member for 
Buckingham, I shall have been married for 29 years.  (c.90-1)
Jacqui Smith was dismissive:
My marriage is not made stronger by knowing that the loving, caring and skilled potential 
parents down the road are prevented from offering a home to a child because they are not 
married. Marriage is not the strong institution that I believe it to be if it has to be protected 
by limiting the life chances of vulnerable children. (c.95)
That these speakers were disagreeing with the Lords in a dispute ostensibly 
about marriage, suggests a contextual advantage in highlighting their personal 
commitment to it. However, in affirming their marital status, they were also 
alluding to their heterosexuality. Predictably, the allusions passed without 
critical attention (Wodak 2007: 214). They suggest speakers’ residual unease 
about leaving their sexuality undefined when, albeit indirectly, defending what 
had been cast by the press as ‘gay adoption’. These allusions further suggest that 
heterosexuality was becoming less taken for granted if nonetheless preferred.   
As Weeks notes:
The emergence of people explicitly declaring their heterosexuality, or straightness, may be 
a testimony to continuing fear of the other. But it also indicates a growing pluralization of 
sexual subject positions and identities that requires the articulation of what was hitherto 
unspoken. 
(Weeks 2011: 82) 
The indirectness of these allusions does not undermine Weeks’ point. Speakers 
alluding to their heterosexuality are rare in previously analysed debates which 
supports its previously more taken-for-granted status.
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 Significantly, only one speaker who agreed with the Lords, Julian Brazier, 
felt the need to affirm his married credentials⎯ironically in a concession to its 
less than ideal reality: 
Nobody would argue that every marriage is perfect. From time to time, my good lady 
reminds me that my marriage is imperfect. I pay tribute to my wife, who has done 18 years' 
service—six more than it took me to get my Territorial decoration—for putting up with me. 
Nobody argues that there are no stable relationships outside marriage. However, the 
burden of the statistics is overwhelmingly on the side of marriage. (c.75)
Arguments for marriage stability were the mainstay of speakers agreeing with the 
Lords and were widely supported by often unreferenced or generalised statistics, 
as in Andrew Selous’ early intervention:
What is the hon. Gentleman's response to the statistic that 83 per cent. of cohabitations 
that do not become marriages break up in 10 years, whereas 60 per cent. of marriages last 
for life? (c.26)
Jonathan Djanogly invoked pro-marriage organisations:
I am sure that all hon. Members present have received an enormous amount of 
documentation from any number of organisations that maintains that marriage is the best 
state for adoptive parents. (c.31)
He conceded alternatives:
I admit that sometimes personal circumstances—perhaps if a strong foster or other 
relationship already exists—can mean that it is correct that a person, whether single or 
gay, or an unmarried couple, should be entitled to adopt. (c.31)
But he sidelined same-sex adoption:
Even if it were acceptable that non-marrieds should regularly be able to adopt—which I do 
not accept—most adopted children will know, by reason of their age, that children 
normally have parents who are married and not of the same sex. (c.32)
Generalised statistics followed:
Surveys have proved that in such cases children will often keep the identity of their 
parents a secret, both at school and from their peers. Furthermore, as has been 
mentioned, couples who cohabit out of marriage are statistically almost twice as likely to 
separate as those who are married. (c.32)
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He did not accept more adoptive parents were needed:
Statistics show that there is no shortage of people who want to adopt. [...] it is a question 
not of who wants to adopt but of who is acceptable to the professionals. (c.33)
Tim Loughton sought to focus on Social Services bureaucracy: 
I want to consider widening the pool, the current obstructions to adoption inherent in the 
system and the legal implications of moving from marriage as a benchmark in law to a 
system of flat equality. (c.40-1)
He claimed a majority view on the ideal, yet he conceded:
We all [...] accept that in an ideal world a mother and father figure is best, although not 
always achievable and not always entirely appropriate when dealing with certain very 
damaged children. (c.38)
His approach to statistics was initially careful:
I do not want to get bogged down in trading statistics and dubious research. I start from 
the premise that although marriage is not a dead cert, by all accounts it offers the best 
probability of a stable home for an adopted child. [...] Furthermore, my remarks are based 
on the rough premise presented by the figures from the Office for National Statistics: that 
cohabiting couples are more likely—by whatever margin we care to state—to split up. (c.41)
But then he conjectured:
In this country at the moment there are 11 million married couples. So we need 1,900 
couples to adopt one of those children each. [...] That represents 0.17 per cent. of the 
entire married couples pool in the country at the moment. Indeed, we are not short of new 
raw material, as 268,000 marriages occurred last year and for once we are seeing a slight 
increase in the number of people marrying. (c.41)
And affirmed the heterosexuality of marriage:
Once marriage is removed as the benchmark for adoption, there will be no midway 
compromise. I remind hon. Members that marriage is defined in the European convention 
on human rights as marriage between a male and a female. (c.45)
Jonathan Djanogly revised a generalised statistic:
No one here queries the statistics that say that the rate of divorce among unmarried 
couples is significantly—two or three times—higher than among married couples. (c.49)
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Julian Brazier was more specific:
A survey that the Office for National Statistics conducted in 1997 says it all for me. The 
survey showed that a child born 10 years earlier, in 1987, whose parents were married had 
an 81 per cent. chance of being with parents who remained married in 1997. A child born 
into an allegedly stable relationship in 1987, whose parents did not get married almost 
immediately afterwards, had only a 15 per cent. chance of being with parents who 
remained in a stable relationship 10 years later. (cc.75-6)
He added:
The idea that the views of a specific social worker on a relationship are so powerful that 
such statistics can be brushed aside in the best interests of the child is unconvincing. 
(c.76)
But his insistence on marriage clearly sidelined same-sex couples:
We have civil law marriages in this country and, as the hon. Member for Wakefield said, the 
vast majority of cases involve heterosexual couples. We simply ask, if both individuals want 
to have legal ties to the child, is it so much to expect them to make a binding legal tie to 
each other? A civil marriage contract is simply that. (c.76)
He went on assert:
A moment ago, I gave the statistics for heterosexual couples. [...] The argument that I 
applied to heterosexual couples applies in spades to homosexual couples. Their 
partnerships last a much shorter time than those of heterosexual couples. Before my hon. 
Friend says that he can point to individual cases of long-lasting relationships, I accept that 
there are a few. However, we are dealing with a relatively small pool about which not many 
statistics are available. (c.76)
Then he defensively insisted:
My point is about splitting up rather than homosexual adoption. (c.77)
Andrew Selous sought to defend statistics, then generalised:
We know that the average length of cohabitation is only two years. We know that 83 per 
cent. of cohabitations will break up within 10 years.I am sure that everybody— married 
couples, unmarried couples or same-sex couples—starts their relationship hoping that it 
will be permanent. [...] However, we know from the statistics and the evidence, which we 
are not here to dispute tonight, that married relationships provide the most permanent 
form of security, and that is what we are concerned about for adopted children. (c.88)
He became more emotive:
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I think that my argument is backed up by the fact that cohabiting couples are, sadly, six 
and a half times more likely than married couples to split up after the birth of a child. I am 
concerned about permanence and continuing stability for these very damaged children. 
(c.88)
And he concluded:
We need a positive campaign to persuade more married couples to adopt. We need to 
remove some of the procedures. [...] We should take away unnecessary barriers to 
adoption. (c.90)
This was ironic when removing a barrier was the amendment’s purpose.
 Interestingly, speakers agreeing with the Lords made no accusations of 
undermining marriage. Their concessions to alternative adoption arrangements 
are also notable. As they were not challenging the pre-amendment status-quo, 
even though it did not exclude lesbian and gay individuals as adoptive parents, 
they needed to acknowledge alternatives in order to be coherent. However, their 
defence of heterosexuality via their upholding of marriage is clear.
 Speakers disagreeing with the Lords challenged the relationship statistics 
on the basis of mismatched samples and irrelevance:
The first point to make, which has been made clear by statisticians and others who have 
done research in this area, is that we are not comparing like with like. People who do not 
believe that they will remain with their partner for a lifetime are more likely to be in the 
[unmarried group]. That does not mean that all the people in the unmarried group do not 
have the same commitment as many of those in the married group. 
(Evan Harris c.53)
This is not about statistics. It is not about the number of relationships that break down or 
the number of people who live in gay relationships and how long they have been together. It 
is about matching children to homes. 
(Meg Munn c.61)
It may well be valid as a general proposition, as the statistical evidence adduced would 
appear to suggest, that married couples’ relationships are longer lasting and more stable 
than those of unmarried couples. However, it seems a non sequitur to generalise from 
those statistics when we are dealing, and when we know that we are dealing, in the context 
of a debate about adoption, with a specific and self-selecting group of cohabiting people ... 
(John Bercow c.68)
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The statistics that opponents of the motion are advancing are deeply flawed, because they 
are not comparing the right samples. They are considering only the generality of statistics 
on unmarried couples. They are not looking at the unmarried couples who are putting 
themselves forward as adopters. 
(Kevin Brennan c.87)
The hon. Gentleman mentions statistics. Is it not the case that many cohabiting couples 
have no intention of remaining together and have no children to care for? It is therefore 
misleading to compare them with married couples, ... 
(Michael Jabez Foster c.88)
Jacqui Smith agreed:
The overall statistics are not, therefore, a helpful guide. People who are in casual, short-
term relationships are most unlikely to put themselves forward as prospective adopters, 
and if they did, they would certainly not advance beyond the first stage of the approval 
process. (c.95)
In concluding the debate, she failed to see how enabling an adopted child to have 
a legal relationship with both parents undermined stability. She presented the 
choice as one between real-life and ideals:
This debate is about making difficult but fundamental choices for children. It is about 
whether our adoption system should be based on the needs of individual children and 
families or on dogma backed up by dodgy statistics. It is about whether we focus on the 
reality of modern children and families or on outdated visions of a supposedly perfect 
family life. It is about whether more children are adopted or whether they end up staying in 
care. (c.96)
She agreed it was a difficult issue, but the Government had said it would listen 
and that was why the reforms were being introduced⎯at which point the vote 
was called.
 Amid emotive appeals, children’s best interests were sacrosanct. Phrases 
such as ‘languishing in care’ and ‘damaged children’ recurred. No-one suggested 
improving institutional care; only Hilton Dawson acknowledged the value of the 
whole care system. No-one defined good parenting; only Liz Blackman repeatedly 
stressed ‘good quality parents’. For pro-reform speakers, suitable parents were 
rigorously assessed. For anti-reform speakers, suitable parents were married and 
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by proxy heterosexual. Pro-reform speakers linked their generally more reasoned 
arguments to real-life examples, but variously conceded the ideal of marriage. 
Thus the institution of marriage remained unquestioned and the status of 
heterosexuality protected. 
 The proposal to disagree with the Lords was carried by 344 to 145 votes. 
Eight Conservatives voted against their party whip; 35 Conservatives abstained. 
The next day’s press portrayed the Conservative rebellion as an attack on Iain 
Duncan Smith’s leadership (Blackman/Eastham/Jones/Watt/Waugh & Woolf/ 
Webster & Hurst 5.11.2002). The ‘gay adoption’ theme that had dominated 
reports since May was almost forgotten in the rush to speculate on his survival. 
Yet adoption by same-sex couples was the subtext of the debate. 
 The Lords accepted the change, but the composition of the House differed 
(5.11.2002 cc.569-624). While 358 Lords had voted on 16.10.2002, 399 did so on 
5.11.2002. Of Lords supporting the Commons, 86.4% voted on both occasions, 
but only 69.4% of the Lords who had supported Earl Howe did so, five of whom 
changed their vote. 
 Words and Themes
 The following analyses focus on each side’s top-ten keywords (Appendices 
53 & 54) and their collocates (Appendices 55 & 56). Core features of each side’s 
contributions to the debate are shown on Flowcharts 7 and 8 below. 
*       *       *
 The pro-reform keywords (Appendix 54) on Flowchart 7 are peripheral. It 
is the recurring keyword collocates (Appendix 56) children and unmarried that 
are pivotal. The keywords and collocates in the upper part of the chart relate to 
arguments on behalf of children needing adoption; those in the lower part relate 
to arguments about who can apply to adopt.
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Flowchart 7: Pro-reform Keyword and Collocate Network
key: BOLD CAPITALS: keywords in the top ten
 BLACK CAPITALS: keywords
 RED CAPITALS: sexuality-term keywords and keywords collocating with sexuality terms
 black lower case: keyword collocates

























Of the 242 concordance lines for children (Appendix 57A), 219 refer to children in 
care. Of these, 45 lines profile the children, for example:
50 pool, we need to consider the sort of  children  for whom they are required come for       JSh 4.11pro.txt
56 ldren, we must recognise that those  children  are difficult boys, who have been ph       JSh 4.11pro.txt
64 o whom I referred earlier—the older  children  who were abused and who manifest       JSh 4.11pro.txt
87 ok, every month, at the faces of the  children  in this magazine because every chil        MM 4.11pro.txt
91 uren, seven. Now we move on to the  children  who are very hard to place, not nece        MM 4.11pro.txt
95 very child, but particularly for older  children,  a thorough assessment is needed of        MM 4.11pro.txt
142 s. In particular, those hard-to-place  children  are very likely to be those with beha         JB 4.11pro.txt
154 nd loving context. The longer those  children  stay in children's homes, the longer         LB 4.11pro.txt
161 ly babies any more, but challenging  children,  many of whom have special needs.          LB 4.11pro.txt
163 e system that offers many damaged  children  a real opportunity and a real chanc         LB 4.11pro.txt
168 age them to accept that many such  children  have histories—seriously damaged          DT 4.11pro.txt
172 one care worker has to look after 15  children  who all need help and attention. Ho         DT 4.11pro.txt
180 ments have been achieved for older  children  with troubled histories with single c         DT 4.11pro.txt
These lines were spoken mostly by MPs who had worked in social services or 
children’s homes. A further 22 lines focus on the number of children in care and/
or awaiting adoption, for example:
4 families. We know that about 5,000  children  are in homes awaiting adoptive plac        DH 4.11pro.txt
34  should change positively for the 25  children  in the area who are waiting to find a         AL 4.11pro.txt
52 t 1,255 inquiries were made for 430  children  in the March 2002 issue of Be My P       JSh 4.11pro.txt
53 e of Be My Parent. However, for 129  children,  there was not a single inquirer. Tho       JSh 4.11pro.txt
76 ed for 20 children—harder-to-place  children—came from single people; and that e         EH 4.11pro.txt
127  we have heard, but there are 5,000  children  waiting for adoptive homes—not 5,0        MM 4.11pro.txt
134 , no fewer than 129 of the 430 were  children  in respect of whom no inquiries wer         JB 4.11pro.txt
152 s. It has been suggested that 5,000  children  are in care. That number could even        LB 4.11pro.txt
177  plain fact is that, every year, 2,000  children live the reality of that statement—th         DT 4.11pro.txt
207  care, but there are actually 55,000  children  in care. Most of them will go back t        HD 4.11pro.txt
222 om care is increasing. Nearly 3,100  children  were adopted from care last year—1       JSm 4.11pro.txt
Twenty-two more lines highlight children’s best interests, for example:
13 dments secure the best interests of  children  by acknowledging that in some circ        DH 4.11pro.txt
44 sts of stability or the best future for  children?            HD 4.11pro.txt
68 ng-term best interests of individual  children".  The amendment does not seem to          EH 4.11pro.txt
83  endments—for the best interests of  children  and in the interests of non-discrimi         EH 4.11pro.txt
189 n the same context. If it is true that  children's  best interests should be paramou         AL 4.11pro.txt
194 f we are now to be concerned about  children's  interests throughout their lives, by         AL 4.11pro.txt
219 al principle, which derives from the  Children  Act 1989, is enshrined, as my hon.        JSm 4.11pro.txt
232 nger be compatible with the right of  children  to have their best interests treated a         EH 4.11pro.txt
233 is not acting in the best interests of  children.  One can, however, assess each pro       JSm 4.11pro.txt
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This category also extends to 14/122 lines for child (Appendix 57B), for example:
24 again. Is that in the interests of the  child?  Of course it is not.         JSh 4.11pro.txt
36 em to make the best interests of the  child  the paramount consideration, as requir         EH 4.11pro.txt
55 ny, contact is in the interests of the  child.  For some children, the right decision i        MM 4.11pro.txt
86 ildren Act 1975, the interests of the  child  will be safeguarded and promoted, in te         JB 4.11pro.txt
102 ions convention on the rights of the  child—it follows logically that if by extending          AL 4.11pro.txt
113  are considering the interests of the  child.             KB 4.11pro.txt
117 e what is in the best interests of the  child.  That fundamental principle, which der       JSm 4.11pro.txt
The interests are unspecified. This concurs with the argument that children’s 
interests were individually assessed, but rests on the core premise that adoption 
is better than care. Children’s NEEDS account for 19 more lines, for example:
26 the paramouncy of the needs of the  children.             LB 4.11pro.txt
42 ters who are interested in taking on  children  who desperately need homes?         MM 4.11pro.txt
43 ect his commitment to the needs of  children,  but how can he argue that it is desi        HD 4.11pro.txt
46 asting, permanent, loving homes for  children.             AL 4.11pro.txt
47 ple trying to find adoptive homes for  children  should seek out the best home that         MM 4.11pro.txt
70 em. We are talking about particular  children  with particular needs. I shall come i         EH 4.11pro.txt
113 s to stop people adopting. There are  children who need to be adopted. The social         MM 4.11pro.txt
212    We are talking about the needs of  children.  This is a matter of conscience. Me        HD 4.11pro.txt
217 thing before the needs of individual  children.  My vote tonight is with the children        HD 4.11pro.txt
The keyword NEEDS also features in nine lines for child, for example:
18 st possible opportunity because the  child's  needs are paramount. That principle        JSh 4.11pro.txt
29 ticular couple meet the needs of the  child,  and the child's needs are paramount.        JSh 4.11pro.txt
62 ilies and want a couple who meet a  child's  needs.           MM 4.11pro.txt
66 important to match the needs of the  child  with a family.          MM 4.11pro.txt
As with interests, the child’s/children’s NEEDS are largely unspecified. The only 
specific NEEDS identified in the co-text are for adoptive placements (2 lines) and 
homes (4 lines). This lack of specification is also evident in the 24/28 lines for 
NEEDS (Appendix 57) which pertain to child(ren). While this too concurs with the 
argument for individual assessment, it also suggests that the nature of children’s 
NEEDS was taken for granted (van Dijk 2008a: 170-1) and therefore within an 
assumed social hierarchy of values (Voloshinov 1986: 123). The emotive focus is 
on the importance of meeting the NEEDS, for example: 
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1 ld recognise the paramouncy of the  needs  of the children.           LB 4.11.pro.txt
4 ible opportunity because the child's  needs  are paramount. That principle underpi      JSh 4.11.pro.txt
6 e needs of the child, and the child's  needs  are paramount.         JSh 4.11.pro.txt
12 d want a couple who meet a child's  needs.           MM 4.11.pro.txt
16 upport. It is important to match the  needs  of the child with a family.        MM 4.11.pro.txt
17 July 2000. He is vulnerable and he  needs  help now. I think of the 10-year-old bo        JB 4.11.pro.txt
18 uary 2000. He is vulnerable and he  needs  help now. I think, for example, of the b        JB 4.11.pro.txt
23  adopted. We must ensure that the  needs  of children who require adoptive place       HD 4.11.pro.txt
25 t we should put anything before the  needs  of individual children. My vote tonight        HD 4.11.pro.txt
Emotive appeals on behalf of children pervade the lines, most blatantly in a 
further 19 lines, for example:
49   providing greater opportunities for  children  who languish in care. The hon. Me       JSh 4.11pro.txt
137 reat unwanted, discarded, forgotten  children  in our society.           JB 4.11pro.txt
143  about abused, neglected and bereft  children  who need to be brought up physical         JB 4.11pro.txt
149 ed, bereft, neglected and vulnerable  children,  and I am not prepared to pass up a         JB 4.11pro.txt
151 y those who are languishing in local  children's  homes, as the hon. Member for Bu         LB 4.11pro.txt
158 ose children hope. That is what the  children  try to cling to. My hon. Friend the M         LB 4.11pro.txt
163 e system that offers many damaged  children  a real opportunity and a real chanc         LB 4.11pro.txt
175 ly stable and has controls to it. The  children  are shunted from one to another an         DT 4.11pro.txt
230 le to offer the stable family life that  children  need so much to the five-year-old b       JSm 4.11pro.txt
The evocation of pity in these lines patronises the children. However, the emotive 
appeal of LOVING is more positive, plus 23/28 lines cite specific NEEDS: 
A LOVING home: 
2 es irrelevant; all that they want is a  loving  home. It would not matter if the adopt       DH 4.11.pro.txt
4 e ability to find lasting, permanent,  loving  homes for children.           AL 4.11.pro.txt
12 at every adult who is able to offer a  loving  home to a child should be allowed to d       MM 4.11.pro.txt
13 icular child, that child could have a  loving  home that they might not otherwise fi       MM 4.11.pro.txt
14 e that every child has the right to a  loving,  permanent home. We do not achieve t       MM 4.11.pro.txt
16 ers have said, to take on and give a  loving  home to children in a different categor        JB 4.11.pro.txt
17 ill be between the offer of a decent,  loving,  stable and committed home headed b        JB 4.11.pro.txt
19  in your life who provide you with a  loving,  caring home. You are allowed only on        LB 4.11.pro.txt
20 ents produce wonderful, secure and  loving  homes for children through adoption.         LB 4.11.pro.txt
25 amendment will help to achieve the  loving  home longed for by thousands of child        DT 4.11.pro.txt
A LOVING relationship:
1 t the hon. Gentleman agrees that a  loving,  stable relationship is required. Does        MF 4.11.pro.txt
5  such children the opportunity for a  loving,  stable relationship.        JSh 4.11.pro.txt
23  on earth can we conclude that the  loving  relationship that produces a well-bala        DT 4.11.pro.txt
24  could produce a stable home and a  loving  relationship. That is what we are here         DT 4.11.pro.txt
26 sed to be in a long-term, stable and  loving  relationship. That leaves the opponent        KB 4.11.pro.txt
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A LOVING family: 
3 lue or green; those children want a  loving  family environment. That is where we        DH 4.11.pro.txt
6 ldren's right to an opportunity for a  loving  family. No Labour Member who suppo      JSh 4.11.pro.txt
11 ldren I have spoken about to have a  loving  family. Whether that is provided by a       JSh 4.11.pro.txt
22  children an opportunity to live in a  loving,  stable family.          DT 4.11.pro.txt
27 gh adoption to grow up as part of a  loving, stable and permanent family, and ther      JSm 4.11.pro.txt
LOVING parents: 
21 et additional prospective caring and  loving  parents into the system that offers ma        LB 4.11.pro.txt
28 made stronger by knowing that the  loving,  caring and skilled potential parents d      JSm 4.11.pro.txt
A LOVING context: 
18 s a child without a safe, secure and  loving  context. The longer those children sta        LB 4.11.pro.txt
The frequency of children/child, NEEDS and LOVING  in emotive appeals 
illustrates the social power of values attached to children. As van Dijk (2006c: 
375) argues, appeals to “fundamental norms, values and ideologies that cannot 
be denied or ignored” are a key feature of manipulative discourse. The focus on 
children was pro-reform speakers’ main means of gaining support. That they 
needed such a strategy in turn illustrates the social power of values linked to 
marriage and heterosexual parenting that the amendment impinged upon and 
that Labour had been accused of undermining. 
  Children are also the referents in 33/164 lines for the top keyword THEY 
(Appendix 57), and 27/88 lines for THEIR (Appendix 57C). Many of the reports in 
these lines, like those in the lines for children, are generalised, or ‘pictorial’, and 
thus infiltrated by the speaker’s view (Voloshinov 1986: 120-1). However, as the 
pronouns refer to the ‘already spoken’, they suggest speakers were following up 
their statements about children with further details. Meg Munn (THEY 57-65; 
THEIR 46-49) and John Bercow (THEY 98-104) especially, gave detailed accounts 
of children awaiting adoption. 
 The lower half of Flowchart 7 concerns prospective adopters. Unmarried 
and couples are recurring collocates (Appendices 56D/56E) and thus pivotal. The 
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adjective-noun applications in the lines for these two terms (Appendices 57D/
57E) make an interesting comparison:
 NOUNS to which unmarried applies  ADJECTIVES applying to couples
 unmarried couples (39 lines)
 unmarried couple (5 lines)
 unmarried PARTNERS (5 lines)
 unmarried people (4 lines)
 unmarried parents (3 lines)
 unmarried applicants (2 lines)
 unmarried alliances (1 line)
 unmarried and cohabiting couple (1 line)
 unmarried and same-sex couples (1 line)
 unmarried foster couple (1 line)
 unmarried gay couples (1 line)
 unmarried group (1 line)
 unmarried heterosexual couples (1 line) 
 unmarried or gay parents (1 line) 
 unmarried or same-sex couples (1 line)
 unmarried or same-sex unmarried couples (1 line) 
 unmarried partner (1 line) 
 unmarried relationship (1 line) 
 unmarried relationships (1 line) 
 unmarried couples (36 lines)
 married couples (22 lines)
 same-sex couples (16 lines)
 gay couples (3 lines)
 cohabiting couples (2 lines)
 cohabiting and unmarried couples (1 line)
 gay male couples (1 line) 
 heterosexual couples (1 line) 
 heterosexual unmarried couples (1 line) 
 lesbian couples (1 line) 
 mixed-sex couples (1 line) 
 same-sex and unmarried couples (1 line)
 same-sex unmarried couples (1 line) 
 young couples  (1 line)
The differentiation of sexualities in the applications of unmarried shows it was 
not necessarily seen as an inclusive category, but most uses are undifferentiated. 
This raises the question of the extent to which unmarried was deployed to avoid 
controversy in that it could rest on assumptions of heterosexuality at a time 
when gay people could not marry. The relatively few lines for same-sex couples 
and fewer for lesbian or gay couples suggest strategic deployment. Plus THEY is 
the only keyword on the flow-chart that collocates with a sexuality term (gay), 
but in only four lines. Yet THEY refers neutrally to prospective adopters in 32 
lines and to unmarried couples in 22 lines (Appendix 57). This circumvention of 
prospective adopters’ sexuality leaves the homophobic beliefs mobilised in the 
press and the Lords under the banner of marriage unchallenged. 
 Pro-reform speakers’ support for marriage and emotive appeals on behalf 
of children addressed the Lords knowing they would read the Hansard report. 
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The Government needed the Lords to accept the amendment before the Bill ran 
out of parliamentary time; it could not risk losing the Bill. The strength of this 
need was tangentally related to lesbian and gay adopters. Only at the very end of 
the debate (c.94), and only in response to a question from Evan Harris, did it 
emerge that the Government was aware of the relevance of developing case law to 
the Human Rights Act. An ECtHR case (Frette v France 26.02.2002), while ruling 
against the gay applicant, had accepted that Articles 8 and 14 of the ECvHR were 
relevant to adoption applicants. A South African case (du Toit and de Vos v the 
Minister for Welfare 10.9.2002) invoked the UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child in ruling for the women. The JCHR had revised its view of the Bill in 
October 2002. To have passed a Bill in potential conflict with the Human Rights 
Act would have lost the Government credibility, yet it was an argument they 
chose not to make. They had to get the Bill past the Lords, sections of which had 
fiercely opposed the Human Rights Bill on religious grounds.
*       *       *
 The top anti-reform keyword is # (Appendix 53), which refers to numbers 
and relates to the statistics, quantities and dates cited. As # cannot be used as a 
search term its collocates and concordance lines cannot be compiled, thus it is 
absent from Flowchart 8. However, collocates of related terms (Appendix 55A) 
show # links mostly to children, married and couples, while the related lines 
(Appendix 58A) suggest it applies more specifically to: 
 Children in care or adopted  Potential adopters  Relationship breakdowns
 000 (8 lines)
 year (7 lines)
 per cent (3 lines)
 thousands (3 lines)
 years (2 lines)
 million (8 lines)
 number (5 lines)
 per cent (4 lines)
 numbers (3 lines)
 000 (1 line)
 years (1 line)
 years (6 lines)
 numbers (5 lines)
 per cent (5 lines)
 specific years (4 lines)
 year (1 line)
Statistics, quantities and dates relating to these categories were used to bolster 
anti-reform arguments (Appendices 58C, 58D, 58E).
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 On Flowchart 8, the keyword ADOPTION is pivotal. The top left of the chart 
relates to arguments for children’s best interests and the top right to criticisms of 
the ADOPTION services. The lower part relates to ADOPTION applicants. However, 
the largest category of argument concerns the process of the amendment which 
accounts for 34/82 lines (Appendix 58), of which 14 occur in criticisms of the 
Government and highlight some Ministers’ initial opposition to the deletion of 
‘married’, for example:
19  single ancillary issue of unmarried  adoption,  which now threatens to wreck the          TL 4.11anti.txt
20 econd Reading, the Prime Minister's  adoption  review, the White Paper on adoptio         TL 4.11anti.txt
21 adoption review, the White Paper on  adoption  or a Government manifesto commit         TL 4.11anti.txt
30 e Special Standing Committee: The  adoption  law review, when considering this i         TL 4.11anti.txt
31 ring this issue, concluded that joint  adoption  should remain limited to married c         TL 4.11anti.txt
32 arried couples on the grounds that  adoption  by a married couple was more likel         TL 4.11anti.txt
45 ear, the Minister said in Committee:  Adoption by unmarried couples would raise s         TL 4.11anti.txt
46 dments to the Bill would mean that  adoption  has been singled out to be fast-trac         TL 4.11anti.txt
47 patibility of the status quo, whereby  adoption  is available only to married couples         TL 4.11anti.txt
Seven more lines in this category occur in arguments claiming the amendment 
contravened existing laws and conventions:
22 ried and single people qualifying for  adoption,  as set down in the 1967 conventio         TL 4.11anti.txt
23 hich we are still a signatory and the  Adoption  Act 1976. It is already permissible f         TL 4.11anti.txt
25 contravene the 1967 convention on  adoption.  The Government have given no sig         TL 4.11anti.txt
49  of the European convention on the  adoption  of children, which was agreed to in          TL 4.11anti.txt
50 ge is removed as the benchmark for  adoption,  there will be no midway compromi         TL 4.11anti.txt
54  and that right may be violated if an  adoption  order is granted to two parents of t         TL 4.11anti.txt
55 al reforms to, and improvements of,  adoption  that are represented by an excellen         TL 4.11anti.tx
Seven more occur in arguments claiming the amendment would not increase the 
number of prospective adopters or the number of adoptions:
2 I believe that the proposals to allow  adoption  by unmarried parents give the wron       JD 4.11anti.txt
3 nsure that more children in need of  adoption  are adopted.           JD 4.11anti.txt
5 ppreciate that, but the incidence of  adoption  by such people is relatively small. I        JD 4.11anti.txt
9 ber for Wakefield said, non-married  adoption  is necessary to encourage adoptive         JD 4.11anti.txt
10 ts to come forward and broaden the  adoption  pool. It could be argued that the pr        JD 4.11anti.txt
58 ls will not extend the possibility for  adoption  to any household anywhere in the c        JB 4.11anti.txt
73  technicality involving a one-person  adoption  in a two-person home. They would         JB 4.11anti.txt
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Flowchart 8: Anti-reform Keyword and Collocate Network
key: BOLD CAPITALS: keywords in the top ten
 BLACK CAPITALS: keywords
 RED CAPITALS: sexuality-term keywords and keywords collocating with sexuality terms
 black lower case: keyword collocates




























The other main category of argument is criticism of the ADOPTION services, 
which accounts for 22 lines, for example: 
4 n who can adopt, but our culture of  adoption.  It is a question not of discriminatio        JD 4.11anti.txt
6 e advice of professionals working in  adoption  as the be all and end all of what is r        JD 4.11anti.txt
12  the pool. We need a new culture of  adoption.  We need a culture that insists on c        JD 4.11anti.txt
14 When the BBC ran a programme on  adoption,  there were 19,000 inquiries during        JD 4.11anti.txt
15  failed to achieve even a 1 per cent.  adoption rate for children in care.          JD 4.11anti.txt
37   I want to consider obstructions to  adoption  and why more people are not comin         TL 4.11anti.txt
39 s for Adoption and Fostering during  adoption  week in 1999 stated: The most freq         TL 4.11anti.txt
40 ation also noted a big differential in  adoption  rates around the country—ranging          TL 4.11anti.txt
41 ent local authorities. It is clear that  adoption  is a relatively small-scale activity in         TL 4.11anti.txt
43 roduced by the British Agencies for  Adoption and Fostering, and features childre         TL 4.11anti.txt
68 That was the British Association for  Adoption  and Fostering, which wanted to ent        JB 4.11anti.txt
74 ments from the British Agencies for  Adoption  and Fostering that apparently prej        JB 4.11anti.txt
82  take away unnecessary barriers to  adoption.  That is how we shall extend the po        AS 4.11anti.txt
Specific ‘obstructions’ to ADOPTION were seen as the policy of ethnic matching 
and provisions for some children to have BIRTH family contact. That these were 
seen as ‘obstructions’ rather than considerations of a child’s needs, undermines 
speakers’ claims to be prioritising children’s interests. In addition, speakers’ 
repeated references to DAMAGED or PROBLEM children (Appendices 55E & 58E) 
distances and objectifies them. The few case histories cited by Tim Loughton and 
Julian Brazier were examples of ‘obstructive’ adoption requirements or failed 
adoptions, which suggest that the children themselves were less important than 
undermining the judgments of the ADOPTION services. The BAAF came in for 
particular criticism as the umbrella organisation for adoption agencies whose 
evidence to the Committee had informed the decision to delete ‘married’. Equally 
tendentious was the claim that it was in children’s interests for prospective 
adopters to have LEGAL TIES to each other when there was no legal partnership 
provision for same-sex couples. Arguments against ADOPTION by same-sex 
couples were indirect; sexuality is indicated in only 6/82 lines.
 The lower part of Flowchart 8 concerns prospective adopters. Although 
unmarried has no sexuality term collocates (Appendix 55B), the adjective-noun 
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applications of unmarried and couples (Appendices 58B & 58D) show that 
sexualities were differentiated: 
 NOUNS to which unmarried applies  ADJECTIVES applying to couples
 unmarried couples (20 lines)
 unmarried adopters (3 lines)
 unmarried couple (2 lines)
 unmarried relationship (2 lines)
 unmarried ADOPTION (1 line)
 unmarried couples,  opposite or,  same sex (1 line)
 unmarried couples, gay or otherwise (1 line)
 unmarried couples of different sexes (1 line)
 unmarried couples of whatever description (1 line)
 unmarried couples and same-sex couples (1 line)
 unmarried couples or same-sex couples (1 line)
 unmarried people and HOMOSEXUAL couples (1 line)
 unmarried people (1 line)
 unmarried status (1 line)
 married couples (20 lines)
 unmarried couples (20 lines)
 heterosexual couples (5 lines)
 HOMOSEXUAL couples (4 lines)
 same-sex couples (4 lines) 
 cohabiting couples (2 lines)
 couples of the same sex (1 line)
 couples who cohabit out of marriage (1 line)
 non-married couples (1 line)
 same-sex and non-married couples (1 line)
 gay couples (1 line)
The differentiations are proportionately slightly greater than those for pro-reform 
speakers, which supports an underlying anti-reform concern with sexuality: 
 Speakers
 unqualified uses 
 of unmarried
 qualified uses of 
 unmarried
 couples’ sexuality 
 unidentified
 couples’ sexuality 
 identified
 pro-reform  65/71 (91.5%)  6/71 (8.5%)  40/88 (45.5%)  48/88 (54.5%)
 anti-reform  30/37 (81.1%)  7/37 (18.9%)  24/60 (40%)  36/60 (60%)
However, the anti-reform unqualified uses of unmarried are still large. Alongside 
the indirectness of their arguments against ADOPTION by same-sex couples, this 
suggests they were wary of being seen as homophobic and is supported by 
various disclaimers⎯denials, transfers or reversals (van Dijk 2008a: 109-10):
The problem is not the type of person who can adopt, but our culture of adoption. It is a 
question not of discrimination against unmarried couples, be they opposite or, indeed, 
same sex, but of what is best for the child. 
(Jonathan Djanogly c.31)
We need a culture that insists on clinics for adoption as much as on clinics for abortion; 
that does not discriminate against white parents adopting black children; that stops 
patronising and blocking the efforts of decent prospective parents; and that does not force 
them through a system that often demeans and intimidates them and delays applications. 
(Jonathan Djanogly c.33)
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Like the hon. Gentleman, I wholly abhor any form of homophobia; I want no truck with 
that. However, a Department of Health-funded study found that the average length of a 
close[d] homosexual relationship is only 21 months. Is not that deeply worrying as regards 
the lifetime of commitment needed for a damaged child? 
(Andrew Selous c.34)
I have never argued for discrimination. We have civil law marriages in this country and, as 
the hon. Member for Wakefield said, the vast majority of cases involve heterosexual 
couples. We simply ask, if both individuals want to have legal ties to the child, is it so 
much to expect them to make a binding legal tie to each other? 
(Julian Brazier c.76)
These disclaimers, plus the lack of argument specifically against ADOPTION by 
same-sex couples, suggest speakers were wary of being seen as homophobic. 
This in turn suggests homophobic beliefs were becoming less acceptable. Yet, as 
pro-reform speakers concessions to marriage and heterosexual parenting show, 
the privileged status of heterosexuality remained unquestioned and protected.
 Overall, despite their claims to the contrary, anti-reform speakers were 
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key: red text: proportionately more frequent use of terms
While children and child were most frequently used on both sides of the debate, 
the anti-reform use was proportionately lower. Their greater use of unmarried, 
married, marriage(s) and couple(s) supports their concern with marital status, 
which functioned euphemistically to exclude same-sex parents. By contrast, pro-
reform speakers’ greater use of relationship(s) and PARTNERS/partner supports 
their concern with relationship quality.
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 Views of Sexuality
 The frequencies of terms related to sexuality are remarkably low on both 
sides of this debate, the more so given its great length. 
 Adjectives and Adverbs  Abstract Nouns  Nouns for People
 same-sex
 of the same sex
 mixed-sex
 of different sex


















Pro-reform speakers used 21/22 terms, none of which are keywords, although 
both same-sex and gay are proportionately salient. Anti-reform speakers used 
10/22 terms, of which HOMOSEXUAL is a keyword. Adjectives were the most 
widely used category by far and are the main focus of analysis. The terms are 
investigated via their collocates (Appendices 59 & 61) and concordance lines 
(Appendices 60 & 62). 
*       *       *
 Same-sex was the most used adjective overall and marks a shift from 
sexuality identifiers to gender-aligned terms, along with the less used: of the 
same sex, mixed-sex, of different sex, of different sexes, opposite-sex, and single-
sex. These gender-aligned terms were used proportionately more often by pro-
reform speakers, which concurs with their circumvention of prospective adopters’ 
sexuality as the most contentious issue. 
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 31/39 (79.5% total)
 8/31 (25.8% uses)
70.3%
 8/39 (20.5% total)
 5/8 (62.5% uses)
29.7%
 of the same sex 7
 2/7 (28.6% total)
70.3%
 5/7 (71.4% total)
29.7%
 mixed-sex 2
 2/2 (100% total)
70.3% 29.7%
 of different sex 1
 1/1 (100% total)
70.3% 29.7%
 of different sexes 1 70.3%
 1/1 (100% total)
29.7%
 opposite-sex 1
 1/1 (100% total)
 1/1 (100% uses)
70.3% 29.7%
 single-sex 1
 1/1 (100% total)
70.3% 29.7%
 gay 30
 24/30 (80% total)
 10/24 (41.7% uses)
70.3%
 6/30 (20% total)
 3/6 (50% uses)
29.7%
 lesbian 4
 3/4 (75% total)
70.3%
 1/4 (25% total)
29.7%
 heterosexual 14
 7/14 (50% total)
 1/7 (14.3% uses)
70.3%
 7/14 (50% total)
 3/7 (42.9% uses)
29.7%
 homosexual 13
 3/13 (23.1% total)
 1/3 (33.3% uses)
70.3%
 10/13(76.9% total)
 4/10 (40% uses)
29.7%
 sexual (excluding 
 orientation)
2
 2/2 (100% total)
 1/2 (50% uses)
70.3% 29.7%
 sexually 2
 2/2 (100% total)
 2/2 (100% uses)
70.3% 29.7%
Key: grey text shows the number and % of uses occurring in reports
 red text: shows the proportionately higher frequency of use
 bold red text: keyword
The pro-reform lines for the gender-aligned adjectives (Appendix 60) show the 
nouns to which they apply:
 same-sex
 couples (18 lines)             adoptions (2 lines)         parenting (1 line)
 couple (3 lines)                 adopters (1 line)            partner (1 line)
 relationship (3 lines)         adoption (1 line)            relationships (1 line)
 of the same sex  people (2 lines)
 mixed-sex  adopters (1 line)         couples (1 line)
 opposite-sex  couple (1 line)
 single-sex  couple (1 line )
 of different sex  people (1 line)
Couples, adoption, people and relationship are collocates of same-sex (Appendix 
59). Over half the lines occur in concessions. Andrew Lansley especially, retained 
doubts about extending adoption to same-sex couples: 
In British society today it is a normal outcome for a child to be in a relationship with two 
adoptive parents who are a man and a woman living together, but for a child to have a legal 
relationship with both partners in a same-sex relationship would not normally happen and 
would happen solely at the behest of adoption legislation. That is my problem with the 
issue. (c.85)
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Same-sex couples, when considering adoption as a possibility, will be aware that in natural 
circumstances only one of them could be the natural parent. For a same-sex couple to care 
for a child does not require both of them to be parents, because that is not what occurs 
naturally. (c.85)
He also claimed: 
For example, if a woman has a child and then enters a same-sex relationship, she would 
not expect her partner to be the mother of that child. We are talking about normal 
circumstances. (c.85)
His claim rests on a string of assumptions: that heterosexual norms apply to 
lesbians; that the children of lesbians are necessarily the result of heterosexual 
relationships; that ‘mother’ is a biological relationship rather than an activity 
undertaken; that lesbians do not make co-parenting commitments with partners, 
family, or friends. His doubts exemplify pro-reform ambivalence. Two of David 
Hinchliffe’s lines betray insensitivity as well as ambivalence: 
Another concern is that people automatically assume that same-sex adoptions will involve 
homosexuals or lesbians. I know people of the same sex who live together in long-term 
relationships and who would be offended if they were called homosexuals or lesbians. 
(c.27)
His dissociation of same-sex from sexuality supports a strategic deployment of 
same-sex. Besides his choice of the clinical homosexuals, his presumption of 
heterosexuals’ offence demeans lesbians and gay men and affirms the status of 
heterosexuality. His point was also irrelevant. The legislative issue was couples: 
not all people who live together are couples and not all couples live together. 
 Similarly, two arguments against the Lords aired homophobic beliefs. 
David Hinchliffe aired a pernicious association: 
The Lords’ concern over same-sex relationships seems to be underpinned by the idea, 
which was not mentioned, that same-sex couples somehow present a greater risk of sexual 
abuse to children than heterosexuals. Having worked in social services for many years, I 
honestly am not sure that that is how it works out. That is not my experience as one who 
had to deal with—on few occasions, fortunately—children who had been abused in 
children's homes. By and large, that abuse was heterosexual. (c.28)
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In fact, sexual abuse was mentioned (HL 16.10.2002): Lord Alli queried its 
implication (c.875), Lord Lloyd thought it unlikely (c.879), Baroness O’Cathain 
cited “child abuse” (c.883). This places the association as much at the back of 
David Hinchliffe’s mind as it may have been at the back of some Lords’ minds. 
Kevin Brennan aired a homophobic fear: 
I have studied the debates in the House of Lords, and I believe that for some this argument 
is about the fear of a gay contagion, as if somehow it is possible for children who are 
adopted by unmarried or same-sex unmarried couples—such occurrences are very rare 
and will still be rare when the Bill is passed—to catch homosexuality from their adoptive 
parents. That is absurd, but it seems to be an underlying factor. It is impossible, of course, 
to catch homosexuality from parents, since, by definition, the parents of homosexuals are 
heterosexual. (c.87).
Chris Bryant’s interjection of “Mostly” at this point is apt. Kevin Brennan was, as 
well as marginalising same-sex adoptive couples, denying the existence of lesbian 
and gay parents. His use of contagion also evokes the negative trail of disease in 
the legislative heritage (Chapter 1). That heterosexual contagion is not feared is 
testament to heterosexuality’s protected status.
 Evan Harris was more supportive. He argued against discrimination:
The third reason for returning these amendments to the Bill is the need to end 
discrimination against unmarried and same-sex couples. Given the stringent application 
process and the rigorous assessments that are made on a case-by-case basis, there is no 
justification for disqualifying a couple from adopting jointly simply because they do not 
possess a marriage certificate, if they clearly possess all the characteristics that the agency 
would expect of suitable adoptive parents. (c.51)
And quoted the JCHR assessment of the human rights position:
Paragraph 24 of the [JCHR] report says: Although the judgment in Fretté suggests that it 
might not always be necessary to base a refusal to accept a same-sex couple as adopters 
on evidence related to an assessment of that particular couple’s suitability to adopt, the 
view of the French authorities in that case (which the Court accepted as within their 
‘margin of appreciation’) was based on doubts about the desirability of same-sex parenting. 
However, the case provides no support for the view—reflected in Earl Howe’s amendment—
that it could legitimately be regarded as necessary and proportionate to the aim of 
protecting the best interests of the child to prevent all unmarried couples, including mixed-
sex couples, from being eligible to adopt, regardless of the merits of the individual case. 
(c.51)
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He also countered Conservative statistics on public opinion: 
The most recent polling data that I can find are from MORI in September 2002. They show 
that 44 per cent. of people supported the right of same-sex couples to apply—the hardest 
case as regards popular opinion—while only 36 per cent. opposed that right. I have never 
held the view that we should go by popular opinion in matters to do with human rights —
[Interruption.] I am grateful for the sympathy expressed by Labour Members for the 
necessity of that virtue. (cc.55-6)
With no clue to the ‘[Interruption]’ it is unclear if the last sentence was ironic. 
Labour speakers made no reference to human rights. Given the opposition to the 
Human Rights Bill in sections of the Lords, this was probably strategic.
 Though children were central to pro-reform arguments, child(ren) appear 
in only four lines for same-sex and are absent from pro-reform sexuality-term 
collocates. This marks a dissociation, though the extent to which it links to some 
speakers’ ambivalence or to pro-reform strategy is unclear. 
 The other salient pro-reform adjective, gay, applies to the following nouns:
 couples (4 lines)             relationships (2 lines)       contagion (1 line)           parents (1 line)
 people (3 lines)               men (2 lines)                   couple (1 line)             
 relationship (3 lines)       rights (2 lines)                 male couples (1 line)    
 adoptions (2 lines)          census (1 line)                 parenting (1 line)
Couples, people, relationship and rights are collocates (Appendix 59). Most lines 
(Appendix 60) occur in refutations of anti-reform claims. Evan Harris’ challenged 
a statistic from a Department of Health funded study: 
In an intervention, [...] (Andrew Selous) cited the figure, to which Earl Howe referred, from 
the Christian Institute, which stated that the average length of a closed gay relationship 
was only 21 months. That figure has to be rebutted. My information suggests that that 
figure is an inaccurate portrayal of the findings of a survey carried out in 1992. The survey 
stated that the lengths of same-sex couples’ relationships varied between very short and 
very long— up to 38 years. The mean average length of a relationship was, in fact, almost 
four times that suggested by Earl Howe. A follow-up study carried out by the same 
research team in 1998 found that the average length of gay relationship was almost six 
years and that, again, many couples were in considerably longer relationships. (cc.56-7)
Neither Earl Howe (11.7.2002 c.228; 16.10.2002 c.867) nor Andrew Selous (c.34) 
gave a date for the DoH study and their citing was not exposed as misleading 
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until the next day (Baroness Walmsley 5.11.2002 cc.592-3): it was apparently 
part of a sexual health strategy aimed at reducing STIs. Evan Harris continued:
The 2001 United Kingdom lesbian and gay census, carried out by ID Research, found that 
28 per cent. of gay male couples and 22 per cent. of lesbian couples were in partnerships 
that had been ongoing for between five and 20 years. ID Research surveyed 10,500 
lesbians and gay men nationwide—a far larger sample than the 1992 study cited by the 
hon. Member for South-West Bedfordshire. (c.57)
This is supportive information, and the 2001 study is sourced, which makes his 
rebuttal of the unsourced 1992 study curious in that he fails to expose the DoH 
study’s inappropriacy. Three more lines occur in criticisms of the Lords: their 
fixation on gay adoption (c.27); their claim that supporting gay relationships was 
social engineering (c.30); their hierarchy of suitable parents with gay parenting at 
the bottom (cc.81-2). John Bercow took issue with another anti-reform stance:
A week or two ago, in the context of making what I thought was an important argument in 
relation to the Bill, a senior Conservative, who is himself strongly opposed to adoption by 
unmarried couples, said to me, “This issue is not about gay rights.” It so happens that, in 
the course of the remarks that excited that response, I had made absolutely no reference to 
gay rights, but there you go. On the point of fact, I agreed with that individual: this issue is 
not about the rights of gay people, or of heterosexual people, or of married people, or of 
unmarried people—frankly, it is not about the rights of adults at all. It is about the rights, 
welfare and futures of some of the most vulnerable children in our society today. (c.66)
He pointed to the inequality when unmarried couples adopt:
As we know, couples who are cohabiting already adopt. That is true not only of 
heterosexual couples, but of gay couples. However, they do not adopt jointly, so they face 
the peculiarly unenviable dilemma of deciding which of them is to have the status of the 
adoptive parent, and which of them is to accept the lesser role of second-class citizen 
whose fate and limitation it is, perhaps, to acquire a residence order which will lapse when 
the child involved reaches the age of 16 or 18. (c.69)
And he later challenged Julian Brazier on the same point:
If my hon. Friend had a free hand and was starting from scratch, would he prefer to 
prohibit individual gays adopting? If not, and acknowledging that there are many 
successful gay adoptions, although they form a minute proportion of the total, why is he 
opposed to gay couples adopting jointly to the extent of supporting a three-line Whip, 
which many of us believe sad and ill judged? (c.76)
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Jacqui Smith reinforced the point in her conclusion:
Of course, single people, including gay people, can already adopt. They have been able to 
do so since 1926. Some of them will be in long-term relationships, and the assessment 
process already considers the nature of those relationships. What the reforms will do is 
enable adopted children to have a long-term legal relationship with two parents. (c.96-7)
Only 2/24 lines for gay occur in arguments concerning children. In recounting 
the adoption process, Meg Munn challenged accusations of political correctness:
Social workers have children who need placements. They tell the adoption team about 
them and a matching process takes place. If a social worker is lucky, she might have two 
or three couples or sets of people from which to choose. It is more likely that there will be 
one choice or the team might say that it has someone in the pipeline. It is nonsense to 
suggest that a social worker says, “I’m politically correct and I want a gay couple for this 
child.” That does not happen. Social workers are desperate for families and want a couple 
who meet a child’s needs. (c.63)
In taking issue with Julian Brazier, Jonathan Shaw cited an example of gay 
foster parents who decided to apply to adopt a child in their care:
The hon. Gentleman likes to use examples, often from his own postbag or constituency 
surgery, to illustrate and advance his argument. Perhaps I can offer him another example. 
Let us take a situation in which two gay men were fostering a child who had all kinds of 
different challenges, and it was felt that the best people to look after that child for the rest 
of its life were those two individuals. Would the hon. Gentleman deny that child the 
opportunity to he adopted by those two people? (c.77)
This example comes closest to a positive argument for gay parenting. Although 
the lines for gay occur in less ambivalent arguments than those for same-sex and 
are supportive in their refutations of anti-reform claims, positive arguments for 
lesbian and gay parenting were not made.
 There are only three lines for lesbian (Appendix 60). Two are paired with 
gay and one with homosexual; none are independent. The plural lines for gay 
(couples/people/adoptions/relationships/rights/parents) potentially include 
lesbians, while those for gay men/male couples refer to men. The reference of gay 
where it applies to singular nouns (relationship/couple/contagion/parenting) is 
unclear. As at the time there were more lesbian than gay parents, the imbalance 
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is surprising. Possible explanations are that the reference of gay had become 
more often used inclusively or, as Murphy’s (1997) study suggests, inclusive uses 
of gay may be more likely among heterosexuals. Speakers may also have been 
more focused on gay men or responding to anti-reform animosity towards gay 
men as parents. Nevertheless, the lines for lesbian, like those for gay, occur in 
supportive refutations of anti-reform claims. 
 The three pro-reform lines for homosexual (Appendix 60) apply to partners, 
men and relationships. They also occur in refutations of anti-reform claims. 
David Hinchliffe confirmed ‘unmarried’ was inclusive: 
Politically, it might be helpful for the Conservatives to separate those two concepts, but I 
do not think that the distinctions are as clear as he suggests. The way forward is to accept 
the fact that we are dealing with unmarried partners, who may be heterosexual, 
homosexual or lesbian. (c.27)
This supports a strategic deployment of ‘unmarried’. He also criticised the 
Christian Institute poll cited in the press:
The question that had been put to people—a fairly loaded one—was: If you died would you 
like your children to be adopted by two homosexual men?” [HL 16.10.2002 c.884.] In 
response, 81 per cent. of Tory voters, 71 per cent. of Labour voters, and 65 per cent. of 
Liberal Democrat voters said no. I wonder what the result would have been if the 
alternative had been proposed—of the children remaining in institutional care for the 
remainder of their childhood and adolescence, with numerous transient carers and, 
arguably, a far greater chance of abuse—because that, frankly, is the reality. (c.28)
This supports speakers’ unbalanced uses of lesbian and gay being a response to 
an anti-reform focus on homosexual men. In the third line, Michael Jabez Foster 
confirmed existing law:
I would add that the present provisions do not prevent children from being brought up in 
homosexual relationships, as has been stated already. (c.35)
While these arguments supported reform, the clinical homosexual was used only 
by David Hinchliffe and Michael Jabez Foster who made the most concessions to 
marriage and most qualified the appropriacy of lesbian and gay adoption. 
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 The pro-reform lines for heterosexual apply to the following nouns: 
 couples (3 lines)       partners (1 line)       abuse (1 line)       people (1 line)       parents (1 line)
In all lines (Appendix 60) heterosexual is linked to a non-heterosexual term 
(same-sex couples/homosexual or lesbian/gay people/gay couples/homosexuals). 
It was used only as a comparator and its only negative application is to abuse. 
Two lines occur in appeals on behalf of children: 
In many cases, sometimes of same-sex couples but more frequently of unmarried 
heterosexual couples, one partner adopts the child. When the adoptive partner dies, the 
child is legally in a vulnerable position. 
(David Hinchliffe c.26)
[T]his issue is not about the rights of gay people, or of heterosexual people, or of married 
people, or of unmarried people—frankly, it is not about the rights of adults at all. It is 
about the rights, welfare and futures of some of the most vulnerable children in our society 
today. 
(John Bercow c.66)
While David Hinchliffe sidelines same-sex couples as parents, John Bercow 
equates the categories. However, the consistent pairing of heterosexual with non-
heterosexual terms extends the collocational dissociation of child(ren) to all 
sexuality terms, which suggests sexuality in general was an avoided topic.
 The lines for the remaining pro-reform adjective, sexual, and the adverb 
sexually (Appendix 60), both link to child-sexual abuse. The line for sexual abuse 
occurs in David Hinchliffe’s criticism of the Lords’ (quoted above). Both lines for 
sexually refer to children taken into care because of abuse: 
When we talk about getting more people to adopt children, we must recognise that those 
children are difficult boys, who have been physically and sexually abused, and manifest 
difficult behaviour that requires special people to deal with it. 
(Jonathan Shaw c.48)
Social workers consider each case from the point of view of the child. It would be wrong to 
place a young girl who has been badly sexually abused and who has a range of needs in a 
household where there is a man. She could not deal with that. 
(Meg Munn c.63)
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The speakers who raised the issue of abuse were ex-social workers. Anti-reform 
speakers made no reference to abuse. Pro-reform speakers were intent on giving 
Conservatives a reality-check, as in David Hinchliffe’s line for sexual partners: 
The Lords seem to have swallowed hook, line and sinker all the tabloid tales of so-called 
politically correct social work decisions in adoptions. I have looked at a number of those 
decisions and I have talked to directors of social services about particular examples that 
were brought to light by the tabloids. As those directors always say, confidentiality 
prevents agencies such as theirs from saying why particular applicants are turned down. 
I give an example. Can the House imagine a director of social services telling The Sun, “No, 
Mr. X was turned down not as a Tory-voting smoker, but because medical reports from his 
GP show that he is being treated at a local genitourinary medicine clinic for syphilis, which 
was picked up in his relationships with various sexual partners, unknown to his wife.”?
That is the sort of stuff that occasionally emerges. (c.29)
This is a dubious example unless the man had consulted his GP in addition to 
attending the clinic; GUM clinics are the only branch of medicine with closed 
confidentiality. Even so, pro-reform arguments were generally based on real-life 
experience, albeit with emotive emphasis, while anti-reform arguments were not. 
*       *       *
 The anti-reform lines for same-sex and related terms (Appendix 62) show 
the nouns to which they apply:
 same-sex
 couples (5 lines)       adoption (1 line)       households (1 line)    
 relationships (1 line)
 of the same sex  couples (2 lines)       parents (1 line)       couple (1 line)
 not of the same sex  parents (1 line)
 of different sexes  couples (1 line)
The lines occur in predictable arguments. One theme is heterosexual parenting: 
Does the hon. Gentleman not agree that a child who is brought up by a couple of the same 
sex would automatically be denied either a father or a mother? 
(Angela Watkinson c.27)
Even if it were acceptable that non-marrieds should regularly be able to adopt—which I do 
not accept—most adopted children will know, by reason of their age, that children 
normally have parents who are married and not of the same sex. 
(Jonathon Djanogly c.32)
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There is a legal view that it is arguable that article 8 implies the right for a child to have a 
mother and a father, and that right may be violated if an adoption order is granted to two 
parents of the same sex. 
(Tim Loughton c.46)
The focus on parents’ gender rather than parenting qualities further undermines 
anti-reform claims to be prioritising children’s interests. Child(ren) appear in only 
two lines and couples is the only consistent sexuality-term collocate (Appendix 
61). Children’s interests were nevertheless claimed:
To those people who hold the interests of the child paramount, I say that the proposals to 
allow same-sex and non-married couples to adopt are misguided. They will not work in the 
best interests of the child and, importantly, they will miss the root cause of the problem 
that faces us. 
(Jonathon Djanogly c.33)
The support of public opinion was also claimed: 
Does he acknowledge, however, that the Bill would be more acceptable, both in the other 
place and in the wider country, if we separated the concepts of unmarried couples of 
different sexes and couples of the same sex? 
(Robert Walter c.27)
Some 85 per cent. of the population are against same-sex couples adopting, and 95 per 
cent. of children are adopted by married parents. To a great extent, that means that the 
current system represents what people want. 
(Jonathon Djanogly c.32)
Contrary to the remarks of the hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon (Dr. Harris), 
opinion polls conducted not by disreputable organisations but by ICM showed that 71 per 
cent. of parents have grave concerns about adoption by same-sex couples. 
(Andrew Selous c.89)
The discrepancies between these mostly unsourced statistics calls them into 
question, plus it is unclear which of the statistics cited by Evan Harris’ were 
being dismissed as ‘disreputable’ by Andrew Selous. Reference to the MORI poll 
on public opinion seems unlikely. If the reference was to ID Research, then he 
was clearly discrediting the Lesbian and Gay Census. If he was referring to Evan 
Harris’ rebuttal of the DoH study, he may have been implying improvisation. 
Anti-reform speakers also invoked the example of other European countries:
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I thank the hon. Gentleman for his references to both the Committee's report and the 
judgment of the European Court of Human Rights, but does he acknowledge that most 
European states that recognise same-sex relationships also prohibit same-sex adoption, 
and that the practice in Europe is to oppose it? 
(Robert Walter c.51-2)
This claim ignores adoption reforms then underway in other northern European 
countries, as mentioned by Lord Clement-Jones (16.10.2002 c.904) and Dey 
(2005: 11). In claiming marriage stability, Andrew Selous assumed: 
We know that 83 per cent. of cohabitations will break up within 10 years. I am sure that 
everybody—married couples, unmarried couples or same-sex couples—starts their 
relationship hoping that it will be permanent. No one enters a relationship hoping anything 
else. However, we know from the statistics and the evidence, which we are not here to 
dispute tonight, that married relationships provide the most permanent form of security, 
and that is what we are concerned about for adopted children. Of course unmarried and 
same-sex couples start out intending their relationship to be permanent but, sadly, that 
does not prove to be the case. (c.88)
Apart from the fact that the hopes of partners within individual relationships 
vary, his assumption presents unmarried and same-sex relationships as failures. 
 A similar situation is evident in the few anti-reform lines for gay and 
lesbian (Appendix 62), which apply to the following nouns: 
 gay  adoption (2 lines)       couples (2 lines)       business man (1 line)       person (1 line)
 lesbian  couple (1 line)
While gay couples potentially includes lesbians and the gender of gay business 
man is clear, the reference of gay in other lines is unclear. Four lines occur in 
misleading reports. Tim Loughton quoted Lord Alli out of context:
I should like to mention Lord Alli’s interesting and thoughtful intervention in the House of 
Lords. At column 874, he said: I happily agree with many noble Lords that married couples 
should have priority over unmarried couples. I also agree that unmarried couples should 
have priority over gay couples.”— (c.45)
That Lord Alli is a Labour peer and gay added weight to the point, thus the 
description of interesting and thoughtful is mischievous. Plus the quote was not 
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an intervention, it was a concession that prefaced the start of Lord Alli’s politely 
exasperated speech. The quote in context reads:
My Lords, I have read much in the newspapers today about this debate. To be honest, I feel 
ashamed of the way in which the debate has been conducted. It should have been about 
finding homes for the 5,000 or so children currently in institutional care awaiting adoptive 
families. But it has taken on an unhelpful tone. It has set married couples against 
unmarried couples and married couples against, gay couples. All that any of us want in 
this debate is to find homes for children in institutional care. I happily agree with many 
noble Lords that married couples should have priority over unmarried couples. I also agree 
that unmarried couples should have priority over gay couples. But I cannot agree that a 
child in institutional care is better off there than in a loving, caring home. 
(Lord Alli 16.10.2002 c.874)
Andrew Selous further misreported Lord Alli’s concession:
I have some sympathy with the arguments advanced by the Labour peer Lord Alli in the 
other place. He believes that married couples should have preference over unmarried 
couples, who, in turn, should have preference over homosexual couples. If there were a 
degree of hierarchy supporting the status of marriage, that could usefully be considered. 
(c.89)
A hierarchy of adopters would certainly have been a human rights issue. He also 
selectively reported the views of other gay public figures:
Ivan Massow, a prominent gay business man, has expressed concern about gay adoption. 
He is worried about what might happen in the playground, where children might not be 
politically correct. The same view is held by Michael Brown, a former Conservative MP, who 
is also homosexual. (c.89)
That the need to address playground bullying was omitted leaves it standing as 
accepted and sidesteps their concern. These two lines for gay occur in the only 
argument concerning children. The line for lesbian occurs in Tim Loughton’s 
report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights’ review of developing case law:
Page 10 refers to a lesbian couple who were refused their challenge to adopt. (c.44)
He gave no further information about this case, but did discuss the Frette case 
and that of du Toit and de Vos in order to throw doubt on the significance of the 
judgments. In Voloshinov’s (1986: 116) terms, the reports were “transposed into 
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an authorial context”, thus MPs needed background knowledge to see through 
the impressions given. As van Dijk (2006c: 375) argues, recipients’ “lack of 
relevant knowledge” is a contextual feature of manipulative discourse. 
 The anti-reform keyword HOMOSEXUAL applies to the following nouns: 
 couples (4 lines)        man (1 line)             relationship (1 line)        Michael Brown (1 line)
 adoption (1 line)        parents (1 line)        rights (1 line)
The line where HOMOSEXUAL applies to rights (Appendix 62), includes lesbians 
as it refers to the South African constitution. The applications to couples and 
parents potentially include lesbians, references to men are clear in two lines but 
are unclear in the other two lines. They occur in familiar arguments:
 that the child should be of prime importance in the Bill, not adoptive parents;
 that allowing unmarried homosexual couples to adopt did not solve the shortage of adopters;
 that allowing homosexual couples to adopt would not result in more adoptions of older children;
 that the average length of a homosexual relationship was 21 months;
 that the ECtHR had upheld French social services refusal to allow a gay man to adopt;
 that the South African adoption ruling was not comparable to the British situation;
 that homosexual couples were more likely to break up than unmarried heterosexual couples;
 that the problem was relationship break-up rather than homosexual adoption
 that the order of preference should be married couples, unmarried couples, homosexual couples
 that Michael Brown was concerned about playground bullying.
Most lines occur in arguments discrediting HOMOSEXUAL couples’ relationships 
or dismissing pro-reform arguments for their inclusion. The last two lines report 
gay public figures out-of-context to support anti-HOMOSEXUAL positions.
 Anti-reform speakers also used heterosexual proportionately more often. 
The lines (Appendix 62) show it applies to couples, parents and relationships. It is 
linked directly or indirectly to HOMOSEXUAL and occurs in familiar arguments: 
 that as most cases involve heterosexual couples, a requirement to marry was no problem;
 that the child should be of prime importance in the Bill, not adoptive parents;
 that unmarried heterosexual couples were more likely to split up that married couples;
 that homosexual couples were more likely to split up than unmarried heterosexual couples; 
 that homosexual couples partnerships last a shorter time than those of heterosexual couples;
 that in heterosexual relationships couples tend to marry or break up shortly after a child arrives.
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Julian Brazier spoke 6/7 lines focused on marriage and relationship stability, 
but his last line is curious. In response to John Bercow he argued: 
In heterosexual relationships, couples tend to marry or break up in a year or two after the 
child arrives. When the pool is large enough to consider, I suspect that that will apply to 
homosexuals. I understand my hon. Friend’s point but I do not agree with it. My point is 
about splitting up rather than homosexual adoption. (c.77-8)
His prediction that when the pool of HOMOSEXUAL couples is “large enough to 
consider” statistically, they would follow the heterosexual pattern, sits oddly with 
his well-recorded anti-gay views. This probably unthinking statement implies he 
anticipated an increase in HOMOSEXUAL parents and the introduction of same-
sex marriage. In applying heterosexual norms he is also apparently oblivious to 
the fact that children born to lesbian and/or gay parents do not just “arrive”. His 
statement is clearly detached from real-life knowledge.
 The adjectives show that while pro-reform speakers based their generally 
more reasoned arguments on real-life situations, anti-reform speakers based 
their arguments on ideals supported by conflicting and/or questionable sources.
*       *       *
 The most used abstract noun was homosexuality, but only by pro-reform 











 5/5 (100% total)
 1/5 (20% uses)
70.3% 29.7%
 sexuality 2
 1/2 (50% total)
70.3%
 1/2 (50% total)
29.7%
 sexual orientation 2
 2/2 (100% total)
70.3% 29.7%
 sex (in reference to 
 sexual acts)
2
 2/2 (100% total)
 2/2 (100% uses)
70.3% 29.7%
 homophobia 3
 2/3 (66.7% total)
 1/2 (50% uses)
70.3%
 1/3 (33.3% total)
29.7%
Key: grey text shows the number and % of uses occurring in reports
 red text: shows the proportionately higher frequency of use
Homosexuality is of interest because the lines concern prejudice which modifies 
speakers concilliatory approach to getting the amendment through the Lords. 
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Michael Jabez Foster attributed prejudice to the Lords and by implication the 
press, but mitigated it for his religious constituents:
In respect of the proposals, however, there is clearly prejudice against homosexuality, with 
the suggestion that same-sex couples are somehow damaging to the charges whom they seek 
to adopt. There is only one basis for such a belief. It is certainly not of the making of the 
individuals involved; it relates only to the prejudice created in society by some of those who 
oppose the provision—the homophobia that is so obvious in the other place. (cc.33-4)
The bigotry against homosexuality and against couples who want to provide for young 
children has permeated throughout society because of what is being said. That has created 
prejudice that attaches not only to couples but to the charges whom they might want to take 
on. (c.34)
I understand the deep-seated religious conviction of some of my constituents, who have 
written to me about their belief that homosexuality and relationships outside wedlock are 
wrong, but, even if that is their belief, I would ask them two questions. Do they in all honesty 
believe that the damage to a child in being brought up in what is still today a non-orthodox 
family is more damaging than being brought up in residential care? Is being in a family that 
is not the norm more damaging than not being in a family at all? (c.35)
The other two lines occur in Kevin Brennan’s assumption that the Lords’ feared 
homosexuality was ‘contagious’ (quoted above). His denial that this was possible 
compounds the prejudice in that ‘more gay people’ was not only perceived as a 
problem, but one that mattered enough to be denied. David Hinchliffe also 
addressed homophobia in the Lords:
I want to consider the main themes of the Lords’ anxieties about the amendment that we 
passed some time ago. I hope that hon. Members have studied the relevant Hansard reports 
of the Lords proceedings. I do not like to say so, but one theme underpinned the debates: 
scarcely concealed, crude homophobia. I find that rather sad and worrying in this day and 
age. (c.26)
That he did not like to say so mitigates the attribution. Prejudice was mentioned 
in other contexts (Appendix 60A), but was mitigated and/or indirectly attributed. 
Michael Jabez Foster mitigated prejudice and generalised its attribution:
We must not allow the prejudice of those, however well-meaning, who oppose adoption by 
same-sex and unmarried couples to spoil the life chances of so many young people. (c.33)
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John Bercow mitigated prejudices and attributed them to the debate(s):
I want to attend to the detail, because I am concerned about the way in which generalised 
arguments and—dare I say it?—occasionally deliberate or inadvertent prejudices are tossed 
around in the course of these debates. (c.68) 
I think that the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Wakefield and supported by 
others are sound. They offer hope and could make the situation better. I believe that what we 
need in this debate is less prejudice and more fairness. (c.72)
Dari Taylor only suggested Tim Loughton’s argument was based on prejudice: 
I suggest to him, however, that his argument to the House is based much more on confused 
prejudice than on careful thought. (c.80) 
Jacqui Smith too mitigated her unattributed reference to prejudice:
Adoption is about making judgments about suitability and judgements based on evidence, 
not judgments based on generalisation and—dare I say it—sometimes prejudice. One cannot 
use generalisation to determine assessment—that is not acting in the best interests of 
children. (c.95)
Such caution was needed to avoid unparliamentary language, but also suggests 
avoidance of conflict or, to put it figuratively, a massaging of opposing MPs who 
did not want to be seen as prejudiced. As Baker (2006: 165-6) argues, attribution 
of negative actions to obscured actors backgrounds responsibility. By contrast, 
the pro-reform lines for discrimination/disciminatory/discriminated (Appendix 
60A) are more direct and focus on the amendment’s relation to existing law or 
human rights⎯but were not spoken by Labour MPs.
*       *       *
 Very few nouns for people were used in the debate:










 3/5 (60% total)
 1/3 (33.3% uses)
70.3%
 2/5 (40% total)
29.7%
 heterosexuals 1
 1/1 (100% total)
70.3% 29.7%
 lesbians 3
 3/3 (100% total)
 2/3 (66.7% uses)
70.3% 29.7%
 gays 1
 1/1 (100% total)
70.3% 29.7%
Key: grey text shows the number and % of uses occurring in reports
 red text: shows the proportionately higher frequency of use
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Of the total pro-reform lines for these nouns (Appendix 60) 6/8 occur in David 
Hinchliffe’s or Kevin Brennan’s ambivalent and/or concessionary statements. 
Along with the two anti-reform lines (Appendix 62), this makes the nouns for 
people the most negatively associated lexical category. 
*       *       *
 It is difficult to judge the extent to which the scarcity of terms related to 
sexuality was deliberate on either side of this long debate. Labour speakers’ 
caution indicates the political sensitivity of this move towards social inclusion in 
terms of the emerging human-rights case law which necessitated getting the 
amendment past the Lords. Anti-reform speakers’ wariness of being seen as 
homophobic indicates a decreasing acceptability of its overt articulation; caution 
was also needed in that they were not arguing against the status quo whereby 
lesbian and gay individuals could apply to adopt. The sheer overload of caution 
and repetition in the debate exudes limitation and avoidance on both sides⎯a 
concerted reluctance to delve into the underlying conflict. 
 Associations and Implications
 Four issues require further comment: the dissociation between references 
to children and sexuality identifiers; the shift from sexuality identifiers to same-
sex and other gender-aligned terms; the euphemistic use of marriage to protect 
heterosexuality and the gender binary; the invisibility of lesbians.
 Children in care were the intended beneficiaries of the Bill, of which the 
amendment to delete ‘married’ was a small part. Thus the focus on children in 
care concurred with the Bill’s purpose. Speakers on both sides made emotive 
appeals, but pro-reform appeals were rooted in taken-for-granted values and 
beyond question. They served to gain support and divert attention from adopters’ 
sexuality. A dissociation between children and sexuality identifiers is evident on 
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both sides of the debate. In the case of pro-reform speakers, it relates to conflict 
avoidance. As well as the case for lesbian and gay parenting not being made, 
some speakers restricted its appropriacy. That such marginalisation was seen as 
necessary to get the reform past the Lords, illustrates pervasive resistance to 
lesbian and gay parenting⎯internalised as well as external. Thus the resistance 
was ‘massaged’ rather than challenged. In the case of anti-reform speakers, the 
dissociation relates to their greater focus on couples’ sexuality. Their uses of 
sexuality terms occur in negative contexts and were mainly used to discredit and 
devalue lesbian and gay relationships in which parents barely featured. 
 The shift from sexuality identifiers to same-sex and other gender-focused 
terms, notably among pro-reform speakers, also diverted attention from couples’ 
sexuality. The shift circumvented controversy by desexualising lesbian and gay 
couples. As Cooper (1993a: 269) argues, “lesbians and gays are discursively 
constructed as so sexual that even their mere presence is erotically saturated”. 
The shift implies that gender, as a naturalised category, was seen as innocuous, 
though protection of gender divisions is deeply implicated in homophobic beliefs 
(Chapter 1). Such protection is evident in the anti-reform view, conceded by some 
pro-reform speakers, that children need a mother and a father. This ‘need’: 
 was being denied under the proposal (c.27)           was accepted by all as best (c.38)
 was normal (c.32; c.85)                                         was a child’s legal right (c.46),
 was nature’s way (c.35)                                         was social workers’ preference (c.63)
The ‘need’ was not linked to parenting qualities, but to gender-boundary norms 
and by proxy heterosexuality. It thus presented “heterosexuality as natural, self-
evident, desirable, privileged and necessary” (Cameron & Kulick 2003: 149). 
Heterosexual parenting was presented in terms of: 
 a mother and a father (4 lines)       natural circumstances (2 lines)            natural homes (1 line)
 married parents (3 lines)                a mother and father figure (1 line)       natural parent (1 line)
 natural parents (3 lines)                 mum and dad (1 line)                         nature’s way (1 line)
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This naturalised view invoked heterosexual reproduction and the nuclear family. 
That parenting arrangements have historically taken many forms, positions this 
view as a recent ideal (Stone 1977; Adams 1982). It also cast non-heterosexual 
parenting as ‘unnatural’ which further discredited lesbian and gay adopters. 
 As the amendment topic, marriage was an inevitable focus of debate. It 
was upheld by both sides and married parents were claimed or conceded to be 
best for children. As a heterosexual institution, it marginalised lesbian and gay 
adopters. For pro-reform speakers this was convenient. They were in a delicate 
position. To have U-turned on the adoption agencies’ evidence would have been 
to ignore professional advice and risk challenges under the Human Rights Act, 
plus they risked losing the whole Bill if the Lords refused the change. Anti-reform 
speakers’ protection of heterosexuality was more overt. In upholding marriage as 
the sole measure of relationship commitment, they denigrated lesbian and gay 
relationships. Marriage emerged as a euphemistic front for homophobic beliefs in 
a context where they were becoming less acceptable. Pro-reform speakers were 
also culpable. Their amendment was passed and prejudice was criticised, but 
their concessions to marriage and/or ambivalence towards lesbian and gay 
adopters placed heterosexuality beyond question. The reform was achieved by 
upholding heterosexuality and the gender binary on which it rests. 
 The virtual invisibility of lesbian(s) in the debate also relates to the gender 
binary. The 1980s linking of lesbian and gay/lesbians and gay men originated 
from recognition of distinct histories within common resistance to oppression. 
The compound terms were most used in Clause 28 debates by speakers familiar 
with sexuality politics. The linking appears to have been lost as the use of gay 
became more mainstream. If, in this debate, the reference of gay was largely 
inclusive of lesbians, then the issue is one of lesbian visibility. In social terms, 
Baker (2006:151) locates lesbian invisibility (plus bisexual and trans invisibility), 
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within the prevailing “hetero-gendered order” that maintains the polarising 
hetero-homo and gender binaries. In sexual terms, Waites (2005: 84-5) locates 
lesbian invisibility within polarising beliefs which position men’s sexuality as 
active and women’s as passive and thus unthreatening. If, in this debate, the 
reference of gay was largely to men, then the latter beliefs are relevant and, in 
discounting heterosexual men, further expose heterosexual privilege.
 Conclusion
 The passage of this Bill illustrates the Government’s initially reluctant and 
subsequently very cautious approach to adoption by lesbian and gay couples. 
The first Bill made no provision for lesbian and gay couples to jointly adopt and 
the provision was delayed in the second Bill. Although the adoption agencies had 
asked for the change in submissions to consultation and the Special Standing 
Committee and an EDM for the change had attracted cross-party signatures, the 
amendment was only tabled two months after extra time had been allowed for 
discussion of the issue. In the event, the amendment enabled a non-exclusion of 
lesbian and gay couples rather than a positive inclusion. Dissent in the Labour 
cabinet was exposed in the free vote. The amendment’s reversal in the Lords was 
a set back. That the Government could not afford to lose the Bill meant that the 
amendment had to be dropped or reinstated. The debate on its reinstatement 
was held after the JCHR had reviewed the human rights implications in terms of 
developing case law. Thus its reinstatement and acceptance by the Lords became 
a matter of Government credibility to ensure the Bill complied with the Human 
Rights Act. Of the research reviewed, only Dey (2005) demonstrates a grasp of 
the imperative and political expediency involved in ensuring the amendment’s 
successful passage. Yet, in terms of practical outcomes and despite Labour 
arguments for widening the pool of potential adopters, Dey (ibid) shows that the 
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reform only slightly increased adoption rates. In addition, Hicks’ (2005) analysis 
of lesbian and gay adoption and fostering applicants’ experience shows that they 
could still face homophobic or heteronormative assumptions in their dealings 
with Social Services despite the legislative change. 
 Labour caution is also clearly evident in the debate analysed. The case for 
lesbian and gay parenting was not made, the issue was repeatedly minoritised or 
sidelined in favour of emotive appeals on behalf of children in care, while married 
couples were conceded to be ideal. The apparently strategic substitution of same-
sex couples for lesbian or gay couples suggests the gendered terms were seen as 
less controversial, thus they add to the aura of caution. Caution is also evident 
in anti-repeal speakers’ contributions. They upheld the status of marriage and by 
proxy heterosexuality, but conceded possibilities of non-heterosexual parenting 
in exceptional circumstances. They were not disputing the status-quo of lesbian 
and gay individuals’ ability to adopt and were wary of being seen as homophobic. 
In the Words and Themes section, pro-reform uses of the keyword collocates 
children/child and keywords NEEDS and LOVING reveal the sheer overload of 
speakers’ emotive appeals on behalf of children. By contrast, anti-reform uses of 
the pivotal keyword ADOPTION reveal the extent of speakers’ focus on criticising 
the Government, Social Services and the BAAF, despite their claims of children’s 
best interests. The section confirms a greater anti-reform focus on marital status 
than children and shows speakers were more concerned with unmarried couples’ 
sexuality. Pro-reform speakers less often identified unmarried couples’ sexuality 
and emphasised the rigorous assessment of adoption applicants’ relationships. 
In the Views of Sexuality section, the low frequencies of the related terms and 
their collocational dissociation from children/child/parent(s) on both sides, mark 
the sidelining of lesbian/gay/same-sex parenting from discussion. In addition, 
the pro-reform uses of same-sex reveal a high degree of ambivalence, while most 
uses of gay occur in more positive refutations of anti-reform claims. Anti-reform 
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uses of the keyword HOMOSEXUAL occur largely in arguments discrediting 
HOMOSEXUAL relationships which were repeatedly cast as unstable and short 
term. The virtual absence of lesbian(s) in the debate is notable given the greater 
number and higher public profile of lesbian parents at the time. As in Chapter 7, 
the underlying focus was disproportionately on non-heterosexual men. That 
many characteristics of manipulative discourse (van Dijk 2006c) are evident in 
the debate, especially in the pro-reform and notably in the Labour contributions, 
indicates the strength of resistance that the Government were up against in 
attempting this much needed reform.
 Despite the ambivalence in this debate, the Adoption and Children Act did 
mark a step towards parenting equality—in law at least. However, opposition to 
legal reforms continued, mainly from politically motivated strands of Christian 
idealism which inflated conflict between equality legislation and religion. This is 
explicit in the employment debate (Chapter 9), while the euphemistic protection 




 Public suspicion of Tony Blair escalated prior to the invasion of Iraq. 
Worldwide protests against the proposed invasion (15.2.2003) included a massive 
march in London; the route was packed to a standstill and surrounding streets 
blocked with people waiting to join the march until well after dark. The invasion 
began on 20.3.2003. The UK decision to support the US-led venture was taken 
with uncertain legal backing (Iraq Inquiry 27.1.2010) and on the basis of flawed 
intelligence, which would have been exposed had the UN weapon inspectors been 
able to finish their work (ibid 27.7.2010). The unresolved death of UK weapons 
inspector David Kelly (2003) fuelled the controversy. The confession of Rafid 
Ahmed Alwan al-Janabi, an Iraqi defector whose fabrication was used to launch 
the invasion, exposed the source of the flawed intelligence (Owen 1.4.2012), but 
not the reason for its unverified use. The Chilcot Report of the Inquiry remains 
unpublished pending Whitehall and US permissions to quote classified material. 
Another factor is the Leveson Inquiry finding that Blair called Rupert Murdoch 
three times in the days before the invasion (Leveson 29.11.2012: 1148), while 
Alistair Campbell’s diaries report that Blair also “took a call from Murdoch who 
was pressing on timings, saying how News International would support us” 
(Grice 16.6.2012). As McKnight (2012: ch.8) shows, Murdoch insisted his media 
outlets, particularly in the US, UK and Australia, mobilised “public support for 
their leaders” participation in the invasion (173).
 The invasion of Iraq dominated the remainder of Blair’s premiership and 
was the focus of ongoing public criticism and protest. During 2003 particularly, 
other issues had a lower media profile, including controversial legislation. For 
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example the Extradition Act 2003, which implemented the US-UK Extradition 
Treaty 2003 and allowed UK to US extradition without a requirement for prima 
facie evidence (JCHR 22.6.2011), was passed with little press scrutiny beyond 
repeated criticism of the European Arrest Warrant in the Times. Legislation 
affecting lesbians and gay men was reported more moderately than in previous 
years. The repeal of Section 28 in the 2003 Local Government Act was the most 
reported change; other changes (Appendix 1) had a lower profile. Reports of the 
Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations were mostly supportive, 
with the predictable exceptions of the Telegraph and the Mail. The Independent’s 
coverage was the most comprehensive and the Morning Star’s most committed 
because of trade-union support. 
 This chapter focuses on the implementation of an EU Directive to outlaw 
workplace discrimination. A review of relevant research is followed by an outline 
of the Regulations’ production and a summary of the arguments deployed in the 
debate requesting their withdrawal. Comparisons of each side’s top-ten keywords 
and of the sexuality terms used are followed by a discussion.
 Political Context
 The legislation was required by the EU Council Employment Framework 
Directive 2000/78/EC, made under Article 13 of the Treaty of Amsterdam 1997, 
on outlawing workplace discrimination. The Directive applied to discrimination 
on grounds of religion or belief, disability, age and sexual orientation at all stages 
of employment and vocational training, including recruitment, conditions of 
service, pay, promotion and dismissal. The Government’s decision to legislate via 
Statutory Instrument (delegated legislation) minimised the potential for conflict 
but did not avoid it completely. Article 4.1 of the Directive allowed a ‘genuine 
occupational requirement’ (GOR) exception where a particular job required a 
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particular category of person. In the case of sexuality, jobs requiring a lesbian, 
gay or bisexual person (such as LGB advice or campaign work) could be exempt 
from discrimination. It was the Government’s implementation of Article 4.1 that 
caused the controversy.
 The Sexual Orientation Regulations have 39 Sections. Regulation 7 defines 
the GOR, but includes a controversial opt-out for organised religion added at the 
Church of England’s request after the consultation: 
7.— Exception for genuine occupational requirement etc
(1) In relation to discrimination falling within regulation 3 (discrimination on grounds of 
sexual orientation)—
(a) regulation 6(1)(a) or (c) does not apply to any employment;
(b) regulation 6(2)(b) or (c) does not apply to promotion or transfer to, or training 
for, any employment; and
(c) regulation 6(2)(d) does not apply to dismissal from any employment, where 
paragraph (2) or (3) applies.
(2) This paragraph applies where, having regard to the nature of the employment or the 
context in which it is carried out—
(a) being of a particular sexual orientation is a genuine and determining 
occupational requirement;
(b) it is proportionate to apply that requirement in the particular case; and
(c) either—
(i) the person to whom that requirement is applied does not meet it, or
(ii) the employer is not satisfied, and in all the circumstances it is 
reasonable for him not to be satisfied, that that person meets it, and this 
paragraph applies whether or not the employment is for purposes of an 
organised religion.
(3) This paragraph applies where—
(a) the employment is for purposes of an organised religion;
(b) the employer applies a requirement related to sexual orientation—
(i) so as to comply with the doctrines of the religion, or
(ii) because of the nature of the employment and the context in which it is 
carried out, so as to avoid conflicting with the strongly held religious 
convictions of a significant number of the religion’s followers; and
(c) either—
(i) the person to whom that requirement is applied does not meet it, or
(ii) the employer is not satisfied, and in all the circumstances it is 
reasonable for him not to be satisfied, that that person meets it.
 (The Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations SI 2003/1661)
Regulation 7(2) covers jobs for which a particular sexuality may be required and 
is within the terms of the Directive. Regulation 7(3) allows organised religions to 
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discriminate against lesbians, gay men or bisexuals on the basis of conflict with 
religious doctrine or the beliefs of its followers. This was widely seen as outside 
the terms of the Directive. However the wording of Regulation7(3) is unclear. It 
accommodated the CoE’s request, but its lack of definition passed responsibility 
for its interpretation to the courts. 
 Relevant Research
 The Sexual Orientation Regulations are the focus of a sharply analysed 
legal study (Oliver 2004), which focuses on perceptions of sexuality to expose 
contradictions between the provisions for direct discrimination and the GOR. It 
also addresses issues of sexual identity and practice which complicate the 
Regulations’ operation in law. 
 Oliver begins with evidence from surveys on workplace discrimination 
which position the Regulations as long overdue. To illustrate their importance, 
she outlines problems encountered in cases of workplace discrimination brought 
under prior legislation. She then addresses the view of sexual orientation which 
informed the Regulations. The Regulations define ‘sexual orientation’ as that 
towards persons of the same sex, opposite sex, or both, to cover lesbians, gay 
men, heterosexuals and bisexuals. She notes that a principle of formal equality 
operates in UK law which protects all groups equally, regardless of whether they 
have a history of prejudice or discrimination. The Regulations define both direct 
and indirect discrimination (against an individual or group respectively). In her 
discussion of direct discrimination, she argues that the words ‘on grounds of’ 
ensure perceptions of sexuality are covered, thus an individual does not have to 
disclose his/her sexuality to bring a claim. Privacy is respected whether or not 
the discrimination is based on an accurate perception. She sees this as positive 
in that it “appears to confirm that a person’s sexual orientation is entirely 
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irrelevant to workplace treatment and decisions” (ibid: 3). 
 Oliver discusses the GOR at length. She points out that the conditions 
attached to Regulation 7(2) are narrow and that the Directive states cases are 
likely to be rare. With reference to the Human Rights Act, she argues that GORs 
will require detailed scrutiny in the courts case by case, which could make them 
difficult to justify. She then reviews the contradictions: An individual’s sexuality 
may be undisclosed at work, but the GOR requires disclosure. If the required 
sexuality is not specified on the job advertisement, it could involve intrusive 
questions at interview, which counters the privacy provisions for bringing a case. 
If an applicant is unsuitable, his/her sexuality remains irrelevant, but if an 
applicant’s suitability is unclear, the Regulations allow an employer to decide on 
the basis of his/her perceptions. While this may pre-empt intrusive questions, it 
legitimises stereotypical assumptions and contradicts the provisions for bringing 
a case where the accuracy of perception is irrelevant. It also raises the issue of 
procedure if an employer’s assumption is wrong. 
 In her final section Oliver addresses the problem of categorising sexuality. 
She argues that sexuality does not necessarily fall into rigid and fixed categories: 
it may change over time, people try out different practices, not everyone claims a 
sexual identity, past experiences may differ from present sexual identity, plus 
some individuals may be undecided about their sexuality when applying for a 
job. Her depiction of human sexuality as shifting, fragmented, fluid and multiple 
perhaps exaggerates its instability, but does show how discrimination on the 
basis of sexuality entails unique problems of identification and definition. In 
cases of direct discrimination, categorisation does not arise as the accuracy of 
the discriminator’s perception is irrelevant, but it is a problem in cases of GOR. 
While a group seeking legal protection needs a defined category, sexuality does 
not necessarily fall into rigid categories. Oliver attributes this tension to the ‘one 
size fits all’ approach to the categories of discrimination, which fails to recognise 
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the unique nature of sexuality. She hopes the courts will recognise these issues 
in applying the Regulations.
 The Making of the Regulations
 The Treaty of Amsterdam was made consequential in UK law by the 
European Communities (Amendment) Act 1998, which amended the European 
Communities Act 1972. The Amendment Bill’s passage coincided with that of the 
Human Rights Bill. Both provoked debate on how religious organisations might 
be affected. Conflict between religious views of sexuality and anti-discrimination 
provisions fuelled resistance to the former (HC 12.11.1997; HC 15.1.1998; HL 
27.4.1998). Fear of churches having to marry ‘homosexual’ couples surfaced in 
resistance to the latter (HL 24.11.1997; HL 19.1.1998; HL 5.2.1998).
 The Government bypassed an opportunity to implement Article 13 of the 
Treaty in the Employment Relations Bill 1998-9. At the Bill’s Report stage, David 
Chidgey’s Liberal Democrat amendments on outlawing workplace discrimination 
were denied a second reading by majorities of nearly 300 votes (HC 30.3.1999 cc.
958-964). During the Bill’s Committee stage in the Lords, Lord Razzall tabled and 
withdrew the same amendments (16.6.1999 cc.340-50). At the Bill’s third 
reading, he re-tabled the amendment applying to sexual orientation, but was 
defeated by 126 to 33 votes (15.7.1999 cc.561-565).
 The Government participated in the EC Framework Directive negotiations 
for equal treatment in employment. The Directive was agreed in October 2000. 
Edward Leigh, a Conservative MP with an anti-gay voting record, then presented 
the Employment (Religious Beliefs) Bill, which sought to allow “certain employers 
to have regard to the religious beliefs of those whom they employ [in applying] 
European Community law” (24.10.2000 c.159). Its second reading was set for 
3.11.2000, but the Commons did not sit on that day. The Directive came into 
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force on 2.12.2000 and gave member states three years to comply. 
 On 16.7.2002, the Government made the European Communities 
(Designation) (No.3) Order (SI 2002/1819) which authorised the regulation of 
discrimination under Section 2(2) of the 1972 parent Act. This enabled the 
legislation to proceed by Statutory Instrument which does not require the full 
parliamentary process. A draft of the Sexual Orientation Regulations was issued 
for consultation in October 2002 without religious exemption. The press showed 
negligible interest until after New Year. In The Times (14.1.2003), Lord Lester 
argued for comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation. The Telegraph began 
scare-mongering on behalf of the Church (Petre 25.1.2003/18.3.2003) and 
employers (Wheeler 24.4.2003). The Guardian reported the view of the Lesbian 
and Gay Christian Movement (Bates 2.5.2003). 
 The finalised Sexual Orientation Regulations were laid before Parliament 
alongside those for Religion and Belief (8.5.2003). The addition of Regulation 7(3) 
in the former prompted criticism in the press. The Independent on Sunday 
reported that the Regulations had been watered down at the request of Downing 
Street and that “Barbara Roche, the equalities minister, had been overruled” 
(Waugh 11.5.2003). With reference to a leaked copy of the Church of England 
Archbishop’s Council’s submission to the Regulations’ consultation, the article 
pointed out that the wording of 7(3) was “almost identical” (ibid). It went on to 
report the LGCM’s prediction that 7(3) would institutionalise homophobia in a 
way that made “Section 28 look like a tea party” followed by the National Secular 
Society’s view that it was “a witch hunter’s dream come true” (ibid). The Observer 
reported the NSS as being “absolutely horrified” (Hinsliffe & Ahmed 11.5.2003). 
The article went on to cite their view that 7(3) gave religious organisations “carte 
blanche to get rid of gays” and institutionalised discrimination (ibid). The next 
day’s Morning Star featured the story on its front page, highlighting trade union 
and gay rights campaigner outrage that 7(3) would “allow religious employers to 
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sack gay staff” (Glanville 12.5.2003). The article went on to quote Roger Lyons, 
the joint general secretary of amicus, the union representing many workers in 
religious organisations, who warned that “a whole raft of workers [could] be 
discriminated against [and vowed that amicus would] vigorously campaign 
against” the change (ibid).
 The addition of 7(3) prompted a meeting of Stonewall, the LGCM, the TUC 
and the NSS “to take advice from human rights lawyers” (Waugh 24.5.2003). 
According to Angela Eagle (23.2.2011), the bishops went direct to Downing Street 
bypassing MPs dealing with the Regulations and, as it was delegated legislation, 
once the exception had been included it could not be changed. 
 The compliance of Regulation 7(3) with the Directive was reviewed by the 
Joint Committee for Statutory Instruments. This was described as a “rare move” 
in both the Independent (Waugh 3.6.2003) and the Regulations’ Research Paper 
(HC 03/54: 22). The JCSI called “witnesses to give evidence on ‘certain technical 
aspects’ of the regulations” (ibid 22), some of which is included in the Research 
Paper (ibid 31-33). On publication of the JCSI report, David Tredinnick, the 
Committee’s chair, said in his press release:
The Committee has examined these regulations and has found that there is doubt as to 
whether regulation 7(3), as it is drafted, is allowed by the European Equality Directive. This 
therefore gives rise to a doubt as to whether the Secretary of State has power to include it 
in the Regulations. In our opinion, the doubt is sufficiently significant that it should be 
drawn to the special attention of both Houses before they debate the Regulations. 
[...]
The Committee can offer no definitive ruling as to whether, in including regulation 7(3), the 
Secretary of State is acting within the powers delegated by Parliament. That is a matter for 
the courts to decide. 
(David Tredinnick 13.6.2003; quoted by Evan Harris, HC SC 17.6.2003 c.038) 
The Guardian noted that, as delegated legislation, the Regulations “may be 
subject to only three hours’ debate in committee before entering the statute 
book” (Hall 14.6.2003). The Independent highlighted the Liberal Democrats’ call 
“for the proposals to be scrapped after [the JCSI] warned they may contravene 
309
EU anti-discrimination law” (Waugh 14.6.2003). 
 The Commons Standing Committee on Delegated Legislation considered 
the Religion and Belief and Sexual Orientation Regulations at the same sitting 
(17.6.2003 cc.003-054). The Religion and Belief Regulations were discussed first. 
It became apparent that the Employment Relations Minister, Gerry Sutcliffe, was 
unprepared (c.006). It transpired that he had been asked to stand in at short 
notice (c.009) and that the Regulations had been moved from the Office of the 
Deputy Prime Minister and Barbara Roche to the DTI (c.010). The Religion and 
Belief Regulations were approved after an hour and a half, though Conservative 
MPs saw such regulation as costly and unnecessary ‘red tape’ for business. The 
Sexual Orientation Regulations took slightly longer. Both Conservative and 
Liberal Democrat MPs referred to the JCSI report, albeit for different reasons: 
anti-regulation and anti-discrimination respectively. Evan Harris argued for the 
Regulations to be withdrawn and made compliant with the Directive:
The Government might argue—as they did at the JCSI—that the exemption in regulation 7
(3) is based on article 4(1), not article 4(2), and the Minister has stuck to that line so far. 
Article 4(1) provides that a member state may provide for discrimination on the basis of 
genuine occupational requirements, while article 4(2) provides for organisations with a 
religious ethos to discriminate on the grounds of religion or belief. Article 4(2) clearly states 
that such discrimination may not amount to discrimination on another ground, which is 
why the Minister accepts that he cannot rely on article 4(2) to justify the wording of 
regulation 7(3). 
(Evan Harris 17.6.2003 c.039). 
The Minister replied that it would be for the courts to decide case by case. As all 
nine Labour committee members supported the Government, the Regulations 
were approved by nine to four votes after an hour and 45 minutes.
 The two sets of Regulations came before the Lords on 17.6.2003, but were 
debated separately. Lord Lester proposed the Government withdraw the Sexual 
Orientation Regulations and make them compliant with the Directive; he was 
defeated by 85 to 50 votes. This debate is analysed below. Regulation 7(3) also 
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prompted parliamentary questions (Lord Lester 17.6.2003 c.93WA; Angela Eagle 
18.6.2003 c.327W). When the Regulations came to the Commons for approval, 
there was dissent and the vote was deferred (23.6.2003 c.833). They were finally 
approved by 267 to 54 votes (25.6.2003 c.1177). Barbara Roche was among the 
many MPs who abstained. Questions continued on the implications of 7(3) for 
discrimination (Hew Edwards 30.6.2003; David Rendel 30.6.2003; Lord Lester 
1.7.2003; Evan Harris 15.9.2003; David Borrow 13.11.2003), as did those from 
anti-regulation MPs (Brian Cotter 11.9.2003; Henry Bellingham 13.11.2003/ 
19.12.2003; Michael Fabricant 16.12.2003). Press reports were intermittent. The 
Mail, Telegraph and Express focused on business fears of litigation (O’Connor 
25.8.2003; Rayner/Tyler/Hagger 1.12.2003). The Independent and the Guardian 
focused on employees’ rights (Verkaik 19.8.2003; Andalo/Inman 9.10.2003; 
Hilpern 28.11.2003). 
 The Employment Equality Regulations were included in the 2010 Equality 
Act. The religious exemption was retained in those applying to sexual orientation 
after senior bishops lobbied the Lords⎯even though the Government had been 
twice warned by the European Commission to bring the law in line with the 
Directive (Green 25.1.2010).
 The Debate
 The Lords debate on the Sexual Orientation Regulations lasted two hours 
(17.6.2003 cc.751-784). Fourteen peers made speeches: eight supported Lord 
Lester’s request for the Regulations’ withdrawal and amendment, six supported 
the Government (Appendix 63). Neither debate nor vote divided along party lines. 
Liberal Democrat, Labour and Conservative speakers, plus a Bishop, supported 
withdrawal for reasons of legality, clarity and equality. Labour peers supporting 
the Government argued for the Regulations’ approval alongside Conservatives 
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and a Bishop who sought to preserve religious and heterosexual privilege. As the 
speeches were largely individualised, they are summarised in sequence.
 Lord Lester introduced his request as a matter of law; he would not have 
pursued it had the JCSI been satisfied that Regulation 7(3) was intra vires. He 
explained the legal context and limitations of the GOR as defined in the Directive. 
In outlining the problems with 7(3) he made extensive reference to the JCSI 
report: if 7(3) was ultra vires, then the Government had no power to enact it; 
neither the employers nor employees it applied to were defined; there had been 
no consultation with persons likely to be affected. He predicted that 7(3) would 
“encourage unlawful discrimination” (c.755). He had no doubt:
I stake my professional judgment on it—that the courts would eventually decide that 
Regulation 7(3) was contrary to the principles of legal certainty and proportionality. Either 
the regulation will be struck down, or it will be drastically read down. But why on earth is 
it necessary to have recourse to the costly and protracted procedures of challenge in the 
courts, when it is so easy in this case for the Government and Parliament to enact 
legislation that avoids the vices of undue vagueness and over-breadth? (c.755)
He hoped the Regulations would be withdrawn and amended. 
 He was seconded by Baroness Turner who had three times tried to extend 
the 1975 Sex Discrimination Act to sexual orientation. She had been lobbied by 
her union on behalf of lesbians and gay men working in religious organisations. 
That they could lose their jobs because religious susceptibilities were offended 
was unnacceptable. She could not believe that was the Government’s intention 
and went on to quote from the Law Society briefing: 
In the absence of any limiting words in Regulation 7(3)(b)(1), we consider that a church 
which asserts, as a matter of doctrine, that homosexuality is a sin will be able to deny 
employment to homosexuals in any capacity whatever, without reference to the nature of 
the job. This is hard to reconcile with the purpose of the Directive. (c.756)
With reference to the JCSI, she hoped the Government would reconsider. 
 Lord Pilkington was against state interference and began by raising the 
emotive spectre of Nazi Germany: 
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In Hitler’s Germany, he destroyed faith communities, and the state decided who they could 
employ. It is a fundamental tenet of modern democracy that the communities within the 
state, be they trade unions or Churches, can decide whom to admit. The state does not 
decide that. [...] A lot of other people have said that they are not prepared to accept that a 
faith community should be dictated to by the state—by people who have no commitment to 
their religion. (c.757)
The basis of his brief argument was that as countries such as Germany and 
Ireland were making special provision for religion, England should too. He then 
warned against the kind of secularisation seen in nineteenth century France. He 
wanted the Government to stand firm. 
 The Bishop of Blackburn made a long speech in which ostensibly positive 
statements were increasingly modified. He began by claiming:
The Church of England, in common with many other Churches and faith communities in 
our country, strongly supports the creation of a legal framework to safeguard basic rights 
and to promote dignity, equality and respect for all members of society. 
[...]
It is also wrong that prejudiced views about sexual orientation have been able to deny 
people employment. The two sets of regulations before us tonight address those problems 
and I welcome them. (cc.757-8) 
He went on to explain why the draft Regulations had caused concern:
Churches and faith communities need to retain a broad measure of freedom to determine 
their own requirements in relation to the sexual conduct—not orientation—of those who 
wish to serve or represent them. (c.758)
He then began to oscillate between incompatable positions:
I urge the House to recognise there are genuine issues of religious liberty here. If that is 
accepted the question is how best to safeguard that liberty  [...]  while providing proper 
protection against the discrimination which gay and lesbian people have had to endure.
A difficulty immediately arises as a result of the varying ways in which sexual orientation 
can be used. As regards the Church of England  [...]  there are no circumstances in which 
we would wish to be able to discriminate against people on the grounds of their orientation 
as such. (cc.758-9)
As well as the mitigating “would wish to be able to”, his separation of ‘orientation’ 
from ‘conduct’ allowed discrimination to be denied in the former but implicit in 
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the latter. His prevarication captures a conflict between the liberty to exclude 
categories of employee and a ‘wish’ not to discriminate. He explained: 
We do not have posts or orders where there is a requirement to be heterosexual, or indeed 
homosexual. But we do have some posts and orders where, irrespective of sexual 
orientation, be it heterosexual or homosexual, the requirement remains for marriage or 
abstinence. Our difficulty is that under the regulations that sort of requirement would be 
open to challenge as unlawful discrimination if it were not for Regulation 7(3). The 
tribunals are unlikely to recognise a clear distinction between orientation and behaviour 
manifesting orientation. That is the difficulty. (c.759)
He argued that Regulation 7(2) was inadequate because it applied only where 
sexual ‘orientation’ was an occupational requirement:
All of our posts in the Church of England are open to people of any orientation provided 
they are prepared to observe the disciplines of the Church where that is required. We have 
no intention of discriminating against anyone simply because of their sexual orientation. 
(c.759)
As well as the mitigating “no intention”, this was misleading. The CoE was at that 
time in conflict over the nomination of Jeffrey John, the celibate gay Canon of 
Southwark Cathedral, as Bishop of Reading (his acceptance of the post was later 
withdrawn). This conflict was absent from the Bishop’s speech. He stated the 
CoE welcomed the Government’s response to their concerns; the courts would 
decide if the JCSI view was valid; the Directive was inconsistent; the CoE legal 
advice was that Regulation 7(3) met the Directive’s requirements:
In particular the regulation is confined to employment for purposes of an organised 
religion. It fulfils a legitimate objective—protecting the right to religious freedom—and it is 
proportionate. It is emphatically not about pandering to prejudices. The provision comes 
into play only where doctrine and strongly held religious convictions are at stake. (c.759)
Lord Lester asked him:
Where in Regulation 7(3) are words of limitation which require the principle of 
proportionality to be applied or require that the discrimination should only be in relation to 
what is a genuine occupational requirement? (c.760)
The Bishop could not answer:
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My Lords, an amateur is here in conflict with a lawyer. For me the importance of the matter 
is to comply with the doctrines of religion and religious convictions. That is the main point 
for us. I was going on to say before the noble Lord intervened that the present drafting 
would not have been exactly our choice. However, it attempts to strike a fair balance 
between the rights of individuals and the freedom of faith communities to apply their own 
beliefs and convictions in relation to those who serve and represent them. (c.760)
He urged approval of the Regulations. The apparently benign moderation of his 
speech clouds its agenda. Besides the assumption that ‘religious convictions’ are 
not prejudiced, the ‘right to religious freedom’ is presented as that of organised 
religion, whereas Article 9 of the ECvHR applies to an individual’s freedom to 
follow a religion, not a religion’s imposition on its members or employees. 
 Benign moderation was not a feature of Baroness Miller’s speech. She 
blamed the Government for letting EU power “dictate national policy” (c.760): 
We now have these regulations that are intended to implement the directive. Given that the 
Government have helped to obtain the concessions for religious groups, it is disappointing 
that they have not made the religious exemptions as clear and as firm as they might have. 
As with all badly drafted laws, as the noble Lord, Lord Lester, has said, it will take much 
litigation to establish the boundaries of religious protection. (c.761)
However:
Despite their shortcomings, to reject the regulations would be akin to throwing the baby 
out with the bath water. Without them there would be nothing whatever to protect the very 
people that the regulations are intended to protect. (c.761)
She agreed with Lord Lester on the unclear application of 7(3), but defended the 
protection of religion and disclaimed (van Dijk 2008a: 109-110) prejudice: 
I am certain that every Member of your Lordships’ House would strongly disapprove of 
what might be described as bigotry and unreasonable, indeed, unreasoning, blind 
prejudice. However, those of us—I include myself in this number—who wish to protect the 
rights of various minorities, in this case those of homosexual orientation, must not at the 
same time overlook the rights of other members of the community. There are those who 
find homosexuality objectionable. I certainly do not include myself or, indeed, I think, 
anyone in this House. Although I am a very religious person I certainly would not accept 
the word ‘abomination’, which is used in Leviticus. I think that is quite disgraceful. (c.762)
Arguably, this oddly suggestive disclaimer reinforces the prejudice by reminding 
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her religious listeners of a biblical verse. Similarly, her claim that the Regulations 
were biased, reveals resentment that sexual orientation was protected: 
Paradoxically, the regulations prohibit discrimination on the grounds of the sexual 
orientation of an employee but do not prohibit discrimination on the grounds that the 
employee is living with a member of the opposite sex to whom he or she is not married. 
That in itself is discriminatory, but typical of the biased way in which this type of anti-
discrimination legislation is framed. All employees are equal but some are more equal than 
others. (c.762-3)
She was sure the Regulations would “land employers with claims for substantial 
compensation” (c.763), which she linked to false claims of discrimination:
We could therefore find a person being refused employment or dismissed on perfectly 
normal grounds, and then launching a claim that it was a case of discrimination on the 
grounds of his sexual orientation—of which the employer was not even aware. (c.763)
Conservatives found the Regulations to be inadequate, but with reluctance they 
supported the Government. She concluded with a quote from the Evangelical 
Alliance briefing which saw 7(3) as the best they could hope for at that time.
 Lord Alli supported Lord Lester and urged the Government to think again. 
He addressed the role of the CoE and orgainised religion:
I find it impossible to believe that the Government—one committed to fairness and equality
—should seek to allow the continued discrimination against gay men and women if those 
who seek to discriminate against them believe in God. What an irony: if you are God-
fearing, you can weed out, discriminate and persecute gay men and women, and, if you are 
not, you cannot. Frankly, the exceptions in Regulation 7(3) are a joke. They make a 
mockery of equality legislation. (c.264)
He noted:
How can it be sensible that, on the one hand, the Church is about to appoint a gay bishop, 
and, on the other, it is about to sack gay staff. We see the way in which a tradition in the 
Church seeks to persecute gay men and women. Even today, the right reverend Prelate the 
Bishop of Oxford is under intense pressure following his appointment of Dr Jeffrey John as 
the Bishop of Reading. The fact that he is celibate is immaterial because he has a history of 
homosexuality. That is enough for his critics to want him out. It seems irrelevant that he 
might be the best man for the job. (c.765)
He accepted the right of churches to appoint Christians to their ministry, of 
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mosques to appoint Muslims and temples to appoint Hindus. The Regulations 
protected this. Addressing the Bishops, he pointed out: 
Gay people may be a minority in society, but so too are those who actively profess a faith. 
Each has the right to protection, but not at the expense of the rights and dignity of the 
other. That is what equality means. Today we have the opportunity to demonstrate that 
this House is a modern Chamber, one that acknowledges that religion has a place in the 
national debate, but not a dominant or superior one. (c.766)
He warned his noble friends on the Front Bench of his opposition: 
This is a Government of which I am proud, but this law is a huge stain on a worthy record 
on equality. I have never voted against my party or Government, but in all honesty, noble 
Lords cannot expect a turkey to vote for Christmas, no matter how important it is in the 
Christian calendar. (c.766)
He hoped the Government would reconsider.
 Lord Avebury hoped that noble Lords on the Labour Benches had listened 
to Lord Alli and would put principle above party. Having noted Baroness Miller’s 
illogicality, he outlined the confusion 7(3) would cause in employment tribunals, 
then turned to Article 4.2 of the Directive which invalidated 7(3): 
Specifically, the directive does not allow for differences in treatment on grounds of sexual 
orientation other than the GOR. Therefore the directive cannot be held to allow the 
managers of employment for the purposes of organised religion to apply either of the 
criteria in 7(3) of the sexual orientation regulations. (c.767)
He argued that the wording had a potentially wide application. However:
The point is not the number of organisations that will be covered by the expression. Article 
4.1 does not allow any discrimination on such grounds, contrary to the assertions of the 
DTI in its evidence to the Select Committee. (c.767)
While some religions criticised gay people, no doctrine required a post to be filled 
by a person of a particular sexual orientation:
Therefore, it is impossible to satisfy the tests in 7(3)(b)(i), because the doctrines of no 
religion say anything about the employment of people of a given sexual orientation. (c.768)
In the case of 7(3)(b)(ii):
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If we agreed to the provision, we would allow the bigotry and prejudice of some of a 
religion’s followers to dictate its employment policy. I think that it would be the first time in 
any western country when anti-gay conduct has been approved by legislation. (c.768)
Lord Pilkington asked if he was aware that other countries had “accepted the 
amendments to the directive” (c.768). Lord Avebury did not believe any country 
had an equivalent to Regulation 7(3): 
Specifically, it came almost verbatim from paragraph 24 of the Church of England 
response to the DTI consultation document, [...] It got there by Church of England lobbying 
which, as the noble Lord Alli explained, was not subject to any consultation. (c.769). 
The JCSI had drawn their doubts about 7(3) to the attention of both Houses. He 
looked forward supporting Lord Lester in the division lobby. 
 The Bishop of Worcester was hesitant. He wanted to put on record a 
minority view within the CoE, whose representations he saw as disproportionate 
to the problem. The two major debates in the Church were on sexual ethics and 
human rights. While he believed human rights pursued individual rather than 
community rights, there were two reasons why he regretted the form of 7(3):
First, there is the phrase about the beliefs of a significant number of the followers of a 
religion. I have said, and I repeat, that I do not hold in disrespect those who out of 
Christian, Jewish, Muslim, Sikh or Hindu conviction believe that the conduct of sexual life 
has to be within marriage, or by abstinence. However, I find unacceptable the use of 
phrases such as “beliefs” and “significant number”, which open the door to some kinds of 
campaigning about which all of us would wish to be ashamed. (cc.770-1)
In Worcester he had watched the BNP clothe themselves in religion: 
Therefore, I find it extremely difficult to accept that we should be advancing, with the 
support of religious communities, a regulation that includes such an open-ended licence 
for people to advance things that are not the doctrines of the Church and may not be the 
doctrines of any religion. (c.771)
Secondly, he believed religious community rights should be balanced by civil law: 
A balance must be struck, time and time again as a matter of fact, about whether religious 
communities may preserve their distinctive character or whether that distinctive character 
goes too far outside what the public good has come to see as right. (c.771)
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His concern was that the issue had been presented as though it was clear cut:
I am not worried so much about litigation and long deliberations in courts of law. What 
worries me much more is what might happen on the streets, when people wind up 
communities. I do not believe that we have yet explored nearly far enough the possibility of 
creating language in a regulation that is sufficiently limiting and proportionate to defend 
those things that are undoubtedly necessary for a character of a religious community but 
also require that community to live within the insights of society as a whole. (c.771)
That was why he was supporting Lord Lester.
 Lord Lea cautioned against exaggeration. He was a Labour member of the 
JCSI and strongly supported its report, but would not be voting:
First, as the right reverend Prelate pointed out, two debates are going on here. In one 
respect, one of them is ultra vires, since all we ought to be debating tonight is whether we 
agree about the question of doubt about the vires of Regulation 7(3). We should not be 
having the broad debate that we seem to be getting into. (c.772)
He argued there was little leeway in how the Directive was transposed. Second, it 
did not matter whether 7(3) was redrafted or not:
The ultimate reason why, in a sense, it does not matter what we do tonight, and the reason 
why industrial tribunals will inevitably have to look at some cases— [...] —is that these 
transpositions are going to he ambiguous when it comes to the behaviour of an individual 
and they will have to be tested. (c.772)
The Regulations were a “solid step forward in protecting people’s rights” (c.772). 
He cautioned noble Lords to focus on what was ultra vires. 
 Lord Mayhew focused on whether or not the JCSI’s doubt was justified. 
Addressing the “right reverend Prelates, seated opposite in such impressive 
numbers” (c.773), he went on to ask:
Does a requirement related to sexual orientation always fall within and never outside the 
ambit of a genuine and determining occupational requirement? I refer to a particular 
sexual orientation which is a genuine and determining occupational requirement. That is 
the question. Of course it is possible to have more than one view. (c.774)
The JCSI report had revealed sensible grounds for doubt. He did not know how 
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he was going to vote, but would be influenced by some of the speeches he had 
heard and by what the Minister would say: 
I am interested in whether he accepts that there is a doubt, whether he thinks that there is 
a doubt but it is worth putting up with, or whether he thinks that it might not in all 
circumstances be better not to throw the baby out with the bathwater. We have heard that 
expression already from my noble friend. He might think that it might be wiser to look after 
the baby for a little longer and change the bathwater. (c.774)
It seemed to him that the obligation to legislate clearly and avoid unnecessary 
litigation was being overlooked. At the vote, he supported Lord Lester.
 Baroness Whitaker wanted to add a footnote to the Bishop of Worcester’s 
speech. It seemed to her that Regulation 7(3) was not in the spirit of Article 13 of 
the Amsterdam Treaty, which she had helped to draft. Article 13 flowed from the 
UN Charter and the ECvHR as a basis of agreed rights. She argued that respect 
for faiths and beliefs required “a common ground of tolerance underpinned by 
universal human rights and fundamental freedoms” (c.775): 
Freedom from discrimination in employment, qualified only on the narrowest grounds, is 
one of the most important of these. Freedom from discrimination on the grounds of sexual 
orientation is another. This last freedom is the least honoured in everyday culture. One can 
hear prejudice which, if it were about women or people from different ethnic backgrounds, 
would be repudiated—even prosecuted—spoken quite freely about sexual orientation. 
(c.775)
She urged the Government to think again, but did not vote.
 Lord Clement Jones asked the Minister a series of practical questions on 
outcomes if the Regulations were passed in their present form:
... the first question is whether or not a religious organisation such as the Church of 
England, when putting an advertisement in a newspaper, for instance, could say 
“heterosexuals only need apply”. Will that be legal? At what level of employment will that be 
legal? 
Secondly, at interview, an employer will ask questions of prospective employees. What kind 
of questions will the employer be entitled to ask? Will he be able to ask if the candidate is 
gay, lesbian, in a relationship, or celibate? These questions flow from the regulations. 
Perhaps the Minister can clarify whether it would be perfectly proper for a religious 
organisation to ask them. (cc.775-6)
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He lived in Clapham where the CoE was sponsoring an Academy:
What is the nature of the sponsoring relationship in those circumstances? What signals 
are sent out to parents and prospective pupils? Will the school be able to interrogate 
potential employees about their sexual orientation or not? (c.776)
He fervently hoped the Regulations would not be passed.
 In Lord Brennan’s view, the issue was not “Church and religion versus gay 
and lesbian rights” (c.776), but the vires of the Regulations. He claimed:
First, the Human Rights Act 1998 does not provide a right against discrimination of the 
kind that we are debating this evening. That is why the Minister certified that these 
regulations were compatible with the Act. Secondly, the preamble to the directive explicitly 
recognises the ability of member states to take into account in formulating the directive the 
interests of religious and Church organisations within each member state. (c.776)
He went on to justify Regulation 7(3) in terms of existing law:
Section 19 of the Sex Discrimination Act is a similar provision. So far as I am aware, it has 
not produced a large- scale litigation suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Lester. Equally, 
Section 60 of the School Standards and Framework Act 1998 explicitly provides that the 
governing body of a voluntary-aided school shall have regard in connection with the 
termination of employment of a teacher to any conduct on his or her part that is 
incompatible with the precepts, tenets or religion of the school in question. (c.776)
The JCSI had considered the arguments. Lawyers could take their own view on 
the doubt. In his view, the Directive was properly applied. He continued:
It is not a question of whether Regulation 7(3) stands or falls; it is a question of whether, in 
any particular case in which a Church or religion seeks to rely on Regulation 7(3) in its 
defence, it is required to show under Article 4.1 that the directive in this context 
commands analysis of Regulation 7(3) and that the decision represented a genuine and 
determining occupational requirement that had been applied proportionately. (c.776-7)
This suggests 7(3) would be difficult to defend in court. Lord Brennan felt the 
Government had done their best and that the Regulations should be approved.
 The Minister, Lord Sainsbury, set out to explain the rationale of 7(3) and 
clarify its scope. He paid tribute to Lord Lester, the JCSI and the consultations. 
The Government believed 7(3) was compatible with the Directive: 
321
I say to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mayhew, that the baby has been sitting in the 
bath water for a very long time with people throwing ducks and sponges at it. It is now 
time to take it out of the bath, dry it, and send it to bed. I hope that the House will do that 
this evening. (c.778)
The provision was needed to protect religious doctrine and prevent it being the 
subject of litigation or debated in tribunals. The Government had had to draw a 
careful line between religious traditions and sexual orientation. He argued: 
When drafting Regulation 7(3), we had in mind a very narrow range of employment: 
ministers of religion, plus a small number of posts outside the clergy, including those who 
exist to promote and represent religion. (c.779) 
The provision was not a blanket exception:
It is quite clear that Regulation 7(3) does not apply to all jobs in a particular type of 
organisation. On the contrary, employers must be prepared to justify any requirement 
related to sexual orientation on a case by case basis. The rule only applies to employment 
which is for the purposes of “organised religion”, not religious organisations. (c.779) 
It did not apply to nurses in care homes or teachers in faith schools whose 
purposes were health and education. In reply to Lord Clement Jones he argued:
[An advertisement] could not say “only heterosexuals need apply” unless it was a genuine 
occupational requirement that the job holder be heterosexual. (cc.779-80)
Even if a job was for the purposes of organised religion, two further tests applied:
In the first test the requirement must be applied to comply with the doctrines of the 
religion. We do not believe that that test would be met in relation to many posts. It would 
be very difficult for a church to argue that a requirement related to sexual orientation 
applied to a post of cleaner, gardener or secretary. Religious doctrine rarely has much to 
say about posts such as those. (c.780)
In the second test:
There the church will have to show that the requirement related to sexual orientation is 
necessary, because of the nature of the employment and the context in which it is carried 
out, so as to avoid conflicting with the strongly held religious convictions of a significant 
number of the religion's followers ...”. (c.780)
He emphasised both elements of the second test must be satisfied and that they 
too would apply to very few cases. Lord Lester asked:
322
My Lords, I realise that the Minister intends to move on to another aspect. He used the 
word “necessary”. What he said was that it had to be shown to be “necessary” in terms of 
Regulation 7(3)(b) too. Where is that word to be found, and how can the proportionality test 
be read into the words of the provision? (c.780)
Lord Sainsbury thought it followed clearly:
My Lords it is necessary to be shown that that is the case. That is clearly stated in 
Regulation 7(3). It says the paragraph applies only ‘where’—and therefore it is necessary 
that—those tests are applied. (c.780)  
He reiterated, it was a very strict test that would apply to very few cases. The 
courts and tribunals would have to decide what constituted a significant number 
of a religion’s followers depending “on the circumstances of each case” (c.780-1). 
He continued, there were two differences between 7(2) and 7(3):
First, Regulation 7(2) is of general application. It covers any employment where being gay, 
straight or bisexual is a genuine occupational requirement. By contrast, Regulation 7(3) 
applies only where employment is for the purposes of an organised religion and either 
religious doctrine or the nature and context of the job, together with the religious 
convictions of the religion’s followers, gives rise to a genuine occupational requirement. 
Regulation 7(3) then applies to very few jobs. (c.781)
The other difference was explained less clearly:
Secondly, Regulation 7(2) applies where sexual orientation is a genuine occupational 
requirement. In other words, one has to be gay, straight or bisexual to do the job. 
Regulation 7(3) applies where a requirement related to a sexual orientation is a genuine 
occupational requirement. It is slightly wider than Regulation 7(2) in that respect but 
reflects the wording of Article 4.1. (c.781)
He did not define the ‘requirement’ or how it ‘related’ to sexual orientation, but 
claimed it was necessary to avoid interference with Church doctrine. The 
Government was satisfied 7(3) was intra vires and that the courts and tribunals 
could interpret it in line with the Directive. He concluded: 
We must not forget that there is no protection currently for those who experience 
harassment, discrimination or victimisation at work on grounds of their sexual orientation. 
These regulations are designed to outlaw that kind of unacceptable treatment for the first 
time. (c.781)
He hoped Lord Lester would reconsider.
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 Lord Lester was unmoved. He thanked the participants and emphasised 
his strong support for the Regulations. He saw no dispute in the need to balance 
competing interests. The debate reminded him of that on the Human Rights Bill 
when the churches had tried to obtain exemption from its provisions. The issue 
was whether 7(3) was based on strict criteria and was proportionate:
Regulation 7(2) is quite clear, because it uses as its touchstone the notion of 
proportionality. One has to be of a particular sexual orientation; there has to be a genuine 
and determining occupational requirement; and it must be proportionate to apply that 
requirement in the particular case. That would apply equally to a religious context or any 
other context. (c.782)
This was not the case in Regulation 7(3): 
The vice, as I have described it, of Regulation 7(3) is one of over-breadth and vagueness. 
Leaving aside the vagueness of what is meant by “organised religion”, the vice in 
Regulation 7(3)(b), if one looks at it carefully, is that there are no words of limitation. [...] 
There is no requirement of a genuine occupational qualification, no requirement of 
proportionality, no strict test and no strict criteria. (cc.782-3)
He agreed that a tribunal or court might interpret 7(3) in line with the Directive, 
but argued that it should be clear. The wording was not satisfactory. 
 Lord Lester was defeated by 85 to 50 votes. Eight Labour and five 
Conservative peers voted against their party to support withdrawal. Two Labour 
peers who voiced doubt about 7(3) abstained. Of the Bishops noted by Lord 
Mayhew to be present in “such impressive numbers” (c.773), only three actually 
voted⎯two in support of Lord Lester. 
 Words and Themes
 The following analyses focus on each side’s top-ten keywords (Appendices 
67 & 68) and their collocates (Appendices 69 & 70). Core features of each side’s 
contributions to the debate are shown on Flowcharts 9 and 10 below.
*       *       *
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Flowchart 9: Pro-withdrawal Keyword and Collocate Network
key: BOLD CAPITALS: keywords in the top ten
 BLACK CAPITALS: keywords
 RED CAPITALS: sexuality-term keywords and keywords collocating with sexuality terms
 black lower case: keyword collocates
 red lower case: sexuality terms and sexuality-term collocates
























On Flowchart 9, the pro-withdrawal keywords (Appendix 68) are largely discrete. 
Apart from WOMEN and MEN and SELECT COMMITTEE, the strands of argument 
are linked only by the keyword collocates the, and, not (Appendix 70). The upper 
part of the flowchart relates to discrimination and the lower part to the non-
compliance of Regulation 7(3) with the Directive, while the keywords SEEK, USE 
and SEEMS modify statements in both strands of argument.
 The lines for WOMEN and MEN (Appendix 71) relate to discrimination. 
Most were spoken by Lord Alli in his criticisms of the CoE’s intervention:
1  that a person working with lesbian  women  should be a lesbian, or that a person         LL 17.6.pro.txt
2 discrimination against gay men and  women  if those who seek to discriminate agai       LAl 17.6.pro.txt
3 iminate and persecute gay men and  women,  and, if you are not, you cannot. Fran      LAl 17.6.pro.txt
4 se the lives of ordinary gay men and  women  as a crucible in which to play out the       LAl 17.6.pro.txt
5 rch seeks to persecute gay men and  women.  Even today, the right reverend Prelat       LAl 17.6.pro.txt
6 rly used to persecute good men and  women.  I fully accept the right of the Christi       LAl 17.6.pro.txt
7 discrimination against gay men and  women  by religious institutions?        LAl 17.6.pro.txt
8 ear prejudice which, if it were about  women  or people from different ethnic backg       BW 17.6.pro.txt
1  , or that a person working with gay  men  should be gay—must demonstrate that         LL 17.6.pro.txt
2 ontinued discrimination against gay  men  and women if those who seek to discrim       LAl 17.6.pro.txt
3 out, discriminate and persecute gay  men  and women, and, if you are not, you ca       LAl 17.6.pro.txt
4 seek to use the lives of ordinary gay  men  and women as a crucible in which to pl       LAl 17.6.pro.txt
5   the Church seeks to persecute gay  men  and women. Even today, the right rever       LAl 17.6.pro.txt
6   be unfairly used to persecute good  men  and women. I fully accept the right of th       LAl 17.6.pro.txt
7 actice of discrimination against gay  men  and women by religious institutions?       LAl 17.6.pro.txt
While neither ‘discrimination’ nor ‘discriminate’ are collocates, their presence in 
Lord Alli’s lines with persecute places his focus firmly on anti-gay discrimination. 
Baroness Whitaker’s line occurs in a comparison of everyday acceptance of anti-
gay prejudice with the non-acceptance of that against other groups, while Lord 
Lester’s lines occur in his clarification of the GOR exemption from discrimination 
under the Directive. More generally, the conditions under which discrimination 
on grounds of sexual orientation may or may not be lawful under the Directive 
feature in the lines for discrimination and related terms (Appendix 71A). Together 
they illustrate a clear “community of value judgments” (Voloshinov 2012: 165) 
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that anti-gay prejudice and discrimination are wrong and should not be lawful.
 The lower part of Flowchart 9 relates to the legality of Regulation 7(3). 
Authoritative sources are prominent, notably the EC Framework Directive and 
Joint SELECT COMMITTEE on Statutory Instruments, though it is unlikely that 
EC would be a keyword without its repetition in the Directive’s title: 
1 ation 7(3) so as to conform with the  EC  Framework Directive 2000/78/EC.         LL 17.6.pro.txt
2  EC Framework Directive 2000/78/ EC.              LL 17.6.pro.txt
3 osed on the United Kingdom by the  EC  Framework Directive 2000/78/EC. Beca         LL 17.6.pro.txt
4  EC Framework Directive 2000/78/ EC.  Because the Government have chosen to         LL 17.6.pro.txt
5   Article 4(1) of the  EC  Framework Directive allows in very limite         LL 17.6.pro.txt
6 ation 7(3) so as to conform with the  EC  Framework Directive 2000/78/EC.—(Lor         LL 17.6.pro.txt
7  EC Framework Directive 2000/78/ EC.—(Lord Lester of Herne Hill.)           LL 17.6.pro.txt
These lines were spoken by Lord Lester. Having invited the Government to with-
draw and amend the Regulations to comply with the Directive, he emphasised: 
Because the Government have chosen to proceed by way of subordinate rather than 
primary legislation, the power to make those regulations is conferred by Section 2(2) of the 
European Communities Act 1972. That is a power to transpose the directive faithfully into 
our domestic law. If the regulations fail to do so because they would allow an employer to 
discriminate on grounds of sexual orientation in circumstances not permitted by the 
directive, they are beyond the powers conferred by Parliament in Section 2(2) and are 
unlawful. (c.751)
And he pointed out that: 
Article 4(1) of the EC Framework Directive allows in very limited circumstances that a 
difference of treatment may be justified when a characteristic related to sexual orientation 
constitutes a, “genuine and determining occupational requirement. when the objective is 
legitimate and the requirement is proportionate”. That is known as the GOR—genuine 
occupational requirement—exception. (c.752)
Details of this argument are evident in the lines for Directive (Appendix 71B) and 
the GOR (Appendix 71C), plus those for PROPORTIONALITY (Appendix 71) which 
Lord Lester argued had not been applied to Regulation 7(3). 
 The lines for SELECT and COMMITTEE refer to the JCSI in 10/11 and 
45/46 lines respectively (Appendix 71) and concern its doubts over 7(3)’s legality. 
A total of 31/45 lines for COMMITTEE occur in reports, for example:
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9  them on a number of grounds. The  committee's  main concerns are with Regulati         LL 17.6.pro.txt
11  At paragraph 1.17 of its report, the  committee  concluded that there is doubt abo         LL 17.6.pro.txt
13 lains its reasoning in this way. The  committee  stated: Against this background, t         LL 17.6.pro.txt
15 cture of the religion. It seems to the  committee  wholly within the bounds of possi         LL 17.6.pro.txt
17  be allowed by Regulation 7(3)". The  committee  went on: Yet it is open to question         LL 17.6.pro.txt
19             The Select  Committee  explained that Regulation 7(3)—I          LL 17.6.pro.txt
21 ligion concerned". It is, as the Joint  Committee  explains, important that Article 4         LL 17.6.pro.txt
23          The  committee  went on at paragraph 1.20 of the          LL 17.6.pro.txt
25 in paragraph 1.25 of its report. The  committee  considered that, in the light of Re         LL 17.6.pro.txt
33 , Lord Lea of Crondall, in the Select  Committee:  We are not aware of any cases in       LAv 17.6.pro.txt
35  As my noble friend said, the Select  Committee  has now reported that there is do       LAv 17.6.pro.txt
37 were considered by the Joint Select  Committee  on 3rd June, it had to make do w       LAv 17.6.pro.txt
41 I wish to cite. The report states: The  Committee  considered that regulation 7(2) w        LM 17.6.pro.txt
43  ment. Regulation 7(2) does and the  committee  was happy about that, but does R        LM 17.6.pro.txt
45  nguage that I have mentioned. The  committee  was worried about the provision b        LM 17.6.pro.txt
Ten of the 31 reports are direct quotes and six clearly paraphrase the JCSI report 
or its proceedings, while the remainder straightforwardly report its concerns with 
little ‘pictorial infiltration’ (Voloshinov 1986: 120-1). The JCSI proceedings are 
reported in the lines for MR (Appendix 71) in a similarly straightforward way. 
 Various strands of argument are modified by the keywords SEEMS, USE 
and SEEK. The first two lines for SEEMS (Appendix 71) occur in quotes from the 
JCSI report and thus illustrate the caution with which it phrased its doubts:
1  g to the structure of the religion. It  seems  to the committee wholly within the bo        LL 17.6.pro.txt
2 ment' in these circumstances there  seems  to the committee to be a doubt as to w        LL 17.6.pro.txt
In five lines SEEMS personalises the speakers view which de-objectifies comment:
4              It  seems  to me that the Church of England, wh       LAl 17.6.pro.txt
6 address if I were to do so. The point  seems  to me to be a very narrow one; it is wh       LM 17.6.pro.txt
7              It  seems  to me that one starts with looking at A       LM 17.6.pro.txt
8  the committee's evidence taking, it  seems  to me that there was revealed a very s       LM 17.6.pro.txt
10     I just want to say that it  seems  to me that Regulation 7(3) does not al       BW 17.6.pro.txt
In three lines SEEMS prefaces and thus softens criticism: 
3 gh for his critics to want him out. It  seems  irrelevant that he might be the best m       LAl 17.6.pro.txt
5   these days, the Government's idea  seems  to be to pile it on with the minimum ti       LAv 17.6.pro.txt
9   At the moment it  seems  that, in this rather passionate debate,       LM 17.6.pro.txt
The lines for USE also occur in criticisms. Where USE is a noun, agency is 
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obscured (Baker 2006: 165-6) and thus the criticism oblique. Lord Lester’s lines 
imply that the Government had made unusual or unexpected USE of its powers 
and that USE of ‘etc’ in the heading of Regulation 7 was obfuscatory: 
1 make some unusual or unexpected  use  of the powers conferred by the statute u        LL 17.6.pro.txt
2 lation 7(3) may be explained by the  use  of the word "etc ". The heading refers to,         LL 17.6.pro.txt
The Bishop of Worcester’s criticism was more direct but agency is ambiguous:
3 e. However, I find unacceptable the  use  of phrases such as "beliefs" and "signific     BoW 17.6.pro.txt
Agency is more obvious where USE is a verb. Lord Alli’s criticism of organised 
religion is softened by SEEK to⎯which reduces USE to an intention, while his 
criticism of the Bishops is modified by try to⎯which reduces USE to an attempt:
1 ther organised religions who seek to  use  the lives of ordinary gay men and women       LAl 17.6.pro.txt
2  Bishops' Benches that if they try to  use  the privilege that they enjoy—the extraor       LAl 17.6.pro.txt
Lord Avebury’s line criticises the Government by proxy in highlighting the JCSI’s 
unprecedented USE of its power: 
3 Committee has ever had occasion to  use  this power before. It also criticises the G       LAv 17.6.pro.txt
In Lord Mayhew’s lines, USE distances him from Lord Lea’s words: 
7 he other hand the technicalities—to  use  his word—of the means by which that obj          17.6.pro.txt
8 y difficult subject. To transpose—to  use  the word used by the noble Lord, Lord Lea         17.6.pro.txt
Caution in the lines for SEEK is evident its modification of the main verb in 8/11 
lines which reduces the action to intent. In 2/8 lines this modifies criticisms of 
the Government: 
2 ued that the regulations should not  seek  to meddle with matters of religious doct         LL 17.6.pro.txt
4 ed to fairness and equality—should  seek  to allow the continued discrimination a       LAl 17.6.pro.txt
It modifies criticisms of orgainised religion 2/8 lines:
5 st gay men and women if those who  seek  to discriminate against them believe in        LAl 17.6.pro.txt
6 d and other organised religions who  seek  to use the lives of ordinary gay men an       LAl 17.6.pro.txt
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In one line, the modification prefaces self-depreciation:
7 ing at this point, therefore, I do not  seek  to give to my words and arguments the      BoW 17.6.pro.txt
In 3/8 lines the intent is more neutral within the critical statement:
8 ate to the problem with which they  seek  to deal. I shall support the noble Lord's      BoW 17.6.pro.txt
9  him that a tribunal or court might  seek  to read down Regulation 7(3) in the way         LL 17.6.pro.txt
10 gulations. My plea this evening is to  seek  to avoid the courts having to remake th         LL 17.6.pro.txt
Two-thirds of the lines for SEEMS, USE and SEEK were spoken by peers at odds 
with the position of their party or Church (Lord Alli; Bishop of Worcester; Lord 
Mayhew; Baroness Whitaker), which may account for their caution. Liberal 
Democrat peers (Lord Lester; Lord Avebury) supported their party, which may 
account for their stronger criticism of the Government and major focus on the 
legality of 7(3), while Lord Alli criticised the CoE rather than the Government. 
*       *       *
 On Flowchart 10, the anti-withdrawal keywords (Appendix 67) and 
collocates (Appendix 69) on the left side of the chart relate mainly to the Labour 
speakers, while those on the right relate to the Conservative speakers and the 
Bishop of Blackburn. The keywords down the centre were used by both groups 
with no great imbalance. 
 The pivotal keyword WE shows both groups of speakers were claiming 
common ground (van Dijk 2008: 170-1). Of the 73 concordance lines (Appendix 
72), 36 were spoken by conservatives and 37 by Labour speakers. WE refers to:
 Conservative references of WE  Labour references of WE
 the CoE (11 lines)                   the Evangelical Alliance (3 lines)
 the Lords (11 lines)                generalised WE (1 line)
 Conservatives (5 lines)           the country (England/UK?)(1 line)
 England (4 lines)
 The Lords (23 lines)
 The Government (14 lines)
Most conservative lines were spoken by the Bishop of Blackburn and Baroness 
Miller. WE refers to the CoE in 11/12 of the Bishop’s lines, and occurs largely in 
modified denials of discrimination and justifications for 7(3): 
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Flowchart 10: Anti-withdrawal Keyword and Collocate Network
key: BOLD CAPITALS: keywords in the top ten
 BLACK CAPITALS: keywords
 RED CAPITALS: sexuality-term keywords and keywords collocating with sexuality terms
 black lower case: keyword collocates
 red lower case: sexuality terms and sexuality-term collocates
















7 s. That is not a code for saying that  we  seek special treatment. It is simply an ec     BoB 17.6.anti.txt
8 s, to the extent of it suggesting that  we  are keen to dismiss gay clergy and staff. P     BoB 17.6.anti.txt
9 ber caused much concern and why  we  believe that the new regulations are bette     BoB 17.6.anti.txt
10 ebate in many faith communities as  we  ponder how to respond to the rapid chan     BoB 17.6.anti.txt
11 here are no circumstances in which  we  would wish to be able to discriminate agai    BoB 17.6.anti.txt
12 on as such. I feel like repeating that. We  do not have posts or orders where there i     BoB 17.6.anti.txt
13 osexual, or indeed homosexual. But  we  do have some posts and orders where, irr     BoB 17.6.anti.txt
14 by itself does not give the protection  we  need because it applies only where being      BoB 17.6.anti.txt
15  the Church where that is required.  We  have no intention of discriminating again     BoB 17.6.anti.txt
16 cern at the earlier draft regulations.  We  welcome the way in which the Governme     BoB 17.6.anti.txt
17   ployment of cleaners or librarians—we  do not employ many of the latter in the D     BoB 17.6.anti.txt
The lines illustrate the Bishop’s defensiveness. Baroness Miller’s lines are more 
strident. In five lines WE refers to the Lords in blaming the Government for 
allowing the EU to dictate national policy:
18  the first of the two regulations that  we  are considering this evening. The regulati      BM 17.6.anti.txt
19 ns that apply to religious employers. We  now have these regulations that are inten      BM 17.6.anti.txt
20 n regulations—the next matter that  we  shall debate—as it is in the sexual orienta      BM 17.6.anti.txt
21  the sexual orientation regulations.  We  would not have started from here if all of       BM 17.6.anti.txt
22 of that had not happened. However,  we  are here.          BM 17.6.anti.txt
In four lines WE refers to the Lords in arguing that they were being asked to 
approve protection of the employee at the expense of the employer:
23     We may not agree with such a prejudiced vie      BM 17.6.anti.txt
24 ing the operation of Regulation 7. If  we  go by the precedent of previous anti-discr      BM 17.6.anti.txt
25 ew type of discrimination for which  we  are being asked to legislate today. An em      BM 17.6.anti.txt
26 e would apply to his or her religion.  We  could therefore find a person being refus      BM 17.6.anti.txt
Five more lines occur in her summary of the official Conservative position:
28           To sum up,  we  find these regulations to be poorly and a      BM 17.6.anti.txt
29 poorly and ambiguously drafted but  we  think that they are the best of a bad job,       BM 17.6.anti.txt
31   —he said that he probably would—we  will not be able to support him. Similarly,      BM 17.6.anti.txt
32 imilarly, and with equal reluctance,  we  will support the passage of these regulati      BM 17.6.anti.txt
33 rt the passage of these regulations.  We  very much hope that the adverse conseq      BM 17.6.anti.txt
Her lines are strongly critical of the Regulations and emphasise the reluctance 
with which Conservatives supported them.
 The Labour lines for WE are more focused on legality. In Lord Lea’s lines 
WE refers to the Lords in his attempt to redirect debate to the vires of 7(3):
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37 , one of them is ultra vires, since all  we  ought to be debating tonight is whether w        LL 17.6.anti.txt
38 ht to be debating tonight is whether  we  agree about the question of doubt about t        LL 17.6.anti.txt
39 t about the vires of Regulation 7(3).  We  should not be having the broad debate th        LL 17.6.anti.txt
40 not be having the broad debate that  we  seem to be getting into. We should not be        LL 17.6.anti.txt
41 ate that we seem to be getting into.  We  should not be raising the stakes of tonigh        LL 17.6.anti.txt
42 t. In fact, it is quite remarkable that  we  are having this debate on the transpositio        LL 17.6.anti.txt
43  is no argument about the fact that  we  are transposing a European directive. The       LL 17.6.anti.txt
44 touching on—but broadly speaking,  we  all know that we are transposing a Europ        LL 17.6.anti.txt
45  broadly speaking, we all know that  we  are transposing a European directive with       LL 17.6.anti.txt
46 with very little wriggle-room for how  we  transpose it.           LL 17.6.anti.txt
47         The only wriggle-room for how  we  transpose European directives is to some         LL 17.6.anti.txt
48  in a sense, it does not matter what  we  do tonight, and the reason why industrial        LL 17.6.anti.txt
49 hen it is clearly a step forward, or if  we  do the opposite, to say that it is a leap fur        LL 17.6.anti.txt
He focused on the TRANSPOSITION of the Directive and the need for tribunals 
and courts to interpret Regulation 7(3) case by case. In Lord Brennan’s lines WE 
also refers to the Lords. His claim that the Human Rights Act provides no right of 
protection against discrimination “of the kind we are debating” indicates disdain: 
50 inst discrimination of the kind that  we  are debating this evening. That is why the       LB 17.6.anti.txt
He claimed 7(3) was compatible with existing laws related to religious employers:
51 hin each member state. In addition,  we  must bear in mind that the law in this co       LB 17.6.anti.txt
And that the Government had done its best in balancing competing interests:
52  that they have done their best and  we  should agree to the regulations.         LB 17.6.anti.txt
Lord Lea’s and Lord Brennan’s uses of ought to, should not, must, should suggest 
impatience with the direction of debate. The remaining 21 lines were spoken by 
Lord Sainsbury who took a more patient approach. His lines where WE refers to 
the Lords occur in appeals that caution, concede and cajole:
53 regulations and to clarify its scope.  We  have a duty to think very carefully indeed       LS 17.6.anti.txt
54 sensitive matter, and it is right that  we  should consider the evidence set out by t       LS 17.6.anti.txt
61  the sexual orientation regulations.  We  have to draw a careful line between the t       LS 17.6.anti.txt
63 ns can be taken into account. What  we  are debating this evening is exactly where       LS 17.6.anti.txt
69 t such religious convictions. I think  we  would all agree that that would not be pr       LS 17.6.anti.txt
72  I understand entirely why  we  have focused in this debate on the provisi       LS 17.6.anti.txt
73 s, it is, of course, only a small part.  We  must not forget that there is no protectio       LS 17.6.anti.txt
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Speaking for the Government, his remaining lines occur in an extended defence 
of its position. Its view that 7(3) was compatible with the Directive: 
55 ight succeed if tested in the courts.  We  are firmly of the view that it would.        LS 17.6.anti.txt
Its investment in consultation: 
56     We have made a considerable investment in        LS 17.6.anti.txt
57 ngly with other religious beliefs, but  we  recognise and respect the fact that they a       LS 17.6.anti.txt
Its protection of religious DOCTRINE: 
58    In the same way  we  do not believe that these regulations shou       LS 17.6.anti.txt
59 igious teachings or doctrine, nor do  we  believe it appropriate that doctrine shoul       LS 17.6.anti.txt
60 ld religious convictions" means that  we  would have to go back to a situation wher       LS 17.6.anti.txt
Its balancing of sexual orientation and religious traditions: 
62 employment directive. I believe that  we  have succeeded in doing that.         LS 17.6.anti.txt
Its preparation of 7(3) and consideration of its legality:
64 overnment need to take a lead—and  we  did that in preparing Regulation 7(3). It re      LS 17.6.anti.txt
65 aining consistent with the directive.  We  believe that Regulation 7(3) is lawful beca       LS 17.6.anti.txt
Its belief in the narrow application of 7(3) and its strict requirements: 
66         When drafting Regulation 7(3),  we  had in mind a very narrow range of emplo       LS 17.6.anti.txt
67 ly with the doctrines of the religion.  We  do not believe that that test would be met       LS 17.6.anti.txt
Its reasoning on the wording of 7(3)(b)(ii):
68  terms to be workable in practice. If  we  had stricter wording, referring, for exampl       LS 17.6.anti.txt
Its understanding of the JCSI conclusion: 
70 not to interfere in Church doctrine.  We  understand how the Joint Committee on        LS 17.6.anti.txt
Its belief in the legality of 7(3): 
71 sidered all the arguments carefully,  we  are satisfied that Regulation 7(3) is infra        LS 17.6.anti.txt
Lord Sainsbury’s use of believe accounts for its occurrence among the Labour 
group’s collocates for WE and renders his defence less certain:
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58    In the same way  we  do not believe that these regulations shou       LS 17.6.anti.txt
59 igious teachings or doctrine, nor do  we  believe it appropriate that doctrine shoul       LS 17.6.anti.txt
62 employment directive. I believe that  we  have succeeded in doing that.         LS 17.6.anti.txt
65 aining consistent with the directive.  We  believe that Regulation 7(3) is lawful beca       LS 17.6.anti.txt
67 ly with the doctrines of the religion.  We  do not believe that that test would be met       LS 17.6.anti.txt
This ties in with the Government’s argument that 7(3) would have to be tested in 
the courts and Lord Brennan’s implication that it might be difficult to defend.
 The other central anti-withdrawal keyword on Flowchart 10 is EUROPEAN. 
The nouns to which it applies clearly demarcate each group’s concerns:
 Conservative applications of EUROPEAN  Labour applications of EUROPEAN
 Union (5 lines)                           committee (1 line)
 Communities Act (2 lines)           Directive (1 line)
 Directive (9 lines)
 directives (1 line)
As with the reference of WE, the conservative applications are less cohesive and 
those of Labour more focused. Lord Pilkington’s lines occur in his argument that 
England should follow other countries’ example:
1 ight. The noble Baroness sat on the  European  committee, as I did, together with         LP 17.6.anti.txt
2 mittee, as I did, together with many  European  Union members. England is not al        LP 17.6.anti.txt
3 ith the governments of a number of  European  Union countries. I do not have the         LP 17.6.anti.txt
7 d that various other members of the  European  Union are actually implementing t        LP 17.6.anti.txt
8 to accept that other members of the  European  Union—for example, Ireland or Ge        LP 17.6.anti.txt
9 my question. What is the rest of the  European  Union doing?           LP 17.6.anti.txt
The Bishop of Blackburn’s line occurs in his claim that the Directive allowed a 
provision such as 7(3) to be made: 
4 paragraph 24 of the preamble of the  European  directive in relation to the status o     BoB 17.6.anti.txt
Baroness Miller’s lines oppose a human-rights professor to Lord Lester:
5 at Regulation 7(3) is ultra vires the  European  Communities Act. I certainly woul       BM 17.6.anti.txt
6 at Regulation 7(3) is ultra vires the  European  Communities Act. The Governme       BM 17.6.anti.txt
In fact it was compliance with the Directive that was required.
 In the Labour lines, EUROPEAN was consistently applied to Directive. Lord 
Lea spoke 9/10 lines in his effort to refocus the debate on legality:
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10 of the vires of the transposition of a  European  directive. The temperature of the d       LL 17.6.anti.txt
11 y making points that imply that the  European  directive transposition gives us a l       LL 17.6.anti.txt
12 his debate on the transposition of a  European  directive, because there is no argu       LL 17.6.anti.txt
13 t the fact that we are transposing a  European  directive. The noble Baroness, Lad       LL 17.6.anti.txt
14  all know that we are transposing a  European  directive with very little wriggle-ro       LL 17.6.anti.txt
15  wriggle-room for how we transpose  European  directives is to some extent what i       LL 17.6.anti.txt
16 following Articles 4.1 and 4.2 of the  European  Directive. For those noble Lords w       LL 17.6.anti.txt
17 f what is stated in Article 4.1 of the  European  Directive of which this is the trans       LL 17.6.anti.txt
18  a very important transposition of a  European  directive and it is unreasonable fo       LL 17.6.anti.txt
Lord Sainsbury stressed that the Directive did allow religion to be considered: 
19 xtreme positions. Article 4(1) of the  European  directive is quite clear that religiou       LS 17.6.anti.txt
While conservative speakers were protecting religious privilege, Labour speakers 
were defending the legality of Government capitulation to the CoE lobby. 
	
 From what did religion need protection? The anti-withdrawal lines for 
discrimination and related terms (Appendix 72A) are indicative. The Bishop of 
Blackburn’s lines occur in his defence of protection for religion:
2     It is an undoubted anomaly that  discrimination  against Jews and Sikhs has u     BoB 17.6.anti.txt
3  as a religious community, whereas  discrimination  against Muslims, Hindus or C     BoB 17.6.anti.txt
4 employer. In respect of the religious  discrimination  regulations, that much is sur     BoB 17.6.anti.txt
5  stances would constitute unlawful  discrimination.         BoB 17.6.anti.txt
7 ld be open to challenge as unlawful  discrimination  if it were not for Regulation 7(     BoB 17.6.anti.txt
And his disclaimers of discrimination and prejudice:
6 viding proper protection against the  discrimination  which gay and lesbian people      BoB 17.6.anti.txt
1  which we would wish to be able to  discriminate  against people on the grounds o     BoB 17.6.anti.txt
1 is required. We have no intention of  discriminating  against anyone simply becaus     BoB 17.6.anti.txt
2 mphatically not about pandering to  prejudices.  The provision comes into play onl     BoB 17.6.anti.txt
1  has not been. It is also wrong that  prejudiced  views about sexual orientation ha     BoB 17.6.anti.txt
Over half Baroness Miller’s lines undermine the validity of the Regulations: 
12 radoxically, the regulations prohibit  discrimination  on the grounds of the sexual       BM 17.6.anti.txt
13  of an employee but do not prohibit  discrimination  on the grounds that the empl      BM 17.6.anti.txt
14 iased way in which this type of anti- discrimination  legislation is framed. All empl      BM 17.6.anti.txt
15  is a difference in principle between  discrimination  on the grounds of a person's s     BM 17.6.anti.txt
16 n's sex or race and this new type of  discrimination  for which we are being asked       BM 17.6.anti.txt
1  she is not married. That in itself is  discriminatory,  but typical of the biased way       BM 17.6.anti.txt
3 may similarly want to object and to  discriminate  against persons who live togeth      BM 17.6.anti.txt
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Including her assertion that they would lead to false claims for compensation:
17 nching a claim that it was a case of  discrimination  on the grounds of his sexual       BM 17.6.anti.txt
18 y plausible case of the possibility of  discrimination,  that employer is faced with t      BM 17.6.anti.txt
2 go by the precedent of previous anti- discriminatory  regulations, I fear that these r      BM 17.6.anti.txt
Yet she virulently disclaimed prejudice and discrimination:
1 sonable, indeed, unreasoning, blind  prejudice.  However, those of us—I include m      BM 17.6.anti.txt
2         We may not agree with such a  prejudiced  view but—this is the important pa      BM 17.6.anti.txt
1 rove of what might be described as  bigotry  and unreasonable, indeed, unreasoni      BM 17.6.anti.txt
22 America and Ireland". Deplorable as  discrimination  on grounds of sexual orientati      BM 17.6.anti.txt
The lines suggest it had become necessary, or politic, to deny prejudice and that 
discrimination was becoming increasingly difficult to justify. Condemnation of 
prejudice and discrimination against non-heterosexual people was becoming an 
‘official ideology’ (Voloshinov 2012: 144-6) undermined by residual homophobic 
beliefs. As such it constituted a challenge to strands of religious DOCTRINE. In 
Bakhtin’s (1981: 270-2) terms, an equal treatment ideology that included ‘sexual 
orientation’ had become an authoritative and centralising ‘centripetal’ discourse, 
while the ‘centrifugal’ forces of homophobic belief festered under the surface.
 Views of Sexuality
Unlike previously analysed debates, terms related to sexuality are absent from 
both keyword lists which indicates no significant imbalance of use. 


















Abstract nouns were the most used terms. Pro-withdrawal speakers used 13/17 
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terms and anti-withdrawal speakers 12/17 terms. Apart from sexual orientation 
and gay the frequencies are low. The former was more used by anti-withdrawal 
speakers, the latter by pro-withdrawal speakers. On the anti-withdrawal side, 
Labour speakers used more adjectives and conservatives more abstract nouns. 
Although the Sexual Orientation in the Regulations’ title was defined inclusively 
(lesbian/gay/bisexual/heterosexual), this was little represented in the reference 
of its use. The terms are investigated via their collocates (Appendix 73 & 75) and 
concordance lines (Appendix 74 & 76) in each lexical category in turn.
*       *       *














































Key: grey text shows the number and % of uses occurring in reports
 red text: shows the proportionately higher frequency of use
The anti-withdrawal uses of sexual orientation are supplemented by conservative 
speakers’ uses of orientation. The co-text of each conservative concordance line 
(Appendix 74) indicates the term’s reference:
 CONSERVATIVE ANTI-WITHDRAWAL SPEAKERS
 Reference of sexual orientation:  non-heterosexual/linked to discrimination (15 lines)
                                                  potentially inclusive/applied to the Regulations (3 lines)
                                                  heterosexual and homosexual (2 lines)
 Reference of orientation:  heterosexual and homosexual (3 lines)
                                       generalised (2 lines)
                                       non-heterosexual/linked to discrimination (1 line)
                                       potentially inclusive/applied to the Regulations (1 line)
 homosexual orientation  (1 line)
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Lord Pilkington did not use any terms related to sexuality. Given the centrality of 
sexual orientation to the debate, this suggests an inability or refusal to engage 
with its concepts, contexts and implications. Four of the Bishop of Blackburn’s 
lines refer to non-heterosexual orientation and occur in statements that distance 
the CoE from prejudice and discrimination:
It is also wrong that prejudiced views about sexual orientation have been able to deny 
people employment. (c.758)
In relation to sexual orientation, the arguments, unsurprisingly, become more contentious. 
There has been a good deal of misrepresentation in the press about the position of a wide 
range of faith communities, to the extent of it suggesting that we are keen to dismiss gay 
clergy and staff. (c.758)
As regards the Church of England—and I believe that this will be true for many of the 
Christian denominations and other faiths—there are no circumstances in which we would 
wish to be able to discriminate against people on the grounds of their orientation as such. I 
feel like repeating that. (c.759)
We have no intention of discriminating against anyone simply because of their sexual 
orientation. (c.759)
Four lines refer to heterosexual and homosexual orientation and occur in his 
separation of sexual orientation from sexual conduct that allowed discrimination 
to be denied in the former while being implicit in the latter: 
Churches and faith communities need to retain a broad measure of freedom to determine 
their own requirements in relation to the sexual conduct—not orientation—of those who 
wish to serve or represent them. (c.758)
A difficulty immediately arises as a result of the varying ways in which sexual orientation 
can be used. (c.759)
We do not have posts or orders where there is a requirement to be heterosexual, or indeed 
homosexual. But we do have some posts and orders where, irrespective of sexual 
orientation, be it heterosexual or homosexual, the requirement remains for marriage or 
abstinence. (c.759)
The tribunals are unlikely to recognise a clear distinction between orientation and 
behaviour manifesting orientation. That is the difficulty. (c.759)
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Twelve of Baroness Miller’s lines refer to non-heterosexualities and occur in 
arguments that undermine the validity of protection against discrimination on 
grounds of sexual orientation. Her first line blames the Government for 
empowering the EU to legislate against such discrimination:
The regulations stem from when the Government decided to sign up to Article 13 of the 
Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997. For the first time that gave the EU power to legislate in the 
area of religious and sexual orientation discrimination. Prior to that it could not happen. 
(c.760)
In fact, she supported protection against religious discrimination but repeatedly 
devalued the protection against discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation 
and by implication the people affected. Four lines occur in her summary of Lord 
Lester’s speech, the last two of which skew his argument:
The objection by the noble Lord, Lord Lester—to reduce it, if I may, in my words to its 
simplest terms—is that it would permit discrimination not only on the grounds of the 
sexual orientation of, for example, clergy and teachers but also on the grounds of the 
sexual orientation of an office clerk or, as he said, the cleaning lady or caretaker who may 
never come into contact with students or worshippers in the course of their duties. (c.762)
Rather than all such discrimination being ultra vires as Lord Lester argued, this 
implies that non-heterosexual people should not be in posts that entail contact 
with “students or worshippers”. A subsequent line displays complete non-
recognition of homophobic discrimination:
Paradoxically, the regulations prohibit discrimination on the grounds of the sexual 
orientation of an employee but do not prohibit discrimination on the grounds that the 
employee is living with a member of the opposite sex to whom he or she is not married. 
That in itself is discriminatory, but typical of the biased way in which this type of anti-
discrimination legislation is framed. (c.762-3)
Apart from the trivialising comparison with heterosexual cohabitees, this implies 
that non-heterosexual people had been unfairly selected for protection. Four 
more lines occur in her argument that the Regulations placed an unfair burden 
on employers, two of which position non-heterosexual people as dishonest:
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There is a difference in principle between discrimination on the grounds of a person’s sex 
or race and this new type of discrimination for which we are being asked to legislate today. 
An employer would have no doubt about a employee's sex—at least, I hope he would not—
or, in most cases, his or her race; but there would be no way that an employer could be 
certain of the sexual orientation of an employee or a potential employee. The same would 
apply to his or her religion. We could therefore find a person being refused employment or 
dismissed on perfectly normal grounds, and then launching a claim that it was a case of 
discrimination on the grounds of his sexual orientation—of which the employer was not 
even aware. 
Your Lordships will not have overlooked the fact that under this type of legislation, once 
the employee has established a mildly plausible case of the possibility of discrimination, 
that employer is faced with the almost impossible task of proving the negative. In following 
these directives, we have imported the concept of guilty until proved innocent. (c.763)
Her reference to “this new type of discrimination” alludes to its previously taken-
for-granted status and as such is dismissive. Similarly, the launching of a false 
claim is suggested only on grounds of sexual orientation despite her recognition 
that an employer may be uncertain of an employee’s religion. Two more lines 
present the protection of (homo)sexual orientation from discrimination as an 
infringement of others’ rights and by implication homophobic beliefs:
I am certain that every Member of your Lordships’ House would strongly disapprove of 
what might be described as bigotry and unreasonable, indeed, unreasoning, blind 
prejudice. However, those of us—I include myself in this number—who wish to protect the 
rights of various minorities, in this case those of homosexual orientation, must not at the 
same time overlook the rights of other members of the community. (c.762)
Deplorable as discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation undoubtedly is, respect 
must be given to the genuinely and sincerely held beliefs of others. Surely we should not 
trample over those rights on account of an academic, technical argument about the validity 
of the exception. (c.764)
The first of these disclaimers occurs with her citing of Leviticus, while her use of 
trample in the second casts the discrimination inherent in 7(3) as valid. Her lines 
mark a preoccupation with invalidating the Sexual Orientation Regulations. They 
occur in convoluted messages that condemn discrimination and deny prejudice 
but devalue protective legislation. The above two lines also imply ‘homosexual’ 
people overlook and disrespect the rights and beliefs of religion.
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 In the Labour anti-withdrawal lines (Appendix 74) the references of sexual 
orientation are potentially more inclusive of heterosexuality: 
 LABOUR ANTI-WITHDRAWAL SPEAKERS
 Reference of sexual orientation:  indeterminate/requirement related to (5 lines)
                                                  non-heterosexual/linked to discrimination (2 lines)
                                                  potentially inclusive/applied to the Regulations (3 lines)
                                                  indeterminate/exception to equality (1 line)
                                                  inclusive/gay, straight or bisexual (1 line)
Lord Lea’s line reports the GOR provision where, as a characteristic known to be 
the target of discrimination, the reference is to non-heterosexuals:
The Equality Directive provides that Member States may provide that a difference of 
treatment which is based on a characteristic related to religion, belief, disability, age or 
sexual orientation, shall not constitute discrimination where, by reason of the nature of the 
particular occupational activities or the context in which they are carried out, such a 
characteristic constitutes a genuine and determining occupational requirement. (c.772)
The other 11 lines were spoken by Lord Sainsbury. One line acknowledges the 
exception to equality, but another offsets it against the protection offered by 
Regulations as a whole. The reference of sexual orientation is indeterminate in 
the former but refers to non-heterosexuals in the latter:
We have a duty to think very carefully indeed before making any exception for equality 
legislation. A provision that concerns the sexual orientation of people employed for the 
purpose of organised religion is clearly a particularly sensitive matter, and it is right that 
we should consider the evidence set out by the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments 
in its 21st report of 2002–03 before going on to consider the merits of the regulations as a 
whole. (c.777)
I understand entirely why we have focused in this debate on the provisions in Regulation 7
(3). While an important part of the regulations, it is, of course, only a small part. We must 
not forget that there is no protection currently for those who experience harassment, 
discrimination or victimisation at work on grounds of their sexual orientation. (c.781)
Five lines then occur in his defence of Regulation 7(3) where the unspecified 
requirement related to sexual orientation has indeterminate reference and equality 
on grounds of sexual orientation does not clearly apply:
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It is quite clear that Regulation 7(3) does not apply to all jobs in a particular type of 
organisation. On the contrary, employers must be prepared to justify any requirement 
related to sexual orientation on a case by case basis. The rule only applies to employment 
which is for the purposes of “organised religion”, not religious organisations. There is a 
clear distinction in meaning between the two. A religious organisation could be any 
organisation with an ethos based on religion or belief. However, employment for the 
purposes of an organised religion clearly means a job, such as a minister of religion, 
involving work for a church, synagogue or mosque. (c.779)
Regulation 7(3) does not stop there. Even if an employer can show that the job exists for 
the purposes of organised religion, and that is a significant hurdle, he may only apply a 
requirement related to sexual orientation if one of two further tests are met. (c.780) 
In the first test the requirement must be applied to comply with the doctrines of the 
religion. We do not believe that that test would be met in relation to many posts. It would 
be very difficult for a church to argue that a requirement related to sexual orientation 
applied to a post of cleaner, gardener or secretary. Religious doctrine rarely has much to 
say about posts such as those. (c.780)
If the first test is not met, what about the second? There the church will have to show that 
the requirement related to sexual orientation is necessary, “because of the nature of the 
employment and the context in which it is carried out, so as to avoid conflicting with the 
strongly held religious convictions of a significant number of the religion’s followers ...”. 
I shall dispel one or two myths. It is neither sufficient for the requirement to be imposed 
simply because of the nature of the work and the context in which it is carried out, nor 
may the requirement be imposed simply because of the religious convictions of the 
followers of the faith. Both elements have to be satisfied before the second test can be met. 
They are strict tests and will be met in very few cases. (c.780)
Regulation 7(3) applies where a requirement related to a sexual orientation is a genuine 
occupational requirement. It is slightly wider than Regulation 7(2) in that respect but 
reflects the wording of Article 4.1. (c.781)
According to the Bishop of Blackburn, the requirement related to “marriage or 
abstinence” (c.759). While ‘abstinence’ could apply to any sexual orientation, in 
2003 ‘marriage’ did not; it skewed the CoE requirement towards heterosexuality. 
The ‘skew’ became explicit in 2014 when, after the Marriage (Same-Sex Couples) 
Act 2013, CoE bishops banned gay clergy from marrying (McCormick 15.2.2014). 
The first member of the clergy to marry “had his permission to officiate revoked 
[and began] legal proceedings against the CoE” (ibid 9.9.2014). He has lost his 
case (Duffy 4.11.2015). Despite Lord Sainsbury’s emphasis on strict conditions, 
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Regulation 7(3) clearly allows anti-gay discrimination and clearly renders the 
CoE requirement for marriage hypocritical. It also places the CoE above the law. 
In just one of Lord Sainsbury’s lines the reference of sexual orientation is clearly 
inclusive as in the Regulations’ definition:
Secondly, Regulation 7(2) applies where sexual orientation is a genuine occupational 
requirement. In other words, one has to be gay, straight or bisexual to do the job. (c.781)
His inclusion of straight suggests he was aware of the intended application of 
7(3), which perhaps accounts for his lack of clarity in explaining it.
*       *       *
 The reference of sexual orientation and sexuality in the pro-withdrawal 
lines (Appendix 76) is largely indeterminate:
 PRO-WITHDRAWAL SPEAKERS
 Reference of sexual orientation:  non-heterosexual/linked to discrimination or prejudice (9 lines)
                                                  indeterminate/characteristic or requirement related to (7 lines)
                                                  generalised (6 lines)
                                                  indeterminate/applied to the Regulations (3 lines)
                                                  indeterminate/linked to no difference in treatment (1 line)
 Reference of orientation:  generalised (1 line)
 Reference of sexuality:  generalised (3 lines)
                                     indeterminate/requirement relating to (2 lines)
                                     non-heterosexual/linked to discrimination (2 lines)
Of the 11 lines that refer to non-heterosexual sexualities, five question the 
legality of the Directive’s transposition and thus the validity of Regulation 7(3): 
If the regulations fail to [transpose the directive faithfully] because they would allow an 
employer to discriminate on grounds of sexual orientation in circumstances not permitted 
by the directive, they are beyond the powers conferred by Parliament in Section 2(2) and 
are unlawful. 
(Lord Lester c.751)
It seems to the committee wholly within the bounds of possibility that, for example, an 
employer considering employing a custodian who would, as part of his or her duties, have 
care of religious artefacts might determine not to employ a worker solely on a ground 
related to his or her sexual orientation in order to avoid conflicting with the strongly held 
religious beliefs of a significant number of the religion’s followers. 
(Lord Lester c.753)
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Unless and until legal proceedings are brought to establish the cause of invalidity and to 
have Regulation 7(3) annulled, it will remain effective as a sweepingly broad exemption 
clause apparently permitting a religious body to refuse to employ not a priest but a cleaner 
or messenger because of their sexuality. 
(Lord Lester c.755)
[Regulation 7(3)] was unnecessary because the original version of Regulation 7 contained 
sufficiently wide exceptions, and unlawful because it authorised sexual orientation 
discrimination in circumstances not required by the needs of the particular post or the 
context in which the jobholder would work. 
(Lord Lester c.755)
It seems to me that the Church of England, whose representations to government appear 
to have been influential in bringing about the addition of Regulation 7(3), is seeking to do a 
dangerous thing. In its support of the extension of the circumstances in which it would be 
lawful to discriminate on the basis of sexuality, it is effectively absenting itself from normal 
civil society. 
(Lord Alli c.765)
Lord Lester rejected Baroness Miller’s stance on the Regulations and affirmed his 
support for equal treatment: 
I very much welcome the regulations and do not agree with the attack made upon them by 
the noble Baroness, Lady Miller of Hendon, suggesting that somehow they are not 
regulations that should generally be supported. I strongly support them. In particular, I 
strongly support the commitment to equality of treatment without discrimination placed on 
sexual orientation that they embody. (c.782)
Where the terms’ reference is generalised, 8/10 lines occur in criticisms of 7(3): 
It is surely wrong as a matter of principle and, as the Joint Committee explains, of dubious 
legality, that a person in an administrative or ancillary role within a religious organisation 
should be excluded from employment because they do, or do not, have a particular sexual 
orientation. 
(Lord Lester c.754)
This is a profoundly unsatisfactory state of affairs which will lead to expensive and 
distressing litigation—litigation which will be particularly distressing as it will inevitably 
involve a public analysis of the very private business of a person’s sexuality. 
(Lord Lester c.754)
I cannot accept that it is right for an organised religion to dictate that those in its 
employment should or should not be of a particular sexuality—no more than that they 
should or should not be of a particular race. 
(Lord Alli c.765)
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We have the opportunity, in supporting the noble Lord’s Motion, to influence the kind of 
society we, and others, want to live in. That society recognises and celebrates differences, 
and does not allow irrelevant factors to determine a person’s life chances. One’s sexuality 
is an integral part of one’s identity. It is what makes us human. 
(Lord Alli c.766)
We are not aware of any cases in which religious doctrine requires a post to be filled by 
persons of a particular orientation”. 
(Lord Avebury c.767)
Therefore, it is impossible to satisfy the tests in 7(3)(b)(i), because the doctrines of no 
religion say anything about the employment of people of a given sexual orientation. 
(Lord Avebury c.768)
The second leg of 7(3)(b) is where the nature of the employment and the context in which it 
is carried out are such that hiring somebody of a particular sexual orientation would 
conflict, as has been quoted, with the strongly held religious convictions of a significant 
number of the religion’s followers. [...] If we agreed to the provision, we would allow the 
bigotry and prejudice of some of a religion's followers to dictate its employment policy.
(Lord Avebury c.768)
Regulation 7(2) is quite clear, because it uses as its touchstone the notion of 
proportionality. One has to be of a particular sexual orientation; there has to be a genuine 
and determining occupational requirement; and it must be proportionate to apply that 
requirement in the particular case. That would apply equally to a religious context or any 
other context. The vice, as I have described it, of Regulation 7(3) is one of over-breadth and 
vagueness. 
(Lord Lester c.782)
Of the nine lines for related/relating to sexual orientation/sexuality, where the 
reference is indeterminate, two occur in outlines of what the Directive allows:
Article 4(1) of the EC Framework Directive allows in very limited circumstances that a 
difference of treatment may be justified when a characteristic related to sexual orientation 
constitutes a, genuine and determining occupational requirement, when the objective is 
legitimate and the requirement is proportionate”. 
(Lord Lester c.752)
In practice that means that an employer who wishes to impose a requirement relating to 
sexuality—for example, that a person working with lesbian women should be a lesbian, or 
that a person working with gay men should be gay—must demonstrate that being lesbian 
or gay is essential for the kind of work which is to be undertaken; that there are good 
reasons for imposing the requirement; and that the requirement is an appropriate one to 
apply given those reasons. 
(Lord Lester c.752)
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The remaining lines occur in examinations of whether 7(3) qualifies as a GOR:
Regulation 7(3) concerns employment for the purposes of an organised religion. It does not 
have a genuine occupational requirement provision. Instead it creates a broader exception 
which allows the employer to impose a requirement relating to a person’s sexuality either 
in order to comply with the doctrines of the religion, or because of the nature of the 
employment and its context, to avoid conflicting with what are described as the, strongly 
held convictions of a significant number of the religion's followers”. 
(Lord Lester cc.752-3)
The Select Committee explained that Regulation 7(3)—I now refer to paragraph 1.11 of its 
report—may, permit difference of treatment based on characteristics relating to sexual 
orientation where the characteristic could not be said to be a ‘genuine and determining 
occupational requirement’ which was proportionate”. 
(Lord Lester c.753)
The Committee considered that regulation 7(2) was justified by Article 4.1 of the Directive, 
but that regulation 7(3) might permit difference of treatment based on a characteristic 
related to sexual orientation where the characteristic could not be said to be a ‘genuine 
and determining occupational requirement’ which was proportionate, as envisaged by the 
Directive”. 
(Lord Mayhew c.773)
It seems to me that one starts with looking at Article 4.1 and one sees there that the 
draftsman has recognised that it is necessary to take account of the specific susceptibilities 
that arise when a characteristic related to, for example, sexual orientation constitutes a 
genuine and determining occupational requirement by reason of the nature of the 
particular occupation or activities concerned, provided that it is proportionate and so forth. 
(Lord Mayhew c.773)
The language of Regulation 7(3) speaks of employment, for purposes of an organised 
religion”— I pass over the arguments about that. Regulation 7(3) further states that, the 
employer applies a requirement related to sexual orientation”. I pass over the purposes 
which then follow. 
Does a requirement related to sexual orientation always fall within and never outside the 
ambit of a genuine and determining occupational requirement? 
(Lord Mayhew c.774)
Leaving aside the vagueness of what is meant by “organised religion”, the vice in 
Regulation 7(3)(b), if one looks at it carefully, is that there are no words of limitation. It is 
sufficient for the employer to apply, a requirement related to sexual orientation”— very 
wide words— because of the nature of the employment and the context in which it is 
carried out”— and, these are the limiting words— so as to avoid conflicting with the 
strongly held religious convictions of a significant number of the religion’s followers”. 
(Lord Lester c.782-3)
The pro-withdrawal lines focus on the role of the CoE and the legality of 7(3) in 
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arguments that support equal treatment. That sexuality was apparently used 
interchangeably with sexual orientation raises questions about its currrency. 
Weeks (2011) argues the terms are distinct. He relates sexual orientation to an 
essential sexual nature linked to preferred partner gender, but relates sexuality 
to theorisations that “appear to question the validity of sexual identities” (ibid: 
199). While public declaration of sexual identities has been crucial in struggles 
for legal reform, they are more complex than the simplistic divisions of sexual 
orientation allow. That sexuality was used only by Lord Lester, who was actively 
pursuing wider LGB legal reforms, and Lord Alli, who is gay, positions it as the 
more gay-friendly term. Significantly, Lord Alli did not use sexual orientation. 
 Overall, the lines for sexual orientation, orientation and sexuality effectively 
illustrate the three strands of debate. What the lines clearly show, is how both 
the reference of a term and its connotation shift around with changes of context. 
Importantly, this is not just the linguistic context, but the wider social context of 
the three groups of speakers. As Voloshinov argued:
[T]his fundamentally social phenomenon is completely objective; it consists, above all, of 
the material unity of world that enters the speakers’ purview [...] and of the unity of the real 
conditions of life that generate a community of value judgments⎯the speakers belonging to 
the same family, profession, class, or other social group, and their belonging to the same 
time period (the speakers are, after all, contemporaries). Assumed value judgments are, 
therefore, not individual emotions, but regular and essential social acts. 
(Voloshinov 2012 [1926]: 165, author’s italics)
Significantly, no uses of the terms refer solely to heterosexuality which suggests 
the speakers associated sexual orientation and sexuality more closely with non-
heterosexualities. However, that ‘heterosexual’ was included in the Regulations’ 
definition and potentially included in indeterminate uses of the terms, suggests 
some erosion of its naturalised and normative status. In Voloshinov’s (2012: 167) 
terms, its assumed status had “become dubious”. 
*       *       *
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In the pro-withdrawal lines (Appendix 76) gay applies to the following nouns:
 men and women (5 lines)         bishop (1 line)              somebody (probably a man) (1 line)
 people (5 lines)                        candidate (1 line)         someone (probably gender inclusive) (1 line)
 men (3 lines)                           employee (1 line)          staff (1 line)            anti-gay conduct (1 line)
Gay is paired with lesbian in four lines and applies to men and women in five, 
thus lesbians are included in 9/20 lines and potentially included in other lines 
bar those where gay applies to men or bishop. All of 17/20 lines address the role 
of the CoE and the discrimination 7(3) would allow within organised religion:
I have been lobbied by my own union, Amicus, because it feels that the exemptions 
proposed could make things worse for gay and lesbian people in religious organisations. 
(Baroness Turner c.756)
Could a lesbian or gay employee be discriminated against in the event of co-religionists 
taking exception to his or her continued employment, simply because it offended their 
religious susceptibilities? Surely that would not be acceptable. 
(Baroness Turner c.756)
I find it impossible to believe that the Government—one committed to fairness and equality
—should seek to allow the continued discrimination against gay men and women if those 
who seek to discriminate against them believe in God. 
(Lord Alli c.764)
What an irony: if you are God-fearing, you can weed out, discriminate and persecute gay 
men and women, and, if you are not, you cannot. Frankly, the exceptions in Regulation 7
(3) are a joke. They make a mockery of equality legislation. 
(Lord Alli c.764)
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I believe in God and am fully prepared to put my head above the parapet. I do so to 
condemn those in the Church of England and other organised religions who seek to use 
the lives of ordinary gay men and women as a crucible in which to play out their own 
internal theological disputes. 
(Lord Alli c.765)
How can it be sensible that, on the one hand, the Church is about to appoint a gay bishop, 
and, on the other, it is about to sack gay staff. 
(Lord Alli c.765)
We see the way in which a tradition in the Church seeks to persecute gay men and women. 
Even today, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Oxford is under intense pressure 
following his appointment of Dr Jeffrey John as the Bishop of Reading.  
(Lord Alli c.765)
How can we try to advocate decent civil society in other countries when we legitimise the 
practice of discrimination against gay men and women by religious institutions? 
(Lord Alli c.765)
What is the difference between an absolute right to remove someone from their job because 
they are gay and an absolute right to put somebody in gaol because they are gay? [...] The 
difference is in the degree of prejudice in the law. 
(Lord Alli cc.765-6)
I say to the Lords spiritual on the Bishops’ Benches that if they try to use the privilege that 
they enjoy—the extraordinary privilege that we all enjoy—of law-making, by using the civil 
law as a means of exempting themselves or their religion from the norms and values of civil 
society, they will have diminished their role in society. Gay people may be a minority in 
society, but so too are those who actively profess a faith. 
(Lord Alli c.766)
This is not a party matter; it is a fundamental question of the freedom of gay people in our 
community. 
I am sorry that the noble Baroness, Lady Miller of Hendon, has been illogical about this. 
(Lord Avebury c.766)
It is certainly true that the doctrines of certain religions criticise people who are gay, but I 
am not aware of anything in the Bible or the Qur’an that says that employers should not 
hire gay people. 
(Lord Avebury c.767)
I think that it would be the first time in any western country when anti-gay conduct has 
been approved by legislation.
If the argument is that the sacred books are highly critical of gays, so they are of many 
other human characteristics, such as wanting something that one has not got. 
(Lord Avebury c.768)
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Secondly, at interview, an employer will ask questions of prospective employees. What kind 
of questions will the employer be entitled to ask? Will he be able to ask if the candidate is 
gay, lesbian, in a relationship, or celibate? These questions flow from the regulations. 
Perhaps the Minister can clarify whether it would be perfectly proper for a religious 
organisation to ask them. 
(Lord Clement Jones c.775-6)
Phrases such as make things worse, not be acceptable, impossible to believe, 
what an irony, make a mockery, how can it be sensible, or seeks to persecute in 
these lines for gay exemplify the concern and anger of pro-withdrawal speakers 
that equal treatment of lesbians and gay men was compromised.
*       *       *
 Gay and lesbian were little used by anti-withdrawal speakers and not at 
all by Baroness Miller. Of the six lines (Appendix 74), gay is paired with lesbian 
in three and with straight or bisexual in two. The lines show gay applies to:
 clergy and staff (1 line)       community (1 line)       people (1 line)       rights (1 line)
 (In 2 lines gay, straight or bisexual apply by implication to job applicants or employees.)
The Bishop of Blackburn’s lines occur in his oscillations between disclaiming 
discrimination and defending CoE liberty to exclude categories of employee:
There has been a good deal of misrepresentation in the press about the position of a wide 
range of faith communities, to the extent of it suggesting that we are keen to dismiss gay 
clergy and staff. Perhaps I may briefly explain why the original draft regulations published 
last October caused much concern and why we believe that the new regulations are better 
and more compatible with the directive. (c.758)
I urge the House to recognise that there are genuine issues of religious liberty here. If that 
is accepted the question is how best to safeguard that liberty in the way the noble Lord, 
Lord Pilkington, has just described, while providing proper protection against the 
discrimination which gay and lesbian people have had to endure. (cc.759-60)
His use of endure connotes resignation to suffering and thus pity, which belies 
respect. Lord Brennan’s line occurs in his attempt to redirect the debate:
This is not the occasion to enter into a debate of Church and religion versus gay and 
lesbian rights. The question is whether or not these regulations are intra vires. (c.776)
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His use of rights is dismissive in that he went on to claim that the Human Rights 
Act provided no “right against discrimination of the kind we are debating this 
evening” (c.776), which obliterated the LGB people the discrimination applied to. 
Two of Lord Sainsbury’s lines occur in his explanation of Regulation 7(2): 
First, Regulation 7(2) is of general application. It covers any employment where being gay, 
straight or bisexual is a genuine occupational requirement. (c.781)
Secondly, Regulation 7(2) applies where sexual orientation is a genuine occupational 
requirement. In other words, one has to be gay, straight or bisexual to do the job. (c.781)
Although the inclusion of bisexuals in the Regulations’ definition of sexual 
orientation was a first in British law, their absence from the debate maintained 
“the illusion of the binary system of homosexuality/heterosexuality” (Baker 2008: 
150) which privileges heterosexuality. Lord Sainsbury’s final line acknowledges 
but overrides the strength of feeling among the gay and lesbian community:
To conclude, Regulation 7(3) is necessary if the regulations are not to interfere in Church 
doctrine. We understand how the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments reached its 
conclusion and our extensive consultation leaves us in no doubt about the strength of 
feeling among the gay and lesbian community. But having considered all the arguments 
carefully, we are satisfied that Regulation 7(3) is intra vires and that from December the 
courts and tribunals will be able to construe this tightly drawn exception in a way that is 
consistent with the directive. (c.781)
While 7(3) may have been seen as necessary by the CoE, its compliance with the 
Directive remains in question.
*       *       *
 As in Chapter 8, very few nouns for people were used n the debate: 
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Pro-withdrawal speakers’ greater use of nouns for people, alongside applications 
of lesbian and gay to women, men, or other nouns for people place their focus on 
people. This is in contrast to anti-withdrawal greater use of the more distancing 
abstract nouns, notably greater among the conservative speakers (Appendix 77).
 A final significant point is the scant use of the clinical terms in the debate 
which suggests a decline in their use. It is the uses of sexual orientation that best 
illustrate each of the three groups’ preoccupations, while the pro-withdrawal 
lines for gay illustrate the speakers’ outrage at Regulation 7(3)’s inclusion. In 
addition, the efforts of the Bishop of Blackburn and Baroness Miller to deny 
prejudice and discrimination suggest a positive shift in public values and an 
emerging ‘official ideology’ (Voloshinov 2012: 144-6) in the name of ‘equality’. 
 Associations and Implications
 Two themes emerge from this analysis. One concerns the implications of 
the Regulations’ definition of sexual orientation and the wording of Regulation 7
(3). The other concerns the ascendance of ‘equality’ as an ‘official ideology’ and 
its relation to anti-gay discrimination.
 The Regulations define sexual orientation inclusively, but the principle of 
formal equality takes no account of the very different histories of the protected 
groups. The inclusion of ‘opposite-sex’ orientation in the Regulations’ definition, 
when heterosexuals have no heritage of persecution, medicalisation, prejudice or 
discrimination on grounds of their ‘orientation’ is problematic⎯especially when, 
as Oliver (2004: 1-2) shows, work-place discrimination against lesbians and gay 
men was endemic. Heterosexuals were unlikely to experience ‘discrimination’, 
‘victimisation’ or ‘harrassment’ (Regulations 3-5) at work on grounds of their 
sexual orientation unless they were assumed to be non-heterosexual. Thus their 
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inclusion diffuses the Regulations’ anti-discrimination purpose. This diffusion 
underlay each groups’ stance. Pro-withdrawal speakers were concerned to fully 
protect lesbians and gay men from discrimination. The Bishop of Blackburn and 
Baroness Miller denied anti-gay discrimination while protecting heterosexual 
privilege on religious grounds. Labour anti-withdrawal speakers were concerned 
to defend the legality of Regulation 7(3) while shifting responsibility for its 
interpretation to the courts. Arguably, had ‘opposite-sex’ orientation not been 
included in the definition, 7(3) would have been difficult to include. 
 The unclear wording of Regulation 7(3) suggests Blair’s capitulation to the 
Bishops was a compromise. Its lack of clear definition makes it appear, by 
default or design, unworkable in law. There is the question of what counts as 
religious doctrine. A definition restricted to scripture would offer little to justify 
7(3) and could exclude documents such as the CoE reports on sexuality in 1991 
and 2003 (Nixon 2008: 603-5). Neither strongly held religious convictions nor a 
significant number of a religions’ followers are measurable in ways that might 
satisfy a court. However, as Lord Lester argued, its lack of clarity leaves it wide 
open to interpretation. The first case against the use of 7(3) was won (Reaney v 
Hereford Diocesan Board of Finance 2007⎯see Stonewall 2011: 4) and supports 
Lord Sainsbury’s claim that it does not apply where the plaintiff is not clergy. 
The second case against its use was brought by a hospital chaplain. (Pemberton 
v Southwell and Nottingham Diocese 2015) and was lost. As CoE bishops had 
forbidden gay clergy to marry before the marriage took place, the plaintiff was 
held to be in breach of canonical obedience (Duffy 4.11.2015). The court ruled 
the CoE’s refusal of the plaintiff’s new licence to officiate was an act of direct 
discrimination, but allowed it under the 7(3) exemption. An appeal is “extremely 
likely” (Sarmiento 10.11.2015). Same-sex marriage was held to be against CoE 
doctrine and the CoE said it would “not ordain any person who has already 
entered such a marriage” (ibid). The case makes explicit the place of heterosexual 
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marriage and the gender binary in homophobic belief. As the CoE employs 
lesbian and gay clergy, some of whom are in civil partnerships, the case also 
exposes its confused position on sexuality.
 In the debate, the Bishop of Blackburn’s claim that some posts required 
marriage or abstinence is clearly invalidated by the ruling and clearly positions   
7(3) as a front for homophobic discrimination. It also conflicts with a 1991 CoE 
statement obligating Christians to reject and resist homophobia (Nixon 2008: 
603) which concurs with the Bishop’s commitment to disclaiming discrimination. 
As Nixon (ibid: 603-605) shows, the CoE reports on sexuality are contradictory, 
as were the inconsistencies in the Bishop of Blackburn’s speech. In addition, the 
direct intervention of the CoE in the legislation, highlights the persistence of 
Roman law in theology. The root of this persistence appears to be that scripture 
is interpreted devoid of the political contexts in which it was developed and used. 
As Howe (2002: 39) points out, the Roman establishment of a bureaucracy and 
legal system “enabled the empire’s cultural influence to endure⎯not least 
through religious institutions⎯far beyond its own political demise”.
 The second theme relates to the ascendance of lesbian and gay ‘equality’ 
and its emergence as an ‘official ideology’. The legislative focus on lesbian and 
gay ‘equality’ began under the Major Government and grew under the Blair 
Government with EU support. That ‘equality’ appears in the Regulations’ title is 
inappropriate given Regulation 7(3). The term was used by only five speakers 
(Appendix 78)⎯mainly Lord Lester and Lord Alli, who argued strongly for equal 
treatment, and Lord Sainsbury who defended 7(3) while emphasising the range of 
protections that the Regulations offered secular employees. The disjunction 
between the ‘equality’ in the Regulations’ title and the incomplete protection 
awarded to non-heterosexuals renders the term’s use misleading. 
 That ‘equality’ had become a ‘buzzword’ in LGB politics and legislative 
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reform raises the question of what might constitute LGB equality. Cooper (2000) 
sees equality as a basic political principle within jurisprudence, but one that 
entails complex problems. She reviews three equality paradigms (resources/well 
being/recognition) in terms of equal human worth, but suggests equality of 
power is a better measure because it includes “parity of involvement in economic, 
political and social decision making processes” (ibid: 256). The problem with this 
is that it would give authoritarian groups parity of access, which she examines 
using fascist groups as an example. She sees equality as an ongoing political 
project rather than a state of being as “it always needs to be responding to newly 
emergent forms of social asymmetry” (ibid: 263). In relation to lesbians and gay 
men she points out that social asymmetries extend far beyond legal equality and 
cannot be tackled in isolation from the normative and principles on which a 
society is organised and which naturalise the status quo. She argues:
Thus, even if social asymmetries prove transhistorically enduring, this does not render 
equality’s pursuit fruitless. For it is not the promise of an egalitarian Utopia but rather 
equality’s constant processes of renewal and change that provide the impetus for action 
and analysis which maintain equality centre stage. 
(Cooper 2000: 272)
Cobb (2009) concurs in his review of the 2006 Equality Act, the 2010 version of 
which the Employment Regulations are now part. He argues: 
The government’s refusal to think about the nature and extent of discrimination faced by 
sexual minorities removed any incentive for lesbians and gay men (or the government on 
their behalf) to speak more broadly about their experiences of discrimination. In turn, this 
discursive vacuum was manipulated [...] by conservative (religious) opponents... 
(Cobb 2009: 342)  
He also examines the changing role of Christian opposition to reform:
Whereas in the past the conservative Christian movement argued against gay rights 
normatively, in terms of moral wrong of (particularly gay male) homosexuality, it now 




The arguments of Lord Pilkington, the Bishop of Blackburn and Baroness Miller 
who sought to protect ‘religion’ and exempt it from the Regulations are examples 
of this phenomenon. Their opposition was grounded in protection of heterosexual 
privilege fronted by religious belief. In addition, the Bishop of Blackburn and 
Baroness Miller’s preference for abstract nouns related to sexuality (Appendix 77) 
connotes distance from the people the Regulations were intended to protect. Lord 
Pilkington made no reference to sexuality. Baroness Miller did not use lesbian or 
gay; the Bishop of Blackburn used lesbian once and gay twice; no nouns for 
people were used. Their most used term was sexual orientation.
 While the term sexual orientation is seen as unrepresentative of sexual 
diversity (Weeks 2011: 189-192), its association with partner gender is relevant 
to homophobic beliefs⎯beliefs rooted in the heritage of the Roman prohibitions 
on same-sex sex, mostly between men, in the interests of protecting male gender 
boundaries (Chapter 1). The gender binary was taken for granted by all speakers. 
As Baker (2006: 19) argues “A hegemonic discourse can be at its most powerful 
when it does not even have to be invoked, because it is just taken for granted”.
 Conclusion
 This chapter shows the institutional power of the CoE in obtaining an 
exemption from the legislation. It also illustrates its hypocrisy, both in denying 
discrimination while defending its discriminatory exemption, and in requiring 
sexual relationships to be within marriage then using the exemption to exclude 
married lesbian and gay clergy on the basis of gender. Arguably, it is the explicit 
sanctioning of ‘sexual conduct’ within marriage that underlies the exclusion and 
which clearly locates it within the heritage of homophobic beliefs. The addition of 
the exemption after the consultation period suggests Government caution. The 
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political context of the Regulations’ making shows that in 1997-8, the European 
Communities (Amendment) Bill and the Human Rights Bill were opposed by MPs 
and Lords who sought to protect religion from provisions linked to sexuality. As 
in Chapter 8, the Government was slow to legislate. In theory it could have done 
so any time after the Treaty of Amsterdam was made consequential in UK law in 
1998. Even if it was waiting for the Directive, agreed in 2000, the Designation 
Order to legislate by SI was not made until July 2002. The decision to legislate 
via delegated legislation also suggests caution, but though SIs are not subject to 
the full parliamentary process, they must still be approved by both Houses. With 
the controversial invasion of Iraq as the backdrop to the delayed legislation, the 
addition of 7(3) after the consultation period at the Bishops’ request can be seen 
as an rushed response to further reduce opposition. While the research reviewed 
sharply analyses the adequacy of the Regulations as law, it does not discuss the 
wider political context of 7(3) or the debate on the Regulations’ withdrawal.
 The debate analysis shows a clear division of interests between speaker 
groups. The cross-party pro-withdrawal speakers were concerned with the anti-
gay discrimination Regulation 7(3) could allow and its non-compliance with the 
Directive. Conservative anti-withdrawal speakers were concerned with protecting 
religious belief and by proxy heterosexual privilege, while denying discrimination. 
Labour anti-withdrawal speakers were concerned with defending the inclusion of 
7(3) and claiming its compliance with the Directive. Similarly, the vote indicates 
division within the CoE. Of the many Bishops present, only three voted, two in 
support of Lord Lester and withdrawal. The Words and Themes section clarifies 
the individuality of the speeches. On Flowchart 9, the pro-withdrawal keywords 
MEN, WOMEN, SELECT, COMMITTEE, PROPORTIONALITY and EC were each 
mostly used by one speaker (Appendix 71), while the mitigating SEEMS, USE and 
SEEK were more used by peers speaking against their party or church. On 
Flowchart 10, the anti-withdrawal speeches are linked by the keywords WE and 
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EUROPEAN with different associations on each side. On the Labour side, 
TRANSPOSITION, DOCTRINE and related were each mostly used by one speaker 
(Appendix 72). On the conservative side, MEMBERS, union and employee, less so 
GROUPS, were each mostly used by one speaker (ibid). In the Views of Sexuality 
section, it is sexual orientation that most clearly shows each group’s views. In the 
conservative anti-withdrawal uses it refers mainly to non-heterosexualities and 
occurs in denials of discrimination while dissociating sexual orientation from 
sexual conduct (Bishop of Blackburn), plus convoluted denials of prejudice and 
condemnations of discrimination while devaluing the protective legislation and 
the people to whom it applied (Baroness Miller). In the Labour anti-withdrawal 
uses its reference is more indeterminate and its use more consistent in that 
11/12 lines were spoken by Lord Sainsbury, mainly in defence of 7(3). In the 
pro-withdrawal uses its reference is also largely indeterminate. With sexuality it 
occurs mainly in criticisms of 7(3), notably its non-compliance with the Directive 
and the discrimination it allowed. This is in contrast to the pro-withdrawal uses 
of gay, most of which address the role of the CoE in enabling the discrimination. 
Alongside the individuality of the speeches, the analysis suggests a shift in the 
“social hierarchy of values” (Voloshinov 1986: 123) and an emerging, if nominal, 
“official ideology” (ibid 2012: 145-6) against anti-gay discrimination in the name 
of ‘equality’. Conversely, Government caution in legislating the change shows the 
power of the albeit decreasing resistance.
 The Employment Equality Regulations were of practical and symbolic 
importance despite their incomplete protection for non-heterosexual employees. 
The strong resistance to Regulation 7(3) enabled easier assessment of views on 
equal treatment on grounds of ‘sexual orientation’ than if the draft Regulations 
had been approved without CoE intervention. The deployment of Christianity in 




 The occupation of Iraq was the ongoing backdrop to the political stage in 
2004. Pictures of US soldiers abusing Iraqi prisoners in Abu Ghraib jail sparked 
outrage, which was duly aired in the press (Cornwell 1.5.2004; Fisk 2.5.2004; 
Cockburn 3.5.2004). Publication of the Butler Report (14.7.2004) on intelligence 
relating to Iraq’s alleged WMDs prompted parliamentary debates (HC 20.7.2004; 
HL 7.9.2004) and revived interest in Lord Goldsmith’s advice on military action 
(Carrell & McSmith 18.7.2004; Norton-Taylor 17.9.2004; Woolf 16.10.2004). 
Government fears of retaliation at home led to the Civil Contingencies Bill. It 
provided for broadly-defined large-scale emergencies and the Commons passed it 
unanimously (24.5.2004 c.1411). The Act placed legal obligations on emergency 
services, extended Government powers, and enabled all but the Human Rights 
Act to be amended by emergency regulations. More controversially, the Asylum 
and Immigration Act severely tightened immigration controls. 
 Also high on the Government’s agenda in 2004 was revival of the Northern 
Ireland peace process and restoration of the power-sharing Assembly which had 
been suspended after the Unionists withdrew from the power-sharing Executive  
(14.10.2002). The Justice (Northern Ireland) Act 2004 imposed human-rights 
standards on the Province’s criminal justice system, while ongoing Westminster 
rule inflamed Unionist resistance to the Civil Partnership Bill.
  Other legislation affecting lesbians and gay men during 2004 (Appendix 1) 
included rights and protections for partners. The Domestic Violence, Crime and 
Victims Act included same-sex partners in its provisions. The Housing Act gave 
same-sex partners tenancy-succession rights. The Armed Forces (Pensions and 
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Compensations) Act extended pension and compensation rights to all unmarried 
partners. An exception to this trend was the Gender Recognition Act. It enabled 
transsexuals to get a new birth certificate, but made no provision for those who 
were married to retain a legal relationship with their partner; recognition 
required the marriage be declared null and void.
 This chapter outlines the political context of the Civil Partnership Bill and 
reviews research related to the ensuing debate on assimilation among lesbians 
and gay men. A summary of the Bill’s parliamentary passage is followed by an 
account of the selected debate. Comparisons of each side’s top-ten keywords and 
the sexuality terms used are followed by a discussion.
 Political Context
 Civil Partnership was not a Government initiative. Legislation for partner-
ship registration was first proposed in Private Members’ Bills. The Relationships 
(Civil Registration) Bill 2001 sought to enable lesbian, gay and heterosexual 
couples to register their relationships. It was proposed by Jane Griffiths under 
the ten minute rule (HC 23.11.2001 cc.639-664), but was adjourned without 
conclusion. Lord Lester’s Civil Partnerships Bill 2002 also included heterosexual 
couples. The Bill passed its second reading (25.1.2002 cc.1691-1746), but he 
agreed to halt its progress (11.2.2002) while the Government conducted a review 
to assess its implications (HC Research Paper 02/17: 3).
 The completed review was briefed to the press before being announced in 
the Commons. A flurry of press reports followed (Waugh 6.12.2002; Cecil/Dyer/ 
Hurst/Johnston/Leonard/Parris/Sparrow/Waugh/Wilson 7.12.2002), three of 
which quote Colin Hart of the Christian Institute. This prompted Evan Harris, 
who supported civil partnership, to raise a Point of Order with the Speaker and 
refer to allegations that the Government was using media interest in the issue to 
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hide other news (HC 9.12.2002 cc.37-8). The review was confined to same-sex 
couples and a consultation set for summer 2003. Lord Lester began asking the 
Government questions: about the consultation document (14.1.2003 c.26WA) 
and the legal proposals (22.5.2003 c.105WA; 12.6.2003 c.52WA). 
 Details of the consultation document were reported in the Independent 
and Observer (Dillon/Hinsliffe 29.6.2003) before its publication was officially 
announced in a written statement (HC 30.6.2003 c.2WS). This again prompted 
Evan Harris to raise a Point of Order and complain there were no copies in the 
parliamentary office (HC 1.7.2003 cc.174-7). The document drew considerable 
press interest (Ford/Shaw/Tweedie 30.6.2003; Chrisatis/Cowie/Ford/Doughty/ 
Gove/Nicoll/Sparrow 1.7.2003; Bercow 2.7.2003). 
 The document introduced civil partnership as an equality measure for 
“those in or wishing to enter, interdependent, same-sex-couple relationships that 
are intended to be permanent” (Women & Equality Unit 2003a: 13). Lord Lester 
asked the Government about options for comment and their plans for opposite-
sex couples (14.7.2003 cc.76-8WA). The Government replied that heterosexuals 
could marry and that there was space for additional comments in document. 
Lord Lester then asked about the exclusion of opposite-sex couples, recognition 
of same-sex couples married abroad, whether heterosexual registration in the 
Netherlands discouraged marriage, and the role of financial considerations in the 
Government’s decisions (8.9.2003 cc.76-9WA). The Government reiterated that 
as heterosexuals could marry, their inclusion was unnecessary. The course of 
Lord Lester’s questions and the Government’s non-committal answers expose 
their ring-fencing of marriage as a heterosexual institution. The extent to which 
this was for political, financial or ideological reasons is unclear. 
 The consultation ran from 30.6.2003 to 30.9.2003. The results were 
published in November. Overall, 84% of individuals and 74% of organisations  
were supportive (Women & Equality Unit 2003b). Recurring supporter concerns 
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were: the denial of marriage to same-sex couples, the denial of civil partnership 
to heterosexual couples, inheritance tax issues, and recognition of elderly same-
sex couples. Recurring opponent concerns were: claims of threat to marriage, the 
exclusion of other categories of cohabitants, compatibility with religion, and the 
proposal’s relation to EU law. The consultation elicited over 3,000 responses (HC 
Research Paper 04/64: 10). The Paper lists 19 organisations and 27 links to their 
comments (ibid 54-7). By 2013, most links returned ‘page not found’ or the 
organisation’s home page. One returned the Christian Institute’s (2002) booklet 
responding to Lord Lester’s Bill⎯cast as devaluing the sanctity of marriage by 
giving cohabitees equal rights. It relates cohabitation to post-revolutionary 
Russia, communism, the French revolution and social disorder, which confirms 
its ultra-right political agenda. Only the link for UNISON returned a response to 
the consultation. Most members preferred registration to be open to all; views 
varied on how much rights should depend on registration; there was concern 
that people who did not register could be worse off. UNISON stated its points of 
agreement with the proposal and its views on tackling discrimination. It then 
urged the Government to include the Bill in the Queen’s Speech. 
 News that the Government was including the Bill in the Queen’s Speech 
leaked out early in November and created another flurry of press interest. The 
Times reviewed the Government’s legislative agenda (Gibb 10.11.2003; Cracknell 
23.11.2003). Michael Howard’s decision to give Conservatives a free vote featured 
in the Guardian, the Times (Hall/Hurst 18.11.2003) and the Telegraph (Jones 
24.11.2003). The Independent reviewed the limitations of equal-rights legislation 
in the context of wider social inequalities (Orr 25.11.2003) and the likely dissent 
Blair faced over the agenda (Russell & Woolf 26.11.2003). The Mail drummed up 
inflamatory headlines such as ‘Labour kills off marriage’, (Doughty 26.11.2003), 
and ‘THE MURDER OF MARRIAGE’ (Phillips 26.11.2003). 
 Following the Queen’s Speech, the Commons’ ‘Debate on the Address’ 
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(26.11.2003 cc.8-117) and the Lords’ ‘Address in Reply’ (26.11.2003 cc.5-22; 
27.11.2003 cc.25-94; 1.12.2003 cc.106-172) show civil partnership was largely 
welcome. In the New Year, it was Michael Howard’s support for the proposal that 
got most press coverage (Watt/Bennett/Grice 10.2.2004), followed by scrutiny of 
the CoE position (Petre/Bates 12.10.2004), while the Mail again drummed up 
scurrilous headlines (Grant 17.2.2004; Walters 28.3.2004). 
 The Bill was introduced by Baroness Scotland for the Government in the 
Lords (30.3.2004 c.1176). It was subjected to sustained opposition in the right-
wing press, particularly the Mail, fuelled by the Christian Institute. In the Lords 
a group of determined Conservative and Unionist peers succeeded in passing an 
amendment which subverted the Bill’s purpose and made it unworkable in law. 
The amendment was deleted by the Commons and the Act finally passed a day 
before it ran out of parliamentary time. It has eight Parts and 264 Sections. The 
introduction reads:
1  Civil partnership
(1)  A civil partnership is a relationship between two people of the same sex (“civil 
partners”)—
(a) which is formed when they register as civil partners of each other—
(i) in England or Wales (under Part 2),
(ii) in Scotland (under Part 3),
(iii) in Northern Ireland (under Part 4), or
(iv) outside the United Kingdom under an Order in Council made 
under Chapter 1 of Part 5 (registration at British consulates etc. or 
by armed forces personnel), or
(b) which they are treated under Chapter 2 of Part 5 as having formed (at 
the time determined under that Chapter) by virtue of having registered an 
overseas relationship.
(2)  Subsection (1) is subject to the provisions of this Act under or by virtue of 
which a civil partnership is void.
(3)  A civil partnership ends only on death, dissolution or annulment.
(4)  The references in subsection (3) are to dissolution and annulment having effect 
under or recognised in accordance with this Act.
(5)  references in this Act to an overseas relationship are to be read in accordance 
with Chapter 2 of Part 5.
(Civil Partnership Act, 2004 Chapter 33)
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Given the resistance to its passage, the Act was a political achievement, but 
many lesbians and gay men had mixed feelings. Its legal recognition was based 
on the norms of heterosexual marriage. A debate on assimilation ensued in 
which the symbolic effect of the Act on prejudice featured surprisingly little.
 Relevant Research
 Lesbian and gay partnership registration has produced more studies than 
can be reviewed here. Those selected for review relate directly to Civil Partnership 
and focus on its legal provisions and the views of lesbians and gay men. Barker 
(2004) and Glennon (2006) focus on the Bill’s provisions in relation to lesbian 
and gay relationships and politics respectively. Harding (2008) analyses lesbian 
and gay views in terms of legal consciousness. Weeks (2007; 2008b) offers a 
broader perspective on the symbolic value of the Act. 
 Writing during the Bill’s passage, Barker (2004), assesses its provisions 
and addresses issues of assimilation and diversity in its focus on cohabiting 
couples. She introduces the Bill in the context of equivalent legislation in other 
countries and argues it was the Private Members Bills of 2001 and 2002 that 
prompted the Government to legislate, backed by pressure for UK recognition of 
partnerships and marriages registered abroad. In outlining the Bill’s provisions, 
she points out that while they were based on those for marriage, discrepancies 
existed. Registration on religious premises or within a religious service was 
prohibited. Entitlement to a partner’s pension after bereavement was restricted. 
Partnerships were formed by signing a register rather than by spoken words. The 
terminology differed (‘spouse’ for heterosexual couples, ‘civil partner’ for same-
sex couples). The Bill’s provisions were otherwise comparable to marriage. In her 
second section, Barker reviews lesbian and gay reservations. One reservation 
was the “ideology of a sexual, monogamous, life-long relationship between two 
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people” which no more applies to heterosexual couples (ibid: 319). While the Bill 
did not technically require monogamy, it was “designed to encourage long-term 
stable relationships” in which stability was conflated with monogamy (ibid: 320). 
Another reservation was the Bill’s exclusion of other lesbian and gay relationship 
arrangements, such as cohabiting friends who identify as family, or a lesbian 
couple raising children with the fathers. In this respect she argues the Bill risked 
marginalising those who do not assimilate to the ideology of ‘couple’. She does 
not refer to the belief among many lesbians and gay men that legal change effects 
social change and that equal relationship recognition increases acceptance and 
reduces prejudice (see Harding 2006). Barker concludes the Act would benefit 
only those whose relationships fall into a couple arrangement and would push 
other arrangements further from legal reform. 
 Glennon’s (2006) study has three sections. She considers the Act in terms 
of family law, lesbian and gay politics, and life in Northern Ireland. She begins 
with assumptions underlying policy development in family law, namely ‘family 
values’ and ‘social stability’. However, she notes policy makers pragmatically 
allow for diverse families, while maintaining rhetorical commitment to traditional 
‘family values’. Thus in law, distinctions between marriage and cohabitation are 
blurred; both same-sex and other-sex cohabiting couples are recognised for some 
purposes. She argues that while the Act brings more couples into “the preferred 
regulatory net”, as an incremental change it exposes the lack of coherent policy 
on family recognition (ibid: 247). Even so, she sees civil partnership as reducing 
the significance of sexuality in family law: although the Act increases the division 
between formalised and unformalised relationships, because lesbian, gay, and 
heterosexual relationships fall on both sides of the divide, the focus on sexuality 
is reduced. On lesbian and gay politics, Glennon questions the polarisation of 
identity politics and queer politics in terms of being for or against assimilation 
respectively. Her alternative is a concept of social recognition that values 
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individuals. Citing Fraser (2003), she argues that such recognition would require 
legalisation of same-sex marriage followed by the de-institutionalisation of all 
marriage. This would remove “marital status as the proxy for the conferment of 
benefits and [allow substitution of an indicator such as] citizenship or residency” 
(ibid: 255). Thus she argues, “the assimilationist strategy of civil partnership is 
worth pursuing as an achievable middle-course agenda” (ibid: 255). She also 
views the recognition of lesbian and gay relationships in terms of existing norms 
as an effective way to counter maligned social status: 
Partnership legislation will not, by itself, eradicate prejudice. But continuing to withhold 
relationship status from gays and lesbians constitutes an impermeable barrier to full social 
status. Indeed, the ability to identify oneself without social stigma is thwarted by the 
presence of barriers to full citizenship, the terms of which include choice in relationship 
form. Thus, symbolically, the exclusion from legal partnership status is of greater 
detriment than the potential benefits of inclusion. 
(Glennon 2006: 258)
This cost-benefit argument underpins Glennon’s section on Northern Ireland. 
She begins with the reductionist paradigm of two polarised communities, then 
relates both colonial and nationalist histories to a patriarchal culture reproduced 
in both unionist and nationalist ideology. “The result has been to erase gay and 
lesbian sexuality from the dominant culture” (ibid: 264). She cites an Institute for 
Conflict Research report (Jarman & Tennant 2003) on homophobic violence and 
harassment in Northern Ireland, which concluded discrimination was seen as 
normal. She argues that unchallenged homophobia plus the lack of visible gay 
space are good reasons for supporting assimilationist strategies in the Province 
and points out that civil partnership forced a reaction from the political parties. 
The DUP and UUP voted against it, the SDLP for it, and Sinn Fein, who do not 
take up their seats at Westminster, supported both civil partnership and gay 
marriage. She puts the emergence of these divergent views down to the political 
climate of the peace process. She concludes, the extension of civil partnership to 
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Northern Ireland must be supported “for allowing cracks in the seemingly 
universal moral conservatism of political dialogue to emerge” (ibid: 276). 
 Harding (2008) analyses lesbian and gay views of civil partnership via 10 
in-depth interviews framed by legal consciousness: how people “approach, use 
and think about the law in everyday life” (ibid: 743). She notes the basic concepts 
of legal consciousness (before the law/conformity; with the law/engagement; 
against the law/resistance) do not relate directly to lesbian and gay experience. 
By linking these concepts to Foucault’s view of power and resistance, she creates 
a “version of legal consciousness that is sympathetic to the nuances of lesbian 
and gay experiences of law and regulation” (ibid: 744). Two themes emerged from 
her analysis. One was a complex interplay between recognition and regulation of 
lesbian and gay relationships in which three concerns were salient. First, the 
cost of recognition was seen as regulation⎯this generated ambivalence towards 
recognition. Second, joint assessment of partners’ income meant less money if 
one or both were claiming benefit⎯this was raised only by lesbians in the study. 
Third, the Act entailed assimilation⎯some participants saw this as imposing 
heteronormative expectations, others saw it as a framework in which partners 
could organise their lives. The other theme was unease over the Act’s relation to 
marriage in which three more concerns were salient. First, was a difficulty in 
reconciling civil partnership with formal equality⎯most participants wanted 
marriage and civil partnership to be open to all. Second, was a tension between 
marriage, civil partnership and religion⎯some participants were glad religion 
was excluded, others felt a religious ceremony should be open to those who want 
it. Third, was an objection to the patriarchal heritage of marriage and privileging 
of the couple⎯this view co-existed with that of civil partnership as an alternative 
within which assimilation could be resisted. Harding’s analysis reveals concerns 
underlying participants’ support for the Act:
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As these participants’ perspectives show, legal change impacts upon lesbians and gay men 
in different ways, depending on their personal circumstances, and people respond in 
different ways to the effects of law and power in their lives. Through strategies of resistance 
to the regulatory and disciplinary effects of marriage and civil partnership, and the legacy 
of different relationship forms within non-heterosexual communities, these participants 
also stressed that space can be created within the disciplinary mechanisms of power for 
resistance to the negative, assimilatory potential of civil partnership.
(Harding 2008: 757)
She concludes that participants’ linking of recognition to regulation suggests an 
against the law legal consciousness, while their concern about the lack of formal 
equality suggests a before the law legal consciousness. 
 Weeks (2007; 2008b) sees civil partnership as both an effect of social 
change and a major step towards inclusion and acceptance. As an effect of social 
change, he argues it represents a shift in social values. In Britain, as in various 
other countries, legal recognition of same-sex partnerships was more the result 
of elite activism than popular pressure. He acknowledges the importance of 
ECtHR judgments and EU law in other reforms, but on civil partnership suggests 
both Stonewall and the Government were responding to existing social change: 
I have suggested elsewhere (Weeks, 2007) that a defining characteristic of the remaking of 
sexuality since the 1950s has been those everyday experiments that happen at a grass-
roots, sub-political level, often at first outside and beyond the visibility of historians and 
sociologists. Surely what is striking about the current salience of same-sex relations is that 
it crept up on commentators and theorists unawares, stimulated above all by the AIDS 
crisis amongst gay men, and the concern over parental rights especially amongst lesbians. 
The felt need for same-sex relationship rights grew from the ground upwards. 
Governmental interventions, influenced as they were by skilful lobbying, were from this 
perspective a response to changing social realities, not an anticipation of them. 
(Weeks 2008b: 789)
In seeing the Act as a step towards social inclusion and acceptance, he argues 
that as marriage promotes and naturalises heterosexuality, legal recognition of 
lesbian and gay partnerships contributes to heterosexuality’s denaturalisation. 
Thus, civil partnerships are more than another legislative reform which affects 
only a minority of people: 
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Logic would usually suggest that de-heterosexualising marriage by promoting same-sex 
unions/marriages is a potential transgressive and subversive assault on its 
heteronormivity, an undermining of its cornerstone role, and a destabilising of the hetero-
homo binary that constitutes the gendered and sexual order. 
(Weeks 2007: 184)
In response to queer theorists who view marriage as welded to heterosexual 
assumptions and same-sex partnerships as a surrender to heteronormivity, he 
notes the take-up of civil partnerships when they became law. The Government 
had estimated between 11,000 and 22,000 in the first five years, but 15,500 
partnerships were registered in the first nine months. Most partners were in 
stable relationships and registered for pragmatic rather than political reasons: 
the protections of legal status, inheritance rights, parenting rights. While Weeks 
(2008b: 788) acknowledges “real political divides about the nature, relevance, 
value and prospects for same-sex unions” and recognises fear of assimilation, he 
argues that ultimately, as legally binding commitments, civil partnerships must 
have implications for wider norms and values: 
Whether the impact of this is [...] assimilationist or radical will depend ultimately on the 
degree to which the practice of same-sex unions can transform both the normative 
meanings of marriage, and everyday practices of LGBT people themselves. 
(Weeks 2007: 198)
He concludes with affirmations of living an ordinary life:
The very ordinariness of recognised same-sex unions in a culture which until recently cast 
homosexuality into secret corners and dark whispers is surely the most extraordinary 
achievement of all. 
(Weeks 2007: 198)
But at a deeper level surely, what we see here is the wish for recognition for what you are 
and want to be, for validation, not absorption, a voting with our feet for the ordinary 
virtues of care, love, mutual responsibility. We should never underestimate the importance 
of being ordinary. It has helped transform the LGBT and the wider world. 
(Weeks 2008b: 792)
Though the long-term effects remain to be seen, Weeks’ conclusions effectively 
grasp the shift in atmosphere from that in the 1980s where this study began.
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 The Passage of the Bill
 At the Bill’s second reading (HL 22.4.2004 cc.387-433) it was welcomed, 
often warmly, by 13 of the 17 peers who spoke, including the Bishops of Oxford 
and Peterborough who reported support in the General Synod and Archbishops’ 
Council. Baroness Wilcox and Lord Elton had some reservations; only Baroness 
O’Cathain and Lady Saltoun were avidly against it. By contrast, Lord Alli was 
joyous. After recounting the remarkable journey of lesbian and gay reforms since 
he entered the House in 1999, he took astute measure of the opposition:
They will talk about being sympathetic and, indeed, claim not to be homophobic. We know 
who they are⎯they have voted against every piece of legislation that I have listed. They will 
abuse two legitimate concerns to undermine the Bill. The first notion, of course, is that it 
will undermine marriage. In countries where there is gay marriage or civil partnership, 
there is certainly no evidence to suggest that it does that. In fact there is evidence to 
suggest the reverse. More importantly—I agree with the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of 
Oxford—it seems illogical to argue that something that encourages stability in society 
should somehow undermine marriage.
The second argument to be deployed will be, “We’re very pleased to give these rights to the 
gay community, but we should see a way of extending beyond the gay community to others 
—to sisters, to brothers or to a carer. Should they not be granted the same protection?” 
That is a seductive argument, but it is not an issue for this Bill. Those are legitimate 
questions for the Government, but the Bill is not the place for those arguments. (c.409)
These were indeed the bases on which the Bill was contested and almost lost. 
While these arguments were first mooted by the Christian Institute (2002: 26-7), 
its involvement was unacknowledged by the Bill’s opponents.
 The Lords’ Committee spanned five long sessions. At the first (10.5.2004 
cc.1-60GC) it was announced that there should be no voting in Committee and 
disputed amendments should be withdrawn until the Report stage. The debate 
lasted four fractious hours. Six amendments sought to adjust the wording; four 
clearly sought to undermine the Bill. Lord Tebbit sought to omit same-sex and of 
the same sex on the grounds that the restriction was discriminatory. Of Baroness 
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O’Cathain’s three amendments: one sought to extend the Bill to other categories 
of cohabitees on the basis that homosexual relationships were being treated as 
more important than other relationships; another sought to exclude Northern 
Ireland from the Bill on the basis that civil partnership was unwanted there; the 
third sought to replace the registry office ceremony with an agreement witnessed 
by a commissioner for oaths on the basis that the ceremony was too much like 
marriage. She cast the Bill as an inheritance-tax avoidance Bill for a selected few. 
All amendments were withdrawn. 
 The second Committee session (12.5.2004 cc.115-180GC) lasted four 
equally fractious hours. Baroness Scotland and Baroness Crawley’s Government 
amendments were agreed. The rest were withdrawn. Lord Higgins’ amendments 
focused on clarity; the five of Baroness Wilcox were challenging. Two sought to 
extend the Bill to other categories of cohabitees on the basis that their exclusion 
was discriminatory. Three were ‘probing amendments’ to elicit the Government’s 
view on the exclusion of religious premises, the absence of words of commitment, 
and punishment of offenders against the Bill’s provisions. Baroness O’Cathain 
then tried to replace the proposals for dissolution with termination on request, 
which enabled her to argue that the Bill was mimicking marriage.
 The third and fourth sessions were shorter and dealt mostly with property 
issues and financial arrangements. In the third (13.5.2004 cc.181-238GC), there 
was a heated exchange on the Bill’s extension to Northern Ireland between Lord 
Maginnis and Baroness O’Cathain on one side, and Lord Lester and Lord Alli on 
the other. Baroness Amos, Leader of the House, intervened after which a string of 
clauses and Government amendments were briskly agreed. The fourth session 
(17.5.2004 cc.239-264GC), was also conducted with brisk efficiency. Baroness 
Amos carefully explained the amendments to Northern Irish law, but Baroness 
O’Cathain took little part. The provisions for recognising same-sex marriages and 
partnerships registered in other countries drew most comment. The fifth session 
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(25.5.2004 cc.449-526GC) again lasted four hours. A succession of Government 
amendments were briskly agreed, which led Baroness O’Cathain and Lord Tebbit 
to complain about the volume of Government amendments. 
 The withdrawn amendments were revived at the Report stage (24.6.2004 
cc.1364-1391). When Baroness O’Cathain moved to extend the Bill to categories 
of relationship other than same-sex couples on the grounds that the Bill was 
discriminatory, twelve peers spoke in support, only two of whom had participated 
in the Committee debates. Only five peers spoke against. As Lord Alli put it:
The noble Baroness’s argument in Grand Committee was not only that she wanted to help 
carers but that she wanted to stop gay people having these sets of rights. As I said, I have 
supported calls for the issue of carers to be looked into. But I have to say to the noble 
Baroness, as I said to her in Grand Committee, that if an amendment looks like a wrecking 
amendment, feels like a wrecking amendment and looks as though it will wreck the Bill, 
she should not be surprised if some of us oppose it.
He continued:
I hear noble Lords shout “no”, but the noble Baroness’s principal position, and that of the 
noble Lord, Lord Tebbit, on homosexuality is clear. They have never voted for legislation 
which encourages any kind of equalisation of rights for homosexuals. Indeed, on Radio 4 
on 27 May 2004, the noble Lord, Lord Tebbit, said about the gay marriage Bill, as he called 
it: “We not only have an epidemic of obesity—we have a huge problem with AIDS, and the 
Government’s attitude is to do everything it can to promote buggery, knowing that those 
two are somewhat intimately related”. (c.1370)
The amendment was passed by 148 to 130 votes. It extended the Bill to relatives 
over the age of 30 who had lived together for 12 years and subverted the Bill’s 
purpose of recognising lesbian and gay partnerships. The debate was adjourned 
for an hour. When it resumed (cc.1406-1462), Baroness Scotland announced: 
The decision that the House has just made amending Clause 1 fundamentally alters the 
basis upon which the Government have brought forward the whole Bill and on which they 
have consulted widely before doing so. In those circumstances the Government feel unable 
to proceed with any of their amendments previously tabled and to contribute to the debate 
on other amendments, except to indicate that we oppose them. (c.1408)
Lord Lester agreed: 
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My Lords, on behalf of these Benches, we entirely agree with that view. We regard what has 
happened as a torpedoing of the Bill in the guise of noble motives. Personally, I am most 
disappointed, since it was my Private Member's Bill that began the matter in this House 
and the only proper course is to bring it before the democratic Chamber as soon as 
possible. (c.1408)
After discussion, it was agreed that the Bill should proceed in the usual way but 
without the Government amendments. Lord Tebbit’s comment was triumphant: 
I believe that behind that approach is the fact that there must have been a panicky 
telephone call from the Treasury. That is the heart of it. The noble Baronesses opposite 
say, “No, no. The Treasury? Good gracious me. The Treasury? It would not be the 
Treasury’s concern”. The amendment has done nothing to attack the principle of the Bill. 
All those who would have benefited under the Bill as it was introduced essentially remain 
to benefit. The earlier vote on the amendment of my noble friend Lady O’Cathain has done 
nothing to detract in any single way from the rights which the Bill would extend to certain 
groups of people. That vote has meant that another group or two of people have been made 
beneficiaries.
The noble Baroness, Lady Crawley, looks astonished. I thought she’d got hold of that idea 
earlier today. Most of us did, and that is why we voted for my noble friend’s amendment. 
We wanted to benefit another group of people in order to reduce the inequities which the 
Bill would have created. (c.1413)
Over 20 amendments were then moved by Conservative peers which Ministers 
opposed without engagement. A few were passed. One went to a vote but was 
defeated. The main argument was over Baroness O’Cathain’s amendment on 
Northern Ireland which sought to allow the Assembly a veto on civil partnership 
when it reconvened. Lord Alli was adamant:
In the Northern Ireland context, I would say that this piece of legislation is probably 
needed more than in any other place. It will allow people who wish to register their civil 
partnerships to stand up and have protection in a way they do not at the moment. So the 
debate we witnessed less than two hours ago probably reinforces the need for this 
legislation more than anything else I have heard in the House. (c.1418)
Baroness O’Cathain withdrew. 
 Press reports of the debate were patchy. The Guardian highlighted the 
homophobic undermining of the Bill and the fury of its supporters (White & Hall 
25.6.2004). The Telegraph highlighted the claimed discrimination alongside views 
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of Conservative peers and Government ministers (Jones 25.62004). The Belfast 
News Letter headlined ‘ULSTER PEERS UNITE TO STOP SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 
PLANS’ (25.6.2004).
 At the third reading (1.7.2004 cc.391-430) Baroness Scotland outlined a 
range of anomalies the wrecking amendment could cause if a partnership was 
registered between relatives. For example a (grand)son/daughter caring for an 
elderly (grand)parent, would have to divorce that (grand)parent if s/he wanted to 
marry or register a partnership. Much of the debate was spent on an attempt by 
Lord Maginnis’ to exclude Northern Ireland from the Bill. He spoke in a highly 
offensive way and linked civil partnership to child sexual abuse in the Province. 
He was rebutted at length by eight peers before he withdrew. Lord Alderdice 
noted that his speech “made clear the real purpose of the amendment, which 
[was] fundamentally to oppose the whole purpose of the original Bill” (c.401). 
Baroness Amos affirmed the Government’s “responsibility to challenge bigotry, 
discrimination and prejudice” (c.407). Various peers pointed out that as a human 
rights issue, the Bill was not a devolved matter. Baroness Scotland and Baroness 
Hollis moved amendments on those parts of the Bill unaffected by the wrecking 
amendment. It was passed without a vote. Lord Tebbit then reiterated his view 
that the original Bill was “outrageously discriminatory” (c.429) and commended 
its improvement by Baroness O’Cathain, but apologised to Lord Lester for being 
so rude in the heat of the previous debate. As the exact piece of rudeness he had 
in mind is difficult to identify, his apology suggests an excuse to laud Baroness 
O’Cathain’s amendment, thereby apparently gloating over its effect on the Bill. 
Lord Lester replied that the debate had harmed the “reputation of the House” 
(c.429). Baroness Scotland thanked Lord Tebbit for his admission, but pointed to 
the “travesty” of describing the Bill as outrageously discriminatory (ibid).
 The Bill’s second reading in the Commons (planned for 16.9.2004) was 
postponed by the Prime Minister at the request of Ian Paisley as Unionist MPs 
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would be in talks to restore the Northern Ireland Assembly. As the Bill was short 
of parliamentary time, this was seen as another Unionist attempt to derail it 
(Cracknell 19.9.2004). The talks failed. Meanwhile, the Northern Ireland Gay 
Rights Association picketed a Christian Institute meeting in Belfast (McAleese 
24.9.2004). The second reading was held on 12.10.2004, five weeks before the 
end of the parliamentary year. This debate is analysed below. The Conservative 
free vote exposed the depth of the ‘moderniser’-‘traditionalist’ divide. The Bill was 
passed by 426 to 49 votes. There was little press interest. The Guardian reported 
plans to overturn the Lords’ amendments (White 13.10.2004). The Independent 
reported Tory disarray (Woolf 13.10.2004). The Belfast Telegraph reported 
Unionist opposition (McCambridge 13.10.2004).
 The Bill was restored to its original form at the first of its five Standing 
Committee sessions by a vote of 13 to 1 (HC 19.10.2004 cc.007-028). On the day 
it was due back in the Commons on Report (9.11.2004), the Christian Institute 
placed a £20,000 full-page advertisement in the Times against the restriction of 
civil partnership to ‘homosexual’ couples and in support of Edward Leigh’s 
amendment on extending the Bill to cohabiting siblings (White 10.11.2004). Over 
half the debate (cc.724-796) was spent on this amendment. It was defeated by 
307 to 74 votes. Two further obstructions tabled by Christopher Chope were 
more quickly rebutted. Government amendments were passed in the remaining 
time. The Bill’s third reading followed (cc.796-815). It was passed by 389 to 47 
votes. The Mail and the Telegraph published satirical sketches (Letts/Gimson 
10.11.2004). The Times and the Guardian reported the defeat of traditionalist 
Conservatives (Charter/White 10.11.2004). 
 In a lecture on the legislative changes, Angela Eagle (23.2.2011) told how 
before the Bill’s return to the Lords, supportive MPs phoned all supportive peers 
to ask them to vote. When the Lords considered the Commons’ amendments 
(17.11.2004 cc.1449-1553), Baroness O’Cathain again tried to dissociate the Bill 
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from same-sex couples with another amendment on cohabiting relatives. Against 
this final assault on the Bill, Lord Hunt argued, “If the amendment is passed this 
afternoon, I doubt whether the Bill will ever come into force because of the legal, 
practical and financial difficulties involved” (c.1458). It was defeated by 251 to 
136 votes. Nine peers changed their vote; 60 peers who had previously supported 
Baroness O’Cathain were absent. The Bill was enacted the next day. It came into 
force a year later. The date for the first bookings (5.12.2005) was UK wide, but 
Northern Ireland was awarded the first ceremonies (19.12.2005), one day earlier 
than Scotland, two days earlier than England and Wales.
 The Debate
 The Bill’s second reading in the Commons (12.10.2004 cc.174-250) lasted 
five hours. Thirty-four MPs spoke: 23 in support, 11 against (Appendix 79). Of 
those in support, 12 were Labour, seven Conservative, two Liberal Democrat, one 
SDLP and one SNP. Of those in opposition, nine were Conservative, one DUP and 
one UUP. Twenty-two MPs made speeches, 15 in support and seven against. As a 
second reading, the debate focused on the nature and purpose of the Bill as a 
whole. Thus the Lords’ amendments were a recurrent topic. Other prominent 
topics were marriage, pensions, next-of-kin rights and Christianity. Many of the 
Bill’s supporters also hailed the progression of legislative reforms for lesbians 
and gay men. Given the debate’s purpose and length (over 42,000 words), this 
section focuses on speakers’ views of the Lords’ amendments. 
 The Minister, Jacqui Smith, introduced the Bill with reference to Labour’s 
record of reform since 1967: the Bill was thus a “historic step” and “natural 
progression” in “the Government’s commitment to social justice and equality” 
(c.174). Barely had she begun, when opposing MPs began to intervene. John 
Redwood asked:
377
Will the Minister recommend to the Treasury that carers, those being cared for and family 
members living together in their own family units should have the benefit of inheritance 
tax relief and capital gains tax relief? (c.174)
Jacqui Smith would not:
No, I will not. It is rather unfortunate that some Opposition Members have chosen to use 
an important equality Bill to pursue their campaign about inheritance tax. I will come back 
to some of the amendments that have been made in the Lords. (c.174)
With reference to the consultation, she began to describe some of the difficulties 
faced by same-sex couples. Angela Watkinson asked:
The points that the Minister is making are valid, but do they not equally apply to platonic 
companions who share a home together and suffer equally? (c.175)
Jacqui Smith did not believe the issues she had described did apply:
There is a particular significance to a partnership between two people who have chosen to 
share their home and their life, to love each other and to care for each other. I will deal 
with the issue of other types of carers, which I take seriously, later, but to conflate the two 
is to do justice neither to the same-sex couples whom the Bill seeks to serve nor to carers 
in the sort of relationships that the hon. Lady describes. (c.175)
James Gray then asked:
The Minister describes a loving couple who have lived together for many years, sharing 
their house, their lives, their food. Do her arguments apply to the elderly sisters in my 
constituency who have lived together for 40 years and care for each other and love each 
other in a very real way as much as they do to lesbian couples? (c.175)
Jacqui Smith was getting impatient:
I am sure that the hon. Gentleman was listening carefully when I identified the specific 
problem for same-sex couples—the legal invisibility of their relationship. Of course there 
are issues about sisters living together, but their relationship is not invisible—it is already 
recognised by society, and often by the law. (c.175)
She resumed her account of the Bill’s provisions, adding:
These are the marks of a civilised and humane society. They are the principles that we set 
out to fulfil with this Bill, yet others have sought to wreck the principles on which the Bill 
is founded. (c.175)
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The Lords’ amendments were completely inappropriate:
I wish to move on to the amendments—frankly, they are wrecking amendments—passed in 
another place. Our belief, which is supported by many hon. Members on both sides of the 
House, is that certain amendments passed in another place render the Bill unworkable. 
Those amendments would allow close relatives over the age of 30 who have lived together 
continuously for 12 years to form civil partnerships. Of course, we recognise that there are 
genuine concerns about the position of carers [...] but this Bill is entirely the wrong place 
to deal with those concerns. (c177)
She then outlined some absurdities they would cause: 
The Opposition amendments passed in another place would also lead to myriad legal 
absurdities. A woman who formed a civil partnership with her grandfather would have her 
own mother as her stepdaughter. A grandfather could leave a survivor’s pension to a civil-
partner grandson. That turns pension provision on its head and could cost the taxpayer £1 
billion a year and the private sector some £1.25 billion a year. (c.177)
Offering support, Desmond Turner asked:
Does my right hon. Friend agree that those amendments could fairly be described as 
wrecking amendments, designed to prevent the Bill becoming effective, and that they were 
tabled in that form by people who are afraid to come out and express their real motive, 
which is to oppose equality? (c.177)
Jacqui Smith thought this a fair point:
As I have said, those amendments fail to recognise the principles on which the Bill is based 
and they will lead to some of the legal absurdities that I have outlined. I hope that all hon. 
Members will be honest about their real views, their real motivations and their real 
objectives in what they propose. (cc.177-8)
Gerald Howarth was indignant:
Is the Minister seriously telling the House that three bishops who voted for the 
amendments so ably moved by my noble Friends in the other place were engaged in a 
wrecking process? (c.178)
Jacqui Smith clarified:
I was saying precisely that the effect of those amendments would be to wreck the Bill. 
Those who voted for them, whatever their motives, need to be aware that that would be the 
effect of the amendments. I was going through the legal absurdities. (c.178)
She listed more absurdities:
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For example, a son in a civil partnership with his elderly mother could lose entitlement to 
jobseeker’s allowance, based on his mother’s ability to support him financially. That would 
take our social security system back to the 1930s. Even more bizarrely, if he then wanted 
to marry someone else, he would have to live separately from his mother for at least two 
years, or he would have to prove her unreasonable behaviour. For those reasons and many 
others, the amendments stand condemned by the TUC, citizens advice bureaux, the 
Solicitors Family Law Association, the Law Society, Stonewall and many others, but, worst 
of all, they stand condemned by the very people whom they purport to help—carers. Carers 
UK believes that the amendments may even harm the position of carers and create new 
problems for them. (c.178)
Offering further support, Charles Hendry asked:
Will she confirm that one of the issues for carers is that they will lose their entitlement to 
benefit if they register such a relationship because joint incomes will be taken into 
account? (c.178)
Jacqui Smith agreed:
The hon. Gentleman points out yet another difficulty with trying to impose an ill-thought-
out wrecking process on a Bill that was intended to deal with another problem. He is 
absolutely right. (c.178)
Also in support, Rob Marris suggested human rights implications:
As I understand it—perhaps she will correct me if I am wrong—heterosexual couples can 
take advantage of the Bill only if they are aged 30 and have been in a relationship for 12 
years. If so, does that not breach the European convention on human rights, as it is 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation? (c.178)
Jacqui Smith qualified:
That is precisely one of the reasons that make the Bill in the amended form incompatible 
with the convention. For all those reasons and many more, we will seek to reverse those 
amendments and restore the Bill to its original purpose. (c.178)
Chris Bryant added to the consternation:
Is not the truth of the matter that those who tabled those amendments in the other 
Chamber did so because they do not believe that homosexuals are equal to heterosexuals, 
and that, unfortunately, that includes many of the bishops? (cc.178-9)
Jacqui Smith concurred:
As I suggested earlier, I hope that people will be honest about their motivation today—I 
suspect that my hon. Friend is right about some people’s motivation. (c.179)
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The early anti-CP questions provocatively foregrounded Baroness O’Cathain’s 
amendment thereby highlighting the Government’s defeat in the Lords. However, 
the subsequent cross-party, pro-CP interventions illustrate widespread support 
for the original Bill and a consensus that the amendments were intended to 
wreck it. After successive interventions on other issues, Jacqui Smith stated the 
Government’s intention, once the Bill was restored, to move the amendments 
that Ministers in the Lords could not proceed with because of its changed 
nature. She then commended the Bill to the House.
 Alan Duncan was delighted to support the Bill from the Conservative 
Front Bench, but when he came to the Lords’ amendments he conceded:
It is profoundly unfair that carers and siblings who cohabit are disadvantaged on the death 
of one or other of them by being forced out of their home by their tenancy terms or by the 
burden of inheritance tax. So it was right for these issues to be raised in debate, and in 
doing so the plight of those who are disadvantaged in this way has been drawn to a wider 
audience. (c.188)
On quoting Baroness Scotland’s undertaking to address the issue, he continued:
As they have now had since May to grapple and to percolate, I look to the Government, as I 
think all Opposition Members do, to fulfil that undertaking. I seek a clear guarantee from 
the Minister of State of the Government’s firm intent to bring forward measures to address 
these issues at an early opportunity. (cc.188-9)
This prompted Angela Eagle to ask:
Does the hon. Gentleman agree that it is highly inappropriate, regardless of the merits of 
argument about home sharers, to think that the solution somehow lies in civil partnership 
arrangements? Will he be voting to take out the provisions in section 2(1) and schedule 1, 
which so disfigure the Bill? (c.189)
The reply was affirmative:
I can assure her that I think she is right. I accept that the Bill was not the appropriate 
vehicle for such action. When those in another place supported the Back-Bench 
amendment to widen the scope of the Bill, I believe that they did so with good intent. 
However, in doing so they fundamentally changed the Bill's nature and effect. They created 
a Bill that is at best bad legislation, and at worst unworkable and damaging. (c.189)
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He went on to quote the Carers Association and argued:
So we are not doing a favour to carers if we move an amendment about carers that they do 
not want. As the Minister said, many other anomalies and rather absurd unintended 
consequences arise. (c.189)
After citing further legal anomalies he pointed out:
On a more serious point, by allowing the degrees of prohibitive blood relationships within 
the existing family to be breached—I hope that this is persuasive to my right hon. and hon. 
Friends—to form a partnership with one another, the amendment does a great deal to 
destabilise and compromise the traditional family unit. 
Their Lordships’ amendment destroys what it sets out to protect. (c.189)
He agreed the amendments were unworkable, but denied the Conservative party 
had sought to wreck the Bill. He then urged his hon. Friends to leave carers and 
siblings to “bespoke legislation” (c.190) and the Government to legislate for them. 
 Alistair Carmichael confirmed Liberal Democrat support for removal of the 
Lords’ amendments:
The provisions that seek to create categories of civil partners other than same-sex couples, 
worthy though they may be, do not belong in this Bill, and they should be removed. When 
the Government table amendments in Committee to remove those provisions, the Minister 
will have the support of its Liberal Democrat members. (c.194)
He then addressed Baroness O’Cathain’s argument:
The argument concerns people who cohabit and who have a relationship based on love—
albeit that the love that exists between siblings is very different from that which exists 
between partners drawn from outwith the family. The law has always treated such 
relationships differently for strong social, genetic and scientific reasons, and to abandon 
that approach in this Bill would be dangerous to say the least. (c.196)
Cohabiting relatives in his constituency regulated their affairs without problems:
I suspect that many of them would be offended by the suggestion that their relationship 
was in some way comparable to that of a husband and wife or a same-sex couple in a long-
term relationship.
One can imagine even greater difficulties being created by the Bill as it stands. The 
example cited is usually that of the adult's offspring who gives up his or her job to care for 
an elderly parent, but what about the same person who gives up a job to care for both 
elderly parents? He or she would be prohibited from entering into a civil partnership until 
one or other of the parents dies. That surely cannot be right. (c.196)
382
He looked forward to the discussions in Committee. 
 Angela Eagle addressed the Lords’ amendments at length and began with 
Conservative divisions. She wished the Front-Bench modernisers well, but:
Some of the comments that were made in the House of Lords give some measure of the 
distance still to go in order to persuade Conservative Back Benchers that they should 
share the welcome views expressed by their Front-Bench colleagues. [...] 
Many Conservatives in the Lords are associated with the spoiling and wrecking 
amendments that have effectively torpedoed the Bill unless we can reverse them. (c.198)
She found the Bill’s passage through the Lords extraordinary:
It was used to argue that liabilities to inheritance tax or property rights somehow ought to 
be minimised through the Bill. The amendments that were passed, which, thankfully, the 
Conservative Front Bench will oppose, and which, I hope, will be overturned today, would 
cost £2.8 billion annually in forgone tax liabilities. I cannot think of anything less 
respectful than trying to turn something so important into a tax loophole. (c.198-9)
Gerald Howarth was sceptical:
The fact is that inheritance tax raises £2.6 billion a year in total. The hon. Lady cannot 
seriously suggest that the changes proposed by my noble Friend Baroness O’Cathain 
would result in an even greater forgoing of tax by the Treasury than the total amount 
currently claimed by inheritance tax. (c.199)
Angela Eagle was unmoved:
No, but inheritance tax is only part of the tax loopholes created by the vote to incorporate 
new clause 2 and schedule 1 in the Bill. The figure represents the cost of the whole effect 
of the provisions that we are considering. Although the hon. Gentleman is obsessed with 
inheritance tax, other loopholes are created by what the Lords did to the Bill. (c.199)
She believed the debate at which the amendments were passed was shameful: 
The Solicitors Family Law Association called the amendments an “unworkable mess” and 
an “absurdity”. Lord Alli said—rightly, I think—that they were 
“spoiling amendments designed to make the Bill unworkable.” 
The Lesbian and Gay Lawyers Association said: 
“We do not believe that people who care for their elderly parents would want to be 
in a situation where they would be prevented from marrying . . . and be jointly 
assessed for welfare benefits with their parents”. 
She continued: 
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Carers UK, who were meant to be assisted by the amendments, said: 
“The changes would have a devastating impact on the income of the carer and the 
person for whom they care.” 
The Law Society said that 
“it is inappropriate simply to include them”—family members—“within the 
categories of those who can register a civil partnership. Registration will not solve 
their problems and may even worsen their position.” (c.199)
She gave further examples of the amendments’ absurd effects and was glad the 
major parties supported their removal. Ann Widdecombe noted:
The hon. Lady has just used an interesting term. She said that if a daughter and mother 
entered into a civil partnership, the daughter would be married to the mother. Therefore, 
she is saying that the Bill is about homosexual marriage. It is about one person in a civil 
partnership being married to the other. (c.200)
Angela Eagle replied that she had been careful in her choice of phrase:
I said that such people would be effectively married. Whether one believes that that is 
homosexual marriage, as the right hon. Lady clearly does, or that it is a parallel state, 
which recognises—rightly, in my view—the legal rights and responsibilities for people who 
live in caring same-sex relationships, is irrelevant. (c.200)
She argued it was completely inappropriate for family members or carers to enter 
a civil partnership to avoid inheritance tax or protect property rights.
 Ann Widdecombe was first to make a speech against the Bill and 
presented the Lords’ amendments as an equality measure: 
I do not impute wrecking motives to those who voted in a certain way, because they were 
making a point, saying that the inequalities are not confined to homosexual couples so 
that if we are concerned about them in the one context, we should also be concerned in the 
other. The Bill is not, as I said, the place to address that matter. 
Equally, the Bill is not the right way to address those problems when applied to 
homosexuals. The essence of the Bill is that people sign a register, as they do when they 
marry, which automatically confers all the rights of marriage. If there are problems, such 
as being dispossessed of a home because of inheritance tax or tenancy arrangements, they 
should be dealt with separately and they should cover not just homosexual arrangements 
but others as well. (c.202)
She would “address injustices, but not through aping marriage” (c.204). 
 Jane Griffiths reported difficulties faced by lesbian and gay couples in her 
constituency, then argued:
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Those real life examples provide evidence that the change we want to make is so right and 
that the wrecking attempts in the other place are so wrong. (c.206)
She looked forward to the Bill becoming law.
 For Robert Key the Bill was a serious attempt to address the injustices 
facing same-sex couples: 
We believe it should be passed in its original form, without the amendment passed by the 
House of Lords on Report, which extended the scope of the Bill to family members and 
carers. I have great sympathy for siblings and others in mutually supportive relationships
—we all know many such people in our constituencies—but I am convinced that the 
provision is wrong. That view is shared widely by Carers UK, the Law Society and others, 
so I very much hope that the House will remove the amendment. (c.206)
He spoke of cultural, social and religious change and hoped the Government 
would pass the Bill as soon as possible.
 David Borrow hoped to take advantage of the Bill once it was passed. In 
his largely personal speech, he argued:
The amendments agreed in the Lords will, I hope, be thrown out in Committee. No matter 
how good the intentions, they are clearly unworkable. If we are to tackle some of the issues 
raised by the amendments, it is better done elsewhere. (c.210)
His main concern was the importance of gay relationship recognition. He looked 
forward to the Bill’s successful passage.
 Controversy resumed with Christopher Chope. He wondered why the Bill 
was not called “the same-sex partnership Bill” (c.211): 
I suspect that the amendment was passed in the House of Lords—I include myself among 
those who sympathise with the arguments made there—because people took the Bill at 
face value and thought that it was about giving new rights to people who are in partnership 
outside marriage. If it were designed merely to enable those in settled long-term 
relationships to have a better deal from inheritance tax law or pension benefit law, I would 
have no problem with it. (c.211)
The Government was missing an opportunity:
However, if we go along with the Government’s arguments on rejecting the Lords 
amendments to the present Bill, we will have missed a great opportunity to get a fair deal 
for participants in long-term relationships outside marriage. (c.211)
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Edward Leigh concurred:
The truth is that no Government will ever address that issue in any Finance Bill. Doing so 
would simply be too expensive. (c.211)
Christopher Chope added:
It is disingenuous of the Government to argue that they will give serious consideration to 
the matter when they have an opportunity, in the form of the Civil Partnership Bill, to 
ensure that there is no discrimination between different types of relationship outside 
marriage. We should deal with all such relationships on the same basis. (c.211)
His closing remark, that the Bill was a “buggers’ muddle” (c.213) was noted to be 
“deliberately offensive” by Chris Bryant (c.224).
 John Bercow strongly supported the original Bill and strongly opposed 
Baroness O’Cathain’s amendment, which he dealt with in cogent detail. Firstly: 
The rationale of this Bill is not to deal with inheritance tax, nor is it principally about tax 
relief—its focus is relationship recognition. If my right hon. and hon. Friends want to argue 
the case for the reduction or abolition of inheritance tax, good luck to them—I happen to 
think that they have a powerful case—but inheritance tax relief was never originally a 
rationale for the introduction of the Bill, and it certainly should not be allowed to hijack it 
and become its defining or central feature now. (c.218)
Second, he argued the amendment supported neither marriage nor the family: 
Indeed, it is not even neutral. It is counter-productive. It is a force for undermining 
marriage and damaging the family. The hon. Member for Wallasey (Angela Eagle), in a 
persuasive speech, gave the example of a woman living in a civil partnership with her 
mother. It is important to underline the significance of that example. If that young woman 
decides that she wants to get married, she must extricate herself from the civil partnership 
and then demonstrate that there has been an irretrievable breakdown of her relationship 
with her mother—and there is a possibility that she could wait for up to five years before 
her wish to marry would be fulfilled. What could be more anti-marriage than that? 
[...] If, within a family civil partnership, there is a breakdown, and the dissolution process 
is set in train, there would have to be, quite properly, equitable financial provision for all 
the different parties involved. Certainly, in most cases, it is foreseeable that the family 
home would have to be sold. The prospect exists that an elderly relative would be evicted 
from the home in which he or she had long lived. What could be more anti-family than to 
do that? (c.218-9)
Third, he tackled Baroness O’Cathain’s claim to be helping carers:
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Of course, as right hon. and hon. Members on both sides of the Chamber will acknowledge, 
very large numbers of carers are within the family, and yet if that is the principal motive 
force behind the amendment, how does she explain the fact that she failed to consult the 
principal representative organisation of carers, which has been championing their interests 
for 40 years, Carers UK? She did not consult the Law Society or the Solicitors Family Law 
Association either. Each and every one of those three organisations—I name only three at 
this stage—believes that there are potent objections to the amendment. (c.219)
Nicholas Winterton asked:
Does not he think that he is being unfair on my noble Friend Baroness O’Cathain, who was 
trying to put right an injustice whereby a daughter, for example, could look after her 
elderly family for many years, and when her mother and father die might have to leave the 
family home because she cannot pay the inheritance tax that would be due on the 
property, which has been her home for the whole of her life? (c.219)
John Bercow countered:
The reality is that most of us have studied the debates on the Bill, and my noble Friend 
Baroness O’Cathain set out her stall at an early stage, on Second Reading. I am willing to 
acknowledge that there will be people who voted for that amendment in good faith, who 
believe that it can be of benefit and who are not motivated by any desire to undermine the 
Bill. The trouble is that that argument does not work for my noble Friend Baroness 
O’Cathain, any more than it works in favour of my noble Friend Lord Tebbit. Both those 
individuals made it clear beyond doubt that they passionately opposed the Bill and wished 
that it had never been brought before the House in the first place. (c.219)
He added:
I reiterate what seems an important constitutional point. It was grossly irresponsible of 
Baroness O’Cathain to press the amendment—successfully, as it transpired—without 
undertaking the elementary duty of consulting the organisations whose client groups 
would be affected. Equally, it was grossly irresponsible of the other place to allow the 
amendment to pass, in the full knowledge that Baroness O’Cathain had failed so to 
consult. (c.220)
His fourth argument concerned the amendment’s financial implications:
To suggest an additional £2.25 billion-worth of expenditure, which is what the extension to 
close family relatives of civil partnership arrangements would require, seems an 
extraordinarily profligate way in which to behave. I am bound to say to my right hon. 
Friend the Member for West Dorset (Mr. Letwin)—the distinguished shadow Chancellor—
that if my party is to pursue a policy of fiscal restraint, it seems a rather curious state of 
affairs to allow the party in the other place to go ahead with a proposal of this kind. (c.220)
He clarified:
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Ultimately, the O'Cathain amendment is but a smokescreen. It is a smokescreen erected by 
its proposers in a determined but ultimately doomed attempt to conceal their deep-seated 
hostility to the very principle of gay equality. For in fact, of course, they simply cannot 
abide it. They despise it. They are frightened by it. The policy of the Bill’s most vociferous 
opponents is driven not by considerations of reason, logic or fairness, but by 
considerations of paranoia and prejudice. Such an approach should be thoroughly 
denounced and rejected. (c.220)
He was also critical of the Conservative party’s record. It was not good enough to 
“retreat under the comfort blanket of a free vote” (c.220). 
 Desmond Turner was heartened by John Bercow’s articulation of why the 
Lords’ amendments must be removed:
I had thought myself perhaps a little cynical about the motives of those who tabled those 
amendments, but the hon. Member for Buckingham has made me realise that I am 
absolutely justified in my cynicism about them. (c.221)
He went on to note the change in the Opposition Benches attitude’ before chiding 
the Conservative record on lesbian and gay reforms.
 Chris Bryant acknowledged discussion of the Lords’ amendments, but 
wanted to say more. He was bewildered by the Tory obsession with inheritance: 
I am not sure whether that is because they all form part of the 5 per cent. whose estates 
might fall liable to inheritance tax, or because they are worried about dying off, given that 
they are so elderly. Either way, the inheritance tax issue is one of the largest red herrings—
in fact, it is a red cod or a red tuna fish—in the middle of the Bill. (c.226-7)
He believed the amendments were tabled to wreck the Bill, that was not to say all 
who voted for them sought to do so: 
Lord Tebbit’s views on homosexuality are extremely well known. He aired them on the 
‘Today’ programme, when I heard one of the most bizarre things that I have heard in all my 
life: he said that one of the major causes of childhood obesity in this country was the 
Government’s promotion of buggery. That was one of the most extraordinary leaps. [...]
Baroness O’Cathain’s views on homosexuality seem similar. She has taken up the mantle 
that was cast upon her, Elijah-like, by Baroness Young in opposing [the repeal of] section 
28. So we know exactly what her aim was; she declared it very openly in moving her 
amendments. Incidentally, I thought she was wrong to press them to a vote because that 
showed that they were not about simply airing the issues, but specifically about trying to 
wreck the Bill. Let us be honest: some people think that homosexuality is wrong and a sin. 
(c.227)
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He argued Baroness O’Cathain’s amendment was bizarrely worded and outside 
the scope of the Bill. He was surprised it had been allowed to be tabled. 
 Charles Hendry made no mention of the amendments in his speech, but in 
response to his tribute to Stonewall, Gerald Howarth asked:
Is my hon. Friend aware that Stonewall brought enormous pressure to bear on British 
Airways to disown our noble Friend Baroness O'Cathain, who is a director of BA? She may 
be forced out because of the views that she honourably and honestly expressed in another 
place. Does my hon. Friend think that that was a good thing for Stonewall to have done? 
(c.232)
Charles Hendry did not think it was a bad thing:
Shareholders will decide whether our noble Friend is the right person to hold a position on 
that board. My hon. Friend says that she may be forced out. It is entirely legitimate in a 
democracy to make people aware of the views and the comments that others have 
expressed. (c.232)
He went on to challenge the idea that the Bill gave unfair advantages to lesbians 
and gay men. He saw the Bill as part of kicking negative attitudes into history.
 Gerald Howarth was next to address the amendments and used pro-CP 
MPs accounts of injustice to launch a plea for ‘other injustices’: 
I understand how they must feel, but as my noble Friend Baroness O’Cathain pointed out 
in the other place, there are other injustices as well. Her amendments were designed to 
draw to the public’s and Parliament’s attention the fact that the Bill sought to remedy one 
set of injustices without remedying another. It is no good certain of my hon. Friends and 
others who support the Bill saying, “Well, those are separate matters and we will deal with 
them later.” These people feel that their injustice should have been dealt with. They wonder 
why homosexual couples should be treated favourably in this way, when the problems that 
they face have not been resolved. (c.240)
As with other opposing speakers, he had no real-life examples of “these people”. 
Baroness O’Cathain’s amendment was to help people living co-dependently:
Setting up an alternative to marriage—or a parallel to it, as my hon. Friend the Member for 
Rutland and Melton suggests—is not the answer. (c.240)
He reminded the House of an old adage “sad cases make bad law” (c.241). This 
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provoked an [interruption], presumably for its subversion of ‘hard cases make bad 
law’ by substituting ‘sad’⎯as negatively applied to ‘homosexuals’ in past years 
(eg. HL 18.12.1986 c.312; HL 12.7.1994 c.1772). He then claimed the expression 
was familiar in legal circles but rephrased it “these are sad cases, involving 
people who are in difficulty” (c.241), which suggests deliberate subversion.
 Angela Watkinson complained the Minister had given “the impression that 
the Bill would exclusively benefit homosexual couples” (c.241). 
Unamended, the scheme will apply only to gays and lesbians, and other house sharers will 
be excluded. Would two elderly ladies living together for most of their lives have to affect to 
be homosexual in order to gain the advantages in law as described in the Bill? Would one 
of two sisters sharing a house over a long period incur inheritance tax when the other dies? 
Under the Bill, if a homosexual couple registered their partnership, even after a few 
months, one would inherit tax free if a partner died. That amounts to an injustice where 
there was none before. (c.242)
She suggested the Bill was unnecessary, whether its purpose was to overcome 
tax injustices or to create a “pseudo-marriage” (ibid). In her view the traditional 
family and procreation of children was the basis for a stable society. 
 Edward Leigh summarised for the anti-CP Conservatives (c.242) and 
argued for an addition to the existing corpus of marriage law:
We must now create another corpus of law, either with this Bill or with a Finance Bill, to 
relieve the unfair burden placed on people who have lived together a long time and who 
want to leave pension rights or property to each other, or who want to visit each other in 
hospital or enjoy all the other benefits that have been mentioned today. (c.243)
Cohabitees in non-sexual relationships were being treated unfairly. He conceded 
the Lords’ amendments were unworkable, but implied this was because the 
Government were not “serious about addressing anomalies that hit people who 
have been living together for a long time” (c.243).
  Tim Boswell summarised for modernising Conservatives. He was the only 
MP to address the lack of provision for married transsexuals in the Bill. The 
Lords’ amendments were briefly mentioned:
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What has inevitably featured extensively is the tranche of amendments moved by my noble 
Friend Baroness O’Cathain, which cause real difficulty for the Bill, so I shall have no 
problem if the Government want to remove them in Committee. The difficulty is partly 
practical. For example, what would be the situation of three sibling sisters living together? 
Could they conclude a simultaneous civil partnership with each other, or if not, which of 
them would be excluded and on what grounds? The mind boggles. (c.245)
He argued that the need to look at the position of carers should not “get in the 
way of the thrust of the Bill’s equality legislation for civil partnerships” (c.246).
 Anne McGuire, Under-Secretary of State for Scotland, after summarising 
for the Government, turned to general matters before concluding. 
As we have heard from examples cited today, the amendments made in the other place 
frankly left us in a faintly surreal situation. Although I would not impugn the reputation of 
all those who supported the amendments, the Bill was hijacked for reasons that are 
generally recognised to be outwith its scope. (c.249)
She affirmed, it was the legal invisibility of same-sex couples the Bill addressed, 
it did not undermine marriage. The people affected by the Bill were ordinary 
people going about their daily lives. It was “time to offer them dignity, justice and 
the right to be treated fairly” (c.250), she then commended the Bill to the House.
 These views of the Lords’ amendments show that the Bill’s opponents were 
intent on preventing recognition of lesbian and gay couples. They denied that 
lesbian and gay couples were disadvantaged and clearly resented them being 
treated as such. The opponents’ concern with protecting marriage and by proxy 
heterosexuality is further examined in the following sections. 
 Words and Themes
 The following analyses focus on each side’s top-ten keywords (Appendices 
83 & 84) and their collocates (Appendices 85 & 86). Core features of their 
contributions to the debate are shown on Flowcharts 11 and 12 below. 
*       *       *
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 The top pro-CP keyword AND (Appendix 84) is not on Flowchart 11. While 
26/29 terms on the chart are its collocates (Appendix 86) it is not meaningfully 
pivotal. In about 600 of the 853 concordance lines (Appendix 87) its uses are 
routine (linking clauses or adding information). Other uses are predictable:
 two-part constituency titles (34 lines)                    lists of the Bill’s provisions (11 lines)
 formal references to other MPs (21 lines)               lists of countries recognising partners (9 lines)
 references to relatives and carers (19 lines)           lists of UK countries (5 lines)
 references to lesbians and gay men/gay men and women/lesbian and gay (18 lines)
Less predictable are paired words, often with related meanings and emotive 
import, which serve to reinforce points being made, for example: 
 rights & responsibilities (19 lines)                                      each & every one (2 lines)
 family(ies) & friends/friends & family(ies) (7 lines)             for all Britain & all Britons (2 lines)
 equality & social justice/social justice & equality (5 lines)   full equality & full justice (2 lines)
 goods & services (4 lines)                                                  unfairness & unequal treatment (2 lines)
 in sickness & in health (3 lines)                                         loved & cared for (2 lines)
 acknowledged & accepted (2 lines)                                    stable & committed (2 lines)
RIGHTS and responsibilities was something of a Labour mantra; it was used only 
once by a non-Labour MP supporting the Bill. Other variously paired words are:
 discrimination(s) (8 lines)      fair (3 lines)                 unequivocal (3 lines)      hardship (2 lines)
 commitment (5 lines)            love (3 lines)                 absurd (2 lines)             opportunities (2 lines)
 support (4 lines)                   Parliament (3 lines)      difficult (2 lines)             unfair (2 lines) 
 damaging (3 lines)               respect (3 lines)            fairness (2 lines)            unworkable (2 lines)
Most pairings occur in positive presentations of the original Bill or SAME-SEX 
relationships; others occur in criticisms of the Lords’ amendments or accounts of 
the need for legal recognition of SAME-SEX COUPLES.
 On Flowchart 11, SAME-SEX, PARTNERS, RIGHTS and COUPLES are 
pivotal. While SEX is the keyword given (Appendix 84), same is its top collocate 
(Appendix 86) and hyphenated in 98/115 lines (Appendix 87). SAME-SEX is 
therefore treated as a keyword. The upper part of the chart relates to the need for 
legal recognition; the lower part to the Bill’s provisions. 
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Flowchart 11: Pro-Civil Partnership Keyword and Collocate Network
key: BOLD CAPITALS: keywords in the top ten
 BLACK CAPITALS: keywords
 RED CAPITALS: sexuality-term keywords and keywords collocating with sexuality terms
 black lower case: keyword collocates
 red lower case: sexuality terms and sexuality-term collocates
 red italics: not collocates of AND (sexuality, opposite-sex, pensions)
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 Like RIGHTS and responsibilities, SAME-SEX was more used by Labour 
speakers (74.5% of the uses from their 52.3% of the pro-CP words). This suggests 
a strategic deflection of sexuality (see also Chapter 8) and is supported by the 
greater non-Labour use of gay (67.6% of the uses from speakers 47.7% of the 
pro-CP words). The nouns to which SAME-SEX applies are predictable:
 COUPLES (65 lines)         PARTNERS (7 lines)      couple (4 lines)       relationship (1 line)
 relationships (14 lines)    partnerships (5 lines)    marriages (1 line)    and married couples (1 line)
The lines for SAME-SEX (Appendix 87) fall into five main categories of argument. 
The largest concerns the difficulties faced by SAME-SEX⎯mostly COUPLES and 
accounts for 21/98 lines, for example:
5 rsonal stories of difficulties faced by  same-sex  couples precisely because they lac       JS 12.10.pro.txt
8  I identified the specific problem for  same-sex  couples—the legal invisibility of the      JS 12.10.pro.txt
20 d solution to the disadvantages that  same-sex  couples face because they cannot g       JS 12.10.pro.txt
27 pt their booking because they are a  same-sex  couple. Most people in the House       BR 12.10.pro.txt
30 ich, after the death of a partner in a  same-sex  relationship, the surviving partner       AC 12.10.pro.txt
37     For many years,  same-sex  couples have had to live not only w      AE 12.10.pro.txt
40 ionships", which so damaged many  same-sex  couples during the era of section 2      AE 12.10.pro.txt
49 mpt to address the injustices facing  same-sex  couples in the context of changing       RK 12.10.pro.txt
51 any of the injustices faced by stable  same-sex  couples. We also believe that it sho      RK 12.10.pro.txt
62  explanation of the dilemmas facing  same-sex  couples in permanent long-term re   AMk 12.10.pro.txt
70 ment in this Session, because many  same-sex  partnerships face hardship and dis   AMk 12.10.pro.txt
86                 "Same-sex  couples . . . are . . . invisible in the      CH 12.10.pro.txt
98 ed to some of the personal stories of  same-sex  couples. We heard similar stories t    AMg 12.10.pro.txt
More specific difficulties emerged from case histories given by various speakers⎯ 
most were caused by the lack of partnership recognition. The second category 
concerns recognition and accounts for 12 lines, for example:
14  couples choose to marry. However,  same-sex  couples currently have no route of        JS 12.10.pro.txt
21 clear and unequivocal message that  same-sex  couples deserve recognition and re       JS 12.10.pro.txt
23 justified. It is designed to recognise  same-sex  relationships while applying the sa      AD 12.10.pro.txt
35 osition regarding the recognition of  same-sex  marriages constituted in Massachu      AC 12.10.pro.txt
38 ght and to grant legal recognition to  same-sex  partnerships. That gives them righ      AE 12.10.pro.txt
53 ng legal and practical recognition to  same-sex  relationships, the Bill may help to       RK 12.10.pro.txt
63 ed to provide formal recognition for  same-sex  couples and to address the disadva   AMk 12.10.pro.txt
71  tackled—by the legal recognition of  same-sex  partnerships. The Bill is not about       JB 12.10.pro.txt
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These lines support the Bill and SAME-SEX couples/relationships/partnerships. 
The third category concerns the relation of civil partnership to marriage, but the 
23 lines fall into different strands of argument. Eight lines occur in affirmations 
of the Bill’s equivalence to marriage, for example:
12 ill provide the same opportunity for  same-sex  couples to gain legal recognition of        JS 12.10.pro.txt
19 t income-related benefits rules treat  same-sex  couples in the same way as opposit      JS 12.10.pro.txt
29 ights and opportunities to people in  same-sex  relationships as are currently offer      AC 12.10.pro.txt
33 rts and all. They have sought to put  same-sex  couples in exactly the same positio      AC 12.10.pro.txt
36 tion, equality of legal recognition to  same-sex  partners, who until now have not h      AE 12.10.pro.txt
48 tem of civil registration would allow  same-sex  couples to be treated in the same       JG 12.10.pro.txt
Six lines complain the Bill’s provisions are unequal to those for marriage:
10  an inequality of treatment between  same-sex  couples and married heterosexual       AE 12.10.pro.txt
22 ged by the retrospectivity applied to  same-sex  couples. That needs to be discusse      AD 12.10.pro.txt
32  t in the new law. The Bill will allow  same-sex  partners to accrue survivor's pensi      AC 12.10.pro.txt
42 ightly identified, as drafted it treats  same-sex  couples and married heterosexual       AE 12.10.pro.txt
64 roviding retrospective provisions for  same-sex  couples. However, she missed the    AMk 12.10.pro.txt
69 ather than its simply being inferred.  Same-sex  couples who express consent want   AMk 12.10.pro.txt
Five lines occur in dissociations of civil partnership from marriage:
52 n understand why some committed  same-sex  couples yearn to call themselves m      RK 12.10.pro.txt
54 nd civil partnership or nothing for a  same-sex  couple.         RK 12.10.pro.txt
61  not apply to relationships between  same-sex  partners. I support the Governmen   AMk 12.10.pro.txt
83 n about parallel lines. I do not want  same-sex  relationships to ape marriage in an      CB 12.10.pro.txt
92 ips. I think that it is fair to say that  same-sex  couples could have a ceremony in     AMg 12.10.pro.txt
Four confirm the pension inequalities will be addressed:
94 n public service schemes, registered  same-sex  couples will be treated in the sam     AMg 12.10.pro.txt
95 quality, as they will allow registered  same-sex  partners to accrue survivor pensio    AMg 12.10.pro.txt
96 posite-sex couples are replicated for  same-sex  couples. We have made it clear tha    AMg 12.10.pro.txt
97 inance Bill to ensure that registered  same-sex  couples will be treated the same as    AMg 12.10.pro.txt
The pro-CP speakers were caught in a bind. In defending the Bill against its 
opponents, they differentiated it from marriage; in upholding it as an equality 
measure they emphasised its equivalence to marriage. Despite complaints that 
the pension provisions were not equivalent to those for marriage, upholding the 
Bill’s equivalence to marriage outnumbered the differentiations. This suggests 
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greater speaker confidence in the appeal of equality arguments. The fourth 
category concerns the Bill’s provisions and accounts for nine lines, for example:
1 creating a new legal relationship for  same-sex  couples, this Bill is a sign of the G       JS 12.10.pro.txt
4 importance of stable and committed  same-sex  relationships. It marks a major ste       JS 12.10.pro.txt
9            The Bill would allow  same-sex  couples security in life, peace of mi       JS 12.10.pro.txt
16  the rights and responsibilities that  same-sex  couples  are given support them i        JS 12.10.pro.txt
17       After going through the process,  same-sex  couples' relationships will no longe       JS 12.10.pro.txt
18 y resolve many of the problems that  same-sex  couples face, including issues of h       JS 12.10.pro.txt
50 ecular solution to the way in which  same-sex  couples are treated, but there is al      RK 12.10.pro.txt
In 13 lines, the collocates committed, stable, love (Appendix 86) and related terms 
positively present the relationships the original Bill was providing for:
3 importance of stable and committed  same-sex  relationships.          JS 12.10.pro.txt
4 importance of stable and committed  same-sex  relationships. It marks a major ste       JS 12.10.pro.txt
26 pport from people who had been in  same-sex  relationships for years. They loved       BR 12.10.pro.txt
41 bilities for people who live in caring  same-sex  relationships, is irrelevant. Clearly,      AE 12.10.pro.txt
51 any of the injustices faced by stable  same-sex  couples. We also believe that it sho      RK 12.10.pro.txt
52 n understand why some committed  same-sex  couples yearn to call themselves m      RK 12.10.pro.txt
57 d many others who are in long-term  same-sex  relationships.         DB 12.10.pro.txt
72 s original form, will be about loving,  same-sex  couples, who want to make a com      CB 12.10.pro.txt
73  rdained by God, it is impossible for  same-sex  couples to love one another. I defy       CB 12.10.pro.txt
74 ld learn much. If they still said that  same-sex  couples could not love one another      CB 12.10.pro.txt
75 ere are also people who believe that  same-sex  couples who love one another cann      CB 12.10.pro.txt
76 find difficult to accept is that loving  same-sex  couples who want to make a comm      CB 12.10.pro.txt
89 t value and humanity of committed  same-sex  relationships.       AMg 12.10.pro.txt
The lines for SAME-SEX are therefore closely allied to the original Bill’s purpose.
 The lines for COUPLES (Appendix 87A) follow a similar pattern with 
considerable overlap in outlines of the Bill’s provisions and the difficulties faced 
by SAME-SEX/gay COUPLES. The adjectives applying to COUPLES are:
 SAME-SEX (65 lines)       opposite-sex (6 lines)        homosexual (2 lines)             loving (1 line)
 gay (15 lines)                  mixed-sex (5 lines)           gay and lesbian (1 line)       “normal” (1 line)
 married (10 lines)            heterosexual (4 lines)       lesbian (1 line)
The largest category of argument, 46/131 lines, concerns the relation between 
marriage and civil partnership which further illustrates the related strands of 
argument. Sixteen lines affirm the Bill’s equivalence to marriage, for example: 
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16  as currently exists for opposite-sex  couples  through the route of marriage. That        JS 12.10.pro.txt
24 les in the same way as opposite-sex  couples.  Child support rules will assess civil        JS 12.10.pro.txt
47 . They have sought to put same-sex  couples  in exactly the same position as peopl      AC 12.10.pro.txt
59 il registration would allow same-sex  couples  to be treated in the same way as oth      JG 12.10.pro.txt
66 onship as those enjoyed by married  couples.  I am a strong supporter of tradition      RK 12.10.pro.txt
93 ief that currently applies to married  couples  transferring assets to each other, clo      JB 12.10.pro.txt
112 ame rights as heterosexual married  couples  who have made the same legally bin      CH 12.10.pro.txt
114 n 18 and 30 said yes, of course gay  couples  should have exactly the same rights       JB 12.10.pro.txt
118 t ensure through this Bill that such  couples  have the chance to have the same op      CH 12.10.pro.txt
Nine lines complain the Bill’s provisions are unequal to marriage, for example:
9 x couples and married heterosexual  couples in relation to survivor benefits under       AE 12.10.pro.txt
28  pension schemes for registered gay  couples?          RM 12.10.pro.txt
29  retrospectivity applied to same-sex  couples.  That needs to be discussed properly      AD 12.10.pro.txt
52 x couples and married heterosexual  couples  unequally in respect of survivors' pe      AE 12.10.pro.txt
86 its simply being inferred. Same-sex  couples  who express consent want to do so e   AMk 12.10.pro.txt
102 a significant issue for many lesbian  couples.  Two women living together may hav      CB 12.10.pro.txt
Five lines occur in dissociations of civil partnership from marriage:
67 should be reserved for heterosexual  couples  and that it should have a religious a      RK 12.10.pro.txt
68 and why some committed same-sex  couples  yearn to call themselves married, bu      RK 12.10.pro.txt
69 thermore, the fact that opposite-sex  couples  cannot enter into a civil partnership       RK 12.10.pro.txt
91 il registration arrangements for gay  couples  will be to undermine marriage, my r      JB 12.10.pro.txt
123 k that it is fair to say that same-sex  couples  could have a ceremony in addition to    AMg 12.10.pro.txt
Ten lines address the Bill’s exclusion of heterosexual couples, for example:
12  position of unmarried opposite-sex  couples,  many of whom are under the misap       JS 12.10.pro.txt
14  that there are aspects on which all  couples  who live together need protection, es       JS 12.10.pro.txt
33  answer is clearly no, because such  couples  have the option of marriage, in eithe      AD 12.10.pro.txt
34  to apply civil partnerships to such  couples  would undermine marriage. That is       AD 12.10.pro.txt
46 ating to civil marriage for mixed-sex  couples,  warts and all. They have sought to p      AC 12.10.pro.txt
48 king the Bill available to mixed-sex  couples,  but in practice I can see no material      AC 12.10.pro.txt
54 ute rule. My Bill sought to allow all  couples  living together to register their relati      JG 12.10.pro.txt
Six lines confirm financial inequalities will be addressed:
125 ervice schemes, registered same-sex  couples  will be treated in the same way as m    AMg 12.10.pro.txt
126  treated in the same way as married  couples.  The change will be achieved by mea    AMg 12.10.pro.txt
127  and responsibilities of opposite-sex  couples  are replicated for same-sex couples.     AMg 12.10.pro.txt
128  couples are replicated for same-sex  couples.  We have made it clear that we will u    AMg 12.10.pro.txt
129 l to ensure that registered same-sex  couples  will be treated the same as married c    AMg 12.10.pro.txt
130  will be treated the same as married  couples  for tax purposes.       AMg 12.10.pro.txt
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The Bill’s exclusion of heterosexual couples was justified on the grounds that 
they had the option of marriage, which confirms the Government’s ring-fencing 
of marriage as a heterosexual institution. 
 The lower part of Flowchart 11 relates more closely to the Bill’s provisions.
The people PARTNERS refers to differentiates it from the use of COUPLES in that 
only one line includes heterosexuals:
 civil (8 lines)                 lesbian (1  line)                                our (gay men and women 1 line)
 same-sex (7 lines)         lesbian and gay (1 line)                   they (homosexual people 1 line)
 surviving (5 lines)         their (same-sex partners 2 lines)      drawn from outwith the family (1 line)
 bereaved (2 lines)         their (gay spouses overseas 1 line)   of people who have died (1 line)
 surviving civil (2 lines)   their (people who are gay 1 line)      who have been together for a long time 
The 36 lines for PARTNERS (Appendix 87) fall into three main categories of 
argument. The first concerns unequal pension provisions and accounts for 12 
lines, for example:
9 n pension entitlement for surviving  partners.  It makes no sense to undertake an       AC 12.10.pro.txt
10 ew law. The Bill will allow same-sex  partners  to accrue survivor's pensions in pu      AC 12.10.pro.txt
11 t on pension provision for surviving  partners,  and given what we have heard this      CB 12.10.pro.txt
12 om providing pensions for surviving  partners  on the basis of parity with spouses.       CB 12.10.pro.txt
15 talking about pensions for surviving  partners.  I very much welcome the commitm      AE 12.10.pro.txt
16  that people in a similar state—civil  partners  or spouses—have access to the sam      AE 12.10.pro.txt
24  paid into the pot knowing that our  partners  will not benefit from it, yet we have       DB 12.10.pro.txt
33  next 10 days to offer surviving civil  partners  parity with widowers' pension arran      CB 12.10.pro.txt
Unlike those for married couples, bereaved civil PARTNER pensions dated from 
commencement of the Bill rather than the start of contributions. Ann McGuire’s 
announcement that bereaved-PARTNER access to public-sector pension schemes 
would be backdated to 1988 partly addressed the inequality. Seven more lines 
occur in outlines of the Bill’s provisions, for example:
2 hts and responsibilities for the civil  partners  involved. The provisions will ensure       JS 12.10.pro.txt
3 nd obligations to each other as civil  partners  will be significant. They will have re       JS 12.10.pro.txt
4 Child support rules will assess civil  partners  in the same way as married people,        JS 12.10.pro.txt
5 me way as married people, and civil  partners  will be entitled to most state pensio       JS 12.10.pro.txt
6 ed people are made available to civil  partners  from the date of the Bill's commenc       JS 12.10.pro.txt
7 d to put in place to ensure that civil  partners  have the opportunity to have that ci       JS 12.10.pro.txt
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Five lines concern the difficulties PARTNERS faced:
1 uded terminally ill people and their  partners  who had to face not just the heartbr       JS 12.10.pro.txt
23 re are well-documented cases of the  partners  of people who have died or become i      DB 12.10.pro.txt
29 mbers have referred to the fact that  partners  who have been together for many ye      CB 12.10.pro.txt
30 lationship. Sometimes the bereaved  partners  had to have separate ceremonies be      CB 12.10.pro.txt
31 ers have mentioned, many bereaved  partners  are made homeless. They may be u      CB 12.10.pro.txt
Given that lesbian and gay PARTNERS were the intended beneficiaries of the Bill, 
anti-CP speakers virtual non-use of PARTNERS is significant. It was outside their 
repertoire (Voloshinov 1986: 20), replete with pro-CP contexts and therefore 
“overpopulated with the intentions of others” (Bakhtin 1981: 293-4). This non-
appropriation compounds anti-CP opposition to the recognition of lesbian and 
gay relationships. The only anti-CP use of ‘partners’ was in a quote where it 
refers to unmarried heterosexual partners (c.212). 
 A wide range of adjectives, possessives and determiners apply to RIGHTS:
 legal (8 lines)                   property (4 lines)                   child’s (1 line)              some (1 line)
 human (6 lines)               their (LG couples’ 2 lines)       employment (1 line)     special (1 line)
 same (6 lines)                  their (heterosexuals’ 1 line)    equal (1 line)               succession (1 line)
 those (CP, 5 lines)           additional (1 line)                    extra (1 line)                survivor’s (1 line)
 those (married, 1 line)     adoption (1 line)                     extra set of (1 line)       retrospective (1 line)
 pension (4 lines)              basic (1 line)                          next-of-kin (1 line)        welter of (1 line)
 prior (4 lines)                   certain (1 line)                        package of (1 line) 
The 88 lines (Appendix 87) fall into six main categories of argument. The largest 
presents the Bill’s provisions and accounts for 15 lines, for example:
1 er into a legal relationship in which  rights  are balanced with responsibilities and       JS 12.10.pro.txt
11 will flow from that relationship. The  rights  and responsibilities are serious, so ent       JS 12.10.pro.txt
12 n. That process would involve both  rights  and responsibilities for the civil partne       JS 12.10.pro.txt
13 annot be exited lightly and that the  rights  and responsibilities that same-sex cou       JS 12.10.pro.txt
28 ssage of the Bill; next of kin rights;  rights  to death registration; intestacy recogni      AE 12.10.pro.txt
36  Bill as a major step forward for the  rights  and responsibilities of an important se      JG 12.10.pro.txt
62 he status of civil partner a welter of  rights  and responsibilities that will be influe      JB 12.10.pro.txt
64 nother and who accept not only the  rights  that civil partnership will give them, b      CB 12.10.pro.txt
78 ngly that the Bill is about conveying  rights  and although there may be certain pri      TB 12.10.pro.txt
Six lines occur in affirmations of the Bill’s equivalence to marriage, for example:
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2 il partnership will receive the same  rights  and take on the same responsibilities        JS 12.10.pro.txt
3 ror in many ways the requirements,  rights  and responsibilities that run alongside       JS 12.10.pro.txt
22 as an opportunity to offer the same  rights  and opportunities to people in same-s      AC 12.10.pro.txt
31 nises—rightly, in my view—the legal  rights  and responsibilities for people who live      AE 12.10.pro.txt
76 to have the same opportunities and  rights.  We are dealing with an outdated restr      CH 12.10.pro.txt
88 , which will be amended so that the  rights  and responsibilities of opposite-sex co    AMg 12.10.pro.txt
The predominance of RIGHTS and responsibilities in the Labour lines presents 
Bill as a circumspect measure and emphasises civil-partner obligation. As with 
SAME-SEX, this suggests strategic Government caution. Conversely, the stress 
on equality counters opposing claims that the Bill awarded special privileges to a 
selected few. Eight lines specifically address these claims:
18 argued, about giving an extra set of  rights  to gay couples and thereby discrimina      AD 12.10.pro.txt
50 , rather than simply give additional  rights.  It recognises that our society, on the   AMk 12.10.pro.txt
61 uality; it is not about giving special  rights,  but it is about affording equal treatm      JB 12.10.pro.txt
65 e that point. I do not see how giving  rights  to one set of people would undermine       CB 12.10.pro.txt
66  set of people would undermine the  rights  of others. Indeed, I have always believe     CB 12.10.pro.txt
71  some have suggested, to give extra  rights  to same-sex couples; it is simply to giv      CH 12.10.pro.txt
72 s; it is simply to give them the same  rights  as heterosexual married couples who      CH 12.10.pro.txt
87 , just because we want to give legal  rights  to people in that position, that does no    AMg 12.10.pro.txt
In addition to affirmations of the Bill’s equivalence to marriage, nine more lines 
occur in more general arguments for partnership equality, for example:
15 ted gay couple are denied the basic  rights  that a married heterosexual couple wo      AD 12.10.pro.txt
20 ter their relationship and enjoy the  rights  that many of us take for granted.       BR 12.10.pro.txt
69  arried, I became eligible for certain  rights  and entitlements and, to go with that,      CH 12.10.pro.txt
70 mply cannot understand why those  rights  that I as a married man take entirely f      CH 12.10.pro.txt
73 uples should have exactly the same  rights  as heterosexual couples?        JB 12.10.pro.txt
80 t if their objective is to secure those  rights  through a parallel process, they shoul      TB 12.10.pro.txt
82 e financial implementation of those  rights.  It would be helpful if the Minister cou      TB 12.10.pro.txt
A further nine lines argue specifically for equal pension provision, for example:
14 aying categorically today that equal  rights  will be retrospectively applied for publi      AD 12.10.pro.txt
16 , practical matters such as pension  rights  and financial issues are on one side, b      AD 12.10.pro.txt
23 ion schemes to obtain retrospective  rights  back to 1976, if they had paid the app      AC 12.10.pro.txt
25 e the acquisition of inferior pension  rights  for a surviving spouse in certain circu      AC 12.10.pro.txt
46 d me a discount, because survivor's  rights  are not applicable to me. It is a matter      DB 12.10.pro.txt
52 s, to allow these important pension  rights  to be backdated. I urge the Governme   AMk 12.10.pro.txt
68 e. Similarly, survivors have had no  rights  to a partner's pension. That has been      CB 12.10.pro.txt
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Eight lines take issue with the Lords amendments, for example:
4 unable to declare under the Human  Rights  Act 1998 that the Bill is compatible wi      JS 12.10.pro.txt
5 he European convention on human  rights.            JS 12.10.pro.txt
6 he European convention on human  rights.  As I understand it—perhaps she will      RM 12.10.pro.txt
7 he European convention on human  rights,  as it is discrimination on the basis of      RM 12.10.pro.txt
30 ilities to inheritance tax or property  rights  somehow ought to be minimised throu      AE 12.10.pro.txt
34 t of the Joint Committee on Human  Rights,  which I recommend that everyone rea      AE 12.10.pro.txt
Support for civil partnership as an equality measure pervades the lines for these 
pivotal pro-CP keywords and confirms support for the original Bill. 
*       *       *
 On Flowchart 12, the top anti-CP keyword (Appendix 83) MARRIAGE is 
pivotal. That it is qualified by an adjective in only 34/82 lines (Appendix 88), 
suggests its heterosexual status was largely assumed:
 gay (10 lines)                          civil (3 lines)            one and only (1 line)            proper (1 line)
 OUTSIDE (8 lines)                    legal (1 line)            ordinary (1 line)                   pseudo- (1 line)
 HOMOSEXUAL (6 lines)           new (1 line)             present (1 line)
Notably, heterosexual and MARRIAGE do not collocate (Appendices 85 & 91). 
The lines for MARRIAGE fall into five main categories of argument. The largest 
(38 lines) is that the Bill was about gay/HOMOSEXUAL MARRIAGE, for example:
1 n future in exactly the same way as  marriage  in law?       AWi 12.10.anti.txt
2 d announced that they support gay  marriage.  Why will they not do so?       EL 12.10.anti.txt
3 e Bill is actually about homosexual  marriage?       AWi 12.10.anti.txt
4 ister office, has all the attributes of  marriage  and can be terminated only by a for     EL 12.10.anti.txt
10 g that the Bill is about homosexual  marriage.  It is about one person in a civil par   AWi 12.10.anti.txt
18 utomatically confers all the rights of  marriage.  If there are problems, such as bein   AWi 12.10.anti.txt
19  register that exactly resembles the  marriage  register and by making the divorce    AWi 12.10.anti.txt
20 the same as those that apply to civil  marriage.  As a result, the proposals would ex   AWi 12.10.anti.txt
37 hed is that the Bill is a homosexual  marriage  Bill in all but name. As a result, it      CC 12.10.anti.txt
40 Bill does all but equate the terms of  marriage  breakdown with civil partnership b     CC 12.10.anti.txt
42 is that the Bill is about homosexual  marriage.         CC 12.10.anti.txt
51  Such people regard this Bill as gay  marriage  in all but name, and they simply th     GH 12.10.anti.txt
55 edibility of the Iraq dossier. It is gay  marriage  in all but name. Ministers cited the     GH 12.10.anti.txt
61 hrase. But in truth, it will be a legal  marriage  in all but name."       GH 12.10.anti.txt
63 onfetti to illustrate the similarity to  marriage.         GH 12.10.anti.txt
67 dren. The Bill rests on the view that  marriage  and same-sex partnerships are equ   AWa 12.10.anti.txt
80 g what is contained in our ordinary  marriage  laws—we are not creating a form of     EL 12.10.anti.txt
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That gay and the clinical HOMOSEXUAL were preferred to ‘same-sex’ in these 
lines, re-sexualises civil partnership and suggests an underlying anti-CP focus 
on sexual acts which are obligatory in heterosexual MARRIAGE. As Baker found 
(2004b: 92-3) in Lords debates, anti-reform speakers associated HOMOSEXUAL 
with sexual acts. In addition, the transposition of gay into this negative context 
constitutes a subversion of its positive identity⎯a demotion “to a lower rank” 
(Voloshinov 1986: 105). A further 22 lines occur in arguments defending 
(heterosexual) MARRIAGE, for example:
11 e will undermine the uniqueness of  marriage,  which is why I will oppose it at eve   AWi 12.10.anti.txt
12  society, to defend the institution of  marriage,  to defend traditional values, and to   AWi 12.10.anti.txt
21 erty that has always been unique to  marriage.       AWi 12.10.anti.txt
22 ich will be translated into law, that  marriage  is no longer unique. I want to keep    AWi 12.10.anti.txt
23              If we want to keep  marriage  unique we should vote against this   AWi 12.10.anti.txt
25 ss injustices, but not through aping  marriage.       AWi 12.10.anti.txt
38 further undermine the institution of  marriage—the holiest state of matrimony. At t     CC 12.10.anti.txt
43 down leading to divorce in a proper  marriage  is sexual infidelity on the part of th     CC 12.10.anti.txt
47 t does not uphold the institution of  marriage  strikes at its own heart. The home i       IP 12.10.anti.txt
53   The issue is the nature of  marriage,  no matter what the Deputy Ministe    GH 12.10.anti.txt
65 o all we can to support and sustain  marriage.  I am opposed to the Bill because it     GH 12.10.anti.txt
66  partnerships by creating a pseudo- marriage,  that amounts to an entirely differe   AWa 12.10.anti.txt
71 every register office, it is stated that  marriage  is about a permanent union betwee     EL 12.10.anti.txt
Unique and uniqueness can here be read as metaphors for heterosexual(ity), 
while aping MARRIAGE, proper MARRIAGE and pseudo-MARRIAGE more clearly 
exclude same-sex partners from its definition. Eight lines support the Lords’ 
amendments by claiming the Bill discriminated against cohabitees in non-sexual 
relationships OUTSIDE MARRIAGE:
17  responsibilities place them outside  marriage  will also face similar unkindnesses    AWi 12.10.anti.txt
26 ople who are in partnership outside  marriage.  If it were designed merely to enabl     CC 12.10.anti.txt
27 tled long-term relationships outside  marriage  is apparent from the estimate of th     CC 12.10.anti.txt
28 re engaged in relationships outside  marriage.  He continues: "This is what we sha     CC 12.10.anti.txt
29 s in long-term relationships outside  marriage.         CC 12.10.anti.txt
30 ifferent types of relationship outside  marriage.  We should deal with all such relati     CC 12.10.anti.txt
36 rticular type of relationship outside  marriage  on a pedestal, in preference to all o     CC 12.10.anti.txt
39 ives with relatives or friends outside  marriage,  because their relationships will be      CC 12.10.anti.txt
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That non-sexual relationships were considered more worthy is evident in the 
claim (line 36) that same-sex partnerships were being put on a pedestal. Five 
lines occur in Christopher Chope’s argument that the Bill discriminated against 
heterosexual couples who could not or would not marry: 
31 e historical implications of the word  'marriage'  and the historical nature of the in     CC 12.10.anti.txt
32 who do not wish to enter into a new  marriage  because they feel that they have ha     CC 12.10.anti.txt
33 at they have had their one and only  marriage,  but that does not stop them enteri     CC 12.10.anti.txt
34  So, too, are the many people whose  marriage  has collapsed but who, because on     CC 12.10.anti.txt
35 d but who, because one party to the  marriage  objects, have to serve out their five      CC 12.10.anti.txt
He summarised:
Why are the Government putting one particular type of relationship outside marriage on a 
pedestal, in preference to all others? The unavoidable conclusion that I have reached is 
that the Bill is a homosexual marriage Bill in all but name. As a result, it will be a double 
whammy. It will further undermine the institution of marriage—the holiest state of 
matrimony. At the same time, it will be an affront to Christians and other faith 
communities. It will also be an insult to all those who happily share their lives with 
relatives or friends outside marriage, because their relationships will be given institutional 
inferiority to homosexual ones. (c.213)
Edward Leigh too cast lesbian and gay partners as inferior in his argument for 
MARRIAGE laws to discriminate in favour of (heterosexual) MARRIAGE: 
68           Our present  marriage  laws discriminate against many peo    EL 12.10.anti.txt
69 as that it discriminates in favour of  marriage.  It is neutral about other relationsh     EL 12.10.anti.txt
70 hips, but discriminates in favour of  marriage  because that is what has happened     EL 12.10.anti.txt
74 we should discriminate in favour of  marriage.  We do not want to discriminate ag     EL 12.10.anti.txt
75  favour of the building block that is  marriage.         EL 12.10.anti.txt
76 about this Bill. We need a corpus of  marriage  law, and we have one. I have perso     EL 12.10.anti.txt
77 ve one. I have personal views about  marriage.  For many years, I have said that w     EL 12.10.anti.txt
All five lines for DISCRIMINATES (Appendix 88) occur in this same argument. 
Ultimately, it was the recognition of lesbian and gay partners in the name of 
equality that anti-CP speakers objected to, in which the protection of MARRIAGE 
and by proxy heterosexuality avowed HOMOSEXUAL inferiority. That anti-CP 
speakers were protecting heterosexual superiority is evident in successive 
quotes, for example:
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The Minister has several times used the word “equality”. Will she be very specific? Is the 
equality that she seeks that whereby a homosexual relationship based on commitment is 
treated in future in exactly the same way as marriage in law? 
(Anne Widdicombe c.176-7)
... some of us have a deep-seated and genuine fear that setting up [...] “a parallel 
institution” will send out the message to the people of this country that there are two 
equally valid lifestyles and that one can be in a homosexual relationship or a heterosexual
—many of us would describe it as normal—relationship? That message will encourage the 
proliferation of homosexuality. 
(Gerald Howarth c.217)
The Bill permits children, whom virtually all the authorities concede should be brought up 
in a natural household of a man and woman, to be brought up in another form of 
household. 
(Gerald Howarth c.241)
The traditional family provides the basis for a stable society and the procreation of 
children. 
(Angela Watkinson c.242)
On the walls of every register office, it is stated that marriage is about a permanent union 
between a man and wife, to the exclusion of everyone else. 
(Edward Leigh c.242)
It will come and the next step will be for the gay community to insist—rightly, in their view
—that gay marriage be recognised, that it should be an offence to attack homosexuality 
and that it should be taught in schools on equal terms. That is the agenda. Let us not be 
mealy-mouthed about it. 
(Edward Leigh cc.243-4)
Thus heterosexuality’s believed superiority constituted an “assumed community 
of values” within the speakers’ social group (Voloshinov 2012: 169). 
 While the protection of (heterosexual) MARRIAGE constitutes the mainstay 
of anti-CP arguments, the lines for DO (Appendix 88) expose the weakness of the 
speakers’ stance. Of the 49 lines, 25 occur in negative statements. In 18 of these, 
do not is auxilliary to a stative verb or verb with stative meaning: 
 BELIEVE (3 lines)         have (2 lines)          intend (1 line)              take seriously (1 line)
 accept (2 lines)             want (2 lines)          recognise (1 line)         think (1 line)
 agree (2 lines)              impute (1 line)         share (1 line)               wish (1 line)
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Twelve of these negative states are in the first person singular: 
5               I  do  not think so.       AWi 12.10.anti.txt
12  context to rectify those problems. I  do  not impute wrecking motives to those who   AWi 12.10.anti.txt
14         No, I  do  not accept that. I am usually in agreemen   AWi 12.10.anti.txt
16 st this Bill. That is not to say that I  do  not recognise that the law contains certai   AWi 12.10.anti.txt
17             I therefore  do  not take seriously the Government's sugg     CC 12.10.anti.txt
24  very well-argued case, with which I  do  not entirely agree but which I respect enti    NW 12.10.anti.txt
28  is has been an interesting debate. I  do  not intend to disappoint my hon. Friends      GH 12.10.anti.txt
31 w that he is a very generous man. I  do  not accept his point, and he is unfair in a     GH 12.10.anti.txt
32 erwhelming view in this Chamber, I  do  not believe the view outside to be the sam     GH 12.10.anti.txt
38  s that ought to be addressed. But I  do  not believe that this Bill is the means by      GH 12.10.anti.txt
41 encourage children to believe that. I  do  not share that view; it is not the right thin     GH 12.10.anti.txt
43 ps are equivalent or the same, but I  do  not believe that they are.    AWa 12.10.anti.txt
These personalisations occur in disagreement with either pro-CP speakers or the 
Bill’s provisions and convey a sense of embattlement⎯as if anti-CP speakers 
could defend their position only by negation; they had no credible argument and 
were outnumbered. In four lines where negative states are attributed to others, 
the agents are generalised categories: 
6  llow that heterosexual couples who  do  not want to marry might feel that the ter     PG 12.10.anti.txt
21 le who have been widowed and who  do  not wish to enter into a new marriage bec     CC 12.10.anti.txt
22 of people who live together but who  do  not effectively have the choice to get marri     CC 12.10.anti.txt
33 e, and there are people outside who  do  not agree with civil partnerships. Further     GH 12.10.anti.txt
Not a single real-life example of someone holding such views was given. Similarly, 
two more lines use a generalised anti-CP we: 
A country that does not uphold the institution of marriage strikes at its own heart. The 
home is the building block of society. If we do not have good, moral and righteous homes, 
the nation will suffer. 
(Ian Paisley c.223)
We do not want to discriminate against anyone else—not sisters, brothers, uncles, 
nephews, stepsons or grandfathers, grandsons or gay people. 
(Edward Leigh c.242-3)
While Ian Paisley implies non-heterosexual homes are immoral and damaging, 
Edward Leigh’s want relegates his claim to intent and his anyone else admits 
existing discrimination⎯with or gay people tagged on the end. In 14 more lines 
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DO is in the infinitive which introduces a sense of potential action:
15 uch relationships should be able to  do  so because, after all, Almighty God gave u   AWi 12.10.anti.txt
23 e business of encouraging people to  do  this or that. If I were to encourage people      CC 12.10.anti.txt
26  iatrists and doctors were unable to  do  anything to help her. My colleague spent      MS 12.10.anti.txt
29 to anybody, but they are nothing to  do  with the Bill. The fact that action has not      GH 12.10.anti.txt
30 ttable, and those who have failed to  do  so should be upbraided.       GH 12.10.anti.txt
35  t civil partnerships have nothing to  do  with marriage. I submit that that assertio     GH 12.10.anti.txt
36 ust pretend that this has nothing to  do  with marriage in order to perpetrate a dec     GH 12.10.anti.txt
39  t this Bill is the means by which to  do  so. Setting up an alternative to marriage     GH 12.10.anti.txt
40 f family life. We desperately need to  do  all we can to support and sustain marriag     GH 12.10.anti.txt
42 that view; it is not the right thing to  do.          GH 12.10.anti.txt
44 hews and many others who want to  do  the same. Yet it is not so much that the p     EL 12.10.anti.txt
46 one possibility—it would allow us to  do  what the Government want to do with thi     EL 12.10.anti.txt
47 to do what the Government want to  do  with this Bill.         EL 12.10.anti.txt
49 t the Government seem to want it to  do.  We must be honest about these matters.      EL 12.10.anti.txt
Potential, negated and futile action are evident in verbs preceding the infinitive: 
able/unable/failed/need/want/allow. Five of these lines occur in misleading 
statements. Gerald Howarth indirectly accused the Government of deceit:
She has repeated the Government line, which is shared by my hon. Friends, that civil 
partnerships have nothing to do with marriage. I submit that that assertion has all the 
credibility of the Iraq dossier. It is gay marriage in all but name. (c.239)
Here in the Chamber, we must pretend that this has nothing to do with marriage in order 
to perpetrate a deceit on the public, but in fact, not everyone in the Labour party is on 
message. I gather that in March, the Labour website ran a picture of the Bill covered in 
confetti to illustrate the similarity to marriage. (c.239)
In fact the Government was clear that the Bill’s provisions were based on those 
for civil marriage. Edward Leigh misconstrued the Government’s intention: 
Whatever such a Bill might be called—the Sharing of Long-Term Domicile Bill is one 
possibility—it would allow us to do what the Government want to do with this Bill. (c.243)
We are not homophobes or anything like that, but we are saying that this Bill does not do 
what the Government seem to want it to do. We must be honest about these matters.
(c.243)
His repeated use of honest⎯four in this argument, betrays its distorted basis; it 
also reinforces his contention that the Government were being dishonest. His 
denial of homophobia in the latter quote was one of five such denials:
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I have no time for homophobia, which is prevalent in all societies, but I am not convinced 
that the Bill will actually advance our response to young folk who hold such attitudes. 
(Martin Smythe c.236)
These are decent people that I am talking about. They are not homophobes, bigots or any 
of the other epithets so readily thrown about. They are tolerant and generally neither 
inquire nor want to be told what other people do in the privacy of their own home. 
(Gerald Howarth c.238)
There is no room for middle ground in that statement: one either regards same-sex 
relationships as acceptable or one is homophobic. 
(Gerald Howarth c.239)
We are accused of many things—of being homophobes and the rest of it—but I believe that 
we have a point of view that we are perfectly entitled to express. 
(Edward Leigh c.242)
These denials further illustrate speakers’ embattled position. In eight more lines, 
DO is preceded by a modal or semi-modal verb which adds to the provisionality: 
4 ort gay marriage. Why will they not  do  so?          EL 12.10.anti.txt
8 as to answer—I am sure that he will  do  so elegantly, if not persuasively—is, is he      GH 12.10.anti.txt
15 uch relationships should be able to  do  so because, after all, Almighty God gave u   AWi 12.10.anti.txt
18 hat the Government would actually  do.              CC 12.10.anti.txt
19  e continues: "This is what we shall  do  our best to achieve in the House of Comm     CC 12.10.anti.txt
20 uples who choose not to marry may  do  so for very personal reasons of conscience     CC 12.10.anti.txt
27  If we deal with equality, we should  do  so across the board.         MS 12.10.anti.txt
40 f family life. We desperately need to  do  all we can to support and sustain marriag     GH 12.10.anti.txt
Negativity and defensiveness pervade the lines for DO while their often personal 
and provisional nature suggest anti-CP resignation to defeat. 
*       *       *
 Overall, the pro-CP keywords exude support for SAME-SEX PARTNER 
recognition comparable to, if distinct from, heterosexual marriage. By contrast 
the anti-CP keywords converge on arguments against the specific recognition of 
non-heterosexual partners in which the protection of heterosexual MARRIAGE is 
a euphemistic front for the preservation of heterosexual superiority. Ironically, 
the defensive anti-CP reciprocal collocation of MARRIAGE with HOMOSEXUAL 
and gay (Appendices 85 & 91) was fortuitous. As Morrish notes: 
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It is significant, perhaps, that ‘gay’ has now been awarded the status of collocate with 
‘marriage’ to the extent that the latter term now requires the parallel modifier 
‘heterosexual’. Surely, this must qualify as a successful intervention into a discourse that 
has historically been uniquely the provenance of heterosexuals? 
(Morrish 2010: 332)
This implicates the anti-CP defence of heterosexual privilege in its erosion.
 Views of Sexuality
 As in all previously analysed debates, supportive speakers used a wider 
range of sexuality terms. Pro-CP speakers used 24/26 terms of which SAME-SEX 
is a keyword. Anti-CP speakers used 16/26 terms of which HOMOSEXUAL and 
HOMOPHOBES are keywords. Adjectives were most frequently used overall: 

















 sex (in reference to gender)






The adjectives offer the most comprehensive insight into each side’s views and 
are therefore the main focus of analysis. The terms are analysed via their 
collocates (Appendices 89 & 91) and concordance lines (Appendices 90 & 92) in 
each lexical category in turn.
*       *       *
 The most used term was SAME-SEX, proportionately more so by pro-CP 





 Pro-Civil Partnership Uses
 Pro-CP %
 Debate Words





 29/98 (29.6% uses)
78.5%
 9/107 (8.4% total)
 4/9 (44.4% uses)
21.5%
 of the same sex 1 78.5%
 1/1 (100% total)
21.5%
 mixed-sex 7
 7/7 (100% total)
 3/7 (42.9% uses)
78.5% 21.5%
 of mixed sex 1
 1/1 (100% total)
 1/1 (100% uses)
78.5% 21.5%
 opposite-sex 8
 6/8 (75% total)
 1/6 (16.7% uses)
78.5%
 2/8 (25% total)
 1/2 (50% uses)
21.5%
 of the opposite sex 1
 1/1 (100% total)
78.5% 21.5%
 gay 87
 68/87 (78.2% total)
 31/68 (45.6% uses)
78.5%
 19/87 (21.8% total)
 3/19 (15.8% uses)
21.5%
 lesbian 23
 21/23 (91.3% total)
 9/21 (42.9% uses)
78.5%
 2/23 (8.7% total)
  1/2 (50% uses)
21.5%
 bisexual 2
 2/2 (100% total)
78.5% 21.5%
 straight 1
 1/1 (100% total)
78.5% 21.5%
 heterosexual 24
 18/24 (75% total)
 3/18 (16.7% uses)
78.5%
 6/24 (25% total)
 3/6 (50% uses)
21.5%
 homosexual 41
 9/41 (22% total)
 4/9 (44.4% uses)
78.5%
 32/41 (78% total)





 6/9 (66.7% total)
 4/6 (66.7% uses)
78.5%
 3/9 (33.3% total)
21.5%
 homophobic 8
 7/8 (87.5% total)
 6/7 (85.7% uses)
78.5%
 1/8 (12.5% total)
21.5%
Key: grey text shows the number and % of uses occurring in reports
 red text: shows the proportionately higher frequency of use
 bold red text: keywords
The pro-CP lines for SAME-SEX and the other gender-focused terms (Appendix 
90) show the nouns they apply to are comparable in that all apply to nouns for or 
related to various kinds of partnerships: 
 SAME-SEX
 COUPLES (65 lines)              partnerships (5 lines)           marriages (1 line)
 relationships (14 lines)         couple (4 lines)                     relationship (1 line)
 PARTNERS (7 lines)             and married couples (1 line)
 mixed-sex  couples (5 lines)        couple (2 lines)
 of mixed sex  civil marriages (1 line)
 opposite-sex  couples (6 lines)
 of the opposite sex  relationships between people (1 line)
COUPLES is the top collocate of SAME-SEX/mixed-sex/opposite-sex (Appendix 
89), but mixed-sex/opposite-sex do not apply to PARTNERS. This concurs with 
the non-application of heterosexual to PARTNERS found in the previous section. 
Although mixed-sex and opposite-sex apply to few nouns, they occur in a similar 
range of arguments to those identified for SAME-SEX in the previous section:
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 mixed-sex
 the relation of civil partnership to marriage (3 lines)
 the exclusion of heterosexual couples from civil partnership (3 lines)
 the Lords amendments (1 line)
 of mixed sex  the relation between civil partnership and marriage (1 line)
 opposite-sex
 the relation of civil partnership to marriage (5 lines)
 unmarried couples lack of rights (1 line)
 of the opposite sex  the Bill’s symbolic value in challenging prejudice (1 line)
The last of these was one of eight statements upholding the Bill’s symbolic value 
(see also Appendix 90A):
The Bill will reduce prejudice against such relationships and reduce homophobic violence. 
It will also reduce homophobia because it challenges the view that the social benefits of 
marriage, which I think are stability, faithfulness, the nurturing of children, mutual 
support and so on, can apply only to relationships between people of the opposite sex. That 
is important. 
(Robert Key c.207)
The lines for mixed-sex/opposite-sex, like those for SAME-SEX, occur in relatively 
straightforward statements of support for the Bill.
 The pro-CP lines for gay (Appendix 90) show it applies to a wider range of 
nouns than the gender-alligned terms:
 couples (16 lines)                    equality (2 lines)                               individuals and couples (1 line)
 people (16 lines)                      relationships (2 lines)                       Lawyers Association (1 line)
 men (3 lines)                           adoption (1 line)                               love (1 line)        
 vote (3 lines)                           agenda (1 line)                                 marriage (1 line)
 men and women (3 lines)        Christians and ministers (1 line)        partners (1 line)
 community (2 lines)                 club (1 line)                                      policeman (1 line)
 couple (2 lines)                        Conservative Member (1 line)
Gay also occurs in a wider range of arguments. Only 26/68 lines occur in 
arguments prominent in the lines for SAME-SEX:
 that (lesbian and) gay people/couples face difficulties and discrimination (13 lines)
 that the Bill provides for/offers redress against such injustice (6 lines)
 that gay couples/people live in committed/loving/meaningful/faithful relationships (5 lines)
 that the Bill’s pension provisions should be equalised with those for marriage (2 lines)
Seven lines focus on changing attitudes: 
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One of the facts about people’s attitudes to gay people in the modern world is that 
essentially they are relaxed—utterly unexercised—about the phenomenon until the time 
when which they detect intolerance, at which point they become deeply and profoundly 
indignant. 
(Alan Duncan cc.182-3)
Gay couples live together in committed relationships across the land and are accepted as 
couples by their friends and families. 
(Alan Duncan c.184)
As an aside, I may say how pleased I am to see gay and lesbian people as part of the 
mainstream of our society and no longer having to skulk, as they did 30 or 40 years ago, in 
little establishments that the rest of us were not even supposed to think about. 
(Jane Griffiths c.204)
It is good that the Bill proposes justice for gay and lesbian people. Is it not interesting, 
Madam Deputy Speaker, that 10 or 15 years ago those words would not have passed my 
lips? If we are honest, it is a measure of our own prejudice that I would not have spoken 
the words “gay” or “lesbian” then—certainly not in public. 
(Robert Key c.206)
I have had the privilege of being a Member of the House for the past seven years, during 
which there has been a sea change in public attitudes to, and legislation affecting, gay 
people. 
(David Borrow c.209)
... that trend was expressed in the recent Populace survey published in The Times, which 
showed, in contrast to some of the antediluvian attitudes that still prevail in this Chamber, 
that 75 per cent. of respondents aged between 18 and 30 said yes, of course gay couples 
should have exactly the same rights as heterosexual couples? 
(John Bercow c.231)
Five lines occur in arguments supporting families and parenting:
Measures such as those before us today are a way of protecting the family in changed 
times, not of damaging it. As I have said, gay couples are a fact of life. Rather than ignoring 
their existence, perhaps the House can now take a positive stance on their position in 
society. I am sure that the issue of child care, which often causes strong feelings, will arise 
during the debate. [...] children are now raised in many different circumstances. What is 
most important is that love is given to the child and that there is stability in his or her 
home life. We had these debates at length two years ago during the passage of the Adoption 
and Children Act 2002, which legalised joint adoption by gay couples. [...] In many ways, 
that was a far more emotive issue than the one that we are discussing today. Having 
passed such measures into law, it makes even more sense now to approve civil 
partnerships. If we are concerned that children should be brought up by a stable, loving 
couple, these measures, when seen in conjunction with gay adoption, make a positive 
contribution to the family, rather than detract from it. 
(Alan Duncan cc.187-8)
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I have found it quite a struggle intellectually and emotionally to come to the view, for 
example, that same-sex couples can become parents. Opinion remains very divided within 
the gay community, let alone within the heterosexual community, about the merits or 
otherwise of in vitro fertilisation or embryo manipulation among lesbian partners, but it 
takes place. As more lesbian and gay people become parents, there is now a growing body 
of research from the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada and the United States that finds 
no measurable difference between the children of lesbian mothers in terms of gender 
identity, social or emotional disturbance, quality of friendships, social acceptance or sexual 
orientation. Those are the facts. I have faced them and I have talked to some same-sex 
couples in my constituency. I have concluded that I was as prejudiced about this as most 
people are, not because I was wicked or perverse or stupid but because that is the received 
wisdom of the society in which I was born and educated. 
(Robert Key c.207)
While Alan Duncan had had reservations about gay couples adopting (he had 
abstained) and Robert Key overlooked informal sperm donation arrangements, 
these statements from Conservative speakers support lesbian and gay parenting. 
Robert Key’s account also offered anti-CP MPs an example of changed thinking. 
Seven lines address the Conservative’s anti-gay image:
I may be the first openly gay Conservative Member, but history will show that gay men and 
women have played leading roles in our party for many years, and I am pleased to say that 
many are among our candidates in winnable seats at the next election. So I do not accept 
that the Bill is in some way incompatible with conservatism. 
(Alan Duncan c.188)
We on the Conservative Benches still have a great deal to prove. No member of the current 
shadow Cabinet voted on 10 February 2000 for equalisation of the age of consent. Only one 
member of the current shadow Cabinet—[Tim Yeo]—voted in March last year for the repeal 
of section 28. This is the third big policy challenge in the field of gay equality and we must 
not duck it. We must meet it, rise to it and do the decent thing, which happens also in the 
end to be the politically advantageous thing. We must support the Bill in its pure form. 
(John Bercow c.220)
I do not believe that there is such a thing as a gay vote. I think that parties can drive away 
the gay vote just as they can drive away the women’s vote, the elderly vote or the black vote
—my party has tried to do it quite effectively over the years—but there is no single issue 
that it can be said will win over the gay vote. However, addressing issues such as those in 
the Bill will ensure that those who are gay, lesbian or bisexual can look at issues in the 
round and vote for the party that they believe in because it is advocating the right policies 
on health, education and the economy, rather than make their choice because they think 
that sexuality continues to divide the parties. 
(Charles Hendry c.234)
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These lines highlight Conservative modernisers’ concern about their electability 
which indicates wider social change. Pro-CP Conservatives also spoke 9/11 lines 
against anti-CP claims and 5/6 lines in arguments against anti-gay prejudice in 
general. Of the latter, Alan Duncan and Tim Boswell were most explicit:
As a Conservative, I believe in encouraging committed long-term relationships that 
strengthen society. That is one of the best reasons that I can give for supporting the Bill. 
For too long there has been perpetuated a negative stereotype of gay love as less 
committed, less stable and less valid than that between heterosexuals. That has been at 
the root of much homophobia, and has been used by otherwise rational people to argue for 
the retention of discrimination. “I am not homophobic”, they say, “but gay people are 
promiscuous and do not want long-term relationships.” That argument is not only 
insulting but inconsistent. How can people argue, as the Christian Institute does, that the 
proposals “create a counterfeit moral standard that is imposed on all” while also claiming 
that there is no demand for them? If we refer to our personal experience, I suspect that 
most of us can see at once how wrong that contention is. 
(Alan Duncan c.190)
There remain entrenched—we have heard them today—overt and, perhaps more 
interesting, covert beliefs and habits that are hostile to gay relationships. Yet, and I say 
this as someone who has had 35 years in Christian marriage and has children and 
grandchildren—I celebrate that—I hope that I can recognise now the validity of the wish of 
my friends and the friends of my children who happen to be gay to enshrine their loving 
and faithful relationship in law. 
(Tim Boswell c.246)
Tim Boswell’s reference to covert beliefs and habits further indicates that there 
was more to the anti-CP views than their observable arguments. 
 Of the Bill’s non-Labour supporters, only Conservatives used gay: their 
46/68 lines account for 67.6% of the uses from their 39.5% of the pro-CP words. 
Similarly, their 11/21 lines for lesbian account for 52.4% of the uses from 39.5% 
of the pro-CP words. Liberal Democrat, SNP and SDLP speakers did not use the 
terms. As well as marking a chasm in Conservative views, the terms illustrate a 
difference between Labour and Conservative approaches to supporting the Bill. 
Labour opted for caution with its deployment of SAME-SEX and highlighting of 
responsibilities as well as rights. Conservatives supported lesbian and gay people 
in arguments addressing homophobic beliefs and behaviour.
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 Gay is paired with lesbian(s) in 18/68 lines and applies to men and 
women in three. Where gay is used independently, it clearly refers to men in 
3/47 lines. While lesbians are better represented in this debate than in those 
analysed in Chapters 7-9, as discussed in Chapter 8, the extent to which the 
reference of gay has become more inclusive or, as Murphy (1997) suggests, is 
more often used inclusively by heterosexuals, is here difficult to judge.
 The nouns to which lesbian applies vary little from those for gay:
 people (7 lines)       partners (2 lines)                        Lawyers Assc. (1 line)     relationship (1 line)
 couples (3 lines)     Christians & ministers (1 line)     mothers (1 line)
Of the 21 lines (Appendix 90), 17 are paired with gay and occur in arguments 
already outlined. Lesbian is used independently in four lines. In one, Barbara 
Roche recalls a conversation with a friend at a wedding:
I turned to a friend who was sitting beside me at the ceremony and talked about that. She 
is in a long-standing lesbian relationship. We were all enjoying the lovely occasion, but she 
told me that the possibility of a commitment to her long-standing partner in which rights 
and responsibilities were exchanged was not open to her. That made a great impression on 
me, and I discussed it with my family and friends afterwards. I vowed that if I ever had the 
opportunity to do something about it, I would. (c.191)
The other independent uses concern parenting. Robert Key’s lines for lesbian 
partners/lesbian mothers occur in his statement on parenting (quoted above with 
the lines for gay). Chris Bryant’s line occurs in an outline of past inequalities:
Similarly, survivors have had no rights to a partner’s pension. That has been a significant 
issue for many lesbian couples. Two women living together may have child care 
responsibilities. One of them may not work throughout her economically active life and 
reach retirement age without having acquired any pensionable service of her own. Bearing 
in mind the fact that many women are paid considerably less than men, the issue of 
poverty and rectifying injustice is important. (c.226)
The uses of lesbian and gay are more concerned with the lives of people than the 
uses of SAME-SEX, which relates to the need for and nature of the Bill.
 The nouns to which heterosexual applies link it to marriage in 10/18 lines 
(Appendix 90), plus married and marriage are collocates (Appendix 89): 
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 marriage (4 lines)                      couples (2 lines)                    married man (1 line)
 married couples (3 lines)           couple (1 line)                        people (1 line)
 community (2 lines)                   married couple (1 line)           unmarried couple (1 line)
This suggests pro-CP speakers took marriage less for granted as a heterosexual 
institution. Unlike previously analysed debates, in most lines heterosexual is 
used independently, but in its wider co-text it still functions as a comparator to 
differentiate the situation of non-heterosexuals. The main category of argument 
(8 lines) relates to inequality:
Will my right hon. Friend take another look at the Bill, because it will create an inequality 
of treatment between same-sex couples and married heterosexual couples in relation to 
survivor benefits under occupational pension schemes? Will she see whether she can iron 
out that manifest discrimination? 
(Angela Eagle c.176)
The need for the Bill is obvious to anyone who has seen and felt some of the heart-rending 
injustices that can occur when a committed gay couple are denied the basic rights that a 
married heterosexual couple would take for granted. 
(Alan Duncan c.183)
We welcome the fact that it grants equal access to state pension entitlements in what is a 
highly complex and technical set of provisions, but as the hon. Member for Orkney and 
Shetland (Mr. Carmichael) rightly identified, as drafted it treats same-sex couples and 
married heterosexual couples unequally in respect of survivors’ pension benefits under 
occupational pension schemes. 
(Angela Eagle c.200)
Does my hon. Friend agree that it would be odd if someone like me, who has been paying 
into a public sector pension fund for nearly 30 years, did not have the same rights as a 
married heterosexual man, and if they did not receive any discount in respect of the 
amount that they had been forced to pay throughout that period? 
(David Borrow c.201)
A system of civil registration would allow same-sex couples to be treated in the same way 
as other couples. If people are not working, for whatever reason, the benefits they receive 
should not be affected by whether they are gay or lesbian, or heterosexual. 
(Jane Griffiths c.205)
Surely the difference is that an unmarried heterosexual couple have the opportunity to 
rectify that problem by entering into a secular or civil marriage. That course of action is not 
available to same-sex couples. 
(Alistair Carmichael c.212)
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To correct that position is not, as some have suggested, to give extra rights to same-sex 
couples; it is simply to give them the same rights as heterosexual married couples who 
have made the same legally binding commitments to one another. 
(Charles Hendry c.231)
... that trend was expressed in the recent Populace survey published in The Times, which 
showed, in contrast to some of the antediluvian attitudes that still prevail in this Chamber, 
that 75 per cent. of respondents aged between 18 and 30 said yes, of course gay couples 
should have exactly the same rights as heterosexual couples? 
(John Bercow c.231)
In these lines marriage and heterosexuality are clearly upheld as the benchmark 
for equality; their status was beyond question. Four more lines challenge the 
claim that civil partnership undermined marriage:
The hon. Gentleman is making an excellent speech. Earlier, he read out a long list of 
countries that have civil partnerships, some of which have had them for years. Has his 
research revealed any shred of evidence that the existence of partnerships has in any way 
undermined heterosexual marriage? 
(David Cairns c.186)
The fundamental premise being put forward by my right hon. Friend is that she wants to 
defend and protect traditional heterosexual marriage, and I think that all hon. Members 
agree with that. However, does she accept that homosexual love exists, as do permanent 
long-term homosexual relationships? Those relationships are of considerable value, even 
though they may be different. People who are gay are never going to enter into a 
heterosexual marriage, but does my right hon. Friend accept that their wish to be 
recognised as partners in no way competes with or undermines the heterosexual marriage 
that she wants to defend? 
(Alan Duncan c.203)
Two lines occur in considerations of relationship quality:
Most of us know at least one gay couple who live together in a loving, committed 
relationship. Many of us also know of at least one heterosexual couple whose relationship 
may not be so healthy or committed. 
(Alan Duncan c.190)
When people, be they heterosexual or gay, meet someone special, a relationship develops. 
One can be in love with a person, but that does not mean that one wants to share one's 
mortgage with them. When the point comes in a relationship when couples decide that they 




One line occurs in Charles Hendry’s catalogue of homophobic abuses gathered in 
his role as shadow Minister for young people:
I heard a young lad in Brighton describe how he was beaten up in the streets simply 
because he was out with his partner. He was not doing anything that anyone in the 
heterosexual community would find it difficult to do. He was beaten up merely because he 
was out with his partner. I heard from a young kid in Leeds who had suffered constant 
homophobic bullying in school. When he, as an individual, finally fought back he was the 
one who was excluded. That was abominable. He was the victim. Bullied children are 
always the victims and they need Members of this place to stand up for them. (c.232)
Yet strategies for reducing heterosexual dominance were not raised.
 The pro-CP lines for homosexual (Appendix 90) are comparatively few and 
occur in more negative arguments. The term apples to:
 couples (2 lines)                   acts (1 line)           marriage (1 line)           relations (1 line)
 relationships (2 lines)           love (1 line)           people (1 line)
Besides the low frequency of homosexual, the lines show it was not the speakers’ 
term of choice. Four lines occur in reports and the other five in responses to 
anti-CP speakers which echo the preferred anti-CP term: 
Anne Widdecombe: Therefore, she is saying that the Bill is about homosexual marriage. It 
is about one person in a civil partnership being married to the other. 
Angela Eagle: I was careful in my choice of phrase—I said that such people would be 
effectively married. Whether one believes that that is homosexual marriage, as the right 
hon. Lady clearly does, or that it is a parallel state, which recognises—rightly, in my view—
the legal rights and responsibilities for people who live in caring same-sex relationships, is 
irrelevant. (c.200)
Alan Duncan was also responding to Ann Widdecombe (quoted above with the 
lines for heterosexual). Chris Bryant was responding to Ian Paisley:
Ian Paisley: The census of 2001 found only 288 same-sex couple households in the whole 
of Northern Ireland. The Government say that only 5 per cent. of same-sex couples will 
commit to civil partnerships. Well, 5 per cent. of 288 is 14, so 14 couples in Northern 
Ireland will have the opportunity provided by the Bill, even though a majority of people who 
have a view on the matter across the political and religious divide oppose it. Their voices 
were not heard or taken into account. The basis of family law in Northern Ireland is to be 
changed for the sake of 14 homosexual couples. (c.223)
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Chris Bryant: I am delighted to be able to follow that speech, although perhaps we shall 
now have to refer to the hon. Member for North Antrim (Rev. Ian Paisley) as the orange 
juice man. I have to tell him that I suspect that there are rather more than 288 
homosexual couples living together in Northern Ireland. I suspect that they are very 
reluctant to admit to the fact, owing to some of the bigotry that they have had to face in 
Northern Ireland over the years. (c.224)
In the last sentences of his speech, following a response to Gerald Howarth’s fear 
that the Bill would result in proliferation of homosexuality, Chris Bryant gives 
homosexual a positive flourish:
In the end, the Bill is about recognising a simple fact of life. It is not about setting up a 
new lifestyle, as the hon. Member for Aldershot (Mr. Howarth) claimed. It is not about 
persuading people to be gay or lesbian. It is not about proliferating homosexuality because, 
in truth, homosexuality is not something that we can proliferate. It is not something that 
we can be persuaded into. It is not an illness that we can catch. It is not a cancer that we 
can have excised. For roughly one in 10 people in this land it is simply a fact of life that 
they have to come to terms with. Now, at last—thank God—the law will recognise the fact 
of loving homosexual relationships. The whole of the UK will come to terms with a world in 
which two men or two women can love one another and make a commitment to one 
another, for richer and for poorer. (c.230)
Whether this is a case of him adapting his language (van Dijk 2004: 350) to that 
of Gerald Howarth (the switch from gay or lesbian to homosexual(ity) supports 
this), or of him elevating homosexual’s clinical negativity to a “higher rank” 
(Voloshinov 1986: 105) is debatable (his addition of for richer and for poorer as in 
CoE marriage vows supports the latter). Either way, this defensive argument 
concurs with the Labour caution already identified.
*       *       *
 The anti-CP lines for same-sex and opposite-sex (Appendix 92) are few and 
apply to the following nouns:
 same-sex
 couples (4 lines)            couple households (1 line)    partnerships (1 line)
 relationships (2 lines)    partnership Bill (1 line)    
 not of the same sex  people (1 line)
 opposite-sex  unmarried couples (1 line)    marriages (1 line)
The lines occur in convoluted arguments. One occurs in Christopher Chope’s 
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apparently disingenuous query over the Bill’s title: 
I have been wondering why the Bill is called the Civil Partnership Bill rather than the 
same-sex partnership Bill. I suspect that the amendment was passed in the House of Lords
—I include myself among those who sympathise with the arguments made there—because 
people took the Bill at face value and thought that it was about giving new rights to people 
who are in partnership outside marriage. (c.211)
He then cast the Government’s, and by implication Michael Howard’s, rejection 
of the Lords amendments as a missed opportunity:
[Michael Howard’s] letter states:  “I therefore think it better to allow the Bill to be returned 
to its original form and fight vigorously for provisions to be included in a Finance Bill 
which would remedy the unfair disadvantages which affect them”—that is, people not of 
the same sex who are engaged in relationships outside marriage. 
He continues:  “This is what we shall do our best to achieve in the House of Commons 
during the passage of the next Finance Bill.”
However, if we go along with the Government’s arguments on rejecting the Lords 
amendments to the present Bill, we will have missed a great opportunity to get a fair deal 
for participants in long-term relationships outside marriage. (c.211)
People not of the same-sex could here refer to cohabiting relatives or heterosexual 
couples. The ambiguity enabled him to extend his discrimination argument to 
opposite-sex unmarried couples by means of an out-of-context quote from the 
JCHR report on the Bill:
Both of these considerations would call in to question the Government's reliance on 
‘choice’ as the justification for not extending the scope of the Bill to opposite-sex 
unmarried couples.”
I am sure that you, Madam Deputy Speaker, know people who have been widowed and who 
do not wish to enter into a new marriage because they feel that they have had their one 
and only marriage, but that does not stop them entering a long-term relationship. At 
present, such people are discriminated against by the legislation. (c.212)
He thus verged on an argument for the Bill’s extension to heterosexual couples 
which, as David Borrow noted (c.212), was outside “traditional Conservative 
philosophy”. Two lines occur in Ian Paisley’s argument, based on the assumed 
accuracy of the 2001 census (quoted above), which implies the claimed 14 
homosexual couples were unimportant. Two more lines occur in Gerald Howarth’s 
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attempt to separate a negative view of same-sex relationships from homophobia: 
The plan to create civil partnerships was first announced in December 2002, when 
[Barbara Roche]—I am sorry that she is not in her place at the moment, although she 
spoke earlier—who was then Minister for Social Exclusion, indicated that legal change was 
intended to force cultural change. She said:
“It would send a powerful message about the acceptability of same-sex relationships 
and about the unacceptability of the homophobia still far too prevalent in our society.” 
There is no room for middle ground in that statement: one either regards same-sex 
relationships as acceptable or one is homophobic. (c.238-9)
The remaining lines occur in Angela Watkinson’s argument that the Bill was 
unfair, in which her use of other and platonic skew the reference of same-sex 
couples to include cohabitees who would not normally be seen as ‘a couple’:
First, the Bill is unfair. It purports to overcome inequality, but it introduces inequality 
where there was none before. It gives preference and advantages in law to homosexual 
couples over and above other same-sex couples, which is unjustifiable. (c.241)
She continued:
I cannot claim to have read every page of the Bill, which is rather a weighty tome, but I saw 
no reference to homosexuality in it. It refers simply to “same-sex couples”, so I am left 
wondering whether platonic same-sex couples are excluded. 
[...]
Some heterosexual opposite-sex marriages are platonic and two homosexual people can 
live together and share a home even though they are not involved in a personal 
relationship with one another. There are other variations on the theme. (c.241)
Her final line occurs in a more direct statement of belief: 
The Bill rests on the view that marriage and same-sex partnerships are equivalent or the 
same, but I do not believe that they are. (c.242)
These few uses of gendered terms marginalise same-sex couples without specific 
focus on sexuality. The anti-CP uses of gay are, unexpectedly, slightly more 
frequent than supportive speaker uses, while HOMOSEXUAL is a top anti-CP 
keyword (Appendix 83). Both serve to highlight sexuality.
 The 19 lines for gay (Appendix 92) show it applies to few nouns:
 marriage (10 lines)       people (5 lines)       marriages (2 lines)       community (1 line)
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Marriage is the top collocate (Appendix 91). Gay is paired with lesbian in one 
line. Two lines occur in Edward Leigh’s attempts to gain admissions from Jacqui 
Smith and Alan Duncan that they supported gay marriage: 
It would surely be much fairer to Members on both sides of House if the Government came 
clean and announced that they support gay marriage. Why will they not do so? (c.177)
Why will he not simply be honest and say that what we are creating is a form of gay 
marriage? (c.185)
This approach was modified when he intervened in Chris Bryant’s speech: 
The hon. Gentleman is arguing his point of view powerfully, but I am not sure that both 
sets of Front Benchers will welcome his remarks, because we were informed earlier that 
neither were in favour of gay marriages and that we were not considering a gay marriage 
Bill. However, the hon. Gentleman is eloquently arguing for exactly that, ... (c.228)
In fact Chris Bryant was arguing for the inclusion of religious readings and the 
use of religious buildings in both civil partnership and civil marriage ceremonies. 
Gerald Howarth invoked the support of the public: 
This is a highly controversial issue, and there are people outside who do not agree with 
civil partnerships. Furthermore, those people will be astonished that the Bill is being 
rammed through the House in the space of about 10 days. That is not the way to treat an 
issue of such major importance. Such people regard this Bill as gay marriage in all but 
name, and they simply think that that is wrong. They are our constituents, they are decent 
people— (c.238)
His use of wrong invokes a morality based on homophobic beliefs, while decent 
excludes the Bill’s supporters and relegates them to indecency⎯which has a 
sexual connotation. He then argued the Government was deceiving the public:
The issue is the nature of marriage, no matter what the Deputy Minister for Women and 
Equality may say. She has repeated the Government line, which is shared by my hon. 
Friends, that civil partnerships have nothing to do with marriage. I submit that that 
assertion has all the credibility of the Iraq dossier. It is gay marriage in all but name. 
Ministers cited the case in Brighton, where what has been called a “pink wedding list” is 
apparently being drawn up. Weddings are ceremonies that are associated with marriage— 
(c.239)
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At this point John Bercow interjected “So what?”. Gerald Howarth continued:
My hon. Friend says from a sedentary position, “So what?”, but the Government have 
asserted all along that civil partnerships are not gay marriage. I am sure that he fully 
accepts the concept of gay marriage, but the Government have said that this measure is 
completely different, although the Minister quoted with approval what was going on in 
Brighton. I shall not repeat the various clauses in the Bill that mirror exactly the 
provisions in relation to marriage, because we have discussed those at length. All the 
newspapers call this gay marriage. I rarely quote The Guardian, but I shall at least quote 
what it said on 30 June 2003: 
“The tabloids may go wild over ‘gay marriages’ and New Labour will no doubt shrink  
timidly from the phrase. But in truth, it will be a legal marriage in all but name.” 
Here in the Chamber, we must pretend that this has nothing to do with marriage in order 
to perpetrate a deceit on the public, but in fact, not everyone in the Labour party is on 
message. (c.239-240)
This was more than a ploy to discredit the Government. That the Bill’s provisions 
were based on those for civil marriage was no secret. His lines impart real angst 
about gay couple recognition. That he saw the issue as the nature of marriage 
suggests its required consummation underlay his angst. Angela Watkinson’s line 
raises a different issue. Here gay and lesbian appear to be awkward self-
corrections: 
I listened to the opening speeches and noticed that the Minister repeatedly used the term 
“homosexual”, so it is clear that the Bill’s provisions are intended for homosexuals, though 
I cannot remember whether the precise terms “gay” or “lesbian” were used. (c.241)
Her off-hand I cannot remember distances and suggests these were not terms she 
used. As the Minister used homosexual once in a quote, gay twice and lesbian 
not at all, the logic of this self-correction is unclear, but it suggests uncertainty 
about and irritation with the terms. Edward Leigh’s summary accounts for the 
remaining lines. One occurs in an incredulous denial that the Conservative party 
was turning away voters: 
I must admit that I was surprised by the suggestion made by one of my hon. Friends in his 
closing remarks that the Conservative party as a whole was trying to turn away women, or 
people who are black or gay. Nothing is further from the truth. We are the party of all 
Britons. (c.242)
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Two lines occur in his argument for discriminating in favour of marriage, which 
recontextualised (Wodak 2003: 138) discrimination against gay people by placing 
them with non-sexual categories: 
Our existing law discriminates against gay people who wish to leave property to each other, 
but it also discriminates against sisters, uncles or nephews and many others who want to 
do the same. Yet it is not so much that the present law discriminates against those people 
as that it discriminates in favour of marriage. (c.242)
Over the centuries, Parliament has taken the view that we should discriminate in favour of 
marriage. We do not want to discriminate against anyone else—not sisters, brothers, 
uncles, nephews, stepsons or grandfathers, grandsons or gay people. We want to 
discriminate in favour of the building block that is marriage. (c.243)
He then returned to alleging Government dishonesty:
There is no doubt that there are people in this House who believe that gay people should 
be allowed to go through a form of marriage. If they love each other and have made a 
commitment to each other, why should gay people be denied something called marriage 
when the rest of us are allowed it? However, a person would have to be utterly credulous to 
believe that, by enabling people to register a civil partnership at a register office and by 
providing that a long-term relationship can be ended only after it has suffered 
irredeemable breakdown—in other words, by replicating what is contained in our ordinary 
marriage laws—we are not creating a form of gay marriage. (c.243)
He concluded with a scathing attack on the direction of gay equality reforms:
Why cannot we be honest about it? It will come and the next step will be for the gay 
community to insist—rightly, in their view—that gay marriage be recognised, that it should 
be an offence to attack homosexuality and that it should be taught in schools on equal 
terms. That is the agenda. Let us not be mealy-mouthed about it. (cc.243-4)
That only two anti-CP MPs spoke 18/19 lines for gay begs a question. The tone 
and content of their remarks suggests they were engaged in a subversion of gay’s 
more usual affirmative contexts. As Voloshinov argued:
In actual fact, each living ideological sign has two faces, like Janus. Any current curse 
word can become a word of praise, any current truth must inevitably sound to many other 
people as the greatest lie. 
(Voloshinov 1986 [1929]: 22)
These negative uses of gay thus reverse its majority use as a marker of support 
in earlier debates. A different issue arises from the independent use of lesbian:
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The Minister describes a loving couple who have lived together for many years, sharing 
their house, their lives, their food. Do her arguments apply to the elderly sisters in my 
constituency who have lived together for 40 years and care for each other and love each 
other in a very real way as much as they do to lesbian couples? 
(James Gray c.175)
The comparison of a lesbian couple to a relationship between elderly sisters, or 
sisters of any age, is clearly inappropriate. Both uses of lesbian are dismissive; 
the lines for gay are more aggressive in speakers’ insinuations of Government 
dishonesty and claims of discrimination against non-sexual cohabitees. The 
extent to which gay is inclusive of lesbians is debatable but, as it is the term 
inclusive of men, its disproportionate use and more aggressive tone suggests 
greater animosity towards gay men. 
 The lines for HOMOSEXUAL (Appendix 92) give a fuller picture of anti-CP 
polarisation. It applies to the following nouns:
 couples (8 lines)             individuals (2 lines)          arrangements (1 line)       household (1 line)
 marriage (6 lines)           people (2 lines)                 community (1 line)           love (1 line)
 relationship (4 lines)       relationships (2 lines)       couple (1 line)                  partnerships (1 line)
The lines for HOMOSEXUAL MARRIAGE occur, as discussed in the previous 
section, in speakers’ insinuations of Government dishonesty. The other lines 
occur in arguments against homosexual couples/relationship(s)/partnerships 
being treated as equal to heterosexual married couples. Five lines occur in 
relatively straightforward concerns about the proposed equality:
The Minister has several times used the word “equality”. Will she be very specific? Is the 
equality that she seeks that whereby a homosexual relationship based on commitment is 
treated in future in exactly the same way as marriage in law? 
(Ann Widdecombe cc.177-8)
I accept that there are some unkindnesses and “inequalities”—to use the buzzword, [...] —
in the way people who have set up a homosexual relationship will be treated by 
comparison with those who have set up in a proper married state. People whose domestic 
arrangements and sharing and caring responsibilities place them outside marriage will also 
face similar unkindnesses and problems.
(Ann Widdecombe c.202) 
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My question is whether we should deal with some of the anomalies that exist in 
homosexual relationships, and other caring arrangements, by means of a Bill on civil 
partnerships which, of necessity, precludes any arrangements other than homosexual 
partnerships. 
(Ann Widdecombe c.203)
At the same time, it will be an affront to Christians and other faith communities. It will 
also be an insult to all those who happily share their lives with relatives or friends outside 
marriage, because their relationships will be given institutional inferiority to homosexual 
ones. 
(Christopher Chope c.213)
Does he understand that some of us have a deep-seated and genuine fear that setting up 
what my hon. Friend [Alan Duncan] called “a parallel institution” will send out the message 
to the people of this country that there are two equally valid lifestyles and that one can be 
in a homosexual relationship or a heterosexual—many of us would describe it as normal—
relationship? That message will encourage the proliferation of homosexuality. 
(Gerald Howarth c.217)
The heart of the argument was expounded in Belfast by a representative of the homosexual 
community who said that in his opinion there is a difference between marriage, which is a 
sacrament, and civil partnership. There are those of us who believe that marriage is not a 
sacrament but an ordinance of God, and we wonder whether the state can continue to try 
to replicate the pattern that God has ordained. 
(Martin Smythe c.237)
We desperately need to do all we can to support and sustain marriage. I am opposed to the 
Bill because it sends out a false signal, particularly to young people, that somehow a 
homosexual relationship is an equally valid lifestyle. 
(Gerald Howarth c.241)
While Anne Widdecombe’s proper married state and Gerald Howarth’s normal 
relationship reinforce the polarisation of homosexual-heterosexual relationships, 
Martin Smyth insinuated the Bill was blasphemous. The polarisation also lurks 
behind Anne Widdecombe’s and Christopher Chope’s extension of inequality to 
non-sexual cohabitees. Nine lines clearly exemplify the belief that homosexual 
couples were being awarded unfair, and by implication unwarranted, privileges:
I do not impute wrecking motives to those who voted in a certain way, because they were 
making a point, saying that the inequalities are not confined to homosexual couples so 




If there are problems, such as being dispossessed of a home because of inheritance tax or 
tenancy arrangements, they should be dealt with separately and they should cover not just 
homosexual arrangements but others as well. 
(Ann Widdecombe c.202)
The basis of family law in Northern Ireland is to be changed for the sake of 14 homosexual 
couples. 
(Ian Paisley c.223)
According to the census, there are 330 times more house sharers in Northern Ireland than 
people living as homosexual couples. However, those house sharers will not have their 
burdens eased or lifted by the Bill. 
(Ian Paisley c.223)
They [cohabiting relatives] wonder why homosexual couples should be treated favourably 
in this way, when the problems that they face have not been resolved. 
(Gerald Howarth c.240)
Of course, certain of the difficulties that have been mentioned by Members from all parts of 
the House could be dealt with under existing law. For example, on inheriting tenancies, 
homosexual couples already have legal rights that other co-dependants do not. 
(Gerald Howarth c.240)
First, the Bill is unfair. It purports to overcome inequality, but it introduces inequality 
where there was none before. It gives preference and advantages in law to homosexual 
couples over and above other same-sex couples, which is unjustifiable. 
I listened to the opening speeches and noticed that the Minister repeatedly used the term 
“homosexual”, so it is clear that the Bill’s provisions are intended for homosexuals, though 
I cannot remember whether the precise terms "gay" or "lesbian" were used. 
(Angela Watkinson c.241)
The impression was created that two women who have been lifelong friends living in the 
same home and sharing a life together would not be subject to the Bill’s provisions. I hope 
that the Minister will clarify that point, because she gave the impression that the Bill 
would exclusively benefit homosexual couples. 
(Angela Watkinson c.241)
Categorising HOMOSEXUAL couples with house-sharers/cohabiting relatives/
other co-dependents/friends relegates the couples to non-sexual categories and 
thus constitutes non-recognition of HOMOSEXUAL relationships. The idea that 
heterosexual couples, via marriage and social acceptance, already had unfair 
advantages was apparently inconceivable. It was these advantages that speakers 
sought to protect. Similarly, Ann Widdecombe’s references to HOMOSEXUAL 
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individuals and HOMOSEXUAL love relegate HOMOSEXUAL relationships to a 
‘legal but no more’ status: 
The fact is that the Government do not interfere in the exercise of the free choice of 
homosexual individuals to form relationships—sometimes very committed ones—or to set 
up domestic arrangements together, which may then prove to be of very considerable or 
permanent duration. There is nothing in our law—or, increasingly, in the attitudes of 
society, which have been a bigger barrier in the past—to prevent that. (cc.201-2)
Failing to pass the Bill will not stop, put any barrier in the way of, or make it illegal for two 
homosexual individuals—whether they be male or female—to set up a permanent 
relationship. If I thought that the law prevented that from happening, my attitude would be 
different, but it does not.  The question before us is not whether we prevent that from 
happening, but whether we bless such arrangements with equivalent rights that have been 
wholly reserved for marriage in the past. (c.202)
I am usually in agreement with my hon. Friend, but perhaps not on this occasion. He says 
that homosexual love exists, and of course it does. As I said earlier—and I think that most 
Conservative Members will agree—it is inappropriate for Government to intervene in 
people’s exercise of choice. (c.203)
This argument too identifies the legal recognition and hence official validation of 
HOMOSEXUAL love and relationships as the problem. Her lines present such 
‘arrangements’ as an individual choice that was clearly not to be given official 
approval. Martin Smythe adopted a more metaphorical line of argument: 
We are not equal. There are different issues, and one of the issues that we are debating is 
the fact that civil partnership is not merely civil partnership; it is giving recognition of 
something that some of us hold dear. I happen to be one of those—perhaps I am the only 
one in the House—who speaks having been put into the den of lions. A medical doctor and 
I had been invited to appear on the “Kelly” show in Belfast to deal with the question of 
homosexuality. We understood that two people on the panel would take the point of view of 
homosexuality, while the other two would take a different line. We thought that the 
audience would be a normal mixed audience, but it consisted completely of homosexual 
people. (c.235)
The biblical reference to the den of lions positions him as the ‘good Christian’ 
having survived in a dangerous place. His use of deal with casts the question of 
homosexuality as a problem, while his use of normal casts the HOMOSEXUAL 
audience as abnormal. Contrary to the repeated claims of Unionist peers and 
MPs, the anecdote does not suggest widespread opposition to the Bill in Northern 
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Ireland. The polarisation is furthered by Gerald Howarth’s focus on families:
All the Office for National Statistics surveys illustrate that children brought up in a 
married household do better than those brought up in a cohabiting household, let alone in 
a homosexual household. The question that my hon. Friend has to answer—I am sure that 
he will do so elegantly, if not persuasively—is, is he not setting up yet another alternative 
lifestyle, which young people will consider equally valid, and will not the nuclear family be 
destroyed? (cc.186-7)
She [Barbara Roche] issued a consultation paper in June last year. In her foreword, she 
announced that thousands of homosexual couples are
“living in exactly the same way as any other family”. 
Exactly the same way? That assertion is disputable. (c.239)
His use of let alone in the former denigrates HOMOSEXUAL parents, while his 
use of elegantly, if not persuasively to Alan Duncan casts surreptitious aspersion 
on his gayness. In citing Barbara Roche he became more sarcastic. As the line 
follows his defence of decent tolerant people who “neither inquire nor want to be 
told what other people do in the privacy of their own home” (c.238) his emphasis 
on Exactly the same way? alludes to sexual practices without attracting critical 
attention (Wodak 2007: 214). As well as being particularly hostile, it suggests an 
underlying preoccupation with sexual relationships. This preoccupation is also 
implied in Angela Watkinson’s last lines:
In any case, who apart from the two involved can possibly know the nature of a personal 
relationship? Some heterosexual opposite-sex marriages are platonic and two homosexual 
people can live together and share a home even though they are not involved in a personal 
relationship with one another. (c.241) 
Would two elderly ladies living together for most of their lives have to affect to be 
homosexual in order to gain the advantages in law as described in the Bill?
Would one of two sisters sharing a house over a long period incur inheritance tax when the 
other dies? Under the Bill, if a homosexual couple registered their partnership, even after a 
few months, one would inherit tax free if a partner died. That amounts to an injustice 
where there was none before. (c.242)
Her explicit upholding of non-sexual relationships suggests she saw partnership 
recognition as validation of same-sex sexual activity, while the idea that ‘worthy’ 
cohabiting ‘ladies’ would need to pretend to be ‘unworthy homosexuals’ to benefit 
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from the Bill further denigrates HOMOSEXUAL couples. The contexts in which 
HOMOSEXUAL occurs are more pointedly negative and polarising than those for 
same-sex, gay, or lesbian, while the “clues and traces” (Wodak 2003: 141) to a 
underlying concern with the validation of same-sex sexual relations illustrates 
the persistence of homophobic beliefs (Chapter 1). 
 That the anti-CP uses of homosexual outnumber those for heterosexual by 
over 5-1 is significant and shows the naturalised category was still largely taken 
for granted. The few lines for heterosexual (Appendix 92) apply to few nouns: 
 couples (3 lines)       couple (1 line)       opposite-sex marriages (1 line)       relationship (1 line)
Four lines occur in arguments that the Bill discriminated against heterosexual 
couple(s), of which Christopher Chope’s quotes suggest the term was outside his 
spontaneous repertoire⎯or non-appropriated (Bakhtin 1981: 293-4). Gerald 
Howarth’s line occurs in his anti-equality argument, while Angela Watkinson’s 
line occurs in her focus on platonic relationships (both quoted above with the 
lines for HOMOSEXUAL).
 The remaining anti-CP adjective that warrants discussion is sexual. 
Christopher Chope’s two lines refer to sexual infidelity and further suggest an 
underlying preoccupation with the validation of same-sex sexual activity:
It seems that that is being done because the Government's mindset is that the Bill is about 
homosexual marriage. The only difference is that one of the grounds for breakdown leading 
to divorce in a proper marriage is sexual infidelity on the part of the other partner to the 
marriage. I have not seen any provision in the Bill that refers to sexual infidelity on the 
part of the other partner to a civil partnership as being a ground for “divorce”.
I regret that I find this to be an extremely muddled Bill. (c.213)
Ann McKetchin pointed out (c.213), that he seemed “to have a muddled view of 
the legal definition of adultery, which does not apply to relationships between 
same-sex partners”. The remaining line occurs in Edward Leigh’s relegation of 
gay relationships to a non-sexual category:
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The Government have tried to pull our heart strings on this matter. We have heard 
powerful stories about people called Chris or Rex, and about people who have been living 
together for 40 years who want to leave their property to each other but who cannot. We 
realise that that is unfair in the modern world. It is unfair that sisters who have lived 
together for many years in a non-sexual relationship should be placed in such difficulty 
and it is a problem that we must address. (c.243)
His use of tried to pull our heart strings shows he and other anti-CP MPs were 
unimpressed, while his use of powerful stories about people called Chris or Rex is 
dismissive of Alan Duncan’s example of 76 year-old Rex, bereaved partner of 
Chris, and other real-life examples of difficulty caused by lack of partnership 
recognition. These anti-CP lines also further support an underlying concern 
about the official validation of same-sex sex (see also Appendix 92A). Arguably, 
these were the “covert beliefs” indicated by Tim Boswell (c.246) and were the 
basis of anti-CP speakers’ resistance to the Bill, but they no longer constituted 
an argument that could be publicly made. 
*       *       *
 Few abstract nouns were used in the debate. Homosexuality was the most 




 Pro-Civil Partnership Uses
 Pro-CP %
 Debate Words




 10/15 (66.7% total)
 5/10 (50% uses)
78.5%
 5/15 (33.3% total)
 3/5 (60% uses)
21.5%
 sexuality 11
 10/11 (91% total)
 6/10 (60% uses)
78.5%
 1/11 (9% total)
21.5%
 sexual orientation 9
 9/9 (100% total)
 1/9 (11.1% uses)
78.5% 21.5%
 orientation 1
 1/1 (100% total)
78.5% 21.5%
 homophobia 5
 3/5 (60% total)
78.5%
 2/5 (40% total)
 1/2 (50% uses)
21.5%
 sex (in reference to
 gender)
1
 1/1 (100% total)
78.5% 21.5%
 sex (in reference to
 sexual acts)
1
 1/1 (100% total)
78.5% 21.5%
Key: grey text shows the number and % of uses occurring in reports
 red text: shows the proportionately higher frequency of use
Of the anti-CP lines for these nouns (Appendix 92), only the line for sexuality is 
not linked to the quotes discussed above. It occurs in Martin Smyth’s convoluted 
statement on the Bill’s relation to homophobia:
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I have no time for homophobia, which is prevalent in all societies, but I am not convinced 
that the Bill will actually advance our response to young folk who hold such attitudes. 
Thankfully, many young people are beginning to react against the commercial side of 
sexuality, which is brainwashing our society.(c.236)
His interjection of homophobia’s prevalence distances his disclaimer and is 
dismissive of homophobia as well as the Bill, while displacing the homophobia 
onto young folk. Given that Unionist Reverends like himself and Ian Paisley 
upheld homophobic beliefs, and that in context, the commercial side of sexuality 
could allude to lesbian and gay culture, the statement arguably supports young 
people’s rejection of it. David Cairns warned him off:
The hon. Gentleman is sliding dangerously close to a view of homosexuality and young 
people from which I urge him to back off, because it will do his argument no good 
whatsoever. (c.236)
Given the rigidity of Unionist views, it is notable that Martin Smyth felt the need 
to disclaim homophobia at all. It indicates both its decreasing acceptability and 
increasing social pressure to not be seen as homophobic. 
*       *       *
 The most used pro-CP terms were sexuality and sexual orientation. The 
lines (Appendix 90) show they have similar patterns of reference:
 Reference of sexuality: lesbian/gay sexualities (linked to prejudice/discrimination: 8 lines)
                                    generalised/inclusive (linked to Christian documents/websites: 2 lines)
 Reference of sexual orientation: lesbian/gay sexualities (linked to prejudice/discriminat’n: 6 lines)
                                                 generalised/inclusive (linked to the children of lesbians: 1 line)
                                                 heterosexuality (in an ironic comment: 1 line)
                                                 unclear (in title of Employment Regulations: 1 line)
 Reference of orientation: lesbian/gay sexualities (linked to prejudice:1 line)
Of the lines for sexuality, 9/10 were spoken by Conservatives. They occur in 
accounts of young people’s views, reports of homophobic abuse and an argument 
that supporting the Bill would help take sexuality out of politics. Of the lines for 
sexual orientation and orientation, only 2/9 were spoken by Conservatives. They 
occur in statements on entitlement to equal treatment, the Lords’ amendments, 
432
positive accounts of the Labour record on legal reforms and lesbian parenting, 
plus a report of the legal problems the CoE may face if civil partnership became 
law. Thus Conservatives were used the gay-friendly term.
 Significantly, ‘heterosexuality’ was not used by either side, which supports 
a continued taken-for-grantedness of its ‘natural’ status. 
*       *       *
 Very few nouns for people were used in the debate. Gays and lesbians 
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 5/6 (83.3% total)
 2/5 (40% uses)
78.5%
 1/6 (16.7% total)
21.5%
 lesbians 6
 5/6 (83.3% total)
 1/5 (20% uses)
78.5%
 1/6 (16.7% total)
21.5%
 heterosexuals 3
 3/3 (100% total)
 1/3 (33.3% uses)
78.5% 21.5%
 homosexuals 5
 2/5 (40% total)
 2/2 (100% uses)
78.5%
 3/5 (60% total)
 1/3 (66.7% uses)
21.5%
 homophobes 3 78.5%
 3/3 (100% total)
 1/3 (66.7% uses)
21.5%
Key: grey text shows the number and % of uses occurring in reports
 red text: shows the proportionately higher frequency of use
 bold red text: keywords
All pro-CP lines for lesbians (Appendix 90) are paired with gays or gay men, but 
only 3/5 lines for gays are paired, though lesbians are better represented than in 
the adjectival forms. All lines occur in supportive contexts, 9/10 in pro-equality 
or anti-discrimination arguments. The uses of heterosexuals are also notable in 
that their status is less taken for granted but, as all occur in equality arguments, 
they function as comparators without independently consideration. 
 The anti-CP lines for homosexuals (Appendix 92) occur in the same range 
of arguments as homosexual, but HOMOPHOBES is a keyword used in denials:
These are decent people that I am talking about. They are not homophobes, bigots or any 
of the other epithets so readily thrown about. 
(Gerald Howarth c.238)
We are accused of many things—of being homophobes and the rest of it—but I believe that 
we have a point of view that we are perfectly entitled to express. 
(Edward Leigh c.242)
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We are not homophobes or anything like that, but we are saying that this Bill does not do 
what the Government seem to want it to do. 
(Edward Leigh c.243)
That the term is not derived from a heterosexual perspective raises questions 
about its use. The denials were not in response to specific interventions or 
comments. This suggests the term alluded to lesbian and gay criticisms of the 
views to which the speakers felt they and others were entitled and that they were 
attempting to present it as an example of abuse. Whatever their definition of 
homophobia may have been, the views they contributed to the debate were 
clearly in line with the heritage of homophobic beliefs (Chapter 1). This in turn 
further illustrates the extent to which views that were once taken for granted 
now had to be defended.
*       *       *
 The sexuality terms in this debate illustrate deep and shifting divisions. 
They suggest that as homophobic beliefs became less taken for granted and more 
widely challenged, the viewpoint of speakers adhering to them was becoming 
hardened and entrenched. 
 Associations and Implications
 Three themes emerging from the debate merit further discussion. First, is 
the anti-CP deployment of marriage as a means to oppose the Bill. Second, is the 
shifting connotations and frequencies of lesbian, gay, and homosexual alongside 
the relative stability in uses of heterosexual. Third, is the pro-CP linking of legal 
reform to reducing prejudice.
 While the Bill’s basis in civil-marriage law facilitated the anti-CP focus on 
marriage, this does not explain their deployment of it. As in the Adoption debates 
(Chapter 8), marriage became a metaphor for the protection of heterosexual 
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status and privilege and a euphemism for homophobic polarisations. Marriage 
was awarded a hallowed status:
 —the holiest state of matrimony. (CC c.213)
... the divine sanctity of marriage. (IP c.223)
... that marriage is a solemn and holy thing. (IP c.223)
... marriage is not a sacrament but an ordinance of God, ... (MS c.237)
Its heterosexuality was claimed:
.... in a proper marriage ... (CC c.213)
... deeply held convictions of so many people about the nature of marriage ... (GH c.239)
The issue is the nature of marriage, ... (GH c.239)
... marriage is about a permanent union between a man and wife, ... (EL c.242)
... contained in our ordinary marriage laws— (EL c.243)
Same-sex couples were excluded from its definition: 
... rights that have been wholly reserved for marriage in the past. (AWi c.202)
... extend to another group a property that has always been unique to marriage (AWi c.203)
... will be translated into law, that marriage is no longer unique. (AWi c.203)
... but not through aping marriage. (AWi 204)
... one particular type of relationship outside marriage on a pedestal, ... (CC c.213)
Setting up an alternative to marriage—or a parallel to it ... (GH c.240)
... a pseudo-marriage, ... (AWa c.242)
... a form of marriage. (EL c.243)
It was in need of protection:
... will undermine the uniqueness of marriage, ... (AWi c.201 & c.204)
... to defend the institution of marriage, ... (AWi c.201)
I want to keep it unique, ... (AWi c.203)
... we want to keep marriage unique ... (AWi c.203)
... undermine the institution of marriage— (CC c.213)
... need to do all we can to support and sustain marriage ... (GH c.241)
As Voloshinov (1986: 106) argued, a word’s contextual meaning is “always 
associated with the generation of the evaluative purview of a particular social 
group”. The anti-CP view suggests marriage offered protection on three counts. 
First, the claiming of marriage as a heterosexual institution was accompanied by 
dismissive and derisory comments on ‘homosexual’ relationships which expose 
its basis in homophobic beliefs. Second, the protection of heterosexuality rests 
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on the protection of gender boundaries. As Weeks argues:
A key element of the gender order is institutionalised heterosexuality, which structures 
and embodies relations between men and women, and defines culturally distinct 
masculinities and femininities. 
(Weeks 2011: 70)
Third, the protection of gender boundaries also protects heterosexual sex. That 
via the passage of religious and legal imposition, marriage became the only social 
arrangement within which sex was not only allowed but obligatory, adds another 
dimension to anti-CP resistance. Weeks again: 
Yet at the same time as politicians, religious leaders, moralists and journalists lament the 
collapse of this key social institution, the very same people are often in the vanguard of the 
opposition to same-sex marriage, which in the early twenty-first century has become the 
single most important issue for LGBT activists, amongst whom clearly the demand for 
marriage is not in decline but very much on the rise. This underscores that ultimately what 
moral conservatives fear above all is less the decline of marriage as such as the threat to 
marriage as the cornerstone of heterosexual normality. 
(Weeks 2011: 108)
The anti-CP speechmakers were all moral conservatives. Four belonged to the 
Cornerstone Group whose motto is ‘Faith, Flag and Family’. One was a devout 
Catholic convert. Two were Unionists and Presbyterian Ministers. 
 The debate also marks a change in uses of lesbian and gay. In the Clause 
28 debate (Chapter 5) the terms were positive markers of familiarity and support, 
while the few pro-Clause uses occurred in reports. In this debate, the anti-CP 
uses of gay were spontaneous and proportionately more frequent, but negative. 
On changes in meaning Voloshinov argued: 
A change in meaning is, essentially, always a reevaluation: the transposition of some 
particular word from one evaluative context to another. A word is either advanced to a 
higher rank or demoted to a lower one. The separation of word meaning from evaluation 
inevitably deprives meaning of its place in the living social process. 
(Voloshinov 1986 [1929]: 105)
Chart 1 summarises shifts in the frequencies and reported use of lesbian(s) and 
gay(s) in Chapters 5-10:
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 1 (16.7%)
 68 (78.1%) R45.6%
 19 (21.9%) R15.8%
 5 (83.3%) R40%
 1 (16.7%)
key:  red text: proportionately more frequent use by supportive speakers (keywords in bold)
 blue text: proportionately more frequent use by unsupportive speakers
 grey text - R%: % of terms used in quotes or reports
Although the debates were discrete in purpose, context and speaker mix, this 
suggests that wider adoption of lesbian(s) and gay(s) in the general population 
has resulted in their increased use by people who harbour negative beliefs about 
lesbian and gay relationships. Voloshinov again:
The meaning of a word is determined entirely by its context. In fact there are as many 
meanings of a word as there are contexts of its usage. 
(Voloshinov 1986 [1929]: 79)
He continued:
The classical instance of such contrasting contexts of usage for one and the same word is 
found in dialogue. In the alternating lines of a dialogue, the same word may figure in two 
mutually clashing contexts. Of course, dialogue is only the most graphic and obvious 
instance of varidirectional contexts. Actually, any real utterance, in one way or another or 
to one degree or another, makes a statement of agreement with or a negation of something. 
Contexts do not stand side by side in a row, as if unaware of one another, but are in a state 
of constant tension, or incessant interaction and conflict. 
(Voloshinov 1986 [1929]: 80)
And as Bakhtin later elaborated:
Each word tastes of the context and contexts in which it has lived in its socially charged 
life; all words and forms are populated by intentions. 
(Bakhtin 1981 [1935]: 293)
Given the positive contexts within which lesbian and gay were ‘socially charged’ 
in the 1980s, their subversion is a measure of homophobic resistance to change. 
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Chart 2 shows shifts in the frequencies and reported use of the clinical terms:
Chart 2
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 9 (22%) R44.5%
 32 (78%) R34.4%
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 5 (33.3%) R60%
key: blue text: proportionately more frequent use by unsupportive speakers (keywords in bold)
 red text: proportionately more frequent use by supportive speakers
 grey text - R%: % of terms used in quotes or reports
The greater use of clinical terms by unsupportive speakers is not the only factor. 
Supportive speakers used the terms in defensive contexts and their use generally 
decreased over time. Bakhtin’s (1981: 270-2) centrifugal and centripetal forces 
apply here. In the 1980s, the centrifugal forces of lesbian and gay politics were 
bubbling up from below against the centripetal forces of Cold War manoeuvring 
in which moral conservatism was a ready-made weapon. By 2004, the number of 
supportive speakers had increased considerably and moral conservatism was on 
the defensive. Yet, the continuing sparse use of heterosexual(s), the rare use of 
straight(s), plus the frequent non-use of heterosexuality suggests its naturalised 
status remained largely taken for granted. Chart 3 shows its frequencies: 
Chart 3
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The lower frequencies of these terms suggests that increased support for lesbian 
and gay equality had little impact on the status of heterosexuality and its coveted 
gender boundaries. The terms were most used as comparators which positions 
heterosexuality as the benchmark for equality. While, as Voloshinov (1986: 19) 
noted, “the word is the most sensitive indicator of social changes”, it is also an 
indicator of lack of change. 
 The pro-CP view that legal reform reduces prejudice permeated the debate 
(Appendix 90A). This view is also widely held among lesbians and gay men (see 
Harding 2006) and underpinned Stonewall’s original agenda for equality before 
the law. It is also implicit in the anti-CP fears of ‘homosexual proliferation’. This 
raises the question of where change comes from. Weeks takes a broad view:
The rise of same-sex marriage as an issue signals two important, intertwined changes: 
shifting priorities within the LGBT world itself, and changes within national cultures that 
were clearly liberalizing their attitudes and laws. 
(Weeks 2011: 168)
Without existing social change among lesbians and gay men and wider support 
for that change, pressure for legal reforms within and between countries would 
be unlikely. The civil partnership debate suggests a minoritising and hardening 
of opposition to legal reforms. Chart 4 suggests this pattern:
Chart 4
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key:  red text: uses of the terms in contexts supporting lesbians and gay men
 blue text: uses of the terms in contexts defending unsupportive positions
 bold: proportionately greater use
 (TERM in brackets): keyword
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Unsupportive speakers’ lesser use of these terms in earlier debates indicates the 
taken-for-granted status of their view, while their greater uses in later debates 
concurs with a need to deny or disclaim prejudice as it became less publically 
acceptable. In the case of supportive speakers, their greater use of abstract 
nouns concurs with an indirect highlighting of the prejudice behind opposition to 
reform. (See Appendix 93 for each term’s frequencies.) That the legal reforms 
responded to existing social change is not to say they were not needed, they most 
certainly were, but the contribution they are making to eroding homophobic 
beliefs and dislodging the privileged status of heterosexuality across the 
spectrum of social life has yet to be evaluated.
 Conclusion
 This chapter clearly illustrates how heterosexuality set the benchmark for 
‘equality’ which in turn illustrates its institutional power. A proposal to abolish 
marriage would not have been given parliamentary time. The political context 
shows civil partnership was not a Government initiative. It was preceded by two 
Private Member’s Bills and only when Lord Lester’s Bill passed its second reading 
in the Lords did the Government intervene and take control. Heterosexuals were 
excluded from the Government Bill and marriage ring-fenced as a heterosexual 
institution. Whether this was for political, financial or ideological reasons is 
unclear, but it introduced inequalities of recognition and provision while placing 
lesbian and gay relationships within the framework of heterosexual marriage. As 
such it illustrates the fine line between social inclusion and social control. Even 
so, the sustained opposition to the Bill in the right-wing press and the wrecking 
amendments passed in the Lords, show the virulence with which lesbian and gay 
partnership recognition was opposed. The research reviewed analyses the legal 
provisions of civil partnership and aspects of its wider socio-political importance, 
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but with no analysis of its parliamentary passage or specific debates.
 The debate analysed shows there was widespread cross-party support for 
the original Bill in the Commons. Only a minority of ‘die-hard’ Conservatives and 
Unionists opposed it and used the Lords’ wrecking amendments as a means to 
devalue lesbian and gay relationships. The Words and Themes section reveals 
stark divisions between the two sides. On Flowchart 11, the pro-CP keywords 
SAME-SEX, PARTNERS, RIGHTS and COUPLES are pivotal. While SAME-SEX and 
COUPLES link to the strong support for the Bill in its original form, PARTNERS 
and RIGHTS link to the Bill’s provisions. On Flowchart 12, the anti-CP keyword 
MARRIAGE is pivotal and was used for a range of negative purposes: to allege 
Government dishonesty, to protect heterosexuality, to polarise HOMOSEXUAL 
and heterosexual relationships, to uphold non-sexual cohabiting relationships 
and invalidate recognition of same-sex sexual relationships. Uses of the keyword 
DO reveal the weakness of anti-CP speakers’ stance. In the Views of Sexuality 
section, the contrasts are multiple. As in Chapter 8, Labour deployment of the 
gender-aligned SAME-SEX shifts the focus away from sexuality identifiers and 
constitutes another example of Government caution. By contrast, Conservative 
supporters of the Bill used both gay and lesbian more often and in a wider range 
of arguments. Lesbian(s) were better represented in this debate than the debates 
analysed in Chapters 7-9, but the terms were still mostly paired with gay(s) by 
pro-CP speakers and little used by anti-CP speakers. As in earlier debates, the 
lack of independent consideration given to lesbian(s) shifts the underlying focus 
towards non-heterosexual men. The scarce pro-CP use of the clinical homosexual 
follows a decline in its use by supportive speakers over the debates analysed. 
Conversely, its position as a top anti-CP keyword and suggests HOMOSEXUAL 
was becoming confined to a minority of virulently antipathetic speakers. Their 
emphasis on the non-sexual relationships of other categories of cohabitants plus 
negative allusions to non-heterosexual sex, point to an underlying concern with 
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its validation via partnership recognition. This locates their stance firmly within 
the heritage of homophobic beliefs (Chapter 1). In contrast to previous debates, 
the uses of heterosexual were mostly independent on both sides, but the term 
still functioned primarily as a comparator leaving the ring-fenced institution of 
heterosexuality without independent investigation.
 The charts in the Associations and Implications section suggest a trend: 
that as homophobic beliefs became less taken for granted and more widely 
challenged, the views of the dwindling number of speakers adhering to them 
became hardened. This is further investigated in Chapter 11 which takes a 
decontextualised approach to the legislative changes and examines the debates 




 This chapter offers an overview of the language used and its associations 
in the two periods under study (1986-1996 and 2001-2004) by speakers who 
supported lesbians and gay men and those who did not. Its focus is broader than 
that in Chapters 5-10 which enables collective shifts and continuities in views of 
sexuality to be identified over time. The corpora analysed here were built from 
the 28 debates, 14 in each period, with above-average frequencies of the search-
terms (Chapter 2; Appendices 2 & 3). Approximately two-thirds of the debates in 
each period were held in the Lords. In addition, half the debates in period one 
occurred during the passage of Clause 28 and half those in period two during the 
passage of the Civil Partnership Bill. These were the most hard-fought issues. 
Each debate was divided into speakers supporting or contesting the legislative 
proposal in question and the resulting texts assigned to four basic corpora: one 
each for and against lesbians and gay men in each period. Apart from a coding of 
each text’s origins (shown in the concordance lines), the data is decontextualised. 
The corpora enable four dimensions of comparison: 
1 PLG1: Speakers against Clause 28 and for reforms 1986-96 (148,347 words, 57% total)
 ALG1: Speakers for Clause 28 and against reforms 1986-96 (111,811 words, 43% total)
2 PLG2: Speakers supporting reforms 2001-2004 (267,525 words, 65% total)
 ALG2: Speakers against reforms 2001-2004 (144,523 words, 35% total)
3 PLG1+2: Speakers supporting lesbians and gay men overall (415,872 words, 62% total)
 ALG1+2: Speakers against lesbians and gay men overall (256,334 words, 38% total)
4 LG1: All speakers in the first period (260,158 words, 39% total)
 LG2: All speakers in the second period (412,048 words, 61% total)
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An initial frequency check of all terms related to sexuality in each corpus shows 
how they vary (Appendix 94). While lesbian/gay/lesbians/gays/heterosexual/ 
heterosexuals/sexuality/sex were consistently more used by PLG speakers, the 
clinical terms homosexual/homosexuals/homosexuality were significantly more 
used by ALG speakers. There are also marked differences between the periods. In 
LG1, homosexuality/homosexual/homosexuals/sexual/sexuality/heterosexuality 
are keywords with p<0.0000000000. In LG2, sex (mostly used in same-sex) is a 
keyword with this p-value and marks a shift from sexuality identifiers to gender-
aligned terms. These observations are examined in four sections which analyse 
each comparison in turn. The comparisons are based on the keyword lists for 
each corpus and the collocates of 15 pivotal terms: 
 lesbian           gays                      homosexuality         heterosexuality             sexual
 lesbians         homosexual           heterosexual           sexuality                       sex
 gay                homosexuals         heterosexuals          sexual orientation         same-sex/same sex
As an added triangulation, to cross-check the analyses and strengthen the 
validity of the conclusions (Taylor 2001b: 322; Baker et al 2008: 295-6), the 
comparisons are approached differently. Comparisons 1 and 2 start from the 
keyword and collocate themes. Comparisons 3 and 4 start from the sexuality 
terms in their lexical categories: adjectives, nouns for people and abstract nouns. 
The comparisons are mainly descriptive with only brief commentary; salient 
features are discussed in the final section.
 PLG1 and ALG1
 In Comparison 1, the comparatively few PLG1 keywords (Appendix 95), 
place the speakers’ vocabulary range more within the mainstream of the debates. 
The longer ALG1 keyword list (Appendix 96) shows speakers used a wider range 
of less-shared words. Notably, there are no ALG1 sexuality-term keywords, while 
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GAY and SEXUALITY are PLG1 keywords. This suggests PLG1 speakers were 
more familiar with sexuality issues and more confident in talking about them. 
 Among the keywords collocating with the 15 sexuality terms (Appendices 
97-111 for PLG1 and 112-126 for ALG1) one in each corpus collocates widely. In 
PLG1, PEOPLE collocates with 12/15 terms (Appendix 127). The L1 (one place to 
the left) collocates of PEOPLE (Appendix 128) identify its referents: 
 YOUNG PEOPLE (98 uses)           GAY PEOPLE (14 uses)         6 million [gay] PEOPLE (3 uses) 
 homosexual PEOPLE (19 uses)    lesbian PEOPLE (10 uses: 9 paired with gay/1 with homosexual)
Some L1 uses of many/some/those/other/such/ordinary/these also refer to GAY 
PEOPLE  (Appendix 129). This suggests PLG1 speakers focused on the PEOPLE 
affected by the legislative proposals. In ALG1, people feature little. The ALG1 
keyword I  collocates with 10/15 terms (Appendix 130), which personalises the 
speakers’ statements. Of the R1 (one place to the right) collocates for I  (Appendix 
131), 29/114 are stative verbs or verbs with stative function:
 I AM (307)             I agree (26)                I wonder (16)       I share (5)             I doubt (3)
 I believe (106)       I know (26)                I feel (13)             I consider (5)         I welcome (3)
 I hope (87)            I understand (23)       I find (12)             I see (4)                 I suspect (3)
 I think (67)            I want (18)                I oppose (6)          I recognise (4)        I submit (3)
 I have (49)            I accept (17)              I prefer (5)            I remember (4)       I hear (3)
 I wish (31)            I support (16)            I suppose (5)        I deplore (3)
Eleven are modal or semi-modal verbs: 
 I shall (133)        I can (48)        I would (41)       I cannot (32)       I might (9)       I could (4)
 I should (69)       I may (46)       I must (32)         I will (25)           I have to (9)
Twenty-eight are reporting verbs some of which are also stative:
 I have +pp (154)       I understood (9)       I received (4)          I tried (3)                I endeavoured (3)
 I was (76)                 I read (8)                 I discussed (3)       I listened (3)           I indicated (3)
 I said (39)                 I made (7)               I agreed (3)            I looked (3)             I gave (3)
 I did (27)                  I spoke (5)               I dealt (3)               I enjoyed (3)           I felt (3)
 I had (23)                 I moved (5)              I began (3)             I explained (3)
 I thought (16)           I took (4)                  I came (3)               I supported (3)       
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This ALG1 subjectivity is strengthened by R1 emphatic adverbs: 
 I strongly (6)         I very (5)               I totally (4)         I well (3)              I really (3)
 I entirely (6)          I certainly (5)         I fully (4)           I warmly (3)         I personally (3)
In addition, I AM, I have and I do (Appendices 131A-C) preface further states and 
reports. This marks a clear contrast with the PLG1 focus on the PEOPLE affected 
by the proposals. Where sexuality was concerned, ALG1 speakers were more 
focused on their personal views. 
 The keyword lists (Appendices 95-96) are further considered along-side 
themes identified on the sexuality-term collocate charts (Appendices 97-111 for 
PLG1 and 112-126 for ALG⎯the themes are collated in Appendices 132-143). 
Ranking the percentage of collocates in each corpus highlights the speakers’ 
main preoccupations: 
 PLG1 Themes     ALG1 Themes _____________________________________  _____________________________________
1. Prejudice/Rights (0.31%/2KWs)   Prejudice/Rights (0.32%/3KWs)
2. Gender (0.23%/2KWs)    Sexual Activity (0.24%)
3. Sexual Activity (0.17%/1KW)   Groups/Organisations (0.18%/4KWs)
4. Children/Young People (0.14%/1KW)  Gender (0.12%)
5. Groups/Organisations (0.11%)   Children/Young People (0.09%)
6. Education/Schools (0.10%/2KWs)  Education/Schools (0.09%)
7. Relationships (0.08%)    ‘Offences’/Criminality (0.08%)
8. ‘Offences’/Criminality (0.08%)   Relationships (0.06%)
9. Parenting/Families (0.03%)   Parenting/Families (0.04%)
10. Health/Disease (0.02%)    Health/Disease (0.01%)
11. Religion/Moralities (<0.01%)   Normality/Deviance (<0.01%)
12. Normality/Deviance (<0.01%)   Religion/Moralities (<0.01%)
To prioritise the most contentious issues, only those themes where the collocates 
in both corpora amount to >0.10% of the corpus words are examined below.
*       *       *
 Prejudice, Discrimination and Rights (Appendix 132) has most collocates. 
In both corpora, homosexual/homosexuals/homosexuality collocate reciprocally 
with heterosexual/heterosexuals/heterosexuality, but there is an imbalance: 
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PLG1 term   Collocates/Frequency (%) ALG1 term   Collocates/Frequency (%) __________________________________  ___________________________________
 homosexual  25/351       (7.1%)  homosexual  15/334        (4.5%)
 heterosexual  25/101        (25%)  heterosexual 15/59      (25.4%)
 homosexuals 10/166          (6%)  homosexuals   4/158        (2.5%)
 heterosexuals 10/33     (30.3%)  heterosexuals   4/12      (33.3%)
 homosexuality   3/393       (0.8%)  homosexuality   8/362        (2.2%)
 heterosexuality   3/15        (20%)  heterosexuality   8/19      (42.1%)
The sparse use and greater pairing of heterosexual/heterosexuals/heterosexuality 
in both corpora support the category’s largely taken-for-granted status, it was 
“not subject to discussion” in its own right (Voloshinov 2012: 167). However, the 
terms were differently associated by each side. In ALG1, alternative occurs in 
claims that homosexuality was not an acceptable alternative to heterosexuality 
(Appendix 144); in PLG1, acceptance occurs in arguments supporting acceptance 
of homosexuality (ibid). In ALG1 between occurs in assertions of difference or 
denials of equality between homosexuality and heterosexuality (Appendix 145); in 
PLG1 whether occurs in statements applied to both heterosexual and homosexual 
(ibid). The shared collocates occur largely in Clause 28 debates in arguments 
over the claimed promotion: 
 acceptable       acceptability       discrimination       encouraging       illegal            problems
 prohibition       promote              promoted              promotes           promoting       promotion
As in the Clause wording they link to the clinical terms and not lesbian or gay. 
 Two collocates, against and rights, link to lesbian and gay as well as the 
clinical terms. In PLG1, the R1 collocates for against  (Appendix 146) list:
 against homosexuals (11)           against AIDS (6)              against local (3) 
 against lesbians (6)                    against GAY (6)              against PEOPLE (3) 
Concordance lines for these collocates (Appendix 147) show that discrimination 
and PREJUDICE against homosexuals, lesbians and GAY MEN, AIDS prevention 
initiatives, local authorities and PEOPLE in general were concerns. PREJUDICE, 
FEAR and BIGOTRY are keywords (Appendices 148-150), plus discrimination was 
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proportionately more used by PLG1 speakers and collocates more widely with the 
sexuality terms. In ALG1, the R1 collocates for against (Appendix 151) list:
 against homosexuals (13)        against discrimination (3) 
Denials pervade the lines for both collocates (Appendix 152), but are undermined 
by the keyword collocates PROHIBITION, INFLUENCE and LIFESTYLE (Appendix 
153). Most lines for PROHIBITION link to the claimed promotion of homosexuality 
in Clause 28 debates, while the lines for INFLUENCE of and LIFESTYLE position 
homosexuality as undesirable.
 Similar differences are evident in the collocates for rights. In PLG1, the L1 
collocates for rights (Appendix 154) list:
 human rights (39)         civil rights (27)         GAY rights (13)         equal rights (7) 
These collocates (Appendix 155) occur in various arguments. The lines for human 
rights and civil rights appeal to an assumed commitment to both. Most lines for 
GAY rights occur in Clause 28 debates and defend Labour support for them, 
while the lines for equal rights occur in equality arguments. In ALG1, the L1 
collocates for rights (Appendix 156) list:
 civil rights (14)         human rights (8)         gay rights (5)         lesbian rights (5) 
The lines for these collocates (Appendix 157) also occur in different arguments. 
Most lines for civil rights, occur in Clause 28 debates and claim protection of civil 
rights while denying the Clause would affect them. Similarly, the lines for human 
rights occur in denials that the issues in question were a human rights matter. 
However the lines for gay rights and lesbian rights exude scepticism and derision, 
which further undermines ALG1 speakers’ claims to be against discrimination 
and protecting civil rights. 
 The theme reveals important distinctions between the corpora. PLG1 
speakers argued against prejudice and discrimination and defended lesbian and 
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gay rights. ALG1 speakers denied discrimination, but refused to consider how 
rights applied to lesbians and gay men. In so doing, they maintained the “official 
ideology” (Volshinov 1976: 88-9) of homophobic beliefs.
*       *       *
 The theme of Sexual Activity (Appendix 133) has the second-highest joint 
collocate frequency, markedly higher in ALG1. Many collocates are shared:
 activity           acts           behaviour     act                consent     sex                 sexual       conduct
 intercourse     relations     engage        experience     private      homosexual     matters     
However their distribution varies. The ALG1 focus is on homosexual activity, but 
the PLG1 focus extends to sexual activity and heterosexual activity. Gay(s) barely 
feature in the theme and lesbian(s) not at all. The sexual activity is linked to the 
clinical terms (as in Baker 2004b/2005: Ch.2), while the intermittent pairing of 
homosexual(s) and lesbian(s) (Appendices 158-159) shifts the focus onto men. 
Activity is the most frequent collocate and links to homosexual, heterosexual and 
sexual in both corpora. Acts is the second-most frequent collocate which in ALG1 
links only to homosexual, but in PLG1 to homosexual, sexual and heterosexual.
 The ALG1 concordance lines for homosexual activity (Appendix 160) divide 
between legislative issues. Those in Clause 28 debates (1-11) imply Labour 
councils were promoting homosexual activity, though whether this was actually 
believed or a rhetorical ploy is indeterminable. Lines in armed-forces debates 
(12-17; 25-32) stress the incompatibility of homosexual activity with forces life, 
though administrative discharge applied to lesbian and gay personnel regardless 
of sexual activity. This conflation of homosexuality with acts epitomises the ALG1 
position. Lines occurring in the age-of-consent debates (18-24) cast homosexual 
activity as neither natural nor normal, nor equivalent to heterosexual activity. 
These views are echoed in the lines for sexual activity and heterosexual activity 
(ibid) in which derision of homosexuality is maintained. References to infection 
and disease appear in the lines for all three collocates. 
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 The ALG1 lines for homosexual acts (Appendix 161) also divide between 
legislative issues. Those in Clause 28 debates (1-9) focus mainly on descriptions 
of homosexual acts and the feared acceptance of homosexuality. Homosexuality is 
again conflated with acts and compounded by the scarcity of ALG1 collocates 
linked to Relationships (Appendix 139). Lines in armed-forces debates focus on 
decriminalisation (10-11) and the dismissal of homosexual personnel (19-26; 29). 
Though dismissal applied equally to lesbians, the lines focus on sex between 
men. Lines in age-of-consent debates (12-18) cite Christian morality and stress 
privacy: abnormal, offensive, morally wrong and buggery pepper the lines. Both 
buggery and private (Appendix 162) collocate with homosexual and link to the 
conditions of the 1967 Sexual Offences Act which applied only to men and which 
ALG1 speakers upheld as a bastion of tolerance in civilian life. 
 Most PLG1 lines for homosexual activity (Appendix 163) occur in armed-
forces debates. While lines 2-6 occur in arguments for the decriminalisation of 
gay forces personnel, lines 13-17 are concessionary: they occur in an attempt to 
dissuade military chiefs from making the 1992 discharge policy legally binding. 
Lines in age of consent debates (7-11) occur in arguments for decriminalisation 
and include a refutation that homosexual activity was abnormal. Similarly, the 
concession in a Clause 28 debate (1) that homosexual activity was morally wrong 
prefaces the argument that this was no reason to legislate against it. The lines 
for sexual activity (ibid) maintain equality between sexualities, as do the lines for 
heterosexual activity (ibid), one of which (2) challenges its claimed normality. 
 Most PLG1 lines for homosexual acts (Appendix 164) occur in age-of-
consent debates (8-23) where they dispute distinctions between heterosexual and 
homosexual acts and legal distinctions between homosexual men and women. 
Conversely, they do distinguish between homosexual acts and homosexuality in 
arguing that the former do not necessarily lead to the latter. Similarly, the lines 
in Clause 28 debates (1-7) tackle the ALG1 conflation of homosexual acts with 
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homosexuality, as does a line for sexual acts (1) and one for heterosexual acts (1) 
(ibid). Most lines for these latter collocates occur in age-of-consent debates (3-12; 
2-3). Those for sexual acts dispute distinctions between sexualities and genders, 
while those for heterosexual acts uphold the age of 16 as an enforceable age of 
consent for all. There is also more PLG1 emphasis on consent. Consenting and 
consensual are PLG1 collocates as well as consent. However, as Waites (2005a: 5) 
notes, the age of consent refers to legality rather than criteria for consent. 
 The theme illustrates a very basic difference. ALG1 speakers premised 
their claims on sexual acts, thus reviving the lingering heritage of sin and crime 
(Chapter 1). This enabled them to conjure and propagate negative associations 
without directly attacking the people concerned. PLG1 speakers premised their 
arguments on people’s contemporary identities, which illustrates the importance 
group identity in political struggle. As Voloshinov (2012: 146) argued, struggle 
against “official ideology” requires group engagement. 
*       *        *
 The third theme, Gender (Appendix 134), is harder to unravel. The pairing 
of lesbian(s) with gay(s) or homosexual(s) positions the latter as male categories. 
The pairing of lesbianism and homosexuality makes the same point. The pairings 
total 113 in PLG1 (Appendix 165) and 52 in ALG1 (Appendix 166). Though PLG1 
speakers were more inclusive of women, there is an imbalance:
 PLG1 term  total with      total paired % paired  _________________________________________________________________________
  lesbian  87 GAY/homosexual    65+5  80.5%
  lesbians 52 GAY/homosexuals/gays   21+11+8 77%
  lesbianism 5 homosexuality    3  60%
  GAY  237 lesbian/lesbians   65+21  36.3%
  gays  21 lesbians    8  38%
  homosexual 352 lesbian     5  1.4%
  homosexuals 166 lesbians    11  6.6%
  homosexuality 393 lesbianism    3  0.76%
The much higher percentages of pairings for lesbian(s) positions them largely as 
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appendages to the male-aligned terms in that they have little independent use. 
The clinical terms in particular are largely male aligned. Excluding the 14 uses of 
GAY PEOPLE and 19 of homosexual PEOPLE makes little difference to the degree 
of male alignment. In addition, neither GAY PEOPLE nor homosexual PEOPLE link 
to lesbian, but 10/11 uses of lesbian PEOPLE occur in GAY and lesbian PEOPLE 
and one in homosexual and lesbian PEOPLE. This positions GAY/homosexual 
MEN as the focus of debate.
 The PLG1 pairings of women/MEN and female/male (Appendix 167) follow 
a similar pattern, but with a less extreme imbalance: 
PLG1 term total with total % paired sexuality identified  %   no.paired _________________________________________ ___________________________________
 women 106 men 35 33%   women 9/106  8.5%  (8 paired)
 MEN 243 women 35 14.4%   MEN 83/243  33.9%  (8 paired)*
 female 16 male 10 62.5%   female 7/16  43.8%  (5 paired)
 male 45 female 10 22.2%   male 20/45  44.4%  (5 paired)**
 * although 8 identifications are paired with women, 22 others are paired with lesbian(s)
 ** although three identifications are paired with female, two others are paired with lesbian(s)
While there are proportionately more independent uses of women and female 
than lesbian(s), MEN and male are salient. The MEN also have their sexuality 
identified more often, while all but one identification of women’s sexuality are in 
pairings (Appendices 168-169). The pattern for female and male is similar but 
more negative (Appendices 170-171). Sexuality is identified mostly via the clinical 
terms and linked to criminality (rape/teacher-pupil seduction) and litigation. 
Also female is more sexualised than women (7/16 lines link female to sexuality, 
only 9/106 do so for women). With the scarcity of heterosexual identification, 
this suggests the sexuality of women and heterosexuals was not at issue. 
 Although PLG1 speakers were ostensibly defending both lesbians and GAY 
MEN in 12/14 debates, they focused on MEN. The extent to which they were 
addressing an ALG1 agenda, historical precedents, or internalised stereotypes is 
indeterminable, but there is support for the first of these in ALG1. 
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 The ALG1 imbalance of non-heterosexual-term pairings is less marked for 
lesbian(s) and gay(s), but similar for the clinical terms:
 ALG1 term  total with      total paired % paired  _________________________________________________________________________
  lesbian  48 gay/homosexual    29+4  68.8%
  lesbians 20 homosexuals/gay/gays   7+4+4  75%
  lesbianism 6 homosexuality    5  83%
  gay  77 lesbian/lesbians   29+4  42.9%
  gays  4 lesbians    4  100%
  homosexual 334 lesbian     4  1.2%
  homosexuals 158 lesbians    7  4.4%
  homosexuality 362 lesbianism    5  1.4%
Three uses of gay people and two of homosexual people make little difference to 
the degree of male alignment, plus the two uses of lesbian people are paired with 
gay. However, the independent use of lesbian(s) is larger than in PLG1. The ALG1 
concordance lines (Appendix 172) portray lesbian(s) as relatively benign unless 
parenting is involved (lesbian 5, 24, 41-3/lesbians 19); only two lines suggest 
sexual threat (lesbian 47-8). In addition, the retention of lesbian with homosexual 
(lesbian 44-6) in an amendment supports homosexual as a gendered term. This 
further positions homosexual men as the main concern, subsumed in the case of 
ALG1 by homosexual acts. 
 The ALG1 frequencies of men/women and male/female (Appendix 173) are 
more balanced and more frequently paired:
ALG1 term total with total % paired sexuality identified  %   no.paired _________________________________________ __________________________________
 women 58 men 28 48.2%   women  5/58  8.6%  (4 paired)
 men 97 women 28 28.9%   men  13/97  13.4%  (4 paired)*
 female 17 male 13 76.5%   female  5/17  29.4%  (5 paired)
 male 34 female 13 38.2%   male  14/34  41.2%  (5 paired)
 * although four identifications are paired with women, four others are paired with lesbian(s)
While women is less often paired than female or lesbian(s), men and male have 
greater independent use and their sexuality is more often identified (Appendices 
174-175). Notably, there are no references to heterosexual men, but while men’s 
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sexuality is identified more often than women’s, the difference is smaller than in 
PLG1. As in PLG1, female is more sexualised than women, but the ALG1 uses of 
female and male are more negative (Appendices 176-177). As well as the use of 
clinical terms and links to criminality, the lines for both terms are peppered with 
references to that unnatural act, buggery and anal intercourse. 
 Various points need further comment. The greater independent use of 
women in both corpora is accompanied by lower levels of sexuality identification. 
The uses of female are not only more frequently paired, but have negative sexual 
associations that women does not. This difference also applies to male and men, 
especially in ALG1. Both women and men are nouns for people. PLG1 speakers’ 
greater use of these nouns can be related to their concern with the effects of the 
proposals on people’s lives, while their greater focus on the sexual identity of men 
humanises the ALG1 undertow of male homosexual acts. By contrast, female and 
male are adjectives for concepts that need not apply to people. They are thus an 
easier target for negativity, most evident in ALG1.
 Ultimately, the focus on men aligns with views of sexuality based on the 
maintenance of gender divisions handed down via dominant interpretations of 
the bible, imperial laws and quasi-scientific clinical discourse (Chapter 1). It is 
this heritage, the “official ideology” (Voloshinov 2012: 146) it propagated and 
perpetuated, and its proscriptions of sex between men, that ALG1 speakers drew 
on. However, while PLG1 speakers argued for an equal age of consent for men 
and women, and upheld equality in general, the gender binary went completely 
unquestioned in all debates; it had not become “dubious” (ibid: 101). 
*       *       *
 The fourth and final theme in this comparison, Groups and Organisations 
(Appendix 135) relates to 1980s political struggles. Most collocates occur in 
Clause 28 debates. All but one link to the non-heterosexual terms. The most 
frequent collocates in both corpora are local, authority/authorities, which ALG1 
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speakers claimed were promoting homosexuality. All three are ALG1 keywords, 
while council, councils and positive images are related collocates linked mainly to 
the clinical terms, especially homosexuality, as in the Clause wording. However, 
twelve collocates link only to lesbian or gay: 
 ALG1  charter       strength       pride       proud       centres        clubs
 PLG1  Labour       group       theatre       campaign       lines       Capital       centres       clubs
These two sets of collocates highlight key features of the 1980s struggle against 
prejudice and discrimination. 
 Concordance lines for the ALG1 collocates (Appendix 178) show they all 
occur in reports or quotes, which places them outside the speakers’ spontaneous 
repertoire, or unappropriated (Bakhtin 1981: 294). The ubiquity of the collocates 
suggests it was their link to lesbian and gay that put them beyond spontaneous 
use. This non-acceptance of lesbian and gay identities is supported by speakers’ 
more frequent and less reported use of clinical terms, as in the lines for groups 
and community, which collocate with clinical terms as well as lesbian and gay 
(Appendix 179). The ALG1 keyword HETEROSEXISM also occurs only in reports 
or quotes (Appendix 180) and was construed as an attack on heterosexuality 
rather than a term for institutionalised prejudice and discrimination. 
 Factual inaccuracies in the ALG1 lines show the extent to which speakers’ 
information came from hearsay. For example: ‘Changing the World’ was neither 
an ILEA publication nor a glossy pamphlet (charter 1 & 7) but a grey-covered 
booklet produced by the GLC lesbian and gay working party; Lesbian Strength 
and Gay Pride marches were for all lesbians and gay men, not specifically young 
people (strength 5, pride 5); the book ‘Young Gay and Proud’ was for teenagers, 
not children (proud 2); the claim that two-year-olds had access to lesbian and 
gay books in Lambeth play-centres (centres 3) was an inflated account of an 
undated Evening Standard item cited in an earlier debate (HL 11.1.1988 c.1012); 
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‘Tackling Heterosexism’ was not a book brought out by nine London boroughs 
(HETEROSEXISM 8) but a grey-covered booklet produced by the GLC Women’s 
Committee. These quotes and reports misrepresent the publications and events 
referred to. Whether uncomprehending, credulous, or deliberate, they locate 
speakers’ “social hierarchy of values” (Voloshinov 1986: 123) within the heritage 
of homophobic belief. Misrepresentation is also evident in the lines for positive 
images (Appendix 181) which were misconstrued as promotion of homosexuality 
and by implication, as noted above, homosexual acts. While the PLG1 lines for 
positive images (ibid) challenge the claimed promotion, they fail to address the 
undertow of sexual activity. 
 The PLG1 collocates occur in fewer reports or quotes (Appendix 182). Ten 
lines (Labour 20-3/campaign 22, 24-5/lines 11-12/centres 7) occur in quotes of 
the 1985 Labour-conference resolution on recognising lesbian and gay rights 
and opposing discrimination. These upholdings of Labour policy against ALG1 
misrepresentation occur in the final debate on the Clause before it became law. 
Most other lines occur in justifications of local services for lesbians and GAY 
MEN, or in questions about what constituted promotion. However, two lines for 
campaign (28-29) condemn the Liberals’ exploitation of homophobia during the 
1983 Bermondsey by-election when Peter Tatchell was the Labour candidate. 
 The theme captures some of the local initiatives targeted by Clause 28, 
which in turn became the catalyst that galvanised the struggle for legal reform. 
PLG1 speakers’ acceptance of lesbian and GAY self-chosen identities and anti-
discrimination agenda supports the importance of group identity in political 
struggle. ALG1 speakers’ refusal of lesbian and gay identities and preference for 
the clinical terms linked to (homo)sexual acts (as in Baker 2004b: 92-3) enabled 
them to bypass consideration of lesbians and gay men as people and citizens and 
to misrepresent the struggle against discrimination.
*       *       *
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 The four themes in this first comparison expose notable polarisations. The 
corpora represent two distinct “communities of value judgments” (Voloshinov 
2012: 165). In PLG1, the objective focus on people, via references to lesbians, 
GAY MEN, PEOPLE and CITIZENS, defends anti-discrimination initiatives and 
recognises rights. In ALG1, the subjective focus on speakers’ own views, via the 
keyword I, defends the prohibition of sexual acts between men. The heritage from 
which this subjectivity derives (Chapter 1) relates to the protection of male-
gender boundaries, which are a key constituent of homophobic beliefs. 
 PLG2 and ALG2
 The debates in Comparison 2 divide less along party lines: only two 
debates had whipped votes on both sides; four had whipped votes on one side; 
eight had free votes on both sides. PLG2 speakers include members of all but the 
Unionist parties, but Conservatives dominate ALG2. Prominent among the ALG2 
keywords (Appendix 183) is HOMOSEXUAL with p<0.0000000000 which suggests 
speakers clung to the clinical view. Both LESBIAN and GAY are PLG2 keywords 
(Appendix 184).
 Among the keywords collocating with sexuality terms (Appendices 185-
198 for PLG2 and 199-212 for ALG2) four are prominent. In PLG2, AND and FOR 
collocate with 14/15 and 13/15 terms respectively (Appendix 213). Their L1 and 
R1 collocates illustrate staple features of PLG2. Many collocates of AND concern 
relationship qualities (Appendices 214-215), some of which are linked to form 
recurring thematic pairs. Top among these is rights AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
(Appendix 216) which pervades the civil partnership debates, other paired 
collocates capture the often emotive PLG2 portrayal of relationships (Appendix 
217). The L1 and R1 collocates of FOR are less paired (Appendices 218-219). 
Those that recur support the PLG2 focus on relationships with both real-life and 
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generalised examples (Appendix 220). The PLG2 objective focus on people is 
sustained by the keyword THEIR with p<0.0000000000, which collocates with 
8/15 sexuality terms (Appendix 213). The R1 collocates for THEIR (Appendix 221) 
show the top 20 nouns to which it applies mainly concern people’s relationships:
 lives (49)                    parents (17)            sexuality (13)           home (10)           marriage (6)
 relationship (49)         PARTNER (15)         partnership (13)       lordships (8)       suitability (6)
 children (28)              PARTNERS (14)       commitment (12)       families (7)         partnerships (6)
 relationships (24)       life (14)                   rights (12)                family (7)            position (6)
In ALG2, the keyword I  has p<0.0000000008 and collocates with 8/15 sexuality 
terms (Appendix 222). Of the R1 collocates for I  (Appendix 223), 34/124 are 
stative verbs or verbs with stative function:
 I AM (388)                 I agree (34)          I suspect (13)         I suppose (7)         I remain (5)
 I believe (89)              I want (34)           I recognise (11)      I see (6)                I disagee (4)
 I hope (78)                 I find (21)            I welcome (10)        I doubt (6)             I gather (4)
 I think (62)                I wish (18)            I respect (8)           I realise (6)            I recall (3)
 I have (42)                 I accept (18)         I wonder (8)           I assume (5)          I happen (3)
 I understand (36)       I feel (15)             I presume (8)         I oppose (5)           I trust (3)
 I know (36)                I support (14)       I fear (8)                I remember (5)
Eleven are modal or semi-modal verbs:
 I shall (140)       I can (40)       I cannot (37)       I may (27)        I could (10)       I have to (3)
 I would (58)       I will (39)       I should (28)       I must (13)       I might (4)
Thirty are reporting verbs, some of which are stative:
 I have +pp (90)    I tabled (9)           I gave (6)           I heard (5)       I started (4)    I moved (3)
 I was (78)            I thought (9)        I raised (6)         I referred (5)    I quoted (4)     I were (3)
 I said (34)            I listened (8)       I suggested (5)    I pointed (4)    I used (3)       I dealt (3)
 I did (25)             I came (6)            I read (5)            I felt (4)          I made (3)      I received (3)
 I had (20)            I mentioned (6)    I asked (5)          I wanted (4)    I saw (3)        I described (3)
Six are emphatic adverbs:
 I certainly (13)       I entirely (8)       I really (8)       I very (6)       I simply (6)       I warmly (3)
As in ALG1, I AM, I have and I do preface further states and reports (Appendices 
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223A-C). That both ALG1 and ALG2 speakers were predisposed to personalising 
their views of the legislative proposals in question, affirms the subjectivity of 
their resistance to reform. 
 Of the sexuality-term-collocate themes in Comparison 2 (Appendices 
185-198 for PLG2 and 199-212 for ALG2⎯collated Appendices 224-235), only 
three have collocates amounting to >0.10% in both corpora:
 PLG2 Themes     ALG2 Themes ________________________________  _________________________________
1. Relationships (0.60%/8KWs)   Relationships (0.53%/3KWs)
2. Gender (0.34%/3KWs)    Gender (0.23%/1KW)
3. Prejudice/Rights (0.20%/9KWs)   Prejudice/Rights (0.10%/2KWs)
4. Parenting/Families (0.05%)   Parenting/Families (0.04%/1KW)
5. Children/Young People (0.02%)   Education/Schools (0.04%/1KW)
6. Education/Schools (0.02%)   Children/Young People (0.01%)
7. Religion/Moralities (<0.01%)   Groups/Organisations (<0.01%)
8. ‘Offences’/Criminality (<0.01%)   Religion/Moralities (<0.01%)
9. Groups/Organisations (<0.01%)   Sexual Activity (<0.01%)
10. Sexual Activity (<0.01%)    Health/Disease (0)
11. Health/Disease (0)    Normality/Deviance (0)
12. Normality/Deviance (0)    ‘Offences’/Criminality (0) 
In addition, the last six themes in both corpora account for <0.01% of each 
corpus, two of which in PLG2 and three in ALG2 have no linked collocates at all. 
This constitutes a reversal when compared with Comparison 1. In Comparison 1, 
only two themes accounted for <0.01% of each corpora and the themes of ‘Sexual 
Activity’ and ‘Groups and Organisations’ were prominent. In the case of ‘Groups 
and Organisations’ this suggests that post Clause 28 the theme became a non-
issue. The other five diminished themes in Comparison 2 are all particularly 
negative which suggests associations with them were becoming less publicly 
acceptable. Conversely, the top theme in Comparison 2, ‘Relationships’, was not 
prominent in Comparison 1.
*       *       *
 There is considerable repetition among the collocates linked to the theme 
of Relationships (Appendix 224). By far the most frequent in both corpora are 
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couple(s) and relationship(s), plus the PLG2 keywords PARTNER(S) and the ALG2 
keyword MARRIAGE. 
 The PLG2 collocates for couple(s), relationship(s) and PARTNER(S) confirm 
the repetition (Appendices 236-241). This is most clearly illustrated on the PLG2 
Venn diagram below. The collocates in the centre of the diagram, which are 
shared by all three categories, occur in two main arguments: 
 1.  for the legal RECOGNITION of long-term LESBIAN, GAY or same-sex PARTNERS, who may have 
      been together FOR years, via REGISTRATION of THEIR partnership;
 2.  for legal parity of CIVIL PARTNERS with married heterosexual/opposite-sex couples. 
Other arguments attach to unmarried: 
 1.  against the exclusion of unmarried couples from joint adoption applications;
 2.  against situations that unmarried (heterosexual) or same-sex PARTNERS face through lack of 
      legal rights.
Collocates shared by couple(s) and relationship(s) highlight emotional qualities: 
stable, LOVING, committed and love apply to unmarried couples’ relationships or 
children’s needs in adoption debates and to same-sex couples’ relationships’ in 
civil partnership debates (Appendices 242-245). Sexual collocates only with 
relationship(s) and occurs mainly in responses to ALG2 consternation that CIVIL 
partnership applied only to (homo)sexual relationships (Appendix 246). Collocates 
shared by couple(s) and PARTNER(S) highlight equality: arguments about who 
can/cannot marry mostly support the legal RECOGNITION of same-sex couple(s) 
or PARTNER(S), while benefits, RESPONSIBILITIES, treatment, PENSION, SIMILAR 
and survivor occur mostly in arguments for legal parity between CIVIL PARTNERS 
and married couples (Appendices 247-253). Collocates of couple(s) link largely to 
arguments against discrimination, while those of PARTNER(S) are specific to 
arguments against the proposed unequal PENSION provision for bereaved CIVIL 
PARTNERS. Conversely, the non-collocation of homosexual with PARTNER(S) 
hails a positive dissociation of PARTNER(S) from this clinical term. 
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PLG2 Sexuality Term Collocates shared by Couple(s), Relationship(s), Partner(s)
COUPLE(S)
      
                                                              SINGLE    MIXED*
                                                    CHOICE*    DISCRIMINATION*
                                      UNDERMINE*    ARRANGEMENTS    PROBLEMS*
                                       DISADVANTAGES*    INJUSTICES*    INVISIBLE*
                                SUFFERED*    EXPERIENCED*    FEMALE*    OPPOSED*
                               TREATING*    EXCLUDE*    CEREMONY    DIFFICULTIES*
                                                                     SUFFER*
                                         COHABITING                          HOMOSEXUAL**
                              RELATIONSHIP                                         STABLE    LOVING
                       RELATIONSHIPS                      SEX**                       PARTNERSHIPS
                RESPONSIBILITIES*               SAME**    CIVIL                        COMMITTED
              MARRY    AGAINST*           MARRIED    UNMARRIED                   FORMALISE
                 TREATMENT*              LEGAL    GAY**    BETWEEN*                 MARRIAGE
                  SURVIVOR*               HETEROSEXUAL*    OPPOSITE*               CHOOSE
                   BENEFITS*            RIGHTS*    PARTNERSHIP    LONG                ENTER
                     PENSION*         RECOGNITION*    TOGETHER    TERM           LIVING
                       SIMILAR*         REGISTER    LESBIAN**    WHETHER*           LOVE
                           MALE*           PARTNERS    BOTH*    RECOGNISE
                                                YEARS    LIVE    CANNOT*    RIGHT*
                                                  PARTNER    TWO    REGISTERED
                                                     REGISTRATION    TREATED*
              SURVIVING*                                                                                      SEXUAL
                  PENSIONS*                                                                              COUPLE’S
                         TREAT*                          RECOGNISED
                                                                    COUPLES
                                                                     COUPLE
    
PARTNER(S)           RELATIONSHIP(S)
key: BLACK CAPITALS: sexuality-term collocates linked to Relationships (Appendix 224)
 RED CAPITALS: sexuality-term keyword collocates (p<0.0000000000 in bold)
          * sexuality-term collocates also linked to Gender (Appendix 225) 
          * sexuality-term collocates also linked to Prejudice, Discrimination & Rights (Appendix 226)
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 The ALG2 sexuality-term collocates for couple(s), relationship(s) and 
MARRIAGE (Appendices 254-258) are fewer than those in PLG2, but most are 
shared. Only five collocates on the ALG2 Venn diagram are not on that for PLG2 
(UNIQUE, platonic, sexes, gender, grounds). The collocates in the centre of the 
diagram occur in nine core claims:
 1.  that the relationship(s) of heterosexual couple(s) were more stable and more long-term/long- 
      lasting than the relationship(s) of HOMOSEXUAL/same-sex couple(s)
 2.  that HOMOSEXUAL/same-sex couple(s) could not provide stable homes for children
 3.  that allowing unmarried and HOMOSEXUAL/same-sex couples to adopt equated cohabitation 
      with MARRIAGE and HOMOSEXUAL relationships with heterosexual relationships
 4.  that civil partnerships were a form of civil MARRIAGE for HOMOSEXUAL/same-sex couples
 5.  that civil partnerships equated HOMOSEXUAL/same-sex relationships with MARRIAGE
 6.  that civil partnerships treated HOMOSEXUAL/same-sex couples as equal to heterosexual 
      couples
 7.  that civil partnerships undermined MARRIAGE
 8.  that civil partnerships unfairly privileged HOMOSEXUAL/same-sex couples
 9.  that restricting civil partnerships to HOMOSEXUAL/same-sex couples discriminated against 
      other long-term cohabitants
Significantly, stable collocates only with heterosexual among the sexuality terms. 
Collocates shared by couple(s) and MARRIAGE highlight perceived threats. Gay 
occurs in various negative claims: that civil partnership was gay MARRIAGE and 
thus undermined its (heterosexual) status; that gay couples were unfit to adopt; 
that civil partnership gave gay couple(s) preferential treatment (Appendix 259). 
UNIQUE occurs in protection of MARRIAGE claims and functions as a metaphor 
for heterosexual (Appendix 260). Collocates shared by couple(s) and relationship
(s) focus on relationship status. MARRIED couple(s) were claimed to be the only 
suitable parents, while unmarried and cohabiting couple(s), especially same-sex or 
HOMOSEXUAL couple(s) were deemed unsuitable (Appendices 261- 263). Together 
occurs mainly in claims that home-sharing relatives were unfairly excluded from 
civil partnership (Appendix 264). While some ALG2 collocates of couple(s) and/or 
relationship(s) relate to emotional qualities (loving/committed/caring/supportive/
love), they are not sexuality-term collocates (Appendix 224). They collocate with 
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ALG2 Sexuality Term Collocates shared by Couple(s), Relationship(s), Marriage
COUPLE(S)
      
                                                           MARRY    OPPOSITE*
                                                      BOTH*    GROUNDS*    LIVE
                                          LESBIAN*    SEXES*    GENDER*    PARTNER
                                                                 REGISTERED
                                           GAY*                                         MARRIED
                             RELATIONSHIPS                                           UNMARRIED
                        RELATIONSHIP                       SAME**                     COHABITING
                          AGAINST*                               SEX**                             MARRIAGE
                          UNIQUE                       HOMOSEXUAL**                        TOGETHER
                                                             HETEROSEXUAL*                         PARTNERS
                                                              PARTNERSHIPS                            PLATONIC
                                                               PARTNERSHIP 
                                                                  BETWEEN*
                                                                    STABLE
                                                                      CIVIL
                                                                      LONG
                                                                    RIGHTS*
                                                                       TWO
                                                                                                                       SEXUAL
                                                                                                                 COUPLE
                                                                    COUPLES
    
MARRIAGE            RELATIONSHIP(S)
key: BLACK CAPITALS: sexuality-term collocates linked to Relationships (Appendix 224)
 RED CAPITALS: sexuality-term keyword collocates (p<0.0000000000 in bold)
          * sexuality-term collocates also linked to Gender (Appendix 225) 
          * sexuality-term collocates also linked to Prejudice, Discrimination & Rights (Appendix 226)
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MARRIED (heterosexual) couples and children’s needs in adoption debates, and 
to familial relationships in civil partnership debates (Appendices 265-268), while 
platonic upholds the non-sexual nature of the latter (Appendix 269). As in PLG2, 
sexual collocates only with relationship(s) (Appendix 270), but in ALG2 13/27 
lines refer to relationship(s) that are not sexual in attempts to dissociate civil 
partnership from (homo)sexual relationships. This suggests an underlying 
preoccupation with sexual activity. 
 In both corpora, the theme can be summarised as emotive: in PLG2 on 
behalf of unmarried and same-sex couples; in ALG2 on behalf of (heterosexual) 
married parents and familial relationships⎯categories from which they excluded 
lesbian and gay parents, families and extended family members.
*       *       *
 The prominence of the second theme, Gender (Appendix 225), is largely 
due to the shift from sexuality identifiers to gendered terms which were applied 
to couple(s), relationship(s) and partner(s). As the initial frequency chart shows 
(Appendix 94), of the same sex features little in LG1 and same-sex not at all, but 
in LG2 the frequencies of both soar, especially in PLG2. This appropriation of 
gendered terms is most linked to civil partnership. The Government Bill defined 
civil partnership as ‘a relationship between two people of the same sex’, as does 
the Act. The frequencies of gendered terms are much higher in the 2004 debates: 
           same sex/same-sex   opposite sex/opposite-sex            _____________________  __________________________
PLG2 Lord Lester’s CP Bill 2002      7 + 25 = 32       6 + 3 = 9
 Adoption 2002      18 + 61 = 79       6 + 2 = 8
 Government CP Bill 2004    25 + 350 = 375    13 + 60 = 73
ALG2 Lord Lester’s CP Bill 2002      0 + 5 = 5       0 + 0 = 0
 Adoption 2002      25 + 40 = 65       0 + 0 = 0
 Government CP Bill 2004    31 + 136 = 167      9 + 13 = 22
The higher PLG2 frequency suggests same-sex was used to deflect an opposing 
focus on sexuality. The PLG2 inclusive use of unmarried couples in adoption 
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debates functioned similarly. Predictably, the sexuality of unmarried couples was 
differentiated more often in ALG2 (Appendices 271-272). 
 The PLG2 pairings of the non-heterosexual terms (Appendix 273) follow a 
similar pattern to that in PLG1 in that lesbian(s) have little independent use, but 
the frequencies of the clinical terms are much lower:
 PLG2 term  total with     total paired %paired  ________________________________________________________________________
  LESBIAN 106 GAY/homosexual   75+2=77 72.6%
  lesbians 27 GAY/gays/homosexuals   14+7+2=23 85.2%
  lesbianism 0 
  GAY  349 LESBIAN/lesbians   75+14=89 25.5%
  gays  14 lesbians    7  50%
  homosexual 129 LESBIAN    2  1.6%
  homosexuals 33 lesbians    2  6.1%
  homosexuality 56 
Excluding the 24 unpaired uses of gay people and two of homosexual people from 
the totals little affects the imbalance, but 13 uses of gay men and women suggest 
gay was becoming more used as an inclusive adjective. If so, this may account 
for the lower percentages of lesbian and gay pairings in PLG2, though the higher 
pairings of lesbians and gays suggest a gender distinction was maintained in the 
nouns. Despite the uncertainty, a gender imbalance remains and suggests the 
focus on non-heterosexuality was still inclined towards men. This is supported 
by the more balanced pairings of MEN/women and male/female (Appendix 274): 
PLG2 term total with total %paired sexuality identified  %  no.paired ________________________________________ ___________________________________
 women 78 men 29 37.2%   women 15/78  19.2%  (14 paired)
 MEN 79 women 29 36.7%   MEN 37/79  46.8%  (14 paired)*
 female 25 male 6 24%   female 8/25  32%  (3 paired)
 male 27 female 6 22.2%   male 10/27  37%  (3 paired)**
 * although 14 identifications are paired with women, 15 others are paired with lesbians
 ** although three identifications are paired with female, one other is paired with lesbian
The frequencies and pairings of these terms are almost equal, plus MEN is only a 
PLG2 keyword because the ALG2 frequency is very low (see below). MEN have 
their sexuality identified more often than women, but the difference is smaller 
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than in PLG1 (Appendices 275-276). As in PLG1, male and female are more often 
sexualised (Appendices 277-278), but less so via the clinical terms. Nevertheless, 
negativity survives in the lines for male via references to prosecuting, fear, sexual 
activity and prisoners, albeit in critical contexts.
 The ALG2 pairings of the non-heterosexual terms (Appendix 279) also 
follow a similar pattern to that in ALG1, but with proportionately higher uses of 
the clinical terms and fewer uses of lesbian(s) and gay(s):
 ALG2 term  total with     total paired %paired  ________________________________________________________________________
  lesbian  21 gay/HOMOSEXUAL   14+3=17 81%
  lesbians 10 gay/gays/homosexuals   2+3+2=7 70%
  lesbianism 1 
  gay  124 lesbian/lesbians   14+2=16 12.9%
  gays  7 lesbians    3  42.9%
  HOMOSEXUAL 176 lesbian     3  1.7%
  homosexuals 27 lesbians    3  11.1%
  homosexuality 31 
The imbalance of these pairings supports an ongoing focus on non-heterosexual 
men. Over half the pairs occur in adoption debates in arguments against same-
sex parenting, while those that occur in civil partnership debates degrade lesbian 
and gay partnership recognition in favour of cohabiting relatives.
 The ALG2 frequencies of men/women and male/female (Appendix 280) are 
comparatively low with an unexpected inversion in the case of women and men: 
ALG2 term total with total %paired sexuality identified  %  no.paired ________________________________________ __________________________________
 women 22 men 5 27.7%   women 1/22  4.5%  (1 paired)
 men 9 women 5 55.6%   men 4/9  44.4%  (1 paired)*
 female 13 male 7 53.8%   female 5/13  38.5%  (5 paired)
 male 17 female 7 41.1%   male 7/17  41.2%  (5 paired)**
 * although one identification is paired with women, two others are paired with lesbians
 ** although five identifications are paired with female, one other is paired with lesbian
Over half the pairs occur in adoption debates, mainly in idealisations of married 
(heterosexual) parenting. This is further illustrated in the lines for husband and 
wife, a man and a woman, and mother and FATHER (Appendix 281), which 
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position the protection of gender boundaries as a major factor underlying ALG2 
resistance to the proposals and as integral to the privileging of heterosexuality. 
By contrast, the PLG2 lines for a mother and a father, a man and a woman and 
husband and wife (Appendix 282) occur mainly in concessions to heterosexual 
parenting while defending alternatives, or in arguments supporting legal parity 
for civil partners and married couples. 
 The low ALG2 frequency of men requires comment. The independent uses 
of women are increased by references to the Women and Equality Unit/Deputy 
Minister and by the use of women in generalised examples linked to cohabitation 
and pension contributions where women’s heterosexuality is assumed (Appendix 
283). The lines for men are more paired and occur mostly in arguments against 
same-sex parenting. Similarly, 15/17 lines for male and 11/13 for female occur 
in adoption debates, where sexuality is identified mostly via the clinical terms 
(Appendix 284). Children’s believed needs for male and female role models or a 
male and female parent is asserted in eight lines, while the equal worth of male-
male/male-female/female-female relationships is rejected in three.
 The focus on gender in PLG2 and ALG2 functions differently to that in 
Comparison 1. Although the uses of non-heterosexual terms still incline towards 
men in both corpora, the reduced focus marks a departure from the earlier overt 
preoccupation with homosexual acts. In PLG2, the gendered terms occur mainly 
in equality arguments but, as in PLG1, the gender binary itself was completely 
taken for granted. As Baker (2006: 19) argues “Sometimes what is not said or 
written is more important than what is there”. The ALG2 uses of gendered terms 
occur primarily in arguments idealising heterosexual marriage and parenting 
which mark the preservation of gender divisions as an underlying concern. As 
noted in Comparison 1, the protection of gender boundaries is fundamental to 
the cluster of beliefs that constitute homophobia. 
*       *       *
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 The third theme, Prejudice, Discrimination and Rights (Appendix 226), is 
also focused on relationships; employment and education feature little. While in 
Comparison 1 heterosexual/heterosexuals/heterosexuality were less used and 
more collocated with the clinical terms, here the pattern of collocates differs:
PLG2 term   Collocates/Frequency (%) ALG2 term   Collocates/Frequency (%) ___________________________________  ___________________________________
 homosexual  15/129      (11.6%)  HOMOSEXUAL  12/176        (6.8%)
 heterosexual  15/159        (9.4%)  heterosexual 12/71        (16.9%)
 homosexuals   0/33    homosexual   0/27
 heterosexuals   0/19    heterosexuals   0/5
 homosexuality   0/56    homosexuality   3/31          (9.7%)
 heterosexuality   0/1    heterosexuality   3/3       (100%)
In ALG2, the proportionately lower frequencies of heterosexual(s) and paired use 
of heterosexual(ity) support the category’s continued taken-for-granted status. In 
PLG2, the higher frequencies and less-paired use of heterosexual suggests a less 
taken-for-granted view, but this is modified by other pairings:
PLG2 term     Collocates/Frequency (%) ALG2 term   Collocates/Frequency (%) ____________________________________  ___________________________________
 LESBIAN     5/106       (4.7%)  lesbian    0/21
 heterosexual     5/159       (3.1%)  heterosexual   0/71
 GAY    14/349          (4%)  gay    0/124
 heterosexual   14/159       (8.8%)  heterosexual   0/71
 same-sex *16/488       (3.3%)  same-sex *5/237        (2.1%)
 heterosexual *16/159     (10.1%)  heterosexual *5/71           (7%)
 same-sex *30/488       (6.2%)  same-sex *9/237        (3.8%)
 opposite-sex *30/90       (33.3%)  opposite-sex *9/23      (39.1%)
 *collocates counted in concordance lines where same-sex/same sex is paired with 
 heterosexual or with opposite-sex/opposite sex
In PLG2, heterosexual is paired with four terms (homosexual/LESBIAN/GAY/ 
same-sex) and same-sex with two (opposite-sex/heterosexual), which complicates 
comparison with ALG2. However, while the PLG2 pairings span a range of terms, 
those in ALG2 remain tied to the clinical terms. As in Comparison 1, the terms 
are differently associated in each corpus. In PLG2, between, whether and both 
apply to sexuality terms or civil partnership (Appendix 285) in arguments that 
support the legal equivalence of lesbians, gay men and heterosexuals as parents 
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or partners. In ALG2, comparable applications of between and both (Appendix 
286) occur in objections to equivalence.
 As in Comparison 1, rights and against illustrate the theme. In PLG2, the 
L1 collocates of rights (Appendix 287) list: 
 human rights (70)       pension rights (18)             accrued rights (7)      succession rights (5) 
 same rights (21)         property rights (11)            visiting rights (6)        equal rights (4) 
 legal rights (20)          partnership rights (10)       GAY rights (6)            prior rights (4)
The lines for these collocates occur in four main arguments (Appendix 288). 
Those for human rights co-opt a higher authority and include references to the 
ECvHR, the Human Rights Act, the ECtHR and the JCHR. Those for same rights, 
legal rights and equal rights occur in equality arguments, as do some lines for 
partnership rights. Other lines for partnership rights and most lines for gay rights 
occur in denials that civil partnership undermined marriage; others occur in 
arguments supporting next-of-kin rights for civil partners. 
 In ALG2, the L1 collocates of rights (Appendix 289) list:
 human rights (40)       same rights (13)         legal rights (6)            kin rights (4) 
 gay rights (14)            property rights (7)       pension rights (5)       HOMOSEXUAL rights (3) 
The lines for these collocates highlight five main concerns (Appendix 290). Those 
for human rights and property rights occur mainly in adoption debates: in fears 
about how human rights had been/might be interpreted, or the lack of legal 
control over unmarried-couple relationship breakdown. Those for gay rights and 
HOMOSEXUAL rights occur in dismissals or denigrations of what were cast as 
undeserved rights. Those for same rights and legal rights occur in complaints 
about the similarity of civil partnership to marriage. Those for pension rights and 
kin rights occur in attempts to extend civil partnership to cohabiting relatives. 
 In PLG2 the R1 collocates of against (Appendix 291) list:
 against GAY (5)                  against homosexuality (4)         against CIVIL (3) 
 against unmarried (4)         against couples (3)                   against marriage (3) 
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Apart from against marriage, the lines for these collocates (Appendix 292) occur 
in arguments against prejudice or discrimination. Those for against GAY, against 
homosexuality and against CIVIL concern prejudice against gay people in various 
debates. Those for against unmarried and against couples concern discrimination 
against unmarried couples in adoption debates. Of those for against marriage: 
one notes some heterosexual couples oppose marriage, the other refutes the 
ALG2 contention that civil partnership undermined marriage. 
 Although AGAINST is an ALG2 keyword, the R1 collocates (Appendix 293) 
reveal only AGAINST family and AGAINST ordinary. The lines for these collocates 
(Appendix 294) cast the exclusion of cohabiting relatives from civil partnership as 
discrimination AGAINST ordinary family members, that is ‘heterosexual’ family 
members. The lines for normal and natural support this (Appendix 295). Where 
normal applies to MARRIAGE, family relationships, population, relationship, mixed 
audience, way and lawyers, and where natural applies to parents, household and 
indirectly to parent, both function as a metaphor for heterosexual⎯as opposed to 
‘unnatural’ and ‘homosexual’. In addition, the lines for unnatural apply to sexual 
practices. Their occurrence in a civil partnership debate further suggests that a 
subterranean preoccupation with (homo)sexual acts lurked behind opposition to 
the Bill. Overt opposition was based on the claimed discrimination AGAINST 
(non-sexual) family relationships (Appendix 296). 
 While PLG2 speakers presented the non-recognition of same-sex couples 
as a product of discrimination and prejudice, ALG2 speakers tendentiously 
shifted that discrimination onto familial cohabitees. As van Dijk (1991: 199) 
argues, “the official norm of non-discrimination and tolerance [...] is rather 
powerful”, thus the ALG2 claims of discrimination against a socially accepted 
group were a means to marginalise same-sex couples.
*       *       *
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 Relationships are central to the three themes in Comparison 2. There is 
also a notable lack of overtly negative themes. The battles were fought largely on 
euphemistic and emotive grounds. Prominent in PLG2 is the inclusive use of 
unmarried and gender-aligned same-sex couples alongside an emotive focus on 
relationship qualities. In ALG2 speakers’ personalised statements, adherence to 
clinical terms and subversion of discrimination in civil partnership debates mark 
entrenched resistance to reform, albeit by a determined minority of peers and 
MPs. This begs the question of why civil partnership was so fiercely resisted. A 
plausible explanation is that legal recognition of same-sex partners challenged a 
core constituent of homophobia: it would sanction the believed ‘unnatural’ sexual 
practices underlying the protection of male gender boundaries. That this was not 
argued directly indicates that the age-old “official ideology” (Voloshinov 2012: 
145-7) was being driven underground in public discourse. 
 PLG1+2 and ALG1+2
 Comparison 3 is approached via the keywords and collocates of the 15 
sexuality terms in their lexical categories: adjectives, nouns for people and 
abstract nouns. The six adjectives account for the largest proportions of both 
corpora, but with wider use and more keyword collocates in PLG1+2:
 PLG1+2 Adjectives    ALG1+2 Adjectives _________________________________  ________________________________
1. GAY (586, 0.14% KW)    HOMOSEXUAL (510, 0.20% KW)
2. same sex /same-sex (496, 0.12%)  same sex/same-sex (243, 0.09%)
3. homosexual (481, 0.12%)   sexual (238, 0.09%)
4. sexual (372, 0.09%)    gay (201, 0.08%)
5. heterosexual (260, 0.06%)   heterosexual (130, 0.05%)
6. LESBIAN (193, 0.05% KW)   lesbian (69, 0.03%)
 totals include adjectives with attached dash ignored by concordancing software
Although sex sometimes functions as an adjective, as in sex education or sex 
discrimination, in such compounds it refers either to sexual acts or gender and so 
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is more conveniently analysed with the abstract nouns. 
 In PLG1+2 LESBIAN and GAY are keywords⎯GAY with p<0.0000000000 
(Appendix 297). In ALG1+2 HOMOSEXUAL is the top keyword with this p-value 
(Appendix 298). The keyword collocates for each adjective (Appendices 299-304 
for PLG1+2 and 305-310 for ALG1+2⎯collated Appendices 311-316) highlight 
prominent features of each corpus. A striking contrast is between I  in ALG1+2 
and THEY/THEIR in PLG1+2. All three collocate with all six adjectives, plus I  
and THEIR have p<0.0000000000. This supports PLG1+2 speakers’ objective 
focus on the people affected by the proposals and ALG1+2 speakers’ subjective 
focus on their own views. Other keyword collocates support this. In PLG1+2 
COUPLES, RIGHTS, CHILDREN, PARTNERS, CHILD and MEN collocate with at 
least four adjectives. In ALG1+2, AM collocates with four adjectives and MY with 
three, plus AM has p<0.0000000000. While PLG1+2 keywords collocate widely 
with the adjectives, ALG1+2 keywords do so only with HOMOSEXUAL. 
*       *       *
 The R1 collocates of each adjective show the nouns to which they apply. In 
both corpora, same-sex (Appendices 317-318) applies to nouns salient in civil 
partnership and adoption debates. Eight nouns are shared:
 couples      relationships      partnerships      partners      marriage      relationship      adoption 
In PLG1+2, COUPLES, PARTNERS and PARTNER are keywords (Appendix 311) 
which further supports speakers’ focus on people.
 Over a third of the R1 nouns to which homosexual applies refer to sexual 
acts in both corpora (Appendices 319-320): 9/21 in PLG1+2 and 12/34 in 
ALG1+2, seven of which are shared: 
 acts         activity         behaviour         act         conduct         relations         sex
Two more nouns refer to sexual acts in PLG1+2 (abuse and offences) and five 
472
more in ALG1+2 (practices/ACTIVITIES/practice/experience/consent). The total 
collocate frequencies are proportionately higher in ALG1+2. These nouns link 
homosexual to the heritage of sin and crime (Chapter 1). Fewer nouns link to 
relationships: 5/26 in PLG1+2 and 7/36 in ALG1+2, four of which are shared: 
 couples         relationships         couple         relationship
In ALG1+2, the application of HOMOSEXUAL to three more nouns (marriage/ 
partnerships/partners) plus the consistently higher frequency of R1 relationship 
nouns, imposes a clinical view on the relationships. The clinical association in 
PLG1+2 is mitigated by love among the nouns and by RIGHTS, RECOGNOTION, 
LOVING and RESPECT among the keyword collocates (Appendix 312), but in 
ALG1+2 the potentially mitigating HOMOSEXUAL rights occurs in denials or 
dismissive asides (Appendix 321). A similarity between the two corpora relates to 
gender. Homosexual applies to men and man in both, but not women. Gay also 
applies to men but not directly to women. This supports a preoccupation with 
non-heterosexual men, albeit defensive in PLG1+2. A notable difference between 
the corpora is the ALG1+2 application of HOMOSEXUAL to lobby, fraternity, 
tendencies and LIFESTYLE, which occur mainly in critical statements (Appendix 
322), while fraternity adds to the focus on men.
 The contrast between homosexual and heterosexual is considerable. The 
keyword collocates for heterosexual are fewer (Appendices 312-313), especially in 
ALG1+2. Many collocates for homosexual in both corpora link to debate topics, as 
do many PLG1+2 collocates for heterosexual, but in ALG1+2 the collocates for 
heterosexual do not. This dislocates heterosexual from ALG1+2 speaker concerns. 
The R1 nouns reveal a reversal of the pattern for homosexual (Appendices 323- 
324). Bar acts and experience in PLG1+2 and activity in ALG1+2, heterosexual is 
not linked to sexual acts. Over half the nouns refer to relationships: 8/13 in 
PLG1+2 and 5/6 in ALG1+2, five of which are shared:
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 couples         relationships         relationship         marriage         + unmarried (couple(s)/partner(s))
The PLG1+2 nouns also include couple and partners, plus married (couple(s)). 
This reversal illustrates the polarised values attached to the two categories. In 
addition, the collocates of heterosexual and homosexual/gay are unbalanced: 
PLG1+2  term   Collocates/Frequency (%) ALG1+2 term   Collocates/Frequency (%) ___________________________________  ___________________________________
  homosexual  40/481        (8.3%)   HOMOSEXUAL 27/509        (5.3%)
  heterosexual  40/260      (15.4%)   heterosexual 27/130      (20.8%)
  GAY  14/585        (2.4%)   gay  0/201
  heterosexual 14/260        (5.4%)   heterosexual 0/27
  GAY  12/585        (2.1%)   gay  0/201
  straight 12/14      (85.8%)   straight 0/2
In both corpora, heterosexual functions⎯directly or indirectly⎯as a comparator 
more than the collocates indicate (Appendices 325-326), which further supports 
the taken-for-granted status of heterosexuality.
 The uses of gay are more differentiated in each corpus. In PLG1+2, GAY 
applies to twice as many R1 nouns (Appendices 327-328) and has four times as 
many keyword collocates as ALG1+2 (Appendix 314). In addition, most PLG1+2 
keyword collocates link to prominent debate topics (Civil Partnership, Adoption, 
Clause 28), but only two do so in ALG1+2: SCHOOLS and HARINGEY (Clause 28). 
Prominent among the ALG1+2 keyword collocates are I  and AM, while those in 
PLG1+2 include EQUALITY, PREJUDICE and RESPECT. Of the R1 nouns to which 
gay applies, seven are shared:
 men         couples         people         marriage         rights         community         couple
In both corpora, gay applies to more nouns linked to relationships than to other 
themes. In PLG1+2 additional relationship collocates: relationship(s)/PARTNER/ 
partnerships, contrast with marriages in ALG1+2. No ALG1+2 nouns link to 
parenting, but in PLG1+2 GAY applies to parents, adoption(s) and adopters, plus 
CHILDREN and CHILD are keyword collocates. As well as men (discussed with 
474
homosexual), two more nouns are collocates in both corpora (rights/community), 
but occur in opposing arguments: variously defended in PLG1+2 and variously 
dismissed or denigrated in ALG1+2 (Appendices 329-330). That gay community is 
less frequent than homosexual community is predictable in ALG1+2, but not in 
PLG1+2. The imbalance relates to a shift between periods: in LG1 homosexual 
community was more used (Appendix 331), while gay community evenly spanned 
the periods, albeit with few uses in ALG1+2. Similarly, PLG speakers used gay 
rights more in LG1 to defend gay rights against Clause 28; ALG speakers used it 
more in LG2 to claim only gay rights groups/supporters/activists wanted the 
proposed changes⎯notably the repeal of Section 28. In both corpora, lesbian 
applies to community and rights only where paired with gay (Appendix 332), 
suggesting lesbians were not viewed as a distinct community in need of rights. In 
addition, the lesbian visibility in these pairings was mostly in LG1, suggesting 
greater invisibility in LG2 (see Comparison 4).
 In both corpora, lesbian has the fewest keyword collocates (Appendix 315) 
and the fewest R1 nouns (Appendices 333-334), particularly in ALG1+2. The 
frequent pairing of lesbian with gay and its periodic pairing with homosexual give 
it little independent use. In addition, its keyword collocates in both corpora are 
also among those for gay. The R1 nouns reveal a similar pattern. In ALG1+2 all 
three nouns are among those for gay. In PLG1+2, 3/9 nouns are independent of 
those for GAY: two are gendered (women, mothers), while PARTNERS is a keyword 
collocate for both LESBIAN and GAY. Of the ALG1+2 nouns, only rights is not 
among those in PLG1+2, but in PLG1+2 RIGHTS is a keyword collocate for both 
LESBIAN and GAY. In both corpora, the associations of lesbian are almost wholly 
appendaged to those for gay. This exemplifies lesbian invisibility (Baker 2008: 
151) and further supports speakers’ focus on men. However, and importantly, 
the associations of lesbian and gay, unlike homosexual, are unrelated to sexual 
acts or offences which distances these self-chosen public identities from the 
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heritage of sin, crime and pathology. 
 The last adjective, sexual, is more negatively associated. Only the PLG1+2 
keyword collocates clearly link to debate topics (Appendix 316). The R1 noun to 
which sexual mostly applies in both corpora (Appendices 335-336) is orientation 
(discussed with the abstract nouns below). Over half the nouns link to sexual 
acts: 12/19 in PLG1+2 and 9/15 in ALG1+2, of which seven are shared:
 offences       activity       relations       behaviour       intercourse       matters       act. 
Four more link to sexual acts in PLG1+2 (abuse/acts/conduct/encounters) and 
two more in ALG1+2 (experience/deviation). However, unlike the R1 nouns for 
homosexual, the frequencies in each corpus are roughly proportionate. Offences 
is the most frequent noun in both corpora and links to the 1967 Sexual Offences 
Act. In both corpora, sexual applies to relationship(s), but the concordance lines 
reveal differences (Appendices 337-338). The lines for sexual relationships occur 
in various debates, but in the case of PLG speakers, mostly in LG1. The more 
numerous lines for sexual relationship occur mostly in civil partnership debates 
in conflicts over who would/should benefit from the Bill. The ALG1+2 emphasis 
on the non-sexual occurs in speakers’ attempts to extend civil partnership to 
familial cohabitees in which the upholding of non-sexual can be seen as a means 
to denigrate the same-sex relationships to which the Bill applied. 
 Similarities between the applications of these six adjectives relate to the 
shared debate topics. While the adjectives’ associations were largely determined 
by speaker allegiance and debate context, some associations transcend context 
and adhere to the adjectives more distinctly than others. Notable among these is 
the association of homosexual with sexual acts and thus sin and crime, and the 
association of heterosexual with unmarked relationships. Also the association of 
homosexual and gay with men alongside the dependent use of lesbian illustrates 
speakers’ preoccupation with men. Applicable to all associations are the highly 
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significant keyword collocates, I  in ALG1+2 and THEY/THEIR in PLG1+2, which 
identify the speakers’ views as personal and objective respectively.
*       *       *
 The nouns for people were the least used of the 15 sexuality terms, but 
their total usage is proportionately slightly greater in PLG1+2 which supports 
speakers’ focus on the people affected by the proposals:
 PLG1+2 Nouns for People   ALG1+2 Nouns for People __________________________   _________________________________
1. homosexuals (199, 0.05%)   HOMOSEXUALS (185, 0.07% KW)
2. lesbians (79, 0.02%)    lesbians (30, 0.01%)
3. heterosexuals (52, 0.01%)   heterosexuals (17, <0.01%)
4. gays (35, <0.01%)    gays (11, <0.01%)
 totals include nouns with attached dash ignored by concordancing software
Compared with the adjectives, the nouns’ associations are less accessible. Most 
adjacent collocates are grammar words, plus there are few keyword collocates 
(Appendices 339-342 for PLG1+2 and 343-346 for ALG1+2⎯collated Appendices 
347-350). Notable among the keyword collocates is I  in ALG1+2 and THEY in 
PLG1+2, which collocate with homosexuals, lesbians and heterosexuals, but not 
gays. In PLG1+2, THEIR collocates only with homosexuals. Nevertheless, the 
personalised view of ALG1+2 and objective focus of PLG1+2 is maintained.
 Three-word clusters give the clearest indication of the nouns’ associations 
(Appendices 351-352). In both corpora those for homosexuals, lesbians and gays 
overlap, but those for heterosexuals are unrelated apart from its pairing with 
homosexuals. Pairings of homosexuals with lesbians, and lesbians with gays 
feature in both corpora, plus discrimination and against recur in clusters for all 
three nouns. In PLG1+2, discrimination and prejudice are treated as problems 
(Appendix 353); in ALG1+2, discrimination is denied (Appendix 354). Whether 
ALG1+2 speakers believed their position did not constitute discrimination, or 
were distancing themselves from it being seen as such is indeterminable; either 
way they were supporting continued discrimination in contexts where it was 
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challenged. Discrimination and against are more linked to homosexuals than to 
lesbians or gays in both corpora and most lines occur in Clause 28 debates. 
 In the clusters for lesbians and gays, young recurs in PLG1+2 and adopt 
in ALG1+2. In PLG1+2, problems faced by young lesbians and gays are the focus 
(Appendix 355); the lines occur mainly in LG1 and Clause 28 debates. Additional 
lines for young homosexuals and young gay men occur mainly in age of consent 
debates. In ALG1+2, the ability of lesbians and gays to adopt or foster children is 
rejected (Appendix 356); the lines occur mostly in LG2 and concern speakers’ 
opposition to non-heterosexual parenting in adoption debates. The idea that 
lesbians and gay men should not bring up children is particularly negative. One 
reason for this is evident in the lines: protection of the heterosexual family and 
marriage. However, the subtext is sexual and recalls the tendentious ‘protection 
of children’ arguments in Clause 28 debates. The conflation of sexual identity 
and sexual acts in ALG1 shows homosexuals (less so gays or lesbians) were seen 
as sexual beings in a way that heterosexuals were not. This view allows spectres 
of child sexual abuse to loom fancifully large. The subtext was tackled in PLG1+2 
where abuse collocates with heterosexual and sexual as well as homosexual 
(Appendices 301-303), but not gay(s) or lesbian(s). The ALG1+2 subtext relates 
less to the heritage of sin and crime, when the state took no responsibility for 
children, or even to the Wolfenden era when the press cast ‘homosexuals’ as 
corruptors of youth (Pearce 1981: 312-314) but child sexual abuse in families 
was taboo. It links more to the surfacing of familial abuse via 1980s feminist and 
survivor campaigns (Weeks 2011: 128) and professionals’ reports of its incidence 
(Evans 1993: 209-210). Arguably, the scares engendered by subsequent media 
panics became yet another negative peg on which to hang non-heterosexuality.
 The final noun for people, heterosexuals, was proportionately more used in 
PLG1+2, but in both corpora the frequencies are comparatively low and thus the 
proportion of reciprocal collocates with homosexuals higher: 
478
PLG1+2  term   Collocates/Frequency (%) ALG1+2 term   Collocates/Frequency (%) ___________________________________  ___________________________________
  homosexuals 11/199        (5.5%)   HOMOSEXUALS 4/185        (2.2%)
  heterosexuals 11/52      (21.2%)   heterosexuals   4/17      (23.5%)
Although only homosexuals is a collocate (Appendix 350), about half the lines for 
heterosexuals in each corpus link to a non-heterosexual term (Appendices 
357-358). Comparisons are prominent in both. In ALG1+2 the lines are peppered 
with negative terms linked to stereotypical sexual behaviours, which serve to 
polarise HOMOSEXUALS in arguments against legal parity: 
 indulged             bad                 buggery         privacy         problem             damaging
 promiscuity         normally         offence           angry           dangerous         sickness 
The exception (line 1) is a quote from a spoof highlighting prejudice in the GLC 
Charter (1985: 32), which was seen as an attack on heterosexuality. In PLG1+2, 
just under half the lines occur in anti-discrimination arguments, while a quarter 
occur in arguments questioning the superiority of heterosexuality, five of which 
highlight sexual abuse by heterosexuals. 
 Most uses of heterosexuals in both corpora were defensive. While PLG1+2 
speakers were defending homosexuals/lesbians/gays against discrimination, 
ALG1+2 speakers were, in negatively polarising HOMOSEXUALS, defending an 
idealised heterosexuality against perceived loss of status. 
*       *       *
 The abstract nouns account for the second highest proportions of each 
corpora, but the usage is proportionately slightly greater in PLG1+2:
 PLG1+2 Abstract Nouns    ALG1+2 Abstract Nouns _______________________________   ___________________________________
1. SEX (800, 0.19% KW)    sex (397, 0.15%)
2. homosexuality (449, 0.11%)   HOMOSEXUALITY (390, 0.15% KW)
3. SEXUALITY (119, 0.03% KW)   sexual orientation (62, 0.02%)
4. sexual orientation (113, 0.03%)   sexuality (31, 0.01%)
5. heterosexuality (16, <0.01%)   heterosexuality (23, <0.01%)
 totals include nouns with attached dash ignored by concordancing software
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The pattern of keyword collocates (Appendices 359-363 for PLG1+2 and 364-368 
for ALG1+2⎯collated Appendices 369-373) is similar to those for the other lexical 
categories. In ALG1+2, HOMOSEXUALITY has most collocates. In PLG1+2, SEX, 
SEXUALITY and sexual orientation collocate more widely. Heterosexuality has few 
collocates in either corpus. In PLG1+2, THEIR/THEY collocate with 4/6 terms; in 
ALG1+2, I  collocates with 3/6. This extends the ALG1+2 personalisation and 
PLG1+2 objectivity to the abstract nouns.
 The PLG1+2 keyword SEX was the most used term overall and refers 
either to gender or sexual acts. The L1 and R1 collocates enable identification of 
its reference via concordance checks of the collocates (Appendices 374-375 for 
PLG1+2 and 376-377 for ALG1+2). In both corpora, there are more references to 
gender, but in PLG1+2 these are proportionately higher; references to sexual acts 
are higher in ALG1+2. The PLG1+2 keyword collocates (Appendix 369) have more 
links to debate topics: mainly civil partnership and adoption. In ALG1+2 only 
SCHOOLS and TAX link to debates: Clause 28 and civil partnership respectively, 
but I  is again prominent. 
 The inclusion of the ALG1+2 keyword HOMOSEXUALITY in the wording of 
Clause 28 links it strongly to related debates:
PLG1+2  Debates   Frequency       (%) ALG1+2 Debates   Frequency      (%)  __________________________________   __________________________________
  Clause 28    338/387  (87.3%)   Clause 28    292/356    (82%)
  Section 28 repeal  19/56    (33.9%)   Section 28 repeal  20/31    (64.5%)     _________       _________
       Total  357/443  (80.6%)        Total  312/387  (80.6%)
Over 80% of its uses in both corpora link to the Clause and Section repeal. The 
term’s L1 collocates offer the clearest guide to speakers’ concerns (Appendices 
378-379). Clause related collocates are prominent in both corpora: 
 promote         promoting         promoted         promotes         teaching         advocating 
In PLG1+2 these verbs occur in concessions that promoting homosexuality was 
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wrong and arguments against the alleged promotion, but both the allegation and 
negativity are reinforced by unshared ALG1+2 collocates: 
 abet                prohibit               propogate          proselytising       advocate       overt    
 glamorise        practice               propogating       sell                     open              glamorising
 encourage       promiscuous       rampant             condoned            portray          
As well as alluding (Wodak 2007: 214) to the promotion of sexual acts, open and 
overt invoke the privacy conditions of the 1967 Act and imply HOMOSEXUALITY 
must be kept hidden. The part the term played in maligning Labour councils is 
evident in the ALG1+2 keyword collocates (Appendix 370):
 LOCAL                      MATERIAL                  PROHIBITION           HOMOSEXUALS
 TEACHING                SCHOOLS                  IMAGES                    COUNCILS
 AUTHORITIES           HOMOSEXUAL           LIFESTYLE 
In the PLG1+2 keyword and L1 collocates, resistance appears only in RESPECT, 
support, understanding and recognising. This indicates the strength of residual 
homophobic beliefs that had been called upon in 1980s press campaigns. 
 Heterosexuality is the least used noun, but also links mainly to Clause 28:
PLG1+2  Debates  Frequency  (%) ALG1+2 Debates  Frequency  (%)  ______________________________________   ______________________________________
  Clause 28  13/15  (86.7%)   Clause 28  12/19  (63.2%)
  Section 28 repeal    1/1     (100%)   Section 28 repeal LG2   3/3     (100%)    _______      ______
   Total 14/16  (87.5%)    Total 15/22   (68.2%)
Heterosexuality and homosexuality are reciprocal collocates in both corpora 
(Appendices 360/363 and 365/368). The lines for heterosexuality (Appendices 
380-381) show that 9/16 in PLG1+2 and 17/23 in ALG1+2 include a non-
heterosexual term, plus comparison is implied in the other lines. This lack of 
independent consideration further illustrates heterosexuality’s taken-for-granted 
status. The categories are particularly polarised in ALG1+2: 
 1. equation of ‘unnatural’ homosexuality with ‘natural’ heterosexuality is eschewed 
 2. heterosexuality is seen as denigrated and attacked by attempts to expose prejudice 
 3. accepting homosexuality as an alternative to heterosexuality is seen as a dangerous distortion
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The PLG1+2 lines occur in more diffuse arguments and include: 
 1. references to the pervasive culture of heterosexuality in response to allegations of promotion; 
 2. criticisms of the polarisation of homosexuality and heterosexuality; 
 3. arguments against the promotion of any sexuality; 
 4. arguments maintaining that homosexuality cannot be promoted; 
 5. a suggestion that male chauvinism is more the norm than heterosexuality;
 6. a correction of the ALG1 interpretation of heterosexism as an attack on heterosexuality.
That in both corpora all LG2 uses of heterosexuality occur in the Section 28 
repeal, ties its use to that of homosexuality in the Section’s wording. Alongside 
heterosexuality’s lack of independent consideration this suggests, despite the tide 
of reforms, little progress had been made in evaluating its privileged status or 
seeing it as a socially constructed phenomenon. It served as the benchmark for 
equality and its status remained unquestioned.
 The remaining nouns, sexuality and sexual orientation, were more used in 
PLG1+2. Though the reference of both terms appears to be inclusive, both were 
used largely in reference to lesbian and/or gay sexualities. In PLG1+2 (Appendix 
382), SEXUALITY refers to lesbian and/or gay sexualities in 65/119 lines (54.6%) 
of which 36 (55.4%) include the keyword collocates THEIR/THEY. This supports 
the PLG1+2 focus on he people affected by the proposals. Accordingly, THEIR/
THEY occur in only 19/49 lines (38.8%) where the term’s reference is ambiguous 
or inclusive. In ALG1+2 (Appendix 383), sexuality refers to lesbian and/or gay 
sexualities in 8/31 lines (25.8%) which include negative associations: 
 propagation of active sexuality      aggressively paraded their lifestyle      if allowed to exist openly
 flaunted their sexuality                 sexuality is not a benign trait 
The 20/31 ALG1+2 lines (64.5%) where the reference is ambiguous or inclusive 
are less negatively associated. The term’s scant references to heterosexuality in 
both corpora highlight its taken-for-granted status. As van Dijk argues (2006b: 
164), taken-for-granted ‘knowledge’ is “expressed only when there is ambiguity, a 
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risk of misunderstanding, or when an element of context needs to be specifically 
focused upon”. Here, 2/5 PLG1+2 and 3/3 ALG1+2 references to heterosexuality  
occur in quotes the speaker disagrees with. 
 The lines for sexual orientation follow a similar pattern. In PLG1+2 
(Appendix 384), 68/113 lines (60.2%) refer to lesbian and/or gay sexualities, but 
THEIR/THEY occur in only 19/68 lines (29.4%), comparable to the 11/41 lines 
(29.3%) with ambiguous or inclusive reference. In ALG1+2 (Appendix 385), 34/62 
lines (54.8%) have ambiguous or inclusive reference, but the 28/62 referring to 
lesbian and/or gay sexualities (45.2%) are less negative than those for sexuality. 
References to heterosexuality are scarce: 4/113 in PLG1+2, none in ALG1+2. An 
added dimension of sexual orientation is its use in legislative proposals, notably 
Baroness Turner’s third (1996) attempt to extend the Sex Discrimination Act to 
sexual orientation and the 2003 Employment Equality Regulations. This links the 
term to anti-discrimination measures and awards it a degree of officiality. The 
term’s use in such official contexts may be significant in terms of Waites (2009: 
142-7) argument that the focus of sexual orientation on partner gender and its 
attendant erasure of bisexuality maintains the homo/hetero and gender binaries.
 The apparent inclusivity of sexuality and sexual orientation is little 
supported by their use. The greater PLG1+2 use of SEXUALITY positions it as the 
more positive term, but with no consistent distinction in its reference from that 
of sexual orientation. In these debates at least they functioned either as terms for 
lesbian and/or gay sexualities or as non-specific terms where heterosexuality 
could not be assumed. That heterosexuality was virtually excluded from the 
terms’ specific reference adds to its lack of independent consideration which in 
turn leaves its institutionalised status intact.
*       *       *
 The most salient feature of this third comparison is the magnified contrast 
between the keyword collocates I  in ALG1+2 and THEIR/THEY in PLG1+2. In 
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terms of priorities, what mattered to ALG1+2 speakers was their own view, while 
what mattered to PLG1+2 speakers was people, notably the lesbians and/or gay 
men affected by the legislative proposals. Also notable is ALG1+2 speakers’ fear 
of an increase in HOMOSEXUALITY in Clause 28 debates and their protection of 
the gender binary in adoption and civil partnership debates. While there is no 
necessary relationship between gender and sexuality, “gender norms are very 
strongly linked to sexuality norms” (Baker 2008: 9). The importance ALG1+2 
speakers placed on the gender binary in the privileging of heterosexuality deeply 
implicates it in the heritage of homophobic beliefs (Chapter 1). 
 LG1 and LG2
 Comparison 4 examines the two periods. LG1 and LG2 have four-times 
more keywords than PLG1+2 and ALG1+2, plus >25% of the keywords in LG1 
and >30% in LG2 have p<0.0000000000 (Appendices 386-387). This is partly 
due to the diverse debate topics in each period, but differences in sexuality-term 
use are also salient. An obvious difference is in the sexuality-term keywords: 
 LG1
 HOMOSEXUALITY    HOMOSEXUALS    SEXUALITY                  LESBIANS                LESBIAN
 HOMOSEXUAL         SEXUAL               HETEROSEXUALITY    HETEROSEXUALS
 LG2  SEX  (mainly used in SAME-SEX)
Six LG1 keywords have p<0.0000000000 (not LESBIAN(S) or HETEROSEXUALS). 
In LG2, both SAME and SEX are among the top keywords with this p-value. That 
the LG1 keyword I  has p<0.0000000000 requires comment as it includes PLG1. 
A check of its sexuality-term collocate frequencies (Appendix 388) shows those in 
ALG1 were generally higher when associated with a non-heterosexual term. This 
supports ALG1 speakers’ subjective approach to non-heterosexualities within 
their overall propensity for personalised views. 
*       *       *
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 The adjectives account for largest proportions of both corpora but with 
notable variations in frequency between the periods: 
 LG1 Adjectives     LG2 Adjectives ________________________________  ____________________________________
1. HOMOSEXUAL (686, 0.26% KW)  SAME-SEX/SAME SEX (726, 0.18%)
2. SEXUAL (387, 0.15% KW)   gay (473, 0.11%)
3. gay (314, 0.12%)    homosexual (305, 0.7%)
4. heterosexual (160, 0.06%)   heterosexual (230, 0.05%)
5. LESBIAN (135, 0.05%KW)   sexual (223, 0.05%)
6. same sex (14, <0.01%)    lesbian (127, 0.03%)
 totals include adjectives with attached dash ignored by concordancing software
The inverse frequencies of sexual and same sex in each period concur with the 
shift from sexuality identifiers to gendered terms. The related shift from sexual 
acts to couple relationships is evident in the keyword collocates (Appendices 
389-394 for LG1 and 395-400 for LG2⎯collated Appendices 401-406). 
 The keyword collocates for sexual and same sex (Appendices 401-402) 
clearly reveal the shift from sexual acts in LG1 to couple relationships in LG2, as 
do each term’s R1 nouns (Appendices 407-408 for LG1 and 409-410 for LG2). In 
LG1, same sex was too little used for consistent links, but the preoccupation 
with sexual acts between men is evident in the keyword collocates for SEXUAL: 
 OFFENCES      ACTS                   HOMOSEXUAL    CONSENSUAL         ASSAULT        ANAL
 ACT                 MEN                     ABUSE                OFFENCE                MAN               BUGGERY
 ACTIVITY         MATTERS            CONSENT           HOMOSEXUALITY    AIDS              PRACTICES
 BEHAVIOUR    INTERCOURSE    CONDUCT           NORMAL                  DEVIATION    MALE
These collocates also feature prominently among the R1 nouns for SEXUAL:
 OFFENCES (54)        INTERCOURSE (13)       ACT (8)                proclivity (3)         PRACTICES (3)
 ACTIVITY (22)           relations (13)                CONDUCT (6)        preference (3)       pattern (3)
 BEHAVIOUR (15)      MATTERS (13)              experience (5)       favours (3)
 ACTS (14)                 ABUSE (9)                    ASSAULT (3)        DEVIATION (3)
The prominence of OFFENCES in both sets of collocates links to the 1967 Sexual 
Offences Act which, with ABUSE, OFFENCE and ASSAULT, invokes criminality. 
By contrast, the LG2 keyword collocates for sexual focus on relationships:
485
 RELATIONSHIP          CHILDREN        COUPLE                 COUPLES       FAMILY       HOME
 RELATIONSHIPS        MARRIAGE       PARTNERSHIP       CHILD             LOVE          PARTNERS
However, the R1 nouns still include relations, activity, abuse and offences, albeit 
with low frequencies. The LG2 collocates for SAME-SEX have no overtly negative 
associations. The keyword collocates with p<0.0000000000 include:
 COUPLES                UNMARRIED         COHABITING     TOGETHER      LOVE              ADOPTIONS
 RELATIONSHIPS     PARTNERSHIP      CHILDREN        MARRY             STABLE          PARENT
 COUPLE                  RELATIONSHIP     MARRIED          MARRIAGES     ADOPTERS     
 PARTNERSHIPS      MARRIAGE           PARTNER          PARENTS          ADOPTED
 PARTNERS              ADOPTION            ADOPT             CHILD                FAMILY
Many of which are also among the R1 nouns:
 COUPLES (348)            PARTNER (33)             MARRIAGE (13)       ADOPTION (7)      unions (4)
 RELATIONSHIPS (52)   PARTNERSHIPS (24)   PARTNERSHIP (8)   PARTNER (7)        households (3)
 COUPLE (42)                RELATIONSHIP (16)    MARRIAGES (8)      COHABITING (5)   ADOPTIONS (3)
The contrast between the two periods is stark. The focus on couples and parents 
in LG2 is linked to the most debated topics (civil partnership and adoption). Yet 
in LG1, sexual offences/acts have no obvious connection to debates about local 
councils and education (Clause 28⎯the most debated topic), while in the age of 
consent and armed forces debates the issue was equality before the law in which 
sexual offences/acts were peripheral. This LG1 preoccupation can only be seen 
as an indicator of homophobic beliefs. Arguably, the use of SAME-SEX instead of 
sexuality terms in LG2 aided deflection of overt focus on sexual acts. 
 In LG1, the keywords SEXUAL and HOMOSEXUAL collocate reciprocally 
with heterosexual and share many keyword collocates (Appendices 401, 403- 
404), many of which also relate to sexual acts:
 ACTIVITY       BEHAVIOUR       ACTS      MEN       CONSENT       ABUSE       CONDUCT
Those shared only by SEXUAL and HOMOSEXUAL and not with heterosexual are 
more negative: 
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 OFFENCES    ACT    INTERCOURSE    PRACTICES    OFFENCE    MAN   AIDS    MALE    BUGGERY
While those collocating only with HOMOSEXUAL link to criminality: 
 ACTIVITIES       SEDUCED       CRIMINALISATION       MALES       ATTACK         PROSECUTION
 CRIMINAL         BOYS              CONSENTING              DECRIMINALISATION       PROSECUTIONS
The focus on HOMOSEXUAL MEN illustrates the persistence of the legislative 
heritage in homophobic beliefs. The R1 nouns (Appendices 407, 411-412) are 
less pointed, some of which are also shared by all three adjectives:
 ACTIVITY         ACTS         BEHAVIOUR         experience
More are shared between HOMOSEXUAL and SEXUAL:
 OFFENCES       ACT       PRACTICES       RELATIONS        CONDUCT       ABUSE
While the R1 nouns only of HOMOSEXUAL include:
 MEN (27)     ACTIVITIES (10)    sex (6)     CONSENT (4)     tendencies (4)    experiences (3)     MAN (3)
By way of mitigation, all three adjectives apply to relationship(s), while those for 
HOMOSEXUAL and heterosexual also include people and couple(s), but with lower 
frequencies. That HOMOSEXUAL also applies to community, groups, equality and 
love links to LG1 political struggles, but only heterosexual applies to family.
 In LG2, only homosexual and heterosexual are reciprocal collocates, but 
some keyword collocates are still shared with sexual (Appendices 403-404, 401): 
 COUPLES         MARRIAGE         RELATIONSHIPS         PARTNERSHIP
 COUPLE           CHILDREN         RELATIONSHIP            PARTNERS
Collocates shared by homosexual and heterosexual include:
 UNMARRIED         PARTNERSHIPS         ADOPTION          SINGLE           STABLE         RIGHT
 MARRIED             COHABITING              TOGETHER         RIGHTS          MARRY          LIVE
Differences between the two terms’ associations are evident in their unshared 
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collocates. Those for heterosexual  relate mainly to the availability of heterosexual 
marriage and attendant eligibility to adopt as a couple:
 CHOOSE       ABLE       PARTNER       ADOPTERS       COHABITEES       PARENTS       MARRIAGES 
Those for homosexual relate mainly to conflict over partnership recognition and 
non-heterosexual parenting:
 ADOPT    LEGAL    RECOGNITION    MOTHER    ADOPTIONS    ADOPTED    TREATED    FATHER
Six keyword collocates are shared among the R1 nouns (Appendices 413-414):
 COUPLES       RELATIONSHIPS       COUPLE       RELATIONSHIP       MARRIAGE       PARTNERS
While heterosexual also applies to UNMARRIED and MARRIED, the R1 nouns for 
homosexual also include:
 ADOPTION (6)                community (5)       practice (4)       RIGHTS (3)              man (3)
 PARTNERSHIPS (6)       men (5)                  acts (3)             ADOPTIONS (3)    
Notably, as with sexual in LG2, the application of homosexual to men, practice, 
acts and man perpetuates the preoccupation with sex between men. Thus a 
residual negativity persisted, albeit at a less prominent level. 
 The LG1 preoccupation with sex between men extends to gay, but while it 
collocates reciprocally with HOMOSEXUAL, its keyword collocates (Appendix 405) 
related to sexual acts are few and not graphic:
 MEN        CONSENT        SEXUAL        ACTIVITIES        MAN        SEXUALITY
In addition, only MEN, sex and MAN feature among the R1 nouns (Appendix 
415). Thus the LG1 associations of gay are less sexual and less negative than 
those of HOMOSEXUAL. By contrast, in LG2 gay collocates reciprocally with 
heterosexual, although both terms share some keyword collocates with 
homosexual:
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 COUPLES        COUPLE           ADOPTION              MARRY                 PARTNERSHIP    STABLE
 MARRIAGES    CHILDREN      RELATIONSHIP       PARTNERSHIPS    MARRIED           COHABITING
 RIGHTS           UNMARRIED   RELATIONSHIPS     PARTNERS            TOGETHER 
Keyword collocates shared only with homosexual relate mainly to conflict over 
non-heterosexual parenting and partnership recognition: 
 ADOPT         ADOPTIONS         LIVING         LEGAL         ADOPTED
Those shared only with heterosexual relate mainly to arguments for or against 
equivalence in adoption and civil partnership:
 PARENTS       ADOPTERS       PARTNER       REGISTRATION      MARRIAGES
Notably, the unshared keyword collocates of gay place it closer to heterosexual: 
 REGISTER       FAMILY       FAMILIES       COMMITMENT       CHILD
This further distances gay from homosexual, as do the keyword collocates listed 
among the LG2 R1 nouns for gay (Appendix 416), but upholds heterosexuality as 
the benchmark for equality. 
 The salient collocate of gay is lesbian in both periods. In LG1, 24/25 
keyword collocates for lesbian and 26/27 in LG2 (Appendix 406) are also those of 
gay (Appendix 405). Similarly, 6/7 R1 collocates in LG1 and 7/8 in LG2 are also 
those of gay (Appendices 417-418 and 415-416). In LG1 99/135 uses of lesbian 
are paired with gay and 101/127 in LG2 (Appendices 419-420). If pairings with 
homosexual are added (Appendix 421) this totals 113/135 and 108/127 paired 
uses of lesbian in LG1 and LG2 respectively. The few independent uses of lesbian 
in both periods (Appendices 422-423), supports the focus on non-heterosexual 
men. However, LESBIAN was mostly used (80.7%) in Clause 28 debates. This 
relates to 1980s sexuality politics in which lesbians were prominent (for example: 
GLC 1985; GLC 1986; Cant and Hemmings 1988; Tobin 1990) and in which 
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“affirming lesbian identity and increasing the cultural visibility of lesbianism 
were major preoccupations for activists” (Cameron and Kulick 2003: 95-6). MPs 
familiar with this politics (such as Chris Smith, Ken Livingstone, Tony Banks, 
Jeremy Corbyn) included lesbians more often and generally used gay rather than 
the clinical homosexual (Chapter 5). Post Clause 28, the use of lesbian dwindles. 
This is predictable in the two age-of-consent debates, but not in the other LG1 
debates or the LG2 debates, which applied equally to lesbians and gay men. This 
dwindling use may be partly due to an increase in inclusive uses of gay, but also 
points to the strength of focus on gay/homosexual men in both defending and 
opposing the legislative proposals. Yet as Baker (2008: 151) notes, “not only are 
[lesbians] marginalised by the hetero-gendered order, they are made further 
invisible as ‘women’ even in the gay community”. A recent performance based on 
real-life coming-out stories, ‘Outings’ (Baldwin & Hescott 2014), suggests that 
younger women are coming out as gay rather than lesbian. If so, this can be 
variously interpreted as diminishing lesbian visibility or a decline in gendered 
demarcation. Either way, the male aligned term prevails.
 The adjectives confirm a superficial difference and core similarity between 
the periods: the former is the shift from sexuality identifiers to same-sex entailed 
in the move from sexual acts to couple relationships; the latter is the underlying 
importance of the gender binary in homophobic beliefs.
*       *       *
 All four nouns for people were less used in LG2, but only homosexuals has 
a vastly different frequency in each period:
 LG1 Nouns for People    LG2 Nouns for People __________________________________  ___________________________
1. HOMOSEXUALS (324, 0.12% KW)  homosexuals (60, 0.01%)
2. LESBIANS (72, 0.03% KW)   lesbians (37, <0.01%)
3. HETEROSEXUALS (45, 0.02% KW)  heterosexuals (24, <0.01%)
4. gays (25, <0.01%)    gays (21, <0.01%)
 totals include nouns with attached dash ignored by concordancing software
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The low LG2 frequencies result from the application of gendered or sexuality 
adjectives to COUPLE(S), RELATIONSHIP(S), PARTNERSHIP(S) or PARTNER(S) as 
these relationship keywords are absent from the nouns-for-people collocates 
(Appendices 424-427 for LG1 and 428-431 for LG2⎯collated 432-435). A fall in 
clinical term use is also evident in the polarised frequency of homosexuals. 
 While in LG1 HOMOSEXUALS collocates reciprocally with HOMOSEXUAL, 
it has fewer links to sexual acts among its keyword collocates (Appendix 432):
 MALE         CONSENT        ACT         AIDS         BEHAVIOUR
The LG1 three-word clusters for HOMOSEXUALS (Appendix 436) relate largely to 
prejudice and discrimination, for example:
 discrimination AGAINST HOMOSEXUALS (9)        admission of HOMOSEXUALS (2) 
 that HOMOSEXUALS are (9)                                 BAN on HOMOSEXUALS (2) 
 acceptance of HOMOSEXUALS (3)                        believe that HOMOSEXUALS (2) 
 AGAINST HOMOSEXUALS in (3)                           discharge of HOMOSEXUALS (2) 
 ATTACK on HOMOSEXUALS (3)                           discriminating AGAINST HOMOSEXUALS (2) 
 CAMPAIGN AGAINST HOMOSEXUALS (3)             needs of HOMOSEXUALS (2) 
 discriminate AGAINST HOMOSEXUALS (3)           or humiliate HOMOSEXUALS (2) 
 rights of HOMOSEXUALS (3)                                presence of HOMOSEXUALS (2) 
 services to HOMOSEXUALS (3)                             to accept HOMOSEXUALS (2) 
 that HOMOSEXUALS have (3) 
The clusters link to the PLG1 focus on the people affected by the proposals and 
to ALG1 denials of discrimination. By contrast, the few LG2 keyword collocates 
for homosexuals (Appendix 432) relate to parenting (ADOPT, ADOPTION, SINGLE), 
as do 6/8 clusters (Appendix 437) which occur only in adoption debates: 
 of homosexuals and (3)              homosexuals and lesbians (2)      rights of homosexuals (2)
 adoption by homosexuals (2)      homosexuals or lesbians (2)         (brought) up by homosexuals (2)
In fact homosexuals was disproportionately used in adoption debates (41.7% of 
the lines from debates accounting for 31.9% of LG2) and in both corpora (PLG2 
42.4%/ALG2 40.7%). The ALG2 use of the term is predictable in that its clinical 
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heritage accords with speakers’ opposition; in PLG2 it is surprising. Placing the 
ALG2 and PLG2 lines in sequence (Appendix 438) shows PLG2 uses in the Lords 
were initially in response to ALG2 speakers. In the Lords the PLG2 appropriation 
suggests concession⎯an example of the word forming “itself in the atmosphere of 
the already spoken” (Bakhtin 1981: 280); in the Commons homosexuals was 
used by MPs who showed ambivalence towards non-heterosexual parenting. 
 Lesbians collocates reciprocally with homosexuals and gays in both 
periods: 24/72 with homosexuals and 13/72 with gays in LG1; 11/37 with gays 
and 6/37 with homosexuals in LG2; there are also 27/72 pairings with gay (men) 
in LG1 and 18/37 in LG2 (Appendices 439-440). This leaves 8/72 unpaired uses 
of lesbians in LG1 and 2/37 in LG2 (Appendix 441). The pairings also illustrate a 
reversal of the 1980s convention for lesbians to precede gay men in LG2:
LG1   order     pairs  LG2   order     pairs _______________________________   _______________________________
 lesbians/gay (men) 23/27   lesbians/gay (men)   7/18
 gay (men)/lesbians   4/27   gay (men)/lesbians 11/18
Plus gays is more often used first in LG2: 
LG1   order     pairs  LG2   order     pairs _______________________________   _______________________________
 lesbians/gays    4/13   lesbians/gays    0/11
 gays/lesbians    9/13   gays/lesbians  11/11
And homosexuals is habitually used first in both periods:
LG1   order     pairs  LG2   order     pairs _______________________________   _______________________________
 lesbians/homosexuals   2/24   lesbians/homosexuals    1/6
 homosexuals/lesbians 22/24   homosexuals/ lesbians    5/6
The order of LG1 pairings and use or not of the clinical term are indicative of 
speakers’ familiarity with or distance from sexuality politics. That 73.6% of the 
LG1 uses occurred in Clause 28 debates, further supports the post 1980s 
sidelining of lesbians and ongoing focus on non-heterosexual men. The LG1 
keyword collocates for LESBIANS and gays (Appendices 433-434) relate mainly to 
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Clause 28 and questions of discrimination: 
 lesbians  AGAINST        POSITIVE         IMAGES         PREVENT         PREJUDICE 
 gays  POSITIVE       IMAGES
As do various LG1 clusters for LESBIANS (Appendix 436):
 AGAINST LESBIANS and (7)                       LESBIANS in Britain (2)       that lesbians and (2)
 discrimination AGAINST LESBIANS (5)       rights of LESBIANS (2)         to LESBIANS and (2)
In LG2, the few keyword collocates for lesbians and gays (Appendices 433-434), 
like those for homosexuals, link to parenting:
 lesbians  CHILDREN       ADOPT       ADOPTION
 gays  ADOPT
Various clusters (Appendix 437) also occur only in adoption debates:
 and lesbians to (2)     homosexuals or lesbians (2)     lesbians or gay (2)      fostered by lesbians (2)
 by lesbians or (2)       lesbians are significantly (2)    lesbians to adopt (2)    
 allow gays to (2)        gays to adopt (2)        to allow gays (2)
Thus the LG2 non-heterosexual nouns for people are largely linked to parenting.
 The associations of heterosexuals are few. In LG1 it collocates reciprocally 
with HOMOSEXUALS, with which it shares its few keyword collocates (Appendix 
435), but apart from AGE, which relates to age of consent debates, the collocates 
are devoid of thematic links. The pairing with HOMOSEXUALS is highlighted in 
the clusters (Appendix 436) which occur in arguments for or against equality:
 homosexuals and heterosexuals (4)    heterosexuals as well (2)         legal for heterosexuals (2)
 heterosexuals and homosexuals (2)    heterosexuals should be (2)    
The LG2 keyword collocates of heterosexuals are few, but include COHABITING 
and MARRIED which link it to adoption and civil partnership. The few clusters 
(Appendix 437) also include cohabiting, while heterosexuals are treated implies 
comparison. However, heterosexuals has no sexuality-term collocates in LG2 and 
is linked to a non-heterosexual term in only 7/24 lines (Appendix 442). Most 
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lines occur in PLG2 and mainly in civil partnership debates where heterosexuals 
are largely upheld as the benchmark for equality. Thus the greater independent 
use of heterosexuals in LG2 involves no critical examination of heterosexual 
status or the institution of heterosexuality.
*       *       *
 The abstract nouns account for second largest proportion of each corpus 
with notable variations in frequency:
 LG1 Abstract Nouns    LG2 Abstract Nouns ___________________________________  _____________________________
1. HOMOSEXUALITY (753, 0.28% KW)  SEX (1,004, 0.24% KW)
2. sex (193, 0.7%)     sexual orientation (98, 0.02%)
3. sexual orientation (77, 0.03%)   homosexuality (87, 0.07%)
4. SEXUALITY (102, 0.04% KW)   sexuality (48, 0.01%)
5. HETEROSEXUALITY (35, 0.01% KW)  heterosexuality (4, <0.01%)
 totals include nouns with attached dash ignored by concordancing software
The pattern of keyword collocates for these nouns (Appendices 443-447 for LG1 
and 448-452 for LG2⎯collated 453-457) is less consistent than those for the 
adjectives or nouns for people.
 Sex has the highest overall frequency. In LG1, the salience of EDUCATION 
and SCHOOLS among its keyword collocates (Appendix 453) links it to Clause 28. 
In LG2, it links to civil partnership via its use in SAME-SEX and OPPOSITE-SEX. 
The shift from sexual acts to gender is evident the term’s L1 and R1 collocates 
(Appendices 458-459 for LG1 and 460-461 for LG2). Where sex refers to sexual 
acts in LG1, the collocates are generally more specific and include:
 L1
 SAFER sex (12)              having sex (3)             unlawful sex (2)            had sex (1)
 safe sex (9)                    gay sex (3)                 oral sex (2)                    HAS sex (1)
 have sex (7)                   heterosexual sex (3)    CONSENSUAL sex (2)    consenting sex (1)
 HOMOSEXUAL sex (6)    unsafe sex (3)            appropriate sex (1)         responsible sex (1)
 about sex (5)                  NORMAL sex (2)         TEACHING sex (1)          penetrative sex (1)
 R1
 sex EDUCATION (58)    sex PRACTICES (1)    sex ACT (1)           sex drive (1)
 sex with (8)                  sex shop (1)               sex between (1)    sex guide (1)
 sex CAMPAIGN (1)        sex shops (1)             sex life (1)
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The LG2 collocates where SEX refers to sexual acts are less specific and include:
 L1
 from SEX (6)    effective SEX (3)    schools SEX (2)    FOR SEX (2)          gay SEX (1) 
 on SEX (5)       about SEX (3)        WITH SEX (2)       requires SEX (1)    oral SEX (1) 
 R1  SEX education (43)    SEX outside (2)    SEX offenders (1)    SEX prejudice (1)    SEX life (1)
The prominence of education in both periods links to Clause 28 and the Section’s 
repeal. Where sex refers to gender, differences between the periods are more 
evident in the collocate frequencies than the collocating terms:
LG1 Term  Frequency LG2 Term       Frequency __________________________  ____________________________________________
 same sex     14/193  SAME-SEX/SAME SEX      726/1004
 own sex        9/193  OPPOSITE-SEX/OPPOSITE SEX    113/1004
 either sex       6/193  mixed-SEX/mixed SEX       17/1004
 opposite sex       6/193  single-SEX/single SEX       13/1004
 single sex       5/193  different-SEX/different SEX        4/1004
 whatever sex       2/193  other-SEX          2/1004
 different sex       1/193  two-SEX          2/1004
      either SEX          1/1004
      own SEX          1/1004
      whatever SEX          1/1004
              inter-SEX          1/1004        ________         __________
  Total      43/193     Total    881/1004
Most LG2 references apply to COUPLE(S), RELATIONSHIP(S), PARTNER(S) or 
PARTNERSHIP(S), including inter-sex which bizarrely refers to a heterosexual 
relationship. There are no references to intersex people and only one use each of 
transsexual, trans-sexual, gender reassignation and transgendered, which barely 
suggest a glimmering awareness of gender diversity. All occur in contexts where 
the gender binary was unquestioned (Appendix 462). The use of gendered terms 
to ease the passage of adoption and civil partnership legislation, rested on their 
being accepted as uncontroversial.
 The frequencies of homosexuality are the most polarised of all 15 sexuality 
terms. It is the top LG1 keyword, but in both periods its frequency is in marked 
contrast to that of heterosexuality. In LG1, the use of HOMOSEXUALITY in the 
Clause 28 wording pervades its use. In total, 638/753 uses of HOMOSEXUALITY 
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(84.7%) occur in Clause debates, which account for 58.3% of LG1. In addition, 
50 keyword collocates (Appendix 454) link to the Clause: 16 occur in its wording: 
 PROMOTE         TEACHING              INTENTIONALLY     INTENTION        EDUCATION     NOTHING
 PROMOTING     ACCEPTABILITY     AUTHORITY            SCHOOL             PUBLISH
 LOCAL              PRETENDED           MATERIAL              PROHIBITION     PUBLISHING 
Thirty-four more occur primarily in Clause debates:
 PROMOTION       PROMOTED                 PHRASE          WORKS            ASK               ACTIVITIES
 AUTHORITIES    WORD                          IMAGES           STOP               ACCEPTED    TEACH
 SCHOOLS          ABSTRACT                   PLAY               TAUGHT          TEACHER      PROPAGANDA
 WORDS              POSITIVE                     NORMAL          BOROUGHS    TEACHERS    INTERRUPTION
 INTENDED         HETEROSEXUALITY    PROMOTES      COUNCILS      EFFFECT       
 ACCEPTABLE    LESBIANISM                CLASSROOM    MEANING       THEATRE      
The shadow of Section 28 hung over later attempted and actual reforms. In LG1 
it was cited in an argument against equalising the age of consent (HC 21.2.1994 
c.87) and an attempt to make it illegal for a lesbian or gay man to have custody 
of a child (HL.12.7.1994 c.1771). In LG2, it was cited mainly in the debate which 
repealed it (Appendix 463), as was the notorious ‘pretended family relationship’ 
(Appendix 464). Both FAMILY and RELATIONSHIP are among the few LG2 
keyword collocates for homosexuality. 
 As in Comparison 3, Clause 28 also dominates the use of heterosexuality, 
which collocates reciprocally with homosexuality in both periods (Appendix 455). 
Its few LG1 keyword collocates are all shared with those for homosexuality where 
25/34 uses occur in Clause debates. In LG2 it has no keyword collocates and 
only four uses which occur in the debate on the Section’s repeal. Concordance 
lines for heterosexuality (Appendix 465) show that it occurs only in the context of 
non-heterosexual terms, quotes or reports. Thus the term was used solely in 
comparison or contrast to homosexuality. That this applies to both periods 
suggests the LG2 reforms left the status of heterosexuality intact.
 The final terms, sexual orientation and sexuality, are not prominent in 
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either period. The keyword collocates of sexual orientation (Appendix 456) link 
mainly to the LG2 employment debate:
 REQUIREMENT     REGULATIONS     EMPLOYMENT     RELIGIOUS     RELIGION     REGULATION
In fact 57/98 uses of sexual orientation (58.3%) occur in this debate which 
accounts for only 4% of LG2. Few keyword collocates for SEXUALITY (Appendix 
457) have thematic links bar three to Clause 28 (ANY/PROMOTING/FEAR) in 
LG1. In addition, 34/48 LG2 uses of sexuality (70.8%) occur in the Section 28 
repeal which accounts for only 6.2% of LG2. Thus the terms link to very different 
contexts. The lines for each term (Appendices 466-467 and 468-469) show more 
consistency. Both terms’ references to heterosexuality are minimal compared 
with those to lesbian and/or gay sexualities, which supports a continuation of 
heterosexuality’s taken-for-granted status. However, there is also a small pattern 
of difference between LG1 and LG2: 
 References of sexuality  References of sexual orientation
LG1
 to lesbian and/or gay sexualities  51%
 to heterosexuality  7.8%
 generalised/ambiguous reference  41.2%
 to lesbian and/or gay sexualities  57.1%
 to heterosexuality  3.9%
 generalised/ambiguous reference  39%
LG2
 to lesbian and/or gay sexualities  43.75%
 to heterosexuality  0
 generalised/ambiguous reference  56.25%
 to lesbian and/or gay sexualities  53.1%
 to heterosexuality  1%
 generalised/ambiguous reference  45.9%
In LG2, the proportion of references to specific sexualities is smaller and a larger 
proportion of the terms’ uses have generalised or ambiguous reference. While 
deciding a term’s reference in an example of its use is a judgment based on its 
co-text and not wholly reliable, in this context at least, it could suggest a trend. 
If, as discussed in Comparison 3, the terms were used where sexuality was in 
question and heterosexuality could not be assumed, then a reduced reference to 
specific sexualities could suggest a slight reduction in assumptions.
 Neverthelesss, as in Comparison 3, the apparent inclusivity of sexuality 
and sexual orientation is little supported by their use. Despite the slight apparent 
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shift towards generalisation or ambiguity, specific reference to heterosexuality 
was reduced in LG2. This compounds its lack of independent consideration and 
leaves its naturalised status still largely intact. 
*       *       *
 The salient feature of Comparison 4 is the shift from sexuality identifiers 
to gender-aligned terms and the attendant shift from the focus on sexual acts in 
LG1 to couple relationships in LG2. While this shift entailed less graphic 
controversy, the unquestioned status of heterosexuality and the complete taken-
for-grantedness of the gender binary on which it rests, prevented this core aspect 
of homophobic belief from being questioned. 
 Continuity and Change
 No single language item can necessarily indicate a particular evaluative 
position, this depends on “its myriad of connections with the extraverbal context 
of life” (Voloshinov 2012: 165). Thus the terms and themes examined in the four 
comparisons are variously indicative of evaluative continuity and social change 
depending on how they relate to their political and historical contexts. 
 A most significant and basic evaluative continuity that characterises each 
side of debate in both periods is the contrast between the PLG objective focus on 
the implications of the legislative proposals for the people concerned and the ALG 
subjective focus on their own views. This continuous contrast, established via 
the PLG keywords PEOPLE/THEIR/THEY and the ALG keyword I, illustrates the 
extent to which PLG speakers drew on real-life situations while ALG speakers 
drew on internalised beliefs. The ALG personalisation illustrates an extraordinary 
indifference to living people for the sake of cosseted ideals. 
 A major thematic change is the shift from sexual acts between men in LG1 
to same-sex couple relationships in LG2. The ALG1 preoccupation with sexual 
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acts tapped into the lingering heritage of sin and crime and suggests that the 
speakers saw homosexual men only in such terms. This enabled them to bypass 
consideration of lesbians and gay men as people and citizens. Although PLG1 
counter arguments were more reasoned and inclusive of heterosexuals, the fact 
that proposals for reform in LG1 were unsuccessful suggests that ALG1 appeals 
to socially engrained beliefs were more powerful and more conducive to achieving 
their objectives than reasoned argument. This was how Conservative speakers 
fought for Clause 28 and against subsequent proposals for reform, though their 
parliamentary majority played a significant part in the passing of Clause 28. 
 The LG2 theme of relationships modifies the above observation. Appeals to 
socially engrained beliefs are again identified with ALG speakers, but in LG2 this 
was not conducive to achievement of their objectives. The reforms were passed. 
The Labour majority was a significant factor, but the Conservative party was 
divided and many debates had a free vote on one or both sides. Only the Unionist 
parties consistently opposed reform. This suggests ALG2 appeals to the idealised 
privileging of heterosexual couples, families and parenting, were less powerful in 
LG2. It also signals a shift from the taken-for-grantedness of the homophobic 
beliefs deployed by ALG1 speakers, to a euphemistic entrenchment of them 
manifest in overt protection of heterosexuality and gender divisions. That beliefs 
about ‘unnatural’ sexual practices between men could no longer be appealed to 
directly supports a change in social atmosphere.
 The themes of ‘Prejudice, Discrimination and Rights’ and ‘Gender’ are both 
more illustrative of continuity. The former is more easily summarised. PLG 
speakers consistently supported the civil liberties, civil rights and human rights 
of lesbians and gay men, and consistently argued against discrimination and 
prejudice. Conversely, ALG speakers consistently sidestepped these arguments 
either by denying their position was discriminatory or denying the issues in 
question were a civil rights or human rights matters. The theme illustrates the 
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extent to which ALG speakers were unable to consider lesbians and gay men as 
citizens deserving of equality before the law. In addition, their subversion of 
discrimination arguments in LG2, by applying them to the non-sexual relation-
ships of cohabiting family members, shows how little they understood, or wanted 
to understand, the nature of institutionalised prejudice.
 The theme of Gender requires closer examination. Two issues are crucial. 
One is the relationship of sex between men to the legislative heritage. The other 
is the importance of the gender binary in the cluster of beliefs that privilege 
heterosexuality. The former is relatively straightforward in that the Roman edicts 
and British imperial laws applied to men. Of particular importance in both is the 
protection of ‘male’ gender boundaries and the status of ‘men’. This is evident 
directly in the Roman edicts. It is not specific in the 1533 Buggery Act with its 
very different political objectives against the Roman Church and connotations of 
heresy. It surfaces again in the 18th century during the rise of the British empire 
when the 1533 Act began to be enforced among men in the general population 
against a background of growing concern with gender divisions (Trumbach 1989: 
150-8). The focus on men is also evident in the 1828 and 1861 Acts (Chapter 1). 
Thus it manifested in contexts where imperial powers needed ‘men’ to fight on 
their behalf. As Weeks notes (1977: 13), in the 18th and 19th centuries trials for 
buggery rose and fell according to whether Britain was at war or in a state of 
social turmoil. Similarly, punishments for buggery in the navy were harsher than 
those for other crimes, even murder (Gilbert 1976: 79-84). The armed forces 
debates in this study show that the military chiefs were bellicosely against 
reform. Although the ban on gay personnel applied equally to lesbians, they 
feature little in the debates. Lesbian(s) are mentioned in only two of the three 
armed forces debates included in the LG1 corpus and in 13/15 cases by PLG1 
speakers who supported reform. Arguably, this focus on men’s sexuality is 
relevant to other militaristic powers, not least in the USA and Soviet Union 
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during the Cold War (Baird 2004: 50-1). 
 The importance of the gender binary in the privileging of heterosexuality 
rests on the packaging of ‘man’ and ‘woman’ as two mutually exclusive categories 
linked to different behaviours and values, between which sexual attraction is 
expected and endorsed. This is exemplified in ALG2 speakers’ proportionately 
more frequent references to a man and a woman, husband and wife, a mother 
and a father in their idealisations of heterosexual marriage and parenting. That 
this protection of the gender binary was prominent in ALG2 speakers’ opposition 
to reform, links it to the cluster of beliefs that constitute homophobia. Although 
PLG speakers supported gender equality, the gender binary itself was completely 
presupposed in both periods. This is hardly surprising. Gender remains the only 
mandatory, imposed legal identity based on a judgment of physical attributes at 
birth, despite its biological continuum (Baird 2004: 128-130; ISNA 2014; UKIA 
2015; Mushtaq 12.1.2016; Lewis 2016: 264-9). Gender is compulsory on birth 
certificates, passports and other less official documents and often asked for on 
others. A formal change of gender is difficult without psychiatric assessment and 
stringent conditions, often including surgery (for Europe see FRA 2014; Amnesty 
International 2014). Argentina has some of the most progressive legislation 
(Byrne 2014: 17-26) and was the first country to adopt self-definition in a law 
dictated by trans people (Berkins June 2013). Denmark, Ireland and Malta have 
followed suit. The institutionalised requirement for binarised gender has also 
medicalised intersex people from infancy and denied them basic human rights, 
and in some countries right to life (Ghattas 2013). Legal provisions for non-
binary and non-gendered people do not yet exist in Britain (Hines 2013: 64-7; 
Elan-Cane 2015), while the countries that do recognise a ‘third’—indeterminate 
or intermediate—gender on documents attach eligibility conditions (Byrne ibid). 
Officially and socially the taken-for-grantedness of the gender binary is virtually 
absolute and permeates all aspects of life. Though there is no necessary relation 
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between gender and sexuality, the gender binary underpins the privileging of 
heterosexuality (Weeks 2011: 70-1). As Cameron and Kulick (2003: 72) argue, 
“There is no such thing as a generic, genderless heterosexual: rather there are 
male and female heterosexuals”. 
 Continuity and change are also evident in uses of the sexuality terms 
examined in Comparisons 3 and 4: most significantly in the clinical terms 
(homosexual/homosexuals/homosexuality) and their naturalised contemporaries 
(heterosexual/heterosexuals/heterosexuality), plus the self-chosen identities of 
lesbian and gay. The virtual exclusion of reference to heterosexuality in the uses 
of sexuality and sexual orientation further supports its naturalised status.
 Continuity in clinical term use is evident in ALG speakers’ persistent use 
of them in the face of alternatives. The terms’ negative links to sex between men 
and thus sin, crime and pathology in ALG1, alongside ALG2 speakers’ resistance 
to reform, are continuous with the legislative heritage. Together with other terms 
more used by ALG speakers (buggery/offence(s)/Wolfenden/(un)natural/normal), 
they tapped into “linguistic clues and traces, in order to elicit a particular set of 
beliefs” (Wodak 2007: 213). Their historical associations were thus revived and 
reinforced via their contexts of use and the evaluative position of the group that 
mainly used them. The terms clearly position ALG speakers as a social group 
with “a community of value judgments” (Voloshinov 2012: 165) against reforms 
for lesbians and gay men. Although PLG speakers used the terms, particularly in 
LG1, it was in arguments challenging ALG claims in which the negativity was 
located in society. ALG speakers attached the negativity to a category of people. 
 Change in clinical term use is evident in their reduced LG2 frequencies. 
The use of same-sex partly accounts for this, especially in PLG2, but the smaller 
ALG2 corpus (only 35.1% of LG2) is also significant in that fewer peers and MPs 
were actively resisting reform. While ALG1 speakers had been able to tap into 
residual fears and assumed value judgments with their focus on homosexual 
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acts, ALG2 speakers were a small bastion of resistance to change. This shift in 
the status of overtly homophobic beliefs meant they could no longer be drawn on 
as common-ground knowledge that was widely accepted as true, their beliefs had 
shrunk to the ideology of an interest group (van Dijk 2006a: 131).
 The comparisons offer a very different, bland account of the clinical terms’ 
naturalised contemporaries. Unlike the shift in overtly homophobic beliefs, the 
terms offer little evidence of a shift in the status of heterosexuality. The terms 
were less often used than the non-heterosexual terms and were more often 
paired with them in all eight corpora. In addition, they were without distinctive 
associations. Heterosexuality functioned as a benchmark of legal and social 
status for PLG speakers and as a sacrosanct category in need of protection for 
ALG speakers. This throws an alternative light on ALG2 speakers’ appeals to 
beliefs about heterosexual relationships and parenting. It suggests the failure of 
these appeals to achieve ALG2 objectives depended less on the reduced social 
power of the beliefs than on the increased power of equality arguments. However, 
with heterosexuality as the benchmark for equality, the question of assimilation 
arises. It suggests that despite the symbolic and practical importance of equality 
before the law, among heterosexual peers and MPs supporting reform there may 
have been a strand of making ‘us’ (lesbians and gay men) more like ‘them’. A 
proposal to abolish marriage and put heterosexuals in the position of lesbians 
and gay men would not have received parliamentary time. Thus heterosexuality 
not only retained its privileged status, its protection also became the acceptable 
frontier of homophobic beliefs among ALG2 speakers.  
 There is also more continuity than change evident in uses of lesbian(s) and 
gay(s). That the terms were used mainly by PLG speakers who accepted lesbian 
and gay self-chosen identities and premised their arguments on them in both 
periods, positions the terms as markers of support. Accordingly, the terms were 
less negatively associated than the clinical terms which supports the importance 
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of self-chosen group identity in political struggle (Voloshinov 2012: 145-6). These 
factors are relatively constant. In ALG speakers’ uses of the terms, continuity 
and change are inter-linked. Whereas ALG1 speakers used gay(s) and lesbian(s) 
mainly in quotes or reports which they used in their appeals to homophobic 
beliefs, ALG2 speakers used the terms more spontaneously but in dismissive or 
disdainful contexts. Even so, lesbian(s) and gay(s) were less negatively associated 
by ALG speakers than the clinical terms. Alongside the negative heritage of the 
clinical terms, this constitutes an ongoing refusal of lesbian and gay identities 
and of non-heterosexuals as worthy of equal citizenship. 
 Finally, the less frequent uses and more frequent pairings of lesbian(s) 
with the male aligned terms gay(s) and homosexual(s), on both sides and in both 
periods, illustrates clearly the extent of lesbian invisibility in the debates. It also 
reinforces the centrality of sex between men in homophobic beliefs and highlights 
the importance placed on protecting the category of ‘man’ within the gender 
binary. This suggests that, despite the importance of equality before the law, and 
despite the positive effects of legal reform on lesbian and gay lives, the reforms 
bypassed a basic problem: the official stricture of the gender binary. It further 
suggests that deregulating gender could help. If binarised gender was no longer 
an official requirement, if it was no-longer required on documents from birth 
onwards, it might begin to matter less. Ultimately, it might enable unprescribed 
genders to become optional identities.
 Conclusion
 This chapter shows that many of the findings observed in the qualitatively 
analysed debates (Chapters 5-10) span a wider range of debates in each period. 
The composite analysis above can be summarised in three main strands of 
change and four main strands of continuity.
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 The first strand of change concerns the manifestation of homophobic 
beliefs. In LG1, the taken-for-granted ‘official ideology’ of homophobic beliefs was 
exploited by ALG speakers, largely by means of negative allusions, or in some 
cases graphic references, to (homo)sexual acts. In LG2, the ideology of equality 
had gained a degree of ‘official’ status and the proportion of ALG speakers had 
shrunk. Homophobic beliefs were euphemised in defences of heterosexuality and 
the gender binary via protection of marriage claims, while an underlying concern 
with (homo)sexual acts surfaced in idealised upholdings of non-sexual familial 
relationships. This indicates a change in what was publicly sayable in LG2 while 
highlighting the importance of heterosexuality and the gender binary in 
homophobic belief. 
 The second and related strand of change concerns the uses of sexuality 
identifiers and their associations. Between LG1 and LG2 there were significant 
decreases in the uses of homosexual, sexual, lesbian, homosexuals, lesbians, 
heterosexuals, homosexuality, sexuality and heterosexuality, plus a significant 
increase in uses of same-sex and other gender aligned terms. Within this, PLG 
speakers’ greater uses of gay remained relatively stable, while their uses of the 
clinical terms shrank. By contrast, ALG speakers’ uses of homosexual remained 
relatively stable and it was a keyword in ALG2, as were all three clinical terms in 
ALG1+2. Both lesbian and gay were keywords in PLG1+2. This disparity between 
each side’s preferred terms linked to the terms’ differing associations. Overall, in 
both periods and on both sides, lesbian and gay were more benignly associated 
than the clinical terms. Importantly, they were not associated with sexual acts 
which distances them from the heritage of sin, crime and pathology and supports 
the importance of a positive group identity in political struggle. A handful of 
abusive uses of gay in ALG2 were not linked to the heritage. By contrast, the 
clinical terms, especially homosexual, were very much associated with sexual 
acts and offences on both sides, but while PLG speakers located the negativity in 
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society, ALG speakers located it in the category of people the terms applied to. 
ALG speakers persistent adherence to the clinical terms in LG2 is emblematic of 
an intransigent clinging to the negative heritage. 
 The third and also related strand of change concerns the shift from sexual 
acts to couple relationships and the attendant Labour initiated PLG shift from 
sexuality identifiers to gender-aligned terms. The different debate topics in each 
period only partly account for this. That only 2/14 LG1 debate topics (on the age 
of consent) link to sexual acts, highlights the homophobic preoccupation with 
homosexual acts in ALG1 which was challenged in PLG1. Similarly, that 12/14 
LG2 debates link to relationships does not account for the shift of terms. PLG2 
speakers could have used lesbian and/or gay couples, partners or relationships 
in adoption and civil partnership debates, but in the majority of cases they did 
not. The substitution of same-sex positions the gender-aligned terms as less 
controversial than sexuality identifiers and thus highlights a disparity in social 
acceptability as well as the unquestioned status of gender.
 The first strand of continuity concerns the contrast between PLG speakers’ 
objective focus on people affected by the legislative proposals, via the keywords 
‘people/they/their’, and ALG speakers’ subjective focus on their own views, via 
the keyword ‘I’. This contrast extends to PLG speakers’ generally more practical 
and reasoned arguments, supported by real-life examples, against ALG speakers’ 
appeals to socially ingrained beliefs and ideals, dubious claims and allusions. As 
the ALG personalisation was confined to Conservatives, it would be interesting to 
see how far it applies to their views of other legislative issues. In this study at 
least, it suggests self-importance and disregard for other people.
 The second strand of continuity concerns prejudice, discrimination and 
rights. In LG1 especially, PLG speakers support for lesbian and gay civil liberties, 
civil rights and human rights was prominent. They also consistently argued on 
behalf of lesbians and gay men against discrimination in law and prejudice in 
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society, although their approach to examples of ALG prejudice in debates was 
more oblique. Importantly, this support was premised on the lesbian and gay 
identities of people in society. By contrast, ALG speakers refused to recognise 
that the legislative issues under discussion were civil rights or human rights 
matters. They also consistently disclaimed or denied that their position was 
based on prejudice or constituted discrimination. They resisted homosexuals 
being treated as citizens worthy of equality before the law. The ALG2 claims of 
discrimination against the socially accepted, non-sexual relationships of familial 
cohabitees especially, show speakers’ insensibility to institutionalised prejudice 
as well as their adherence to it. 
 The third strand of continuity concerns the sidelining of lesbians in the 
debates when the legislative issues in 26/28 debates applied to lesbians as well 
as gay men. Although in some cases gay may have been used inclusively, the 
consistently lower frequencies of lesbian and lesbians, particularly in ALG1&2, 
plus their habitual pairing with a male-aligned term, excluded lesbians from 
independent consideration and positions them as unimportant. On both sides of 
the debates and in both periods, there was a disproportionate focus on the non-
heterosexuality of men which directly links to the legislative heritage in terms of 
prohibited sexual acts within militarised imperial powers. It also exposes the 
underlying importance attached to protecting the category of ‘man’ within the 
confines of heterosexuality. Although PLG speakers argued for gender equality, 
the persistent focus on men was unquestioned which positions the gender 
hierarchy as still largely assumed. In all debates, in both periods, and by both 
sides, the gender binary was completely taken-for-granted and its symbiotic 
relationship with heterosexuality unexamined. 
 The fourth strand of continuity concerns the status of heterosexuality. On 
both sides and in both periods the frequencies of heterosexual and especially of 
heterosexuals and heterosexuality were low and their collocates few or in some 
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cases non-existent, thus the terms had no clear thematic associations. This, and 
the lack of specific reference to heterosexuality in the uses of sexuality and 
sexual orientation show it remained largely taken for granted. Even when not 
paired with a non-heterosexual term, the heterosexual terms functioned mainly 
as comparators in PLG arguments for equal treatment and ALG refutations of its 
appropriacy. In civil partnership debates especially, heterosexuality was clearly 
the benchmark for equality. Although PLG speakers’ overall use of the terms was 
greater, heterosexuality received little independent consideration and its status 
remained largely unquestioned. 
 Importantly, the continuities and changes observed above do not simply 
pertain to the speakers who supported or opposed the legislative proposals. They 
are rooted in the tangle of social pressures, political obligations and historical 
influences that were operative on each side and in each period. In both periods, 
the composition of parliament and the wider political context of the legislative 
proposals were key factors. Legal reforms do not occur in a vacuum and do not 
impact on a neutral population. While the reforms may have reduced the taken-
for-grantedness of homophobic beliefs in Britain, such beliefs persist in myriad 
forms and sundry places. How the reforms may relate to social change and may 
contribute or not towards further change is considered in the study’s conclusion.
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Conclusion
 At the Pink News election debate (19.3.2015) politicians from five parties 
took questions from an LGBT audience in the Wellcome Collection auditorium 
chaired by Evan Davis. Prepared positions were thrown off course by ‘curveball’ 
questions, others were more direct. Baroness Stowell apologised (in response to a 
question about trust) on behalf of Conservatives for Section 28. Natalie Bennett 
and Yvette Cooper were generally well informed and supportive, especially on the 
need to make inclusive Sex and Relationship Education (SRE) compulsory in all 
schools. Notably for this study, gender neutrality was least understood. That it 
was even raised is perhaps an indicator of how far we have come. 
 The bank of legislative changes over the two decades of this study marks a 
significant turning away from centuries of proscription. Of the six legislative 
issues selected for qualitative analysis (Chapters 5-10) most involved protracted 
conflict, while the debates analysed on each issue appealed to and reinforced 
beliefs about sexuality in the sections of society the speakers represented. They 
betrayed a socially situated view. The struggles analysed were instigated and 
shaped by a complex mix of historical conditions, social forces and political 
motivations. All six chapters illustrate the influence of the wider socio-political 
context on the legislative proposal, process and outcome, while aspects of the 
legislative heritage (Chapter 1) recurred in the views of speakers against reform. 
 Chapter 5 focuses on Clause 28 and shows how easily negative beliefs 
about a category of people, particularly where those beliefs have a long history, 
can be drawn upon in the service of other political agendas. It shows that where 
a residual prejudice exists in the consciousness of a society it can be deployed 
against political opponents. In this case, Labour’s adoption of anti-discrimination 
policies in the 1980s and their implementation by urban Labour councils were 
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accompanied by a mobilisation of homophobic beliefs in the right-wing press to 
‘discredit’ the Labour opposition to Thatcher Government policies at a time of 
heightened Cold War-mongering in the West. The chapter traces this mobilisation 
during the 1987 election campaign and the passage of the Local Government Bill 
1987-8 in which Clause 28 was included. The debate analysed (HC 15.12.1987 
cc.987-1038) reveals the aspects of homophobic belief that were most productive 
in upholding this episode of political scapegoating. It shows that anti-Clause 
speakers were aware of the Conservative agenda to gain political advantage via 
the mobilised homophobia, but were caught in the social power of the mobilised 
beliefs. The most robust attacks on the Clause were made by Labour MPs with 
London constituencies who were more familiar with sexuality politics. Their more 
frequent uses of lesbian and/or gay rather than the clinical terms (homosexual/
homosexuals/homosexuality) positions the former as markers of support. The 
clinical terms were negatively associated on both sides of the debate, but pro-
Clause speakers focused the negativity onto homosexuality, while anti-Clause 
speakers located the negativity in society. Their more reasoned arguments and 
better supported examples were ignored or distorted by pro-Clause MPs in favour 
of unsupported claims that homosexuality was being promoted, dubious hearsay 
accounts of parents protesting at the anti-discrimination policies and allusions 
to (homo)sexual activities being taught in local authority schools. 
 Chapter 6 focuses on the first attempt to equalise the age of consent for 
gay men with that for heterosexuals at 16. Its parliamentary consideration was 
prompted by the registration of a case at the ECmHR and the prospect of it being 
referred to the ECtHR. An amendment was included in the Criminal Justice and 
Public Order Bill 1994. Conservative division over European integration pervade 
the political context. The debate analysed (HC 21.2.1994 cc.74-119) considered 
three main options: equalisation at 16, a reduction to 18, or no-change at 21, 
which broadly reflect the pro- and anti- European positions respectively. Despite 
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the free vote, the pro-18 amendment was backed by John Major and his Cabinet. 
Arguably, faced with the division over Europe, they could not be seen to be voting 
for either 16 or 21. The debate shows that pro-equalisation arguments were 
generally practical and reasoned, in contrast to the anti-equalisation reliance on 
out-of-date official reports and metaphorical claims. Anti-equalisation speakers’ 
completely inappropriate preoccupation with sexual acts, particularly anal sex, 
positions their view within the heritage of sin and crime. The residual power of 
the anti-equalisation claim that young men needed protection from ‘homosexual’ 
experience is evident in pro-equalisation speakers’ extensive rebuttal of it. That 
they took the claim at face value, illustrates the extent to which the status of 
heterosexuality was beyond question and thus protected. Equally problematic 
was the pro-equalisation emphasis on fixed, mutually exclusive sexual identities. 
Though politically expedient, it propagated views of distinct blanket categories of 
gay/straight sexuality and conflated them with sexual practice in ways that do 
not reflect the wider reality. The divisions over Europe also pervade the debate. 
Pro-equalisation speakers cited other European countries as positive examples, 
anti-equalisation speakers affirmed UK sovereignty. The extent to which anti-EU 
sentiments and homophobic beliefs fuelled each other is unknowable, but the 
two were linked—and still are today. 
 Chapter 7 focuses on an attempt to allow lesbians and gay men to serve in 
the armed forces. It outlines repeated attempts to change military law and the 
1995 judicial review of the ban which recommended it be substituted by a code 
of conduct applicable to all. An amendment was duly included in the Armed 
Forces Bill 1995-6. The political context of the Bill shows the power the military 
chiefs exerted in and over the MoD and Parliament in their determination to 
retain the ban. The debate analysed (HC 9.5.1996 cc.481-512) shows references 
to prejudice and discrimination threaded through the pro-repeal speeches, but 
the prejudice was unattributed or displaced and discrimination was attributed to 
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the law rather than people. Anti-repeal speakers distanced themselves from 
prejudice and discrimination by means of euphemism, displacement or denial. 
Criticism of the military chiefs was off limits on both sides. The analysis also 
reveals two anti-repeal MPs’ personal disagreement with their adopted position, 
thus highlighting distinctions between personal principles and Conservative 
party policy and between pragmatic compromise and Labour party policy. Their 
speeches reveal the importance both the Government and Blair placed on getting 
the decision the military wanted. The mainstay of pro-repeal speeches was well-
supported real-life examples of the ban’s effects on gay forces personnel, based 
on the principle of equal treatment. Anti-repeal speakers relied on unsupported 
claims that the ban maintained operational effectiveness and a tendentious 
argument for protecting heterosexual privacy, alongside euphemised and emotive 
appeals. Although the ban applied to both lesbians and gay men, the primary 
use of homosexuals in the debate, plus the scant use of lesbian(s), points to an 
underlying focus on non-heterosexual men. In the military context especially, 
this links to beliefs about ‘masculinity’ and the policing of its boundaries, under 
which ‘homosexuality’ and ‘femininity’ are subordinated. 
 Chapter 8 focuses on the elegibility of lesbian and gay couples to jointly 
apply to adopt children. It outlines the very carefully negotiated passage of the 
Adoption and Children Bill 2001-2 amidst fierce Conservative resistance in the 
Lords and the terms of the Human Rights Act. The Bill’s passage illustrates the 
Government’s initially reluctant and subsequently very cautious and strategic 
approach to the inclusion of lesbian and gay couples. The adoption agencies had 
asked for the change in their submissions to the consultation and the Special 
Standing Committee, plus an EDM for the change had attracted cross-party 
signatures. Yet an amendment to delete ‘married’ was only tabled two months 
after extra time for discussion of the issue. As such, it enabled a non-exclusion of 
lesbian and gay couples rather than a positive inclusion. Government caution 
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also pervades the debate analysed (HC 4.11.2002 cc.24-100). It reveals pro-
reform speakers’ serial concessions to heterosexual parenting and an abundance 
of emotive appeals on behalf of children in care. The case for lesbian and gay 
parenting was not made, the issue was repeatedly minoritised or sidelined. The 
apparently strategic substitution of same-sex couples for lesbian and/or gay 
couples adds to the aura of caution, plus some Labour uses of same-sex reveal a 
high degree of ambivalence. That lesbian(s) were virtually absent from the debate 
again points to an underlying focus on non-heterosexual men. There is also a 
telling dissociation between children/child and sexuality identifiers on both sides. 
Caution is also evident among the anti-reform speakers. They lauded the status 
of marriage and by proxy heterosexuality, but conceded the possibility of non-
heterosexual parenting in exceptional circumstances. They were not challenging 
the status-quo of lesbian and gay individuals’ ability to adopt and were wary of 
being seen as homophobic, but were clearly more concerned with the sexuality of 
unmarried couples. The reform was passed, but the Government caution is 
testimony to strength of resistance they were up against.
 Chapter 9 focuses on the implementation of Article 13 of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam 1997 to outlaw workplace discrimination, the conditions for which 
were set out in EU Directive 2000/78/EC. The Government’s decision to legislate 
by Statutory Instrument minimised the potential for conflict. However, when the 
Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2003 were presented to 
Parliament for approval, they contained an exemption for organised religion that 
was not in the original draft. The exemption, obtained by CoE bishops lobbying 
the Prime Minister after the consultation, was challenged in the Lords. In the 
ensuing debate (HL 17.6.2003 cc.751-784), cross-party peers, who wanted the 
Regulations withdrawn and amended, were opposed by Labour Ministers and 
conservative Christians who wanted the Regulations approved, but for completely 
different reasons. The keyword analysis illustrates a clear division of interest 
513
between the three speaker groups. Pro-withdrawal speakers focused on the 
exemption’s non-compliance with the Directive and the discrimination it enabled. 
Conservative anti-withdrawal speakers focused on protecting religious belief and 
by proxy heterosexual privilege, while denying or disclaiming discrimination and 
prejudice. Labour anti-withdrawal speakers focused on defending the inclusion 
of the exemption and claiming its compliance with the Directive. However, in 
terms of the Directive’s purpose, the Government’s inclusion of ‘opposite-sex’ in 
its definition of sexual orientation is problematic. Heterosexuals were (and are) 
only likely to face prejudice or discrimination at work on grounds of sexuality if 
assumed to be lesbian, gay or bisexual—in which case the Regulations apply. 
Arguably, had the definition been confined to the latter groups, the religious 
exemption would have been difficult to include. In addition to highlighting the 
CoE’s institutional power in obtaining the exemption and defending it in the 
Lords, the analysis illustrates its confusion and hypocrisy over sexuality.
 Chapter 10 focuses on partnership legislation. It was first proposed in 
Private Members Bills in 2001 and 2002, but when Lord Lester’s Bill passed its 
second reading the Government took cautious control. They ring-fenced marriage 
as a heterosexual institution and excluded heterosexuals from their Bill. The 
Civil Partnership Bill 2004 was started by Ministers in the Lords where it became 
subject to a succession of wrecking amendments. In the debate analysed (HC 
12.10.2004 cc.174-250) there was widespread cross-party support for the Bill in 
its original form. Only a minority of Conservatives and Unionists opposed it and 
used the wrecking amendments to devalue lesbian and gay relationships. The 
analysis shows how the anti-CP keyword marriage functioned as a metaphor for 
the protection of heterosexuality and a euphemistic front for homophobic beliefs. 
In addition, the prominence of the anti-CP keyword homosexual confined the 
term to a minority of virulently antagonistic speakers and suggests their once 
taken-for-granted views had become hardened and entrenched in the face of 
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increasing challenge. Pro-CP speakers focused on real-life examples of hardship 
caused by lack of partnership recognition while emphasising the responsibilities 
as well as rights the recognition would entail. As in Chapter 8, the Labour led 
deployment of the keyword same-sex decreased the use of sexuality identifiers 
while taking the gender binary completely for granted. Heterosexuality also 
remained largely taken for granted and clearly set the benchmark for equality. In 
line with the previous analyses, the sparse use of heterosexual(s), rare use of 
straight(s), and frequent non-use of heterosexuality, plus their main function as 
comparators, suggests that the increased support for lesbian, gay and bisexual 
‘equality’ had little impact on heterosexuality’s naturalised status or its coveted 
gender boundaries. Nevertheless, the pro-CP belief threading through the debate 
that legal reform reduces prejudice is supported by anti-CP increased use of 
terms related to prejudice over the debates analysed. Their view could no longer 
be taken for granted, their prejudice had to be disclaimed or denied. 
 A wider overview was the purpose of the more quantitative analysis in 
Chapter 11. It analyses four basic corpora built from all key debates in each 
period which enables four dimensions of comparison. The four comparisons are 
based on a keyword and collocate analysis linked to 15 basic terms relating to 
sexuality. This offers an overview of each legislative period and of speakers who 
were and were not supportive of lesbians and gay men. The comparisons show 
that many of the findings observed in the six qualitatively analysed debates 
(Chapters 5-10) span a wider range of debates in each period. Chapter 11 shows 
clear divisions between each side and each period as well as features that were 
taken for granted on both sides in both periods. The findings fall broadly into 
three strands of change and four strands of continuity. They are discussed fully 
in the final sections of the chapter and are briefly outlined below. 
 The first strand of change concerns manifestations of homophobic beliefs, 
which shifted from exploited taken-for-grantedness to euphemised protection of 
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heterosexuality and the gender boundaries on which it rests. This suggests overt 
manifestations of homophobic belief became less publicly acceptable. The second 
strand of change concerns the overall lower frequencies of sexuality identifiers in 
period two. However, while the uses of the negatively associated clinical terms 
(homosexual/homosexuals/homosexuality) fell dramatically among supportive 
speakers, they remained the preferred terms of unsupportive speakers and 
illustrate their adherence to the negative heritage. The third strand of change 
concerns a major shift in focus from sexual acts to couple relationships and the 
related shift from sexuality identifiers to gender-aligned terms. The debate topics 
only partly account for this, while the adoption of gender-aligned terms testifies 
to the continued lack of social acceptance. 
 The first strand of continuity concerns the marked contrast between 
supportive speakers’ objective focus on the people affected by the legislative 
proposals sustained by real-life examples, and unsupportive speakers’ subjective 
focus on their own views characterised by appeals to socially ingrained beliefs 
and ideals via dubious claims and allusions. The second strand of continuity 
concerns each side’s approach to prejudice, discrimination and rights, which 
were consistently highlighted by supportive speakers, but sidestepped, denied or 
subverted by unsupportive speakers. The third strand of continuity concerns the 
sidelining of lesbians in the 26/28 debates applying to lesbians and gay men. 
Though in some cases gay may have been used inclusively, the disproportionate 
focus on men links to the heritage of sin, crime and pathology and exposes the 
underlying importance attached to protecting the category of ‘man’ within the 
confines of heterosexuality. In addition, the gender binary on which it rests was 
completely taken for granted on both sides in both periods while bisexuality was 
rarely acknowledged. The fourth strand of continuity concerns the largely taken 
for granted and unchallenged status of heterosexuality. The frequencies of the 
related terms were low and their collocates few without distinctive associations. 
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They functioned primarily as comparators. Heterosexuality set the benchmark 
for ‘equality’ among supportive speakers, but among unsupportive speakers the 
comparisons oozed polarisation and rejections of equality. The institution of 
heterosexuality remained protected.
 The legislative reforms in this study can be seen as a slalom of agency and 
context. As Angela Eagle specified (23.2.2011) the reforms were not inevitable, 
they were achieved through struggle “in the face of fierce Conservative opposition 
and unremitting press hostility”. Apparently the Government was surprised at 
what was achieved. She cited public recognition of the case for change ahead of 
Parliament as a factor. This concurs with Weeks’ (2008: 789) view that social 
changes “at a grass-roots, sub-political level” required Government response. 
However, the trigger was the enormous anger mobilised by Clause 28. Among the 
ensuing factors were Stonewall’s lobbying and legal support, ECtHR judgments, 
EU laws and increasing numbers of out lesbian, gay, and bisexual MPs and 
peers. Less well recognised are party political considerations, such as Labour 
determination to right Conservative wrongs and Conservative modernisers who 
refused to toe the traditional line. The Marriage (Same-Sex Couples) Act 2013 
can be seen as a strategy for modernising the Conservative image besides its 
important symbolic value. The reforms were cued by a range of circumstances 
and motivations whereby sexuality became the carrier of other agendas. As 
Voloshinov (2012: 134) noted “behind any ideological struggle of whatever scale, 
certain objective, material processes are covertly present”.
 The analyses in this study raise questions that can only be touched on 
here. How have the reforms affected us? What effects are they having on wider 
social change? To what extent do we remain easy scapegoats? What further 
changes are needed? Arguably, the interactive and incremental processes of 
language change, social change, legal and institutional change can only modify 
existing frameworks⎯as Voloshinov was well aware:
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Newly emerging social forces find ideological expression and take shape first in these upper 
strata of behavioral ideology before they can succeed in dominating the arena of some 
organized, official ideology. Of course, in the process of this struggle, in the process of their 
gradual infiltration into ideological organizations (the press, literature and science), these 
new currents in behavioral ideology, no matter how revolutionary they may be, undergo the 
influence of the established ideological systems and, to some extent, incorporate forms, 
ideological practices, and approaches already in stock. 
(Voloshinov 1986 [1929]: 92)
Thus where oppression exists and the people affected unite to fight it, especially 
where negative beliefs are deeply embedded in the social mindset, the struggle is 
ongoing. As Cooper argues (2000: 272), it is the “constant processes of renewal 
and change that provide the impetus for action”. In the case of LGBT politics, 
four sites of unresolved, or compromised, struggle emerge from the analyses: 
firstly, the role of group identity in creating social change and achieving legal 
reform; secondly, the protected status of heterosexuality in both debates and 
reforms; thirdly, the ebbs, flows and mutations of homophobic beliefs; fourthly, 
the role of the gender binary in sustaining homophobic beliefs. These interlinked 
issues are considered in turn below.
 The first site of unresolved struggle concerns the role of lesbian and gay 
identities. The analyses show repeatedly that the self-chosen lesbian and gay 
group identity was important in gaining sufficient support for the reforms to 
progress. The terms lesbian and gay were more positively associated than the 
clinical terms and shifted the focus from the heritage of sin, crime and pathology 
onto people as citizens deserving fair treatment. Speakers against Clause 28 and 
for the reforms premised their support on lesbian and gay identities. Speakers 
for Clause 28 and against the reforms premised their antipathy on (homo)sexual 
acts, albeit subterranean in period two, but nonetheless rooted in the negative 
heritage. The problem is that heterosexual/heterosexuals/heterosexuality and 
straight/straights were habitually used as comparators, as were opposite-sex and 
mixed-sex couples. The greater pro-reform use of these terms shows they were 
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taking heterosexuality less for granted, but independent scrutiny of it was 
lacking. On both sides, the comparisons fostered binary thinking. While the now 
established acronym LGBT increasingly spans a range of variant identities, in 
Parliament ‘gay and straight’ were mostly treated as finite categories from which 
bisexual, the third umbrella identity, was virtually absent. This misrepresents 
human sexual experience. As Weeks argues:
Social categorizations have effects in the real world, whether or not they are direct 
reflections of inherent qualities or drives.
(Weeks 2011: 191)
To the extent that views deployed in Parliament are representative of wider social 
mindsets, the debates suggest that the lesbian and gay identities adopted as a 
means of resistance were becoming assimilated into ‘gay or straight’ binary 
thinking. That this was contemporaneous with the emergence of less public non-
binary sexual and gender identities is significant. Their emergence can be seen 
as an indicator of continuing oppression. Peter Tatchell makes the point well: 
But if one form of sexuality is not privileged over another, defining oneself as gay (or 
straight) will cease to be necessary and have no social relevance or significance. The need 
to maintain sexual differences, boundaries and identities disappears (or reduces radically) 
with the demise of straight supremacism. 
Homosexuality as a separate, exclusive orientation and identity will begin to fade (so will its 
mirror opposite, heterosexuality), as humanity evolves into a sexually enlightened and 
accepting society. The vast majority of people will be open to the possibility of both 
opposite-sex and same-sex desires, even if they don’t necessarily physically express them. 
Moreover, they won’t feel the need to label themselves (or others) as gay or straight. In a 
non-homophobic culture, no one will care who loves who. That’s true queer liberation. 
(Tatchell 7.8.2014)
If a clear group identity has so far been a positive means of resistance, then 
binarised public identities alongside below-the-public-radar non-binary identities 
have implications for a way forward. The former are within the existing official 
ideological framework, while the latter have little public voice. It suggests the 
need for a positive group identity to engage in political struggle is not necessarily 
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helpful when it comes to the difficulty of shifting the unequal social status that 
necessitates that struggle. As Vance points out, the struggle involves 
contradictory goals:
 The same irresolvable tension exists within the lesbian and gay movement, which on the 
 one hand attacks a naturalized system of sexual hierarchy which categorizes and stabilizes 
 desires and privileges some over others, and on the other hand defends the interest of 
 ‘lesbian and gay people’, which tends to reify identity and essential nature in a political 
 process [...]. There is no solution here, since to abandon either goal for the other would be 
 foolish. Real, live lesbians and gays need to be defended in an oppressive system, and the 
 sexual hierarchy, which underlies that oppression, needs to be attacked on every level. 
 (Vance 1989: 29-30)
She notes the same contradiction within feminism. Bell & Binnie make a similar 
argument in relation to identity politics and queer politics. They conclude:
 [It] seems the choice to disidentify - to remain non-citizens - will maintain systems of 
 exclusion and discrimination that bring real material harm to many people. 
 (Bell & Binnie 2000: 146)
As Vance (ibid: 27-8) recognises and Bell & Binnie (ibid) imply, our LGBT 
identities are politically expedient. That heterosexuals increasingly feel the need 
to identify themselves in situations where they feel their sexuality might be in 
question, “indicates a growing pluralization of sexual subject positions” (Weeks 
2011: 82) and must contribute to the denaturalisation of heterosexuality. Yet the 
necessity of sexual and gender identities is underpinned by the official imposition 
of the gender binary on which heterosexuality rests, and which also sustains 
homophobic beliefs. Arguably, LGBT identities will continue to be politically 
expedient as long as binarised gender categories remain compulsory.
 The second site of unresolved struggle also relates to the habitual use of 
heterosexual(s), straight(s), opposite-sex and mixed-sex as comparators. As well  
as fostering binary thinking, they were used by pro-reform speakers to uphold 
heterosexuality as the benchmark for equality. In the 1990s attempted reforms, 
equality in law as it applied to heterosexuals was the aim. However, the reforms 
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in period two were within new legislation. In the case of adoption, the contested 
reform included unmarried heterosexual couples as well as same-sex couples, 
which set relationship quality against the institution of marriage. Although the 
Government played down the inclusion of same-sex couples in the debates, the 
reform included no strategic protection of heterosexuality. The Employment 
Regulations and Civil Partnership Act did include such protections. The former 
were compromised by CoE lobbying which opened a loophole for discrimination 
against the non-heterosexual employees of organised religion. The Regulations 
offered much-needed protections to secular employees, but the loophole placed 
organised religion above the law. Salient among the Civil Partnership protections 
were the ring-fencing of marriage for heterosexuals and better pension provision 
for bereaved spouses. Arguably, the protections were strategic to ensure the 
legislation’s passage, or in the case of pensions financial⎯though reducing the 
heterosexual provision to spread the available finance evenly was not considered. 
The impetus of the debates and reforms was the admission of non-heterosexuals 
into existing social structures. In terms of social inclusion, the reforms were 
“certainly a welcome change from [an] often painful history” (Weeks 2012: 411-2). 
On a symbolic level and in practical ways they are supportive, but in personal 
terms, Civil Partnership especially has created divisions. It has made a positive 
difference to some (Shipman & Smart 2007; Pells 19.12.2015), but is remote 
from others’ lives (Hines 2013: 76-82). In addition to the class issues it raised 
(Taylor 2008), it was premised on binarised gender and sexuality. The reforms 
required no material concessions of heterosexual privilege and dominance and 
made no provision for trans* individuals. Ironically, since the passing of the 
Marriage (Same-Sex) Couples Act 2013 and the Government’s failure to open 
Civil Partnership to heterosexuals, a heterosexual couple took their case for 
equal access to the High Court (Duffy 17.1.2016; Tatchell 20.1.2016) and rightly 
so. They lost, but have leave to appeal (Tatchell 29.1.2016). If they win on appeal, 
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it may loosen the reified status of heterosexual coupledom, but is unlikely to 
focus attention on the underlying imposition of binarised gender. 
 The third site of unresolved struggle concerns the ebbs, flows and 
mutations of homophobic beliefs. The analyses illustrate changes in both their 
prevalence and expression. A major shift was the decline in use of clinical terms 
(homosexual/homosexuals/homosexuality), except by the shrinking number of 
speakers avidly against the reforms. In Clause 28 debates, homophobic beliefs 
were largely assumed. Pro-Clause speakers could construct lesbian and gay 
community initiatives as harmful and claim ‘homosexuality’ (with allusions to 
sexual acts) was being promoted in schools. The power of assumed belief also 
accounts for the uncertainty and concessions of those anti-Clause speakers less 
familiar with 1980s sexuality politics and thus unable to forthrightly defend it.  
In the 1990s, the anti-reform focus on (homo)sexual acts and offences became 
more overt and was linked more directly to the heritage of sin and crime and 
underpinned by the protection of male gender boundaries. Pro-reform speakers 
upheld equality before the law. At this stage, despite greater support for reform, 
anti-reform claims held sway. By period two, the preoccupation with sexual acts 
and offences had sunk below the surface of what was publicly sayable. The 
reforms were resisted by means of euphemised protections of heterosexuality, 
mostly via upholding the status of heterosexual marriage and claiming children’s 
need for heterosexual parenting. That these protections were at times conceded 
by pro-reform speakers testifies to their social power. With the falling resistance 
to reform, the anti-reform stance can be characterised as a retreat from attack to 
defence. The specific denials of homophobia in later debates support this. These 
factors support a decreasing public acceptability of homophobic beliefs. In such 
a social climate the potential for scapegoating is reduced, though Nigel Farage 
has been trying. For instance, his attempt in an election debate (ITV 2.4.2015) to 
scapegoat people coming to the UK with HIV met with a gasp from the studio 
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audience and a scold from Leanne Wood which produced the debate’s first round 
of applause. Other party leaders were similarly critical (Payton 3.4.2015). This 
changed atmosphere is no reason for complacency. Public opinion can still be 
manipulated. Murdoch is still at it (Sherwin & Oliver 21.4.2015). The Leveson 
recommendations have yet to be implemented (Watson 3.12.2014). Governments 
change; laws can be changed⎯for better or worse. Worldwide, nine governments 
have in recent years enacted new or harsher laws against non-heterosexuals and 
three more have proposed such laws, while India reinstated its repealed colonial 
law in 2013. Of the nine, four are British Commonwealth states, one is an ex-
Commonwealth state and three are former Soviet Union states including Russia. 
The situation is one of “growing international polarisation around sexual rights” 
(Altman & Symons 2016). Sexuality politics has become an easy target for states 
wanting to resist Western imperialism and leaders wanting to bolster control by 
exploiting fear and prejudice. As Baird (2004: 50-1) argues, the “most obvious 
and simple reason for political leaders of any stripe to wage a campaign against 
minorities is the oldest in the book: scapegoating”. This makes international 
solidarity and support for LGBT asylum seekers more important than ever.
 The final site of unresolved struggle is more deeply ingrained. The silent 
undertow of the debates was the importance of the gender binary in sustaining 
homophobic beliefs. The binary was completely taken for granted by all speakers. 
Pro-reform speakers argued for gender equality in age of consent debates, but at 
no stage was the binary questioned. The analyses in Chapter 11 illustrate the 
importance placed on gender divisions by anti-reform speakers. In age of consent 
and armed forces debates, their underlying concern was the protection of male 
gender boundaries, as in the heritage of sin and crime. In adoption and civil 
partnership debates, they upheld gender divisions in joint parenting and sexual 
relationships in which marriage became a metaphor for heterosexuality and a 
euphemistic front for the homophobic beliefs underlying their resistance to 
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reform. In the sole anti-reform use of trans-sexual (HL 12.5.2004 c.136GC) 
Baroness O’Cathain referred to her attempt during a Gender Recognition Bill 
debate to allow churches to exclude ‘trans-sexuals’. Pro-reform MPs’ single uses 
of transsexual (HC 10.3.2003 c.70), gender reassignation (HC 12.10.2004 c.244) 
and transgendered (HC 9.11.2004 c.790) occur in supportive contexts, but within 
the binary. A check of the Gender Recognition debates (between 18.12.2003 and 
8.6.2004) shows considerable overlap with peers and MPs for and against Civil 
Partnership⎯and for similar reasons. Marriage was contested in both: whether 
transsexuals should be allowed to marry; whether registrars and ministers of 
religion could refuse to marry them; whether a married couple should have to 
divorce on the transitioning of one partner. The former two occurred in attempts 
to derail the Bill (led by Lord Tebbit and Baroness O’Cathain). The latter arose 
from the Government’s ring-fencing of marriage as a heterosexual institution. 
Binary categorisation was not questioned even after clear scientific explanations 
of the biological continuum (HL 29.1.2004 cc.360-1 and HL 3.2.2004 cc.619-20). 
Pro-reform speakers based their arguments on ‘gender dysphoria’, thereby 
reinforcing the pathologisation of gender non-conformity. Anti-reform speakers 
did not recognise such a condition and thus did not accept it should have legal 
protection; they were fixated on essentialist concepts of believed ‘biological’ sex. 
That the gender binary was so completely taken for granted is significant. As 
Baker (2006: 19) argues “A hegemonic discourse can be at its most powerful 
when it does not even have to be invoked, because it is just taken for granted”.
 Stonewall’s recent extensive consultation with trans* people found 
“homophobia, transphobia and sexism are intrinsically linked” and that often 
“transphobic abuse is homophobic abuse” regardless of a person’s sexuality 
(Hunt & Manji 2015: 3). The subterranean role of binarised gender in this study’s 
analyses, alongside the Stonewall consultation, places binary imposition centre 
stage. If gender was not imposed at birth, identification one way or another, or 
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not at all, could become an unmarked personal choice, as could partner gender. 
This suggests the equality paradigm has reached the limits of its usefulness. It 
has resulted in LGBT people being made nominally equal to institutionalised 
categories which have been upheld as unmodified benchmarks. The equality 
agenda and resulting legislation has in many respects eased LGBT lives, but full 
social acceptance remains elusive. Other approaches are needed. 
 The recent Transgender Equality Review Report (Women and Equalities 
Committee 14.1.2016) is interesting—and hopeful in terms of potential change, 
as is recent supportive media interest (for example: New Internationalist October 
2015; BBC World Service 12.1.2016). The Transgender Equality Report made a 
range of much-needed recommendations on behalf of trans* people, of which the 
following relate to the findings of this study: 
 An acknowledgment that the Government needs to address the needs of non-binary and 
 non-gendered people (p.5), plus a recommendation for it to “agree a new strategy to tackle 
 [the trans] issues which remain unaddressed” including “a wholesale review of the issues 
 faced by non-binary and non-gendered people” (no.3 p.79); 
 An acknowledgement that there “is need for greater awareness for trans people’s legal right 
 in most contexts to have their name and gender recorded as they wish without pre-
 condition” (p.63), plus a recommendation that there be “an option to record gender as ‘X’ 
 on a passport” and that in “the longer term, consideration should be given to the removal 
 of gender from passports” (no.56, p.86);
 An acknowledgement that the Government “should be moving towards the ‘non-gendering’ 
 official records as a general principle and only recording gender where it is a relevant piece 
 of information” (p.63), plus a recommendation to this effect (no.57, p.86);
 An acknowledgement that “more needs to be done to ensure gender-variant young people 
 get sufficient support at school” (p.75), plus a recommendation that schools “must 
 understand their responsibilities under the Equality Act [and that] staff receive sufficient
 training to ensure they are compliant across all protected characteristics” (no.64, p.87), 
 An acknowledgement that “in its review of initial teacher training the Government should 
 consider the inclusion of training on the” characteristics protected by the Equality Act 
 (p.75), plus a recommendation that “trans issues (and gender issues generally) should be 
 taught as part of Personal, Social and Health Education” (no.65, p.87). 
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In line with the argument set out in this study on the importance of lesbian and 
gay identities in the struggles for reform, the Report’s recognition of non-binary 
and non-gendered individuals was achieved by witnesses going public with their 
identities and giving evidence to the Committee. Arguably, enabling people to 
self-identify their gender and the official recognition of non-binarised genders, 
alongside a progressive de-gendering of official documents, would weaken the 
imposition of the gender binary. It is in relation to schools that the Report’s 
recommendations are weakest. The Report does not recommend PSHE or SRE be 
made a statutory requirement in all schools. Yet full implementation of the 
recommendations in schools is vital. As Jay Stewart of Gendered Intelligence 
pointed out:
 There are gender divisions across the whole of our school systems [...] uniform policy, Sex 
 and Relationship Education [SRE], Physical Education, sports, toilets, seating plans in the 
 classroom and the ways teachers ask children to line up.
 (Jay Stewart, quoted in the Women and Equalities Committee Report 14.1.2016: 72)
Pupils who do not conform to the gender assigned to them face a higher rate of 
bullying and discrimination than even lesbian and gay pupils (ibid: 73). Statutory 
inclusive PSHE and SRE by adequately trained teachers would help all pupils 
understand gender and sexuality issues better and help to protect all pupils who 
do not, or may not in the future, conform to gender or sexuality expectations; it 
would also be supportive of pupils with LGBT* parents, carers and/or extended 
family members. To what extent the Report’s recommendations will be acted on 
is uncertain. The Government has already rejected a proposal for compulsory 
SRE (Duffy 10.2.2016). Attempts to implement them will almost certainly be 
resisted and may well be compromised as a result of that resistance. As this 
study clearly shows, reform of discriminatory social structures and conditions is 
a long, slow and thoroughly pragmatic process.
*       *       *
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 Until November 2015 a banner commemorating the struggle for LGBT 
rights by Paula Stevens-Hoare hung in Westminster Hall. The legal reforms in 
this study were vitally important, they have contributed to social acceptance, but 
they are “not enough” (Tatchell 17.2.2014). Further reforms are needed and will 
be fought for, but other ways forward need to be found. Yet, whatever directions 
evolve, agency always has a context to negotiate, thus outcomes are uncertain. 
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